On appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia
Representation:
G A Archer for the appellant (instructed by Legal Aid Western Australia)
S E Stone with C C Porter for the respondent (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (WA))
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Stanton v The Queen
Criminal Law – Wilful murder – Alternative verdicts of murder and manslaughter available – Directions of trial judge – Whether trial judge reversed onus of proof – Whether trial judge erred in informing the jury about the circumstances in which they could consider alternative verdicts.
The Criminal Code (WA), ss 277, 278, 279, 280, 595, 689(1). Juries Act 1957 (WA), s 41.
GLEESON CJ, McHUGH AND HAYNE JJ. Following a trial in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, before Anderson J and a jury, the appellant was convicted of the wilful murder of Marie Ann Stanton, his estranged wife. This was a second trial. At a previous trial, the jury had been discharged because of an inability to agree upon a verdict.
On 11 March 1999, the appellant, armed with a shotgun, and a number of rounds of heavy gauge ammunition, went to the victim's house. It was not in dispute that she died as a result of the discharge of the shotgun. The appellant did not deny that he pulled the trigger and caused the gun to discharge. There was only one substantial issue of fact, which was the intent with which the appellant acted. He denied any intention to kill or harm the victim. He said he took the gun with him in order to frighten her. The two had been quarrelling about Family Court proceedings, and the appellant said he took the weapon to "make her see some sense and negotiate".
There was abundant evidence on which a jury could infer an intent to kill. It appeared that the appellant had endeavoured to conceal his arrival at the house. He hired a car for the occasion, and parked it in a location where it could not be seen from the house. He walked up to the house unannounced, apparently surprising his wife before she had a chance to flee. He had equipped himself with a shotgun and ammunition. The evidence was that the shotgun would only discharge when placed in a fully cocked position, which involved exerting approximately three kilograms of pressure. The shotgun was discharged on a level parallel to the floor, and at a very close range to the victim. There was forensic evidence to the effect that the victim had her left forearm in front of her chest in a protective gesture at the time she sustained the fatal wounds. After the appellant shot…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Stanton v The Queen [2003] HCA 29
Case
[2003] HCA 29
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal concerned a conviction for wilful murder. The appellant, Stanton, was alleged to have intentionally and unlawfully killed his estranged wife. He admitted to causing her death by discharging a shotgun he was holding, but denied intending to kill or harm her, claiming he only intended to frighten her to facilitate a negotiation. The Crown alleged he had armed himself with a lethal number of shells.
The legal issues before the High Court of Australia were whether the trial judge erred in directing the jury regarding the circumstances in which they could consider alternative verdicts of murder and manslaughter, and whether these directions had the effect of reversing the onus of proof.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. The Court reasoned that the trial judge's directions, when read as a whole, did not improperly shift the onus of proof. The judge had explained that the jury could consider alternative verdicts if they found the prosecution had not proven all elements of wilful murder, but had proven the elements of a lesser offence. This was consistent with the established legal principle that the onus remains on the prosecution to prove all elements of the offence charged. The judge's comments about the circumstances in which alternative verdicts could be considered were a proper part of guiding the jury through the available legal pathways based on the evidence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The appeal should be dismissed. The facts The facts in outline were these. The appellant was alleged to have intentionally unlawfully killed, that is to say, wilfully murdered his estranged wife on 11 March 1999. He admitted these matters at his trial: the identity of the deceased, the date and place of her death, and that she died as a result of the discharge of a shotgun held by him. The appellant went to his estranged wife's house in Lake Clifton near Mandurah, Western Australia on 11 March 1999. He took with him a shotgun, and, according to him, four or five shells. There was however other evidence that the appellant had armed himself with 20 shells of an especially lethal kind. The other relevant facts are set out in the joint judgment. The appellant gave evidence. He denied that he intended to kill or harm his wife, but maintained that he took the gun only to frighten her. He gave these answers in cross-examination:"You were contemplating discharging that gun, weren't you? --- Not really. I thought that if it came to a thing I could discharge it in the roof to frighten Marie Ann. That was all.I see. You have told the ladies and gentlemen of the jury that you haven't used violence prior to then but you were going to discharge a loaded shotgun into the roof. Is that so? --- That's not violence.Sorry? --- That's not violence.For what purpose - - - ? --- To frighten her. That's all.Just let me - to frighten her; to frighten her. Just on that, to frighten her for what? --- To make her see some sense and negotiate.To see some sense about what? --- To negotiate.To negotiate. Is it your case, Mr Stanton, that you were going to conduct a negotiation at gunpoint? --- That wasn't at gunpoint.Were you going to make your wife an offer she couldn't refuse? --- No. I was - - -Is that so - - - ? --- I was there to negotiate with her." The appellant did not deny that he pulled the trigger on the gun and caused it to discharge. His evidence was:"When she was just there where were you? --- I was coming through the doorway - it's not - to the breakfast room.What happened then? - - - I said - then I spoke. I said, 'Marie Ann, we have to talk' or something like that, 'I want to talk to you' - I can't remember exactly what I said now, but something in those lines.What happened then? - - - Well, she was facing away from me. With that, she swung around. I was sort of still moving towards her. She swung around and growled at me. I don't know why.What was the word you used, growled? - - - Growled, aah aah, something like that, and at the same time she raised her hands - I don't know how - I just said on the video she raised her hands like that, but I just indicate that she raised her hands somehow. I stepped back because she came towards me. I recoiled and the gun went off.How did the gun go off? - - - Well, I must have pressed the trigger. It's the only way I could make it go off.Why did you press the trigger? - - - I don't know; didn't think. It happened so quickly. I didn't even realise it was cocked. I can't even recall it.Let me be more precise and go back for a moment. You said to me, 'I must have pressed the trigger.' Did you press the trigger? - - - I can't - it happened so quickly I can't - it wasn't a conscious effort. I can't recall it.What happened then? - - - Well, Marie Ann slumped. I saw that and I immediately left. I was only holding it lightly. Eventually I found I had a very deep gash in my webbing of my right hand." The trial
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
HUGH AND HAYNE JJ
(dissent)
GUMMOW AND CALLINAN JJ