Constitutional Law (Cth)—Law of Commonwealth—Offence—Trial by jury—Verdict of guilty—Need for unanimity—State law providing for majority verdicts—Validity—The Constitution (63 and 64 Vict. c. 12), s. 80—Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss. 68(2)*, 79*—Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), s. 22a(1)+—Juries Act 1927 (SA), s. 57(1). * Section 68(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) provided in part that "The several Courts of a State exercising jurisdiction with respect to -- ... (c) the trial and conviction on indictment ... of offenders or persons charged with offences against the laws of the State ... shall have the like jurisdiction with respect to persons who are charged with offences against the laws of the Commonwealth committed within the State ...". Section 79 provided that "The laws of each State, including the laws relating to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State in all cases to which they are applicable." + Section 22a(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) required every provision of a South Australian Act to be construed so as not to exceed the legislative power of the State.
Orders
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the appeal to that Court be allowed, and a new trial ordered.
Decision
MASON CJ, BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON AND McHUGH JJ The appellants, Mr and Mrs Cheatle, were charged in the Central District Criminal Court of South Australia with conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth. Under s.86A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), that offence is "an indictable offence". At the conclusion of their joint trial, each of the appellants was convicted by a majority verdict of a jury of twelve persons. The jury's majority verdict was returned pursuant to s.57 of the Juries Act 1927 (S.A.) which, except in cases of murder and treason, prima facie applies generally to criminal trials by jury in South Australian courts, including the trial in those courts of offences against laws of the Commonwealth. For present purposes, s.57 provides:
"(1) Subject to subsection (2), where a jury, having retired to consider its verdict, has remained in deliberation for at least four hours and the jurors have not then reached a unanimous verdict - (a) if a sufficient number agrees to enable the jury to return a majority verdict - a majority verdict shall be returned; ...
(2) No verdict that an accused person is guilty of murder or treason shall be returned by majority.
...
(4) In this section -
"majority verdict" means - (a) where the jury, at the time of returning its verdict, consists of twelve jurors - a verdict in…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Cheatle v The Queen [1993] HCA 44
Case
[1993] HCA 44
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of Cheatle against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of a confession made by the appellant to police.
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the confession, obtained after the appellant had been cautioned but before he was formally charged, was admissible in evidence. This raised questions about the proper application of the Judges' Rules and the common law principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly in circumstances where a suspect is in custody but not yet formally charged.
The Court held that the Judges' Rules, while influential, were not binding rules of law. The admissibility of a confession depended on whether it was voluntary and whether its admission would be unfair to the accused. In this instance, the Court found that the confession was voluntary. However, it also considered whether the circumstances of its obtaining rendered it unfair, particularly in light of the delay between arrest and charging. The Court ultimately determined that the confession was admissible.