R v Lennox; R v Lennox; Ex parte

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Lennox; R v Lennox; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2018] QCA 311

PARTIES:

In CA No 97 of 2018:

R
v
LENNOX, James Ronald

(appellant)

In CA No 127 of 2018:

R
v
LENNOX, James Ronald

(respondent)
EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 97 of 2018
CA No 127 of 2018
DC No 2585 of 2016

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction
Sentence Appeal by Attorney-General (Qld)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 19 April 2018; Date of Sentence: 23 April 2018 (Dick SC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

Date of Orders: 31 October 2018
Date of Publication of Reasons: 13 November 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

18 September 2018

JUDGES:

Philippides and McMurdo JJA and Henry J

ORDERS:

Orders delivered 31 October 2018:

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Conviction on count 4 quashed.

3.   Verdict of acquittal on count 4 entered.

4.   Attorney-General’s appeal against sentence dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – where the appellant was convicted by a jury of rape and sentenced to four and a half years’ imprisonment suspended after 14 months – where the appellant was acquitted on counts of sexual assault for episodes which occurred before and after the rape – where the appellant appeals on the basis of inconsistent verdicts – whether the inconsistency complained of requires the conviction to be set aside to prevent a possible injustice

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – OTHER MATTERS – where the appellant appeals on the grounds of directions not given as to the use to which the jury might put lies told by the appellant other than those in his interview with police – where the appellant lied in his recorded interview with police – where further lies the appellant told the complainant in endeavouring to cultivate a relationship with her were relied upon – where the need for the direction was raised before, and considered and rejected by, the learned trial judge – whether the learned trial judge erred in not so directing

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – OTHER MATTERS – where the the complainant’s evidence was read in response to a jury redirection request without directions, warnings or re-reading of the appellant’s evidence – whether the learned trial judge erred in doing so

Criminal Code (Qld), s 348(1)

Black v The Queen (1993) 179 CLR 44; [1993] HCA 71, cited
Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; [1993] HCA 63, cited
Gately v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 208; [2007] HCA 55, distinguished
GAX v The Queen (2017) 91 ALJR 698; (2017) 344 ALR 489; [2017] HCA 25, cited
KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; [2001] HCA 11, cited
MacKenzie v…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCA 311
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Lennox, was convicted by a jury of raping the complainant and was sentenced to four and a half years’ imprisonment, suspended after 14 months. The appellant was acquitted on counts of sexual assault that occurred before and after the rape. The appellant appealed on the basis of inconsistent verdicts, arguing that the inconsistency required the conviction to be set aside to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice. The appellant also appealed on the grounds of directions not given as to the use to which the jury might put lies told by the appellant other than those in his interview with police. The appellant further argued that the complainant’s evidence was read in response to a jury redirection request without directions, warnings, or re-reading of the appellant’s evidence.

The court was required to decide whether the inconsistency complained of required the conviction to be set aside to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice. The court was also required to decide whether the learned trial judge erred in not directing the jury as to the use to which they might put lies told by the appellant other than those in his interview with police. The court was further required to decide whether the learned trial judge erred in reading the complainant’s evidence in response to a jury redirection request without directions, warnings, or re-reading of the appellant’s evidence.

The court found that the jury’s verdicts indicated that the jury approached their task by considering the counts separately as they were directed to do. The court found that the jury’s verdicts were able to be reconciled in a logical and reasonable manner. The court found that the learned trial judge did not err in not directing the jury as to the use to which they might put lies told by the appellant other than those in his interview with police. The court found that the learned trial judge did not err in reading the complainant’s evidence in response to a jury redirection request without directions, warnings, or re-reading of the appellant’s evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction on count 4, entered a verdict of acquittal on count 4, and dismissed the Attorney-General’s appeal against sentence.

Orders

Orders of the court

Orders delivered 31 October 2018:

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Conviction on count 4 quashed.

3. Verdict of acquittal on count 4 entered.

4. Attorney-General’s appeal against sentence dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In order to explain my reasoning as to ground 1 of the appeal, whether the jury’s conviction was inconsistent with the acquittals (on counts 1, 2 and 5) so as to require this Court to intervene, it is necessary to set out the relevant evidence.EvidenceThe complainant’s evidence in chief The complainant was from Hong Kong and had been living in Australia for a little over a year on a working visa. She was 27 years old at the time of the events in question and working as a nanny. On the afternoon of Saturday, 23 January 2016, at about 2.00 pm, the complainant was waiting alone at a bus stop to take a bus to the library at the Carindale Shopping Centre. The complainant described how a car drove past her, stopped and then drove back and the driver (the appellant) asked if she was going to the shopping centre and offered her a lift, which she accepted. There was a discussion in the vehicle; the complainant told the appellant she was a student and the appellant said he was an engineer. The appellant asked the complainant if she wanted to go out with him that night and they exchanged phone numbers. The appellant also asked the complainant if he could take a photo of them together, which he did. They met again that evening at about 7.00 pm at the same bus stop. The appellant drove to Mt Gravatt and then to Mt Coot-tha to see the view. He then looked at the weather report and said that a storm was coming and that he needed to go to his Sunnybank home to do some things to protect it from the storm. The complainant sat in the car outside a house, which she assumed was the appellant’s house at Sunnybank, while the appellant left for 10 minutes or so. On his return, they went to have fish and chips at Manly and then talked in the car. The complainant gave evidence that:[1]“… when we talking, and he kissed – he tried to kiss me, and he kissed me, but I say I don’t want to kiss. And he said, because he broke up with a girlfriend 12 months ago, so he needs a kiss and hug. So he ask me to have a hug, and then he kissed me. But I say I don’t want.And what did he do when you said, ‘I don’t want’?---He just explain why he want to kiss, because he had just broke up with girlfriend one years ago, and he needs kiss and hug. But – and then I say I don’t want, but he keep kiss me a few times, but then stopped.”[1]AB2 at 31.11-31.19. The complainant said they drove around for 20 minutes or so. They agreed to meet up again the next evening. The complainant gave evidence that on the Sunday she instead sent the appellant a message as follows:[2]“… I say I don’t trust him, because, the first day, he told me he broke up with girlfriend, and he want relationship. He want to marry and have children, and he – when he with his past girlfriend, they together, like, five and six years, is a long relationship. So she – he said that, but after the first day, and I text him, I say I don’t really trust him. And because I think the first day I met him, he already kissed me, and I think he is a – like, a player.”[2]AB2 at 31.36-31.42.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It was argued that there was no room for mistake of fact to arise given that it was submitted that, on the complainant’s account of events, she was at all times “emphatic” as to not giving her consent.Consideration The jury’s verdicts indicate that the jury approached their task by considering the counts separately as they were directed to do. In so doing, the jury distinguished between guilt on the lesser counts 1 and 2 and the much more serious count 4. The verdicts of not guilty on counts 1 and 2 are capable of giving rise to two inferences; that the jury were left with a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the appellant’s touching and sucking of the complainant’s breast, or that, even if they had no doubt that consent was not given, that they were not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defence of that honest and reasonable but mistaken belief as to consent was excluded. The jury’s failure to agree on count 3 is neutral. However, the jury’s verdict on count 4 meant that they were left with no relevant doubt both that the complainant did not consent to penile penetration and that honest and reasonable but mistaken belief of consent to that act had been excluded. On either view of the possible reasoning of the jury in respect of their acquittals on counts 1 and 2, I do not consider that those verdicts are inconsistent as a matter of logic and reasonableness with the verdict of guilty on count 4. I do not consider that the holding of a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant gave consent in respect of counts 1 and 2 would have necessitated the rejection of the complainant’s evidence of not consenting to the rape charge in count 4. Nor do I consider that a reasonable doubt as to the exclusion of the defence of mistaken belief on counts 1 and 2 necessitated a reasonable doubt as to the exclusion of mistake on count 4. In my view, the verdicts were able to be reconciled in a logical and reasonable manner. As to the element of lack of consent, it was open to the jury to consider that there was a difference in the quality of the complainant’s evidence of lack of consent as between counts 1 and 2 and count 4. The appellant’s contention that those verdicts were inconsistent was premised on the submission that the complainant gave the same “emphatic” evidence of not consenting in respect of all counts. But that submission was based on her evidence in chief that she repeatedly said she “did not want” in respect of the acts charged in counts 1 and 2.[51] The appellant’s contention that the complainant unambiguously indicated to the appellant that she was not consenting was made without reference to the complainant’s concessions in her cross examination evidence as to the lesser charges. Notwithstanding her evidence of expressly saying no and that she did not want the appellant’s advances, the complainant accepted in cross examination that she responded to the appellant kissing her by kissing him back. She also accepted that it was at that point, that the complainant might have kissed the complainant’s breasts and nipples. The complainant further accepted that, unlike her evidence at trial, she told police that it was after the appellant rubbed her breast that she tried to push him. When regard is had to those concessions, the jury may have considered that there was an ambiguity or equivocation as to the issue of consent.[51]AB2 at 35.