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Case [2012] HCAB 7 27 June 2012

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High Court Bulletin

Produced by the Legal Research Officer,
High Court of Australia Library

[2012] HCAB 07 (27 June 2012)

A record of recent High Court of Australia cases: decided, reserved for judgment, awaiting hearing in the Court’s original jurisdiction, granted special leave to appeal, refused special leave to appeal and not proceeding or vacated

1: Cases Handed Down
2: Cases Reserved
3: Original Jurisdiction
4: Special Leave Granted
5: Cases Not Proceeding or Vacated
6: Special Leave Refused

Summary of New Entries

1: Cases Handed Down

Case	Title
Williams v Commonwealth of Australia	Constitutional Law
King v The Queen	Criminal Law
Clodumar v Nauru Lands Committee	High Court of Australia

2: Cases Reserved

Case	Title
Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director General of Security & Ors	Citizenship & Migration
International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining NL (Receivers and Managers Appointed) & Ors	Corporations Law

3: Original Jurisdiction

Case	Title
There are no new matters ready for hearing in the original jurisdiction of the High Court since High Court Bulletin 6 [2012] HCAB 06.

4: Special Leave Granted

Case	Title
Monis v The Queen & Anor; Droudis v The Queen & Anor	Constitutional Law
Google Inc v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission	Consumer Law
Westfield Management Limited as Trustee for the Westart Trust v AMP Capital Property Nominees Limited as Nominee of Unisuper Limited in its Capacity as Trustee of the Complying Superannuation Fund Known as Unisuper & Anor	Corporations Law
Stanford v Stanford	Family Law
Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor v Scaffidi & Anor	Trusts

1: Cases Handed Down

The following cases were handed down by the High Court of Australia during the June 2012 sittings.

Constitutional Law

Williams v The Commonwealth

S307/2010: [2012] HCA 23.

Judgment delivered: 20 June 2012

Coram: French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.

Catchwords:

Constitutional law − Executive power of Commonwealth − Commonwealth entered funding agreement with private service provider for provision of chaplaincy services at State school ("Funding Agreement") − Funding Agreement made pursuant to National School Chaplaincy Program − Whether executive power of Commonwealth extends to matters in respect of which Parliament may legislate − Whether s 61 of Constitution or s 44(1) of Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) ("FMA Act") source of power to enter Funding Agreement − Whether s 61 of Constitution or s 44(1) of FMA Act source of power to pay service provider.
Constitutional law − Powers of Commonwealth Parliament − Whether law providing for payments in circumstances identical to Funding Agreement would be law with respect to s 51(xx) of Constitution − Whether law providing for payments in circumstances identical to Funding Agreement would be law with respect to s 51(xxiiiA) of Constitution.
Constitutional law − Freedom of religion − Prohibition on religious tests as qualification for any office under Commonwealth − Under Funding Agreement, "school chaplain" to provide services − Whether "school chaplain" holds office under Commonwealth − Whether Funding Agreement or payments to service…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

AGLC: High Court Bulletin [2012] HCAB 7
Case: [2012] HCAB 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Williams v The Commonwealth, the Court considered the constitutional validity of a funding agreement entered into by the Commonwealth with a private service provider for the provision of chaplaincy services at a state school. The appellant argued that the funding agreement was invalid because it involved the Commonwealth in the provision of religious services, which would violate the prohibition on religious tests for office under the Commonwealth in s 116 of the Constitution. The Court held that the funding agreement was valid and did not contravene s 116 of the Constitution. The Court found that the Commonwealth's executive power extended to matters in respect of which Parliament may legislate, and that the funding agreement was authorised by s 61 of the Constitution or s 44(1) of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth). The Court also held that the appropriation of moneys for the funding agreement was authorised by the Appropriation Acts.

In Clodumar v Nauru Lands Committee, the Court considered whether fresh evidence could be received on appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru. The appellant had discovered a document bearing the signature of the President of Nauru approving the transfer of land to the appellant after the conclusion of the proceeding in the Supreme Court of Nauru. The Court held that the appellant could not rely on the fresh evidence to challenge the validity of the transfer of land to the appellant. The Court found that the appellant could have discovered the document by the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time of the proceeding in the Supreme Court of Nauru.

In King v The Queen, the Court considered whether the trial judge had misdirected the jury in a case of culpable driving causing death. The appellant was convicted of two counts of culpable driving causing death. The trial judge directed the jury that dangerous driving was established by proof that the accused drove in a way that "significantly increased the risk of harming others" and that the Crown did not have to show that the driving was "deserving of criminal punishment". The Court held that the trial judge had not misdirected the jury. The Court found that the direction given by the trial judge was consistent with the statutory definition of dangerous driving and did not depart from the trial according to law or result in a miscarriage of justice.

Orders