Wong v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   WONG -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2011] WASCA 56

CORAM:   McLURE P

BUSS JA
MAZZA J

HEARD:   23 NOVEMBER 2010

DELIVERED          :   14 MARCH 2011

FILE NO/S:   CACR 90 of 2010

BETWEEN:   CHRISTINE WONG

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :McKECHNIE J

File No  :INS 7 of 2010

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Whether direction to jury infringed the principle that a jury must be free to deliberate without pressure being imposed upon them - Whether trial judge directed jury about the sequence in which it could consider alternative charges

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30(5)(a), s 30(5)(b)
Criminal Code (WA), s 7(c), s 8, s 279(1)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 105, s 114

Result:

Leave to appeal refused on ground 2
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S B Watters

Respondent:     Mr J A Scholz

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Thames Legal

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Black v The Queen [1993] HCA 71; (1993) 179 CLR 44

Peers v The Queen [1999] WASCA 295; (1999) 108 A Crim R 573

Simms v The Queen [2004] WASCA 237; (2004) 148 A Crim R 433

Stanton v The Queen [2003] HCA 29; (2003) 198 ALR 41

Tangye v The Queen (1997) 92 A Crim R 545

  1. McLURE P:  I agree with Mazza J.

  2. BUSS JA:  I agree with Mazza J.

  3. MAZZA J:  The appellant was charged with murdering her father and, in the alternative, with his manslaughter.  On 22 April 2010, after a trial before McKechnie J and a jury, the appellant was convicted of murder.  This was the appellant's third trial.  In the two previous trials, each jury had been unable to reach a unanimous verdict.   The appellant now appeals against her conviction on two grounds.  They are:

    Ground 1

    The learned trial Judge erred and there was a miscarriage of justice when, in his directions to the jury (t-s 220), he offended the principle enunciated in Black v The Queen (1993) 179 CLR 44 and, in so doing, created a real risk of interfering with the jury's freedom to deliberate without pressure being placed on them.

    Ground 2

    The learned trial Judge erred, and there was a miscarriage of justice, when he directed the jury contrary to the principle stated in Stanton v The Queen (2003) 77 ALJR 1151;

    Particulars:

    2.1His Honour erred when he directed the jury to only consider the charge of manslaughter if they found the Appellant not guilty of murder (t-s 209);

    2.2The jury were free to consider the charges in any particular order;

    2.3His Honour's failure to tell them of that was an error and was not later ameliorated (t-s 219).

  4. Leave to appeal has been granted on ground 1.…

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Details
Case
[2011] WASCA 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Wong v The State of Western Australia was heard in the Court of Appeal. The appellant, Wong, challenged his conviction for an offence of dangerous driving causing death. The central issue was whether the trial judge's direction to the jury regarding the sequence in which alternative charges could be considered amounted to an infringement of the principle that the jury must be free to deliberate without pressure being imposed upon them. This principle is critical in maintaining the integrity of the jury's decision-making process.

The court was tasked with determining whether the trial judge's direction to the jury about the sequence in which alternative charges could be considered constituted an improper influence on the jury's deliberations. Specifically, the court had to examine whether this direction was coercive and whether it potentially compromised the jury's ability to make an independent decision. The issue hinged on whether the trial judge's instructions were clear and whether they inadvertently led the jury to consider one charge before another, thereby affecting their deliberations.

In examining the trial judge's instructions, the Court of Appeal concluded that the direction did not amount to an infringement of the jury's deliberative independence. The court found that the judge's language was not coercive and did not impose a specific sequence of consideration that would unduly influence the jury. The court emphasised that the instructions were merely procedural and did not prejudice the jury's ability to consider all charges equally. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established