Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Sydney Local Health Network v QY and QZ [2011] NSWCA 412 Hearing dates: 20 May 2011 Decision date: 20 December 2011 Before: Campbell JA at [1]
Macfarlan JA at [75]
Young JA at [78]Decision: (1) Leave to appeal granted.
(2) Appellant to file notice of appeal in the form of the final draft of 21 June 2011 within seven days.
(3) Appeal allowed.
(4) Order that the claim of the respondents be summarily dismissed.
(5) Order that the respondents pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Catchwords: CIVIL LIABILITY - whether a doctor conducting a post mortem is protected from liability under the Coroners Act
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - Anti-Discrimination Act ss 4 and 49B - whether "person" includes a "deceased person"
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - Anti-Discrimination Act s 4 - whether "associate" includes a past associate of the aggrieved person - wording of definition is unambiguous - "associate" only include those who are presently associates
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - Anti-Discrimination Act ss 4, 49M - whether "service" includes the performance of a post mortem - whether a particular matter is a "service" is a question of factLegislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 ss 4, 7, 8, 20C, 20D, 38S, 38T, 49B, 49M, 49ZT, 49ZTA, 49ZXB, 49ZXC, 88, 89A, 93A, 95, 108
Anti-Discrimination (Amendment) Act 1994
Coroners Act 1980
Human Tissue Act 1983
Interpretation Act 1987 ss 5, 21
Judicial Officers Act 1986
Status of Children Act 1996Cases Cited: Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27
AW v CW [2002] NSWSC 301; 54 NSWLR 445
Commissioner of Police v Mohamed [2009] NSWCA 432
Commissioner of Police v Russell [2001] NSWSC 745
Commonwealth of Australia v Griffiths [2007] NSWCA 370; 70 NSWLR 268
Commonwealth of Australia v Wood [2006] FCA 60; 148 FCR 276
Council of the Municipality of Randwick v Rutledge (1959) 102 CLR 54
CUNA Mutual Group Ltd v Bryant [2000] FCA 970; 102 FCR 270
Director-General DOCS v MM & AM [2003] NSWSC 1241; (2007) EOC 93-464
Farah v Commissioner of Police [1998] QB 65
Foley v Phelps 37 NYS 471 (1896)
Harris v Lewisham and Guy's Mental Health NHS Trust [2000] EWCA 52; 3 All ER 769
Harrison v Melhem [2008] NSWCA 67; (2008) 72 NSWLR 380
Hastings Co-operative Ltd v Port Macquarie Hastings Council [2009] NSWCA 400; 171 LGERA 152
IW v City of Perth [2997] HCA 30; 191 CLR 1
Jones v Kaney [2011]…
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- Case
- [2011] NSWCA 412
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court of Appeal included whether the performance of a post-mortem examination constituted a "service" within the meaning of the Anti-Discrimination Act, and whether the protection afforded by the Coroners Act extended to a doctor conducting such an examination. Furthermore, the Court had to determine the scope of the term "person" in the context of the Anti-Discrimination Act, specifically whether it encompassed deceased individuals, and whether the definition of "associate" included individuals who were no longer associated with the aggrieved person.
The Court applied principles of statutory interpretation, emphasising that extrinsic materials, such as second reading speeches, should only be considered after exhausting the ordinary rules of construction. It noted that ministerial statements of intention or understanding are not always capable of assisting in ascertaining the meaning of a provision and that substituting ministerial words for the text of the law is impermissible. The Court found that the wording of the definition of "associate" in section 4 of the Anti-Discrimination Act was unambiguous and only included those who were presently associates, not past associates. The Court also considered that the question of whether a particular matter is a "service" is a question of fact.
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and summarily dismissed the respondents' claims. The respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) Leave to appeal granted.
(2) Appellant to file notice of appeal in the form of the final draft of 21 June 2011 within seven days.
(3) Appeal allowed.
(4) Order that the claim of the respondents be summarily dismissed.
(5) Order that the respondents pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ commented at [33] that "it is erroneous to look at extrinsic materials before exhausting the application of the ordinary rules of statutory construction." Thus it is only at this stage of the judgment that I turn to consider the relevant second reading speeches. Section 34(1) Interpretation Act 1987 provides: I do so bearing in mind that a Minister's statement of intention, or a statement of a Minister's understanding of how a provision will operate in practice is sometimes not "capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision" : Harrison v Melhem [2008] NSWCA 67; (2008) 72 NSWLR 380 at 384-5 [12]-[16] per Spigelman CJ and at 400-1 [168]-[172] per Mason P; Preston v Commissioner of Fair Trading [2011] NSWCA 40 at [174]. I also do so bearing in mind that substituting the words of the Minister "for the text of the law" is not permissible: Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 at 518 per Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ. The second reading speech of the Act (New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 23 November 1976, at 3337 contains a statement by Premier Wran: "This bill is an attempt, so far as legislation can, to end intolerance, prejudice and discrimination in our community." That provides some confirmation of the broad objectives that emerge from the text of the Act. The Anti-Discrimination (Amendment) Act 1994 extended the coverage of the Act to people who experienced discrimination because of their relationship or association with another person who has a characteristic on the basis of which the Act recognises that discrimination can occur. Mr Hartcher, the Minister for the Environment, gave the second reading speech: New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 12 May 1994 at 2464. After noting that definitions of "associate" and "relative" were being inserted into s 4 of the Act, the Minister continued at 2467: The final sentence of this statement is the only part that provides an explanation rather than a precis of the text of the Act. It is consistent with the view that the 1994 amendments were intended to be limited to rectifying discrimination suffered by associates because of their association with living persons. I do not view the passage as supporting the view that the 1994 amendments were intended to convey a broader right to claim discrimination which occurred even after their associate had died. The Minister employed the phrase: "individuals who are associated with or accompanying people ...". That indicates the importance of an ongoing and immediate connection. If this factor were important, it would exclude deceased persons from the scope of the term "person" in the definition of "associate". The Respondents point to the Minister's statement in the second reading speech concerning the new s 49A: "This amendment will protect persons who are discriminated against on the basis of their family medical history, for example". The prime way in which a person might be discriminated against because of their family medical history is if they are perceived as being at risk of developing some medical problem of genetic origin because one or more of their relatives has exhibited that medical problem. Because of the provisions of s 49A(d) (set out at [103] of the judgment of Young JA), a person who will have a disability in the future, and a person concerning whom it is thought that he or she will in the future have a disability, is treated as having, now, a disability.