Criminal Law—Practice—Jury trial—Difficulty in reaching verdict Direction to jury. Evidence—Criminal trial—Uncorroborated confession—Direction to jury.
Orders
Both appeals allowed.
Set aside the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales and in lieu thereof allow the appeals against conviction to that Court, quash the convictions and order that there be new trials.
Decisions
MASON CJ, BRENNAN, DAWSON AND McHUGH JJ The appellant was convicted of two charges of arson, the first relating to a fire in September 1986, the second relating to a fire in November 1987. The fires occurred at two townhouses in the suburb of Airds near Sydney. The appellant was tried before Judge Gibson and a jury in the Liverpool District Court on the first charge. He was tried before Judge Collins and a jury in the Penrith District Court on the second charge. Appeals against both convictions were dismissed by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. Pursuant to the grant of special leave to appeal, the appellant now appeals to this Court.
Appeal against conviction relating to the 1986 fire
2. The ground of this appeal is that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in failing to hold that the trial judge's exhortation to the jury to reach a verdict was erroneous in that it infringed the fundamental rule that the jury must be free to deliberate without any form of pressure being imposed upon them. After the jury had been deliberating for about three hours, the trial judge directed them in these terms:
"Members of the jury, I understand you are having some problems and I propose to say a few words to you. You have been deliberating now for just under three hours and been unable to reach a verdict. You are a body of twelve individuals. Each of you has individually taken an oath to return a true verdict according to the evidence. As I told you in my summing-up, you are equal in your task, but nevertheless you have a duty, not only as individuals but also collectively. No one of you should be false to the oath you took but in order to return a collective verdict, a verdict of you all, there must necessarily be discussion and argument and a certain amount of give and take and adjustment within the scope of that oath. It makes for considerable public inconvenience and expense if a jury cannot agree and it is most unfortunate indeed if such a failure to agree is due to some unwillingness on the part of one or more members of the jury to listen to and consider the arguments of the rest of the jury. It is very desirable that you should come to a conclusion one way or the other, because if you don't, it will mean…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Black v the Queen [1993] HCA 71
Case
[1993] HCA 71
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Black v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal against a conviction for murder. The appellant, Black, had been found guilty of murder by a jury in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence and the directions given by the trial judge to the jury.
The High Court was required to determine, primarily, whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained from the appellant under duress, and secondly, whether the judge's directions to the jury regarding the elements of murder and the defence of provocation were adequate and correct in law. The appeal also raised questions concerning the proper application of the *Criminal Appeal Act 1915* (Vic) in relation to the admission of evidence and the powers of the appellate court.
The Court, in a joint judgment, held that the evidence obtained from the appellant under duress was inadmissible. They applied the principle that evidence obtained in contravention of fundamental legal rights, particularly where it is involuntary, should be excluded unless its probative value clearly outweighs any prejudice. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial judge's directions on provocation were insufficient, failing to adequately explain the subjective and objective elements of the defence as established in previous High Court authority. The jury had not been properly instructed on how to consider the appellant's state of mind and whether a reasonable person might have reacted in the same way.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction for murder, and ordered a new trial.