State of New South Wales v Williamson

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Court of Appeal

New South Wales

Case Title: State of New South Wales v Williamson
Medium Neutral Citation: [2011] NSWCA 183
Hearing Date(s): 17 February 2011
Decision Date: 05 July 2011
Jurisdiction:
Before:

Hodgson JA at [1]
Campbell JA at [6]
Macfarlan JA at [117]

Decision:

1. Grant leave to appeal, on condition that the Applicant pay the Respondent's costs in any event, and that the Applicant not seek to disturb the costs order in the Supreme Court below.
2. Direct the Applicant to file, within seven days of the date of delivery of these reasons, a Notice of Appeal in the form of the draft contained in the White Book.
3. Appeal dismissed with costs.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords:

COSTS - limit on the maximum amount for costs in connection with a claim for "personal injury damages" - Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 338 -- claim for false imprisonment is not claim for "personal injury damages", at least where the damages claimed include damages for wrongful deprivation of liberty and loss of dignity - where such a claim is included in a claim for damages and is not a severable part of that claim, the claim for damages is not a claim for "personal injury damages"

COSTS - limit on the maximum amount for costs in connection with a claim for "personal injury damages" - Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 338 - "personal injury damages" defined to have same meaning as in Part 2 Civil Liability Act 2002 - whether maximum costs limitation applies to awards of personal injury damages resulting from intentional acts - correctness of Cross v Certain Lloyds Underwriters [2011] NSWCA 136

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - principles - reading provision in context - whether, when operative statute adopts a term "as defined in" a source statute, account must be taken of the operation of that phrase in the source statute

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - principles - meaning of statutory provision able to be ascertained by tracing the evolution of statutory provisions from initial enactment and through subsequent amendments

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - principles - reading provision in context - fundamental difference between the meaning of a word or expression and the scope of application of a legal principle

Legislation Cited:

Civil Liability Act 2002
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld)
Civil Liability Amendment (Offender Damages) Act 2004
Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002
Civil Liability Amendment Act 2006
Compensation to Relatives Act 1897
Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965)
Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983
Legal Profession Act 1987
Legal Profession…

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Details
Case
[2011] NSWCA 183
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *State of New South Wales v Williamson* concerned an appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal regarding the application of a costs limitation under the *Legal Profession Act 2004* (NSW). The dispute centred on whether a claim for damages, which included elements of false imprisonment and wrongful deprivation of liberty, constituted a claim for "personal injury damages" for the purposes of section 338 of that Act.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was to determine the correct interpretation of "personal injury damages" as defined in section 338 of the *Legal Profession Act 2004* (NSW). This definition referred to the meaning in Part 2 of the *Civil Liability Act 2002* (NSW). The Court had to consider whether this limitation applied to damages arising from intentional acts and, crucially, whether a claim for false imprisonment, encompassing damages for loss of liberty and dignity, qualified as a claim for "personal injury damages" under the relevant legislation.

The Court of Appeal, in applying principles of statutory interpretation, considered the context and evolution of the relevant legislative provisions. It followed the precedent set in *Cross v Certain Lloyds Underwriters* [2011] NSWCA 136, finding that a claim for false imprisonment, where damages for wrongful deprivation of liberty and loss of dignity were sought and were not severable from the overall claim, was not a claim for "personal injury damages" for the purposes of section 338. The Court reasoned that the definition in the *Legal Profession Act* adopted the meaning from the *Civil Liability Act*, and that the scope of application of Part 2 of the *Civil Liability Act* was distinct from the meaning of the term itself. The Court found no clear error in the *Cross* decision, providing an additional reason to follow it.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal was granted on specific conditions, including that the Applicant pay the Respondent's costs in any event and not seek to disturb the costs order made in the Supreme Court below.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant leave to appeal, on condition that the Applicant pay the Respondent's costs in any event, and that the Applicant not seek to disturb the costs order in the Supreme Court below.

2. Direct the Applicant to file, within seven days of the date of delivery of these reasons, a Notice of Appeal in the form of the draft contained in the White Book.

3. Appeal dismissed with costs.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Federal Court has had occasion to consider what the situation should be, as a matter of precedent, if two differently constituted Full Courts reach differing decisions on the one point at much the same time: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Hicks [2004] FCAFC 114; (2004) 138 FCR 475. The majority (Hill J at [4] and [29] and Hely J at [89]-[90]) held that the earlier decision should be followed unless the later court thought it was clearly wrong, though Carr J at [33]-[35] expressed a different view. The view of the majority in Hicks accords with the spirit of the remarks of the High Court in Farah Constructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Limited [2007] HCA 22; (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [135], even though the literal words of those remarks are not applicable to the present situation. In circumstances where I am not of the view that the decision in Cross is clearly wrong, that provides an additional reason, beyond those I have mentioned at [27], for following the decision in Cross . However, the unusualness of the situation that has arisen in the present case, the importance of the point of construction involved, and the possibility that the matter might go further, have led me to include the Schedule in this judgment. The primary submission of Mr Simpkins SC, counsel for the Appellant, was that s 3B Civil Liability Act did not bear upon whether a claim was one "for personal injury damages" for the purpose of s 338 2004 LP Act . He submitted that, when s 337 2004 LP Act provided that "personal injury damages has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002" it referred to the meaning as stated by s 11 Civil Liability Act , not to the scope of application of Part 2 as set out in s 11A. The difference between the meaning of a word and the scope of application of a legal provision is recognised in ss 3 and 9 of the Civil Liability Act as originally passed; in the contrast between ss 11 and 11A that were incorporated into that Act by the Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act2002 (" the Personal Responsibility Act "); and in many of the numerous Parts that were added to the Civil Liability Act by the Personal Responsibility Act . These provisions all provide textual support for Mr Simpkins' submission. However, following Cross I am obliged to reject that submission. Mr Simpkins has a fallback argument, which he submits applies even if his primary submission is incorrect. It is that the decision below is incorrect because the judge failed to find that the intentional acts of the police officers were "done ... with intent to cause injury" . He submits that such a finding would be required before s 3B(1)(a) would exclude the operation of Part 2, and there was no evidence before the judge on which such a finding could have been made. He submits that there is "no pleading or other process by which the issue of intention to cause injury is determined in favour of the Respondent" , and nor is there any issue estoppel to that effect, as intention to cause injury is not a necessary element of any of the causes of action that had been pleaded.