SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Lennox; R v Lennox; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2018] QCA 311
PARTIES:
In CA No 97 of 2018:
R
v
LENNOX, James Ronald
(appellant)In CA No 127 of 2018:
R
v
LENNOX, James Ronald
(respondent)
EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND
(appellant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 97 of 2018
CA No 127 of 2018
DC No 2585 of 2016DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal against Conviction
Sentence Appeal by Attorney-General (Qld)ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 19 April 2018; Date of Sentence: 23 April 2018 (Dick SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
Date of Orders: 31 October 2018
Date of Publication of Reasons: 13 November 2018DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
18 September 2018
JUDGES:
Philippides and McMurdo JJA and Henry J
ORDERS:
Orders delivered 31 October 2018:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Conviction on count 4 quashed.
3. Verdict of acquittal on count 4 entered.
4. Attorney-General’s appeal against sentence dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – where the appellant was convicted by a jury of rape and sentenced to four and a half years’ imprisonment suspended after 14 months – where the appellant was acquitted on counts of sexual assault for episodes which occurred before and after the rape – where the appellant appeals on the basis of inconsistent verdicts – whether the inconsistency complained of requires the conviction to be set aside to prevent a possible injustice
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – OTHER MATTERS – where the appellant appeals on the grounds of directions not given as to the use to which the jury might put lies told by the appellant other than those in his interview with police – where the appellant lied in his recorded interview with police – where further lies the appellant told the complainant in endeavouring to cultivate a relationship with her were relied upon – where the need for the direction was raised before, and considered and rejected by, the learned trial judge – whether the learned trial judge erred in not so directing
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – OTHER MATTERS – where the the complainant’s evidence was read in response to a jury redirection request without directions, warnings or re-reading of the appellant’s evidence – whether the learned trial judge erred in doing so
Criminal Code (Qld), s 348(1)
Black v The Queen (1993) 179 CLR 44; [1993] HCA 71, cited
Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; [1993] HCA 63, cited
Gately v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 208; [2007] HCA 55, distinguished
GAX v The Queen (2017) 91 ALJR 698; (2017) 344 ALR 489; [2017] HCA 25, cited
KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; [2001] HCA 11, cited
MacKenzie v…
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- Case
- [2018] QCA 311
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the inconsistency complained of required the conviction to be set aside to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice. The court was also required to decide whether the learned trial judge erred in not directing the jury as to the use to which they might put lies told by the appellant other than those in his interview with police. The court was further required to decide whether the learned trial judge erred in reading the complainant’s evidence in response to a jury redirection request without directions, warnings, or re-reading of the appellant’s evidence.
The court found that the jury’s verdicts indicated that the jury approached their task by considering the counts separately as they were directed to do. The court found that the jury’s verdicts were able to be reconciled in a logical and reasonable manner. The court found that the learned trial judge did not err in not directing the jury as to the use to which they might put lies told by the appellant other than those in his interview with police. The court found that the learned trial judge did not err in reading the complainant’s evidence in response to a jury redirection request without directions, warnings, or re-reading of the appellant’s evidence.
The court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction on count 4, entered a verdict of acquittal on count 4, and dismissed the Attorney-General’s appeal against sentence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Orders delivered 31 October 2018:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Conviction on count 4 quashed.
3. Verdict of acquittal on count 4 entered.
4. Attorney-General’s appeal against sentence dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It was argued that there was no room for mistake of fact to arise given that it was submitted that, on the complainant’s account of events, she was at all times “emphatic” as to not giving her consent.Consideration The jury’s verdicts indicate that the jury approached their task by considering the counts separately as they were directed to do. In so doing, the jury distinguished between guilt on the lesser counts 1 and 2 and the much more serious count 4. The verdicts of not guilty on counts 1 and 2 are capable of giving rise to two inferences; that the jury were left with a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the appellant’s touching and sucking of the complainant’s breast, or that, even if they had no doubt that consent was not given, that they were not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defence of that honest and reasonable but mistaken belief as to consent was excluded. The jury’s failure to agree on count 3 is neutral. However, the jury’s verdict on count 4 meant that they were left with no relevant doubt both that the complainant did not consent to penile penetration and that honest and reasonable but mistaken belief of consent to that act had been excluded. On either view of the possible reasoning of the jury in respect of their acquittals on counts 1 and 2, I do not consider that those verdicts are inconsistent as a matter of logic and reasonableness with the verdict of guilty on count 4. I do not consider that the holding of a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant gave consent in respect of counts 1 and 2 would have necessitated the rejection of the complainant’s evidence of not consenting to the rape charge in count 4. Nor do I consider that a reasonable doubt as to the exclusion of the defence of mistaken belief on counts 1 and 2 necessitated a reasonable doubt as to the exclusion of mistake on count 4. In my view, the verdicts were able to be reconciled in a logical and reasonable manner. As to the element of lack of consent, it was open to the jury to consider that there was a difference in the quality of the complainant’s evidence of lack of consent as between counts 1 and 2 and count 4. The appellant’s contention that those verdicts were inconsistent was premised on the submission that the complainant gave the same “emphatic” evidence of not consenting in respect of all counts. But that submission was based on her evidence in chief that she repeatedly said she “did not want” in respect of the acts charged in counts 1 and 2.[51] The appellant’s contention that the complainant unambiguously indicated to the appellant that she was not consenting was made without reference to the complainant’s concessions in her cross examination evidence as to the lesser charges. Notwithstanding her evidence of expressly saying no and that she did not want the appellant’s advances, the complainant accepted in cross examination that she responded to the appellant kissing her by kissing him back. She also accepted that it was at that point, that the complainant might have kissed the complainant’s breasts and nipples. The complainant further accepted that, unlike her evidence at trial, she told police that it was after the appellant rubbed her breast that she tried to push him. When regard is had to those concessions, the jury may have considered that there was an ambiguity or equivocation as to the issue of consent.[51]AB2 at 35.