NH v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA)

Link copied
Case Copied 73 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ

Matter No A14/2016

NH  APPELLANT

AND

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS  RESPONDENT

Matter No A15/2016

RROK JAKAJ  APPELLANT

AND

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS  RESPONDENT

Matter No A16/2016

DAVID ZEFI  APPELLANT

AND

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS  RESPONDENT

Matter No A19/2016

DARIO STAKAJ  APPELLANT

AND

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS  RESPONDENT

NH v Director of Public Prosecutions
Jakaj v Director of Public Prosecutions
Zefi v Director of Public Prosecutions
Stakaj v Director of Public Prosecutions

[2016] HCA 33

31 August 2016

A14/2016, A15/2016, A16/2016 & A19/2016

ORDER

Matter No A14/2016

1.Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside orders 1 to 4 of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia made on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a)the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 16 January 2015 be dismissed;

(b)the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 5 March 2015 be dismissed; and

(c)the Director of Public Prosecutions pay the appellant's costs of the two applications.

3.Remit the matter to the Full Court for further hearing on grounds 3 to 6 of the Notice of Appeal filed in that Court on 7 October 2014.

Matters No A15/2016 and No A16/2016

1.Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside orders 1 to 4 of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia made on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a)the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 16 January 2015 be dismissed;

(b)the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 5 March 2015 be dismissed; and

(c)the Director of Public Prosecutions pay the appellant's costs of the two applications.

Matter No A19/2016

1.Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside orders 1 to 4 of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia made on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a)the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 16 January 2015 be dismissed;

(b)the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 5 March 2015 be dismissed; and

(c)the Director of Public Prosecutions pay the appellant's costs of the two applications.

3.Remit the matter to the Full Court for further hearing on grounds 4 to 6 of the Substituted Grounds of Appeal filed in that Court on 21 November 2014.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia

Representation

M L Abbott QC for the appellant in A14/2016 (instructed by Legal Services Commission of South Australia)

O P Holdenson QC with A M Dinelli for the appellant in A15/2016 (instructed by Ben Sale)

B W Walker SC with S A McDonald for the appellant in A16/2016 (instructed by Patsouris & Associates)

S G Henchliffe with S Georgiadis for the appellant in A19/2016 (instructed by Steven Georgiadis & Associates)

A P Kimber SC and C D Bleby…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read NH v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] HCA 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of NH v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) concerned appeals by NH and Stakaj to the High Court of Australia following convictions for manslaughter. The central dispute arose from allegations that the jury, in delivering its verdicts, had made a mistake regarding the required majority for a "not guilty" verdict on the charge of murder before proceeding to consider the alternative charge of manslaughter. The Director of Public Prosecutions had applied to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, invoking the Court's original jurisdiction, to set aside the jury's verdicts. The Full Court had subsequently quashed the verdicts and ordered new trials.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the presumption of correctness attaching to jury verdicts could be rebutted in the circumstances presented, whether the Full Court had the power to reconsider perfected orders in its original jurisdiction, and whether the alleged mistake by the foreperson constituted a material irregularity leading to unlawful verdicts. Further questions concerned whether the foreperson's mistake and the jury's acquiescence amounted to an abuse of process, whether the Supreme Court possessed an inherent power to correct perfected orders in such situations, and the admissibility of statements made by jurors to impeach their own verdicts, distinguishing between a verdict and a judgment.

The High Court allowed the appeals, finding that the Full Court had erred in its approach. The Court reasoned that the Director of Public Prosecutions' application was brought in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and that the inherent jurisdiction relied upon by the Full Court was a collection of powers in aid of jurisdiction, not a separate head of jurisdiction. The majority of the Full Court had considered the foreperson's affidavit and statements from other jurors, concluding that the foreperson's incorrect response regarding a majority "not guilty" verdict on the murder charge constituted a material irregularity, rendering the subsequent manslaughter verdicts unlawful under s 57 of the Juries Act. They further held that this irregularity, coupled with the jury's acquiescence, amounted to an abuse of process, justifying the exercise of the Court's inherent power to overturn the verdicts and order retrials.

The High Court set aside the orders of the Full Court, dismissing the Director of Public Prosecutions' applications and remitting the matters to the Full Court for further hearing on other grounds of appeal. The Court's decision effectively held that the requirements of s 57 of the Juries Act had not been met, and that the Full Court's reliance on its inherent jurisdiction to quash the verdicts was not warranted in these circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

Matter No A14/2016

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside orders 1 to 4 of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia made on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a) the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 16 January 2015 be dismissed;

(b) the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 5 March 2015 be dismissed; and

(c) the Director of Public Prosecutions pay the appellant's costs of the two applications.

3. Remit the matter to the Full Court for further hearing on grounds 3 to 6 of the Notice of Appeal filed in that Court on 7 October 2014.

Matters No A15/2016 and No A16/2016

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside orders 1 to 4 of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia made on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a) the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 16 January 2015 be dismissed;

(b) the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 5 March 2015 be dismissed; and

(c) the Director of Public Prosecutions pay the appellant's costs of the two applications.

Matter No A19/2016

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside orders 1 to 4 of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia made on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a) the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 16 January 2015 be dismissed;

(b) the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions filed on 5 March 2015 be dismissed; and

(c) the Director of Public Prosecutions pay the appellant's costs of the two applications.

3. Remit the matter to the Full Court for further hearing on grounds 4 to 6 of the Substituted Grounds of Appeal filed in that Court on 21 November 2014.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Reference should be made to the appeals lodged by NH and Stakaj. On 7 and 13 October 2014 respectively, they appealed and sought permission to appeal to the Full Court against their convictions for manslaughter on a number of grounds[35]. The first ground was that the jury had failed to first deliberate and return a true verdict of not guilty of murder before proceeding to consider and deliver a majority verdict on the alternative of manslaughter[36]. The second ground was that such a verdict involved a substantial miscarriage of justice as it was not available until the jury had first reached a verdict of not guilty on the charge of murder. In the alternative, if the verdicts of guilty of manslaughter had been validly returned, each of NH and Stakaj contended that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence and were unsafe and unsatisfactory. Their final ground was that the trial judge had erred in finding that each appellant had a case to answer on the charge of murder or on the alternative of manslaughter. [35]Substituted Grounds of Appeal filed by Stakaj on 21 November 2014 closely mirrored those of NH. In addition to the grounds raised by NH, Stakaj contended that the trial judge had erred in not directing, or not adequately directing, the jury to the effect that they were required to reach a majority verdict of not guilty of murder before delivering a verdict on the alternative of manslaughter. He also raised as a ground of appeal the trial judge's failure to adequately direct the jury in relation to the fact that he had not given evidence at the trial.[36]As noted earlier in these reasons at [16], the verdict of guilty of manslaughter in relation to Stakaj was unanimous. It was not suggested by the Full Court nor in this Court that this error in Stakaj's grounds of appeal was material. The evidence before the Full Court The Full Court received evidence of the foreperson's affidavit and all but the final paragraph of his statement exhibited to that affidavit, which together set out his view as to whether the verdicts delivered reflected the view of the jury. The Court also received the other jurors' affidavits exhibiting their respective statements in answer to written questions from the Court, but limited to the part of the response to Question 5 which asked whether the verdict of not guilty of murder by majority was correct for each appellant[37]. [37](2015) 123 SASR 523 at 547-548 [71]-[73], 561 [121]. In the foreperson's statement, he said that when asked by the associate if the jury were unanimously agreed on a verdict for the charge of murder for each appellant, he had answered "No". He was then asked by the associate if the jury had reached a majority verdict of "not guilty" for the charge of murder, to which he had responded "Yes" for each appellant. A verdict of guilty on the alternative charge of manslaughter was given for each appellant. The foreperson then said:"Immediately after leaving the court room I began to feel unsure about the accuracy of the majority not guilty verdicts given and after arriving home I phoned the Sheriff's Office and asked to come in and speak to the Jury manager to express those concerns.I met with the Jury Manager at approximately 4.50pm on that same day and stated that it was correct that the Jury could not agree on a unanimous verdict of guilty for the charge of murder, however we did not have a majority verdict of not guilty. Upon reflection, when asked if the jury had a majority not guilty verdict for the charge of murder, I should have answered 'No'."

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ (dissent) NETTLE AND GORDON JJ (dissent)
It is necessary, in considering these appeals, to identify the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which the DPP invoked in his application of 16 January 2015. It was clearly not the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the CLC Act. The application was headed "In the Supreme Court of South Australia, Criminal Jurisdiction". It was brought in the original jurisdiction of the Court. The only relevant original jurisdiction was that which the DPP had invoked when filing the information charging the appellants which led to their trial and the verdicts and orders which followed. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that that jurisdiction was not exhausted when the verdicts and sentences were formally recorded, the referral of questions to the Full Court on the first application did not change its nature. As appears below, the "inherent jurisdiction" relied upon by the DPP and the Full Court to authorise the orders made on the application is not an additional head of jurisdiction. It is a collection of powers in aid of jurisdiction.The decision of the Full Court In their joint judgment, the majority reasoned as follows:1.Courts have admitted evidence of material irregularity in proceedings and, if a miscarriage of justice has occurred, overturned the conviction[67].2.The foreperson's response indicating that each of the "not guilty" verdicts on the charge of murder in relation to each defendant was the verdict of 10 or more of the jury when the correct response was "No" was a material irregularity. It resulted in unlawful verdicts pursuant to s 57 of the Juries Act[68].This step in the reasons, preceding the finding as to admissibility of the affidavit evidence, should be read as a statement about the content of the proffered evidence, not as a finding of fact.3.The public pronouncement by the foreperson of the results of the jury's deliberations was not part of those deliberations. If it did not reflect the true verdicts then the Court could have regard to evidence which established that fact[69].4.The Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of its processes. The abuse of process arose from the Court's acceptance of the unlawful verdicts on the premise that the answers given by the foreperson were true and accurate[70]. 5.If it was necessary to point to some conduct in the proceedings giving rise to the abuse, the relevant abuse of process arose out of the foreperson's mistake in the responses to the questions of the associate and the unanimous mistake made by the other members of the jury in acquiescing to those responses at the time of the delivery of the verdicts[71].6.The relief sought was not precluded by the finality rule in relation to the jury's verdicts because the requirements of s 57 had not been met. No valid verdicts had been made. The Court, prima facie, had an inherent power to recall the order[72].7.It was unnecessary to decide the DPP's application dated 5 March 2015. The Court had an inherent power within its inherent jurisdiction to overturn the verdicts of acquittal and order a retrial[73].[67](2015) 123 SASR 523 at 558 [111].[68](2015) 123 SASR 523 at 559 [113].[69](2015) 123 SASR 523 at 561 [119].[70](2015) 123 SASR 523 at 564 [133], 565 [139]. The latter proposition is involved in the acceptance by the Court of the submissions made by the Solicitor-General which were set out in the joint reasons for judgment.[71](2015) 123 SASR 523 at 565 [140].[72](2015) 123 SASR 523 at 570 [159].[73](2015) 123 SASR 523 at 571 [165].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: