SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v GAX [2016] QCA 189
PARTIES:
R
v
GAX
(appellant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 37 of 2016
DC No 187 of 2014DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Mackay – Date of Conviction: 8 February 2016DELIVERED ON:
22 July 2016
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
25 May 2016
JUDGES:
Margaret McMurdo P and Morrison JA and Atkinson J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, Morrison JA and Atkinson J concurring as to the order made, Margaret McMurdo P dissentingORDER:
The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant was convicted of one count of indecently dealing with a child under the age of 16 years who was his lineal descendant – where the complainant gave evidence that the appellant, her father, lay in bed with her and that his fingers were down near where her underwear was supposed to be – where the complainant’s mother and sister also gave evidence of finding the appellant in bed with the complainant – where the mother had made a notation on the calendar on the following day to mark the date on which the incident occurred – where there were some inconsistencies between the accounts of the complainant, the mother and the sister – whether, considering the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offence
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – INCONSISTENT VERDICTS – where the appellant was acquitted of two similar charges – where the complainant’s evidence on these charges was vague and uncertain and not supported by any corroborating evidence of other witnesses – whether the verdict of guilty was inconsistent with the two verdicts of not guilty
MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; [1996] HCA 35, applied
R v SBL[2009] QCA 130, cited
SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13, appliedCOUNSEL:
M J Copley QC for the appellant
S J Farnden for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Macrossan and Amiet Solicitors for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MARGARET McMURDO P: The appellant was convicted on 8 February 2016 of the indecent treatment of his daughter on a date unknown between 11 and 14 July 2003. He was acquitted of two related counts of indecent treatment of the same girl. He has appealed against his conviction on two grounds. The first was that the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported by the evidence. The second was that the guilty verdict was inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts.
Unlike my colleagues, I would allow the appeal on the first ground, set aside the conviction and direct a verdict of acquittal. These are my reasons.
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- AGLC
- R v GAX [2016] QCA 189
- Case
- [2016] QCA 189
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the jury's verdict was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. The jury was entitled to reject the appellant's denial of the incident, especially given the complainant's and the mother's and sister's evidence of finding the appellant in bed with the complainant. However, the jury needed to consider whether the prosecution evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant touched the complainant on the vagina on the night of 11 July 2003. The complainant's evidence was uncertain and raised concerns about her long-term memory and reliability. Additionally, there were inconsistencies between her account and those of her mother and sister. The court concluded that the jury was entitled to conclude that there was an incident in the complainant’s bed, but this did not necessarily mean the appellant was guilty of the charged offence.
The court found that the jury's verdict on the third count was rational and not unreasonable. The complainant's evidence was supported by her mother and sister, who found the appellant in a compromising position with the complainant in bed. The relatively minor inconsistencies between their accounts suggested that they were describing the same event and had not colluded. The jury was entitled to accept the complainant's evidence of what she remembered and the mother's evidence of marking the calendar, which added credibility to the complainant's account. The different verdicts indicated that the jury had considered each count separately and followed the trial judge's instructions. The appeal against conviction was dismissed.
The court dismissed the appeal against conviction and the appellant's conviction stands.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
With regard to ground two, the appellant submitted that the availability or otherwise of evidence independent of the complainant which provided some support for her evidence that she was indecently dealt with would be the obvious explanation for the combination of verdicts. However, he submitted that no rational jury could regard the complainant’s evidence as supported by either her mother’s evidence or her sister’s evidence in view of the substantial and important discrepancies between her account and their accounts and between the two accounts given by the two witnesses. That would then just have left the complainant’s evidence for consideration. The appellant submitted that, as the jury was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of her truthfulness or reliability in relation to those counts where there was no independent supporting evidence, the jury should logically have acquitted the appellant on count three as well.Consideration The complainant’s evidence was supported in important ways by her mother and sister who saw the appellant in bed with her, at a time when they were not expected to be in bed together with the mother having arrived home with dinner and calling out for people to come to eat. Any suggestion that the appellant was checking the complainant’s bed to see if she had wet the bed by lying in it was not suggested by him and had it been it would have been plainly ridiculous. His case was that the incident described in count three, where he was lying beside the complainant in her bed when his wife came into the room and turned the light on, did not happen. The conviction on count three can be accounted for by the fact that the complainant’s mother and sister found the appellant in a compromising position with the complainant in bed, with the covers over them, and the complainant’s underpants down. The relatively minor inconsistencies between their versions of events rather tends to suggest that they did not collude and that they were, nevertheless, describing the same occasion. The jury were entitled to accept that the risk of reconstruction was avoided by the prosecutor directing the complainant to only give evidence of what she remembered. The evidence given by the mother that she had made an asterisk on the calendar on the following day to mark the date when she had caught the appellant sexually abusing their daughter was capable of acceptance by the jury and added credibility and reliability to the complainant’s evidence in relation to count three. The difference in the strength of evidence on count three readily accounts for the difference in the verdicts. The different verdicts tend to suggest that the jury faithfully followed the careful instructions given to them by the trial judge to consider each count separately. There was a rational distinction between the strength of the evidence on each of the three counts on the indictment. The fact that the appellant was acquitted on the first two counts is not a positive finding that those events did not occur but a finding that the jury was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the acts alleged in those counts occurred, or occurred at the times or in the circumstances particularised in those counts.[25][25]See R v SBL [2009] QCA 130 at [31]-[32].