Osei v P K Simpson Pty Ltd

[2022] NSWCA 13

Court of Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Osei v P K Simpson Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 13

Hearing dates:

1 December 2021

Date of orders:

14 February 2022

Decision date:

14 February 2022

Before:

White JA at [1];
McCallum JA at [100];
Garling J at [101]

Decision:

(1) Grant the applicant leave to appeal on ground 4 of the proposed “revised draft notice of appeal” dated 18 October 2021.

(2) Otherwise dismiss the applicant’s summons for leave to appeal.

(3) Order that within seven days the applicant file a notice of appeal in accordance with the leave granted.

(4) Allow the appeal against order 1 made in the District Court on 17 June 2021.

(5) Vary the order made by the District Court on 17 June 2021 by deleting the words “in the sum of $10,000”.

(6) Order the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

Catchwords:

NEGLIGENCE — Negligent advice to settle claim for weekly workers’ compensation payments — whether claim for damages for professional negligence was “for personal injury damages” as defined

COSTS — Whether costs capped at $10,000 — Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW), cl 2 of Sch 1

WORDS AND PHRASES — “for personal injury damages” — Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW), cl 2 of Sch 1

WORDS AND PHRASES — “personal injury damages” — Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 11

Legislation Cited:

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002

Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989

Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW)

Legal Profession Act 1987

Legal Profession Act 2004

Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014

Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999

Victim Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW)

Workplace Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998

Cases Cited:

Be Financial Services Pty Ltd v Das [2012] NSWCA 164

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378; [2012] HCA 56

Cross v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters; Thelander v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters [2011] NSWCA 136

Firth v Sutton [2010] NSWCA 90

Firth v Sutton (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 109

Hammond v Stern (2014) 86 NSWLR 612; [2014] NSWSC 864

Hammond v Stern [2013] NSWSC 70

Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351

New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 248 CLR 417; [2012] HCA 57

Nikolaou v Papasavas, Phillips & Co (1989) 166 CLR 394

Oikos Constructions Pty Ltd t/as Lars Fischer Constructions v Ostin & Anor (No 2)

Osei v PK Simpson & Co Pty Ltd and Carney [2021] NSWDC 254

Pritchard v Trius Constructions Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1114

State of New South Wales v Williamson [2011] NSWCA 183

The Age Company Ltd & Ors v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; [2013] NSWCA 26

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Kofi Osei (Appellant)
P K Simpson & Co Pty Ltd (First Respondent)
William Carney (Second Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
V Bedrossian SC with H Stitt (Applicant)
J Steele SC (Respondents)

Solicitors:
Wilson Fox Lawyers Pty Ltd (Appellant)
Collin Biggers & Paisley (First Respondent)
Clyde & Co (Second Respondent)

File Number(s):

2021/106115; 2021/229140

Publication restriction:

Nil

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

District Court of New South Wales

Jurisdiction:

Civil

Citation:

[2021] NSWDC 74

Date of Decision:

19 March 2021

Before:

Scotting DCJ

File Number(s):

2019/29291

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

On 7 March 2010 the appellant, Mr Osei, was assaulted whilst working as a taxi driver. Mr Osei sustained physical and psychological injury. Although Mr Osei’s claim for workers’ compensation was initially approved, the insurer ceased paying weekly compensation to Mr Osei on or about 8 November 2011. Mr Osei filed three applications in the Workers Compensation Commission for reinstatement of weekly benefits. The first two applications were discontinued, and the third was settled.

On 28 January 2019 Mr Osei sued his solicitor and barrister in the District Court claiming damages for negligent provision of legal services in connection with the settlement. The primary judge held that both were in breach of their duties of care to Mr Osei. After applying deductions and a 40% discount to reflect the chance of Mr Osei not succeeding before the Workers Compensation Commission, the primary judge awarded a judgment of $19,086.65 in Mr Osei’s favour. In a second judgment, the primary judge ordered that the costs payable by the solicitor and barrister be capped at $10,000, by reason of cl 2 of Sch 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014.

Mr Osei sought leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal and the appeal, if leave be given, were heard concurrently.

The principal issues before this Court were:

(i) whether the trial judge erred in assessing an appropriate discount to what would otherwise have been an award of damages on account of the appellant’s loss of chance in the amount of 40%, (ground 3);

(ii) whether the trial judge erred in determining that the damages awarded to the appellant were “personal injury damages” as defined in s 11 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (CLA) and, consequently, erred in concluding that cl 2 of Sch 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) operated so as to impose a cap upon the quantum of costs recoverable in the Court below, (ground 4);

(iii) what order should be made as to the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Held: allowing the appeal in relation to ground 4 only (per White JA, McCallum JA and Garling J), and ordering that the respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal (per McCallum JA and Garling J; White JA dissenting).

As to issue (i), per White JA (McCallum JA and Garling J agreeing):

(1) The trial judge’s discount of 40% of the maximum amount which Mr Osei could have achieved before the Commission was open to him, and raised no question of principle warranting the grant of leave to appeal: at [39], [100], [101].

As to issue (ii), per White JA (McCallum JA and Garling J agreeing):

(2) The trial judge erred in finding that the cap in cl 2 of Sch 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) applies. This is because the definition of “personal injury damages” in s 11 of the CLA should be interpreted as only applying to damages “for” personal injury, whereas the damages awarded to Mr Osei were for professional negligence: at [75], [94], [100], [101].

New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 248 CLR 417; [2012] HCA 57, applied.

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378; Cross v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters; Thelander v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters [2011] NSWCA 136; Firth v Sutton [2010] NSWCA 90; Firth v Sutton (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 109, Pritchard v Trius Constructions Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1114; Hammond v Stern [2013] NSWSC 70; Hammond v Stern (2014) 86 NSWLR 612; [2014] NSWSC 864; State of New South Wales v Williamson [2011] NSWCA 183 discussed.

As to issue (ii), per Garling J:

(3) Even if an expansive definition of “relate to” were adopted, Mr Osei’s claim would not “relate to” personal injury damages because his proceedings in the Workers Compensation Commission were for a statutory entitlement to a weekly benefit, rather than damages: at [100].

As to issue (iii), per Garling J (McCallum JA agreeing)

(4) The respondents should pay Mr Osei’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, as the ground that succeeded was the most substantial in monetary terms: at [100], [116].

As to issue (iii), per White JA (dissenting)

(5) The parties should pay their own costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, as it cannot be said that more costs would have been spent on the ground that succeeded than the grounds which were abandoned or failed: at [97].

Judgment

1. WHITE JA: This is an application for leave to appeal from orders of the District Court (Osei v PK Simpson & Co Pty Ltd and Carney [2021] NSWDC 74 (Scotting DCJ)).

2. The applicant, Mr Osei, was the plaintiff in the court below. He sued his former solicitor (PK Simpson & Co) and barrister (Mr Carney) in respect of allegedly negligent advice given to him to compromise proceedings he had brought in the Workers Compensation Commission.

3. Mr Osei’s claim in the Workers Compensation Commission arose from his working as a taxi driver. On 7 March 2010 when working as a contractor for Sunrise Cabs Pty Ltd, Mr Osei was assaulted and sustained physical and psychological injury. His claim for workers’ compensation was provisionally accepted. On 22 April 2010 CGU Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd (“CGU”) acting as agent for “the NSW WorkCover Scheme” advised Sunrise Cabs that CGU had approved payment of weekly benefits and assessed Mr Osei’s current weekly wage rate at $960.18 per week (subject to change).

4. The primary judge recorded that on or about 8 November 2011 the insurer ceased paying weekly compensation to Mr Osei (at [20]).

5. Between 12 December 2011 and 10 July 2012 Mr Osei filed three applications in the Workers Compensation Commission for reinstatement of weekly benefits. The first two applications were discontinued. The third was settled on 29 January 2013. Orders were made by consent following a conciliation hearing before an arbitrator of the Commission, Ms Nicholl. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the Commission determined the matter as follows:

“Consent orders

1. The respondent is to pay the applicant weekly benefits compensation pursuant to section 40 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 at the rate of $630 per week from 20 December 2011 to 19 April 2012 and agreed to total $10,889.99. Thereafter there is an award for the respondent for any and all claims for weekly compensation.

2. Award for the respondent for any claim for section 60 expenses pertaining to psychiatric injury after 19 April 2012.

3. The respondent is to pay the applicant's costs as agreed or assessed.

Notation

1. Upon payment of the monies referred to above the applicant admits and agrees that he has received all entitlements to workers compensation to date and suffers no economic loss or incapacity as a result of injury as alleged in workers compensation matter 7043/ 12, being psychiatric injury.

Certification

1. In light of the medical, legal and factual complexities in this case and for the purposes of Schedule 6 Table 4 Item 4 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2011 I certify this matter as complex with 10 per cent increase in the costs otherwise available to both parties.”

6. On 28 January 2019 the applicant sued the respondents in the District Court claiming damages for negligent provision of legal services in connection with the settlement of 31 January 2013 in the Commission.

7. The primary judge found that Mr Carney, the applicant’s barrister, was in breach of his duty of care owed to the applicant by giving inadequate advice to the applicant which induced the applicant to accept the compromise (J [122]). The primary judge found that PK Simpson & Co was in breach of its duty by failing to correct the barrister’s advice, and encouraging the applicant to bring a work injury damages claim that PK Simpson & Co knew was hopeless and was an irrelevant consideration to his decision to settle the proceedings before the Commission. In addition, both the barrister and solicitor were in breach of their duty of care by failing to ensure that the legal advice given was interpreted to the applicant in his first language (J [122] and [123]).

8. There is no application for leave to cross-appeal from these findings.

9. The claim for damages was a claim for pure economic loss of the chance of recovering a greater award of workers’ compensation benefits than was achieved by the compromise (Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351 at 366, 371-372, 389-390; Nikolaou v Papasavas Phillips & Co (1989) 166 CLR 394 at 400, 402-404).

10. The assessment of the value of the loss of the chance of recovering compensation required the primary judge to assess the applicant’s prospects of success on his application before the Commission. Where it was not clear that the applicant would certainly have succeeded, nor that he would certainly have failed, his chance of success was to be estimated as a percentage of an assessment of the amount of compensation to which he would have been entitled had he wholly succeeded (Johnson v Perez at 372; Firth v Sutton [2010] NSWCA 90).

11. This was how the primary judge approached the question (J [147]). His Honour said:

“[148] In my view, the only matter that the plaintiff can be compensated for is his loss of opportunity to proceed with his case before the Commission for weekly compensation benefits. That can only be done by reference to what the Commission could have awarded him on 29 January 2013.

[149] At that point, the Commission did not have the power to make an award after 1 January 2013, because the 2012 amending Act introduced the requirement for the insurer to conduct a work capacity assessment as a necessary precursor to the award of compensation for the period after 1 January 2013.

[150] It follows that the Commission could only have made an award for weekly compensation benefits for the period 20 December 2011 to 31 December 2012, being a period of 54 weeks.”

12. The applicant did not dispute these conclusions.

13. It would have been necessary for the Commission to calculate the applicant’s current weekly wage. As explained below, the applicant did not have any records to establish his weekly earnings at the date of his injury.

14. In 2020 the applicant filed an application in the Workers Compensation Commission seeking payments of weekly compensation for the period from 1 February 2013 to 14 June 2013 and unpaid s 60 expenses (J [86]). The primary judge recorded:

“The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff s 60 expenses in the sum of $3,696.74 and weekly compensation in the sum of $768.14 for the period of 1 February 2013 to 14 June 2013. The arbitrator found that:

(1) The plaintiff was not estopped from bringing the 2020 application for his physical injuries sustained in the assault because the 31 January 2013 Certificate of Determination applied only to his psychological injuries;

(2) The amount of $960.18 per week provided for by the Taxi Industry (Contract Drivers) Contract Determination 1984 (the Contract Determination) was a fair and reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's pre-injury average weekly earnings;

(3) Because the plaintiff was not an existing recipient weekly benefits on 1 October 2012, he was entitled to weekly compensation for a period of 130 weeks, of which he had already received payments for 111 weeks, leaving an entitlement of 19 weeks;

(4) The plaintiff was not an existing recipient of weekly benefits on 1 October 2012 as a result of the settlement agreement entered on 29 January 2013, which provided for payments up to 19 April 2012.”

15. The primary judge found (J [152]) that the arbitrator’s determination of 26 November 2020 formed the basis for a reasonable estimation of the plaintiff’s pre-injury average weekly earnings. His Honour concluded:

“[153] On that basis, the total amount the plaintiff could have been awarded by the Commission was $960.18 per week for the period of 54 weeks, coming to a total of $51,849.72.”

16. After further deductions (that are not in dispute) for the amount of the settlement, the amount of a disability support pension and taxation, the primary judge determined $21,683.26 as the amount for which the applicant was out of pocket by having compromised the claim, instead of pursuing it to a successful conclusion.

17. The primary judge then applied a discount for the chance of his not succeeding before the Commission of 40%, thus arriving at an assessment of $13,009.96 as the value of his loss of a chance to have had his claim determined by the Commission (J [156]-[159]).

18. With the addition of interest, the applicant was entitled to a judgment of $19,086.65.

19. It was common ground that the applicant’s claim was an apportionable claim within the meaning of s 34 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). The primary judge apportioned the loss 70% to be borne by the solicitor and 30% by the barrister (J [170], [175]). As a result a verdict was given against PK Simpson & Co in the sum of $13,360.65 and against Mr Carney in the sum of $5,726.

20. The claim was heard in the District Court over four days in August 2020 and on four further days between 2 October 2020 and 15 March 2021.

21. In a second judgment given on 17 June 2021 (Osei v PK Simpson & Co Pty Ltd and Carney [2021] NSWDC 254) the primary judge determined the issues of costs. His Honour ordered that the respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings in the sum of $10,000 apportioned 70% to PK Simpson & Co and 30% to Mr Carney.

22. The primary judge held that the applicant’s costs were capped at $10,000 by cl 2 of Sch 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014. Clause 2 provides:

“2 Maximum costs fixed for claims up to $100,000

(1) If the amount recovered on a claim for personal injury damages does not exceed $100,000, the maximum costs for legal services provided to a party in connection with the claim are fixed as follows—

(a) in the case of legal services provided to a plaintiff—maximum costs are fixed at 20% of the amount recovered or $10,000, whichever is greater,

(b) in the case of legal services provided to a defendant—maximum costs are fixed at 20% of the amount sought to be recovered by the plaintiff or $10,000, whichever is greater.”

23. Clause 1 of Sch 1 includes a definition of “personal injury damages”. Clause 1 provides:

“1 Interpretation and application

(1) In this Schedule—

defendant means a person against whom a claim for personal injury damages is or may be made.

party means plaintiff or defendant.

personal injury damages has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002.

plaintiff means a person who makes or is entitled to make a claim for personal injury damages.”

24. In Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act “personal injury damages” is defined in s 11 as follows:

“In this Part--

…

‘personal injury damages’ means damages that relate to the death of or injury to a person.”

25. “Injury” is defined in s 11 as follows:

“In this Part--

‘injury’ means personal injury and includes the following--

(a) pre-natal injury,

(b) impairment of a person's physical or mental condition,

(c) disease.”

26. The primary judge considered the High Court’s decision in Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378; [2012] HCA 56, and Harrison AsJ’s decision in Hammond v Stern [2013] NSWSC 70. He concluded that the damages awarded to the applicant were “personal injury damages” as defined in s 11 of the Civil Liability Act and therefore that his costs were capped at $10,000.

27. The applicant initially filed a notice of appeal asserting an entitlement to appeal as of right. There were seven grounds of appeal. Later, the applicant filed a summons seeking leave to appeal. Ultimately he acknowledged that leave to appeal was required and relied upon a revised notice of appeal that raised only two grounds. The grounds on which leave to appeal is sought are as follows:

“3. The learned Trial Judge erred (at PJ[157]) in assessing an appropriate discount to what would otherwise have been an award of damages on account of the Appellant’s loss of chance in the amount of 40%. His Honour ought, in all of the circumstances, to have assessed that discount as nil or, alternatively, as a nominal percentage not exceeding 5%.

4. The learned Trial Judge erred (Costs Judgment [41]) (CJ [41]) in determining that the damages awarded in favour of the Appellant were “personal injury damages” as defined in s 11 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) and, consequently, erred in concluding that cl 2 of Schedule 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) operated so as to impose a cap upon the quantum of costs recoverable by the Appellant in the Court below.”

28. The raising and abandonment of the other grounds upon which the applicant originally relied, and to which the respondent filed responsive written submissions, has costs consequences to be considered later.

29. The application for leave to appeal and the appeal, if leave be given, were heard concurrently.

Ground 3

30. I would not give leave to the applicant to appeal on ground 3. The ground raises no issue of principle nor potential injustice that is more than merely arguable (Be Financial Services Pty Ltd v Das [2012] NSWCA 164 at [32]-[39]; The Age Company Ltd & Ors v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; [2013] NSWCA 26 at [13]).

31. Although not an employee of Sunrise Cabs, the applicant was a deemed employee of that company pursuant to cl 10 of Sch 1 to the Workplace Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998. He had no records to substantiate his claimed weekly loss of earnings.

32. The primary judge found that the applicant, who had migrated to Australia in 1989, established an export business in about 1997 whereby he bought second hand clothing and exported it to Ghana (J [10] and [11]). His Honour also found that from about late 2009 the applicant worked 12 hour shifts as a taxi driver where he hired taxis from their owners on a shift-by-shift basis. He paid a hire fee and paid for fuel and kept the takings (J [12]).

33. The applicant had no records to substantiate his earnings as a taxi driver. His tax returns for the years ended 30 June 2009 and 2010 recorded his main salary or wage occupation as being that of an “importer”. His tax returns disclosed an income from his salary or wage as an importer and “other business income” against which were set off expenses which exceeded his income. The expenses comprised “purchases and other costs”, depreciation, motor vehicle expenses and other expenses. They contain no corroboration of his earning income as an independent contractor driving taxis. Nor were they inconsistent with his contention that he had derived such income.

34. The first two applications before the Workers Compensation Commission were discontinued in order that the applicant could seek corroborative evidence of his working as a taxi driver and his claim to have earned $1,000 per week as a taxi driver (J [27]). According to his solicitor before the Workers Compensation Commission, Mr Eggins of PK Simpson & Co, the applicant’s accountant, Mack Partners, provided a letter dated 3 April 2012 in which they advised that they were the tax agents for the applicant, that he had two businesses, an importing business which was his core business and a taxi driving business for which he earned $1,000 per week. They advised that the amount had not been audited. Mr Eggins deposed that he received a copy of a statutory declaration prepared by the plaintiff dated 4 April 2012, which was handwritten and difficult to read. That document was not reproduced in the appeal papers. Mr Eggins deposed that, on his reading of the document, the applicant declared that he had no information to provide as he always recorded his time and hours on a worksheet and any enquiries regarding such information should be directed to Sunrise Cabs.

35. The primary judge recorded that the evidence filed with the third application in the Commission included a statement from the applicant and correspondence from his accountant explaining the inability to produce financial records. The primary judge said that the applicant’s business activity statements and income tax returns had been prepared on the basis of primary records provided to him by the applicant which had been returned to him. The applicant said that those records were lost when he was evicted from his residence.

36. Sunrise Cabs was deregistered on 2 January 2011. The primary judge said that the correspondence and subpoenas addressed to Sunrise Cabs was sent at a time when it was in the process of being deregistered and was unlikely to be answered (J [38]).

37. There may have been a number of reasons why no documents to substantiate the applicant’s claimed earnings were obtainable on subpoena from Sunrise Cabs. One may have been that the documents were destroyed after Sunrise Cabs was deregistered. Another may have been that Sunrise Cabs was not itself the owner of the vehicles that were the subject of a contract of bailment between the owner of the vehicle and the applicant, but rather managed the arrangements for such bailments between the driver and the owner of the vehicle. If that were the position, there would be a real question as to whether Sunrise Cabs, as distinct from the owner of the vehicle which the applicant was driving on the night he was assaulted, would be taken to be his employer. A third possibility was that there were no records to produce because the applicant had only hired a taxi from Sunrise Cabs on the day on which he was assaulted. Although the document was not reproduced in the appeal papers, the primary judge recorded that a statement prepared by the insurer had been taken from a Krishna Narula, the proprietor of Sunrise Cabs, who stated that the applicant had only hired a taxi from Sunrise Cabs on the one occasion, being the date on which he was assaulted and had had no prior relationship with the company. The applicant disputed the truth of the statement (J [38]).

38. Mr Narula’s statement tendered in the proceedings in the District Court would not have been evidence of the facts asserted. But it was evidence that would have been before the Commission had the proceedings not been settled at the conciliation hearing before the Commission but proceeded to arbitration. Whether Mr Narula or the plaintiff would have given oral evidence before the arbitrator, or whether the matter would have been decided on the papers, is not known. The primary judge recorded that in the conciliation hearing the arbitrator queried whether the applicant could prove wage loss from his inability to work as a taxi driver (J [30]).

39. The primary judge’s discount of 40% of the maximum amount, which the applicant could have achieved before the Commission had the matter proceeded to a contested hearing, was open to him. The case raises no question of principle. I would refuse leave to appeal on ground 3.

Ground 4

40. Ground 4 raises an important issue concerning the application of cl 2 of Sch 1 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act. The issue has not been decided in this Court and, for the reasons that follow, is not determined by the judgment of the High Court in Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378 which the primary judge applied.

41. The primary judge followed the decision of Harrison AsJ in Hammond v Stern [2013] NSWSC 70 in which the same issue arose. Harrison AsJ’s decision was affirmed on appeal by Button J (Hammond v Stern (2014) 86 NSWLR 612; [2014] NSWSC 864). It appears that the primary judge was not referred to Button J’s decision. Nonetheless it supports the primary judge’s conclusion. Both the judgments of Harrison AsJ and Button J are carefully reasoned. Nonetheless, for the reasons which follow, I do not think that they are consistent with the conclusion of the majority of the High Court in New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 248 CLR 417; [2012] HCA 57. Accordingly, I would give leave to the plaintiff to appeal on ground 4.

42. Ground 4 turns upon the proper interpretation to be given to cl 2 of Sch 1 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act when read with the definition of “personal injury damages” in cl 1(1) of the Schedule and the definition of that term in s 11 of the Civil Liability Act. When the definition of “personal injury damages” is read into cl 2 of Sch 1 it relevantly provides:

“2(1) If the amount recovered on a claim for damages that relate to the death of or injury to a person does not exceed $100,000, the maximum costs for legal services provided to a party in connection with the claim are fixed as follows:

…”

43. The applicant’s claim for damages was for economic loss of his chance to receive payments of weekly workers’ compensation payments following his injuries when assaulted in the course of his work as a taxi driver. The genesis of his claim was his suffering injury. If he had not been injured he would have had no claim to workers’ compensation payments and no chance of receiving an award. Hence the respondents submitted that his claim for damages related to his injury even though his claim was not a claim for damages for personal injury. The respondent submitted that the words “relate to” denote any connection between the death or injury to a person and the claim for damages. They submitted that it was sufficient that the claim for damages for loss of the chance of receiving workers’ compensation payments arose from the applicant’s having suffered injury and it therefore followed that the claim for such damages related to injury to the applicant within the meaning of cl 2(1) of the Schedule. They relied on the decision of the High Court in Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross and of Button J in Hammond v Stern.

44. In the course of oral submissions it was pointed out from the Bench that judgment had been given against each respondent for its and his apportionable responsibility for the claim. Section 34(1) of the Civil Liability Act relevantly provides:

“34 Application of Part

(1) This Part applies to the following claims (apportionable claims)—

(a)    a claim for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages (whether in contract, tort or otherwise) arising from a failure to take reasonable care, but not including any claim arising out of personal injury,

...”

45. The judgments given against each respondent were thus given on the conceded basis that the applicant’s claim was one for economic loss that was not a “…claim arising out of personal injury”.

46. When this was pointed out, Ms Steele SC, who appeared with Mr Beran for the respondents, submitted that whether or not the matter was caught within Pt 4 of the Civil Liability Act, and how it was dealt with in that Part, was not relevant to whether it fell within the definition of personal injury damages under cl 2 of Sch 1 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act. She submitted that in Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross the High Court held that the scheme under Sch 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act operated independently of the Civil Liability Act.

47. The applicant submitted that his claim for damages for professional negligence for economic loss of the chance to recover workers’ compensation payments had a different character from his earlier claim in the Commission. He submitted that his claim did not “relate to” the “death of or injury to a person” but rather “related to” the breach by legal practitioners of their common law duty of care. The applicant submitted that cll 2(1) and (4)(b) of Sch 1 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act apply only to cases in which a direct claim for personal injury damages is brought.

48. The applicant also submitted that it would be incongruous if a lawyer who is negligent in the conduct of his or her client’s claim for personal injury damages, or workers’ compensation arising from personal injury, could take the benefit of the cap provided in cl 2 of Sch 1 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act. The applicant submitted that it was clear that that was not the purpose for which the provision was passed.

49. Section 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) requires that in the interpretation of cl 2 of Sch 1 of the Uniform Law Application Act a construction be adopted that would promote the purpose or object underlying the provision, in preference to one that would not promote that purpose or object. The extrinsic materials whose use is permitted by s 34 of the Interpretation Act may be considered either to confirm that the legal meaning of the Act is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text, or to determine the meaning of the provision if it is ambiguous or obscure or if the ordinary meaning would lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

50. The predecessor to Sch 1 to the Uniform Law Application Act was introduced by an amendment to the Legal Profession Act 1987 made by the Civil Liability Act 2002 No 22. Section 198D introduced to the Legal Profession Act 1987 in 2002 was in substantially the same terms as the current cl 2 of Sch 1 to the Uniform Law Application Act. That section was substantially replicated in the Legal Profession Act 2004 and re-enacted in the Uniform Law Application Act.

51. In the Second Reading Speech for the Civil Liability Bill that introduced s 198D of the Legal Profession Act 1987, the then Premier stated that the object of the proposed Act was to reduce public liability premiums. This object informed the amendments made to the Legal Profession Act. The Premier also said that the cap on fees would promote efficiency on the part of the legal profession and help to contain costs (New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 28 May 2002 at 2085-2086). In Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross Kiefel J said (at [95]):

“The Second Reading Speech also identified a wider common purpose for the controls effected by the Liability Act and the limits placed on costs by the LP Act. The Liability Act was enacted, and the LP Act amended, in response to what was perceived to be a crisis in the affordability of public liability insurance, which was adversely affecting many bodies and small businesses in the community. The crisis had been brought about by substantial increases in premiums charged for insurance of that kind. Premiums are directly affected by the sums insurers are required to pay by way of indemnity for awards of damages and legal costs following upon claims for personal injuries caused by negligence.”

52. It may be accepted that the interpretation of cl 2 of Sch 1 to the Uniform Law Application Act for which the respondents contend, would not promote the purpose or object of the legislation of reducing premiums for policies of public liability insurance. It does not follow from s 33 of the Interpretation Act that the contrary construction should, on that account, be preferred. Neither the construction contended for by the applicant, nor that contended for by the respondent, would promote the purpose or object underlying the amendments made in 2002 of seeking to reduce public liability insurance premiums. The fact that the 2002 amendments, that have been brought forward to the current Act, were not enacted for the purpose of promoting the interests of professional indemnity insurers, or their policy holders or shareholders, is a neutral consideration.

53. The words “relate to” on their face denote a wide connection between the claim for damages and a person’s death or injury. In Hammond v Stern (2014) 86 NSWLR 612; [2014] NSWSC 864, Button J rightly observed:

“[44] The words ‘relate to’ appear in countless statutory contexts…

[45] What is clear from the authorities is that the words, or words of like effect (such as ‘in respect of’), are capable of broad import: Powers v Maher [1959] HCA 52; 103 CLR 478 at 484-5 per Kitto J; State Government Insurance Office (Queensland) v Crittenden [1966] HCA 56; 117 CLR 412 at 416 per Taylor J; O'Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd [1990] HCA 16; 169 CLR 356 at 374 per Toohey and Gaudron J.

…

[47] The phrase ‘relate to’ denotes a connection or relationship, direct or indirect, between one subject matter and another: see O'Grady at 376 per McHugh J. That is not to say, however, that the phrase warrants a broad reading in every instance. Ultimately, the meaning attaching to the phrase must depend on the context in which it is found: Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland v Technical Products Pty Ltd [1988] HCA 49; 165 CLR 642 at 653-654 per Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ.”

54. In Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross the plaintiffs sued for damages for personal injury suffered as a result of an assault by hotel security staff. They sued the defendants as insurers of the company that employed the staff. They alleged that personal injuries were inflicted on them intentionally and with an intention to injure (at [2]). The claim was settled for less than $100,000 on the basis that the defendant would pay the plaintiffs’ costs. The issue was whether the costs were capped at $10,000 pursuant to s 198D(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1987, that was in materially the same terms as what is now cl 2 of Sch 1 to the Uniform Law Application Act. Costs payable to an applicant for compensation under Pt 2 of the Victim Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW), for legal services provided in respect of a claim under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 or a claim for work injury damages as defined in the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998, or for damages for dust diseases brought under the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 were excluded from the operation of s 198D by s 198C(2) (at [5]). The same exclusions are now found in cl 1(2) of Sch 1 to the Uniform Law Application Act.

55. Section 9(2) of the Civil Liability Act (subsequently repealed by cl 5 of Sch 2 of the Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 and substantially replaced by s 3B) provided that

“9(2) The following awards of damages are excluded from the operation of this part:

(a)    an award where the fault concerned is an intentional act that is done with intent to cause injury or death…”

56. Section 3B(1)(a) now relevantly provides:

“3B Civil liability excluded from Act

(1) The provisions of this Act do not apply to or in respect of civil liability (and awards of damages in those proceedings) as follows:

(a) civil liability in respect of an intentional act that is done with intent to cause injury or death or that is sexual assault or other sexual misconduct—the whole Act except Part 7 (Self-defence and recovery by criminals) in respect of civil liability in respect of an intentional act that is done with intent to cause injury or death…”

57. The issue in Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross was whether as the damages recovered were in respect of alleged intentional acts committed with the intention of causing injury such that Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act did not apply to the cause of action alleged, s 198D(1) of the Legal Profession Act fixing the amount of costs for legal services provided in connection with a claim for “personal injury damages” also did not apply. “Personal injury damages” was defined as having the same meaning as in Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002.

58. The Court of Appeal (Cross v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters; Thelander v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters [2011] NSWCA 136) held that the phrase “personal injury damages” did not merely pick up the words of the definition in the Civil Liability Act, but took account of the meaning of that term by reference to the application section of the Civil Liability Act. As the Civil Liability Act did not apply to the particular claim for personal injury damages, it was held that the cost capping provision in the Legal Profession Act 1987 did not apply (at [49], [59]).

59. A majority of the High Court (French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ) disagreed. French CJ and Hayne J said:

“[33] The construction favoured by the Court of Appeal and supported in this Court by the respondents must be rejected. The text of the provisions at issue in these appeals readily yields the construction which the appellants urged: that the expression "personal injury damages" when used in the costs limiting provisions of Div 5B of Pt 11 of the Legal Profession Act1987 extended to any and every form of damages that relate to the death of or personal or bodily injury to a person caused by the fault of another person. In its terms, the definition of "personal injury damages" contained in the Liability Act and picked up by the Legal Profession Act1987 neither required nor permitted any different application according to whether the "fault" which founded the claim was a failure to take reasonable care or the commission of an intentional act with intent to injure. And s 198C(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1987, by providing that "personal injury damages" has the same meaning as in the Liability Act, naturally and immediately directed attention to the definition of that expression in the Liability Act, which used the cognate word "means": "personal injury damages means ..." (emphasis added). It did not refer to the operation or application of the Liability Act. It did not direct attention to whatever was identified as being the legal effect or consequence which the Liability Act produced by using that defined expression in its various provisions.

…

[35] … None of the statutory provisions that depended on the composite expressions "claim for personal injury damages" or "award of personal injury damages" affected the sense in which the defined expression "personal injury damages" was used in the relevant Acts. There is no textual reason to limit the expression "personal injury damages" in the Legal Profession Act1987 to those claims for personal injury damages the award of which was regulated by the Liability Act. ”

60. An additional reason for rejecting the decision of the Court of Appeal was that the exclusions to the operation of the Civil Liability Act and the exclusions to the costs limiting provisions in the Legal Profession Act did not have a coextensive operation (at [36]).

61. Kiefel J also held that the two statutes operated independently of each other and that there was no warrant for reading the Legal Profession Act by reference to the application of the Civil Liability Act (at [102]-[103]). Her Honour said:

“[102] These indicia confirm that the two statutes operated independently of each other and provide no warrant for reading the LP Act by reference to the application of the Liability Act. Whether a claim resulted in an award of damages which was, or was not, calculated by reference to the Liability Act had no bearing upon the operation of Div 5B of Pt 11 of the LP Act. Division 5B was concerned with the proportion between the amount of the damages recovered and the legal costs associated with the claim that resulted in recovery. Division 5B operated universally with respect to legal costs where a claim resulted in recovery of damages of no more than $100,000.

[103] The operation of Div 5B read in this way is nevertheless consistent with the broader purpose of reducing the cost of public liability insurance. Division 5B sought to achieve this purpose by means which differed from those employed by the Liability Act. Nevertheless, in so far as the two statutes were both directed to that purpose, it may be expected that they would not operate inconsistently with each other. Division 5B of Pt 11 of the LP Act, applied universally, was not inconsistent with the purpose underlying the exclusion of awards of damages for personal injuries resulting from intentional acts, namely that compensation for such damages not be limited. So far as concerns the costs of legal services in seeking an award, subject to the exceptions in Div 5B, a claimant's lawyer could not charge more than the maximum amount specified except by agreement with the claimant and the other party could not recover more than that amount in the event that the claimant was unsuccessful.”

62. Crennan and Bell JJ dissented. They held that the extrinsic materials indicated that the Civil Liability Act was enacted to deal with a perceived problem involving the high cost of negligence claims and that the costs limitations provisions in the Legal Profession Act were enacted to remedy the same problem. As the Civil Liability Act did not apply to the intentional infliction of personal injury, s 198C and 198D of the Legal Profession Act 1987 ought not be construed as if the definition of “personal injury damages” had the same meaning as in s 11 of the Civil Liability Act but rather the reference to that phrase having the same meaning as in Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act meant that the costs capping provision in the Legal Profession Act applied only to those claims for personal injury damages that fell within the operation of Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act (at [58]-[60]).

63. Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross did not address the issues raised in the present appeal. There was no issue in that case as to the width of the words “damages that relate to the death of or injury to a person” in the definition of personal injury damages as applied in the Legal Profession Act. That issue did arise in New South Wales v Williamson. Again, the plaintiff’s claim was compromised for less than $100,000 on the basis that the defendant would pay the plaintiff’s costs. The question was whether the costs were capped. Section 338(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) imposed the cap where the amount recovered on a “claim for personal injury damages” did not exceed $100,000. Section 337(1) provided that “personal injury damages” had the same meaning as in Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002. Section 11 of the Civil Liability Act is in the same terms as quoted earlier in these reasons, as meaning “damages that relate to the death of or injury to a person”.

64. In New South Wales v Williamson the plaintiff alleged that he had been unlawfully arrested and assaulted by police officers and then dragged to his feet and lifted into the back of a police wagon and further assaulted. The pleaded facts, if established, would give rise to causes of action in assault and battery, and false imprisonment. He claimed exemplary damages. His particulars of injury and disability included psychological injury as well as feelings of humiliation, indignity, anger and frustration (State of New South Wales v Williamson [2011] NSWCA 183 at [13]-[14]).

65. The claim was settled for a sum of less than $100,000 plus costs and the issue was whether costs were capped by s 338 of the Legal Profession Act 2004.

66. In the Court of Appeal, Campbell JA who gave the leading judgment said:

“[65] Mr Simpkins SC, counsel for the Appellant, accepted that not only was there a reference to false imprisonment in the heading to para 7 of the Statement of Claim, but also that it was plain:

‘from the drafting of the statement of claim that intermingled with those allegations [of serious assaults] were allegations essentially related to him being deprived of his liberty at least for some period of time. I think I have to accept that. So we end up with an intermingled claim ...’ (T 11)

[66] Mr Simpkins submits that where there is a claim of false imprisonment, as part of which it is contended that the plaintiff has, in consequence of the false imprisonment, sustained some effect on his or her mental state, that claim is for personal injury damages. I do not accept that claiming that one of the consequences of a false imprisonment is the suffering of a personal injury, is sufficient to characterise the entire claim for false imprisonment as one for ‘personal injury damages’.

[67] I recognise that, to the extent to which the Respondent claimed compensatory and aggravated damages for the alleged false imprisonment, by reason of developing psychological impairment, there may be room for argument whether such damages, if ultimately awarded, would have been ‘personal injury damages’ within the meaning of the Civil Liability Act . The extension of the ordinary meaning of ‘injury’ to (relevantly) ‘impairment of a person's mental condition’ effected by s 11 Civil Liability Act could arguably have the effect that damages for anxiety and distress can be ‘personal injury damages’ within the meaning of s 11: cf, eg, Ibbett [2005] NSWCA 445 at [124]-[125] per Ipp JA, [212], [216] per Basten JA; State of NSW v Corby [2010] NSWCA 27; (2010) 76 NSWLR 439 at [41] per Basten JA (Beazley and Tobias JJA agreeing). It seems more doubtful that damages for humiliation and injured feelings, not amounting to a psychological injury or something that caused the plaintiff's body or mind to operate less well, would if awarded be ‘personal injury damages’. An argument might also be available to the effect that exemplary damages, if awarded, were also ‘personal injury damages’. That argument seems doubtful, given that exemplary damages are awarded not as compensation but for other purposes (including punishment of the defendant for a high-handed disregard of the plaintiff's rights, deterrence of the defendant to prevent him or her from repeating such conduct, and marking the condemnation of the court for the defendant's conduct: XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448 at 471; Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1 at 8-9). It is unnecessary to decide those questions, because the claim the Respondent brought sought damages, at least in part, for having been wrongfully deprived of his liberty, and loss of dignity. It is not submitted that such damages, if awarded, were bound to be negligible, and thus could be ignored for the purpose of deciding whether the Respondent's claim was one for ‘personal injury damages’.

[68] The judgment in the court below was for a single sum of money, not allocated as between the different causes of action on which the Respondent sued, or the different heads of damage that he claimed. Because he claimed at least some damages that were not ‘damages for personal injury’, it is not possible to characterise the settlement sum that he received as an ‘amount recovered on a claim for personal injury damages’… "

67. Hodgson JA said (at [2]):

“I agree with Campbell JA, for reasons he gives, that:

(1) A claim for damages for false imprisonment, at least insofar as it extends to a claim for damages for deprivation of liberty and loss of dignity, is not a claim for damages that relate to the death or injury to a person.

(2) When such a claim is included in a claim for damages, is not a severable part of that claim, and is not negligible, the claim for damages is not "a claim for personal injury damages" within the meaning of s 338 of the Legal Profession Act 2004.

(3) The appeal must be dismissed on that ground.”

68. Macfarlan JA also agreed with Campbell JA’s reasons on this issue ([117]).

69. In the High Court the State of New South Wales submitted:

“The words ‘relate to’ should not be construed narrowly. ‘Injury’ is defined by section 11 to include impairment of a person’s mental condition. So far as the claim for false imprisonment included a claim for humiliation and injured feelings (including psychological trauma) was for personal injury damages,”

and

“the fact that a claim included as an aspect of the heads of loss a claim for damages for loss of dignity is not relevant to the character of the claim as one for personal injury damage”. (248 CLR 417 at 419, 420).

70. In the opening oral submissions of counsel for the State the argument was put thus:

“…the consequence of reading in the s 11 definition would be that the relevant context for the capping would be a claim which was for damages that related to, relevantly, injury. It would not be necessary to search for a claim that was for personal injury… The purpose of making that opening submission is that it has a relevance when one comes to consider what the consequence is of a claim for damages for false imprisonment that includes other aspects, such as a claim for cost dignity or a claim for deprivation of liberty. Because in relation to those heads of damage the question is not were those heads personal injury damages and was the claim for personal injury damages insofar as it sought to cover the loss. The relevant question is whether those aspects of the claim were damages that related to injury. The submission that we put is that if there is false imprisonment and if there are, as a result of that, injuries to the person then associated incidents such as the loss of a sense of dignity and deprivation of liberty are properly within the concept of relating to that injury.” start="71">

That submission was rejected.

All of the Justices of the High Court dismissed the appeal. Crennan and Bell JJ, who dissented in Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross, did so on the basis that a claim for “personal injury damages” did not include a claim for damages for personal injury occasioned by an act done with the intention of causing injury (at [39]). Kiefel J agreed with the reasons of French CJ and Hayne J that a claim for personal injury damages did not include a claim for damages for false imprisonment (at [45]). French CJ and Hayne J noted (at [32]) that the plaintiff alleged that the batteries he had suffered had caused him personal injury. Their Honours observed that it was far from clear that he alleged that the wrongful deprivation of his liberty had itself impaired his physical or mental condition (at [32]) but assumed that he alleged his false imprisonment had caused him some personal injury (at [34]). Their Honours held that even on that assumption, because the claim for false imprisonment necessarily included a claim for damages on account of the deprivation of liberty with accompanying loss of dignity and harm to reputation (which is not itself physical injury as defined), the claim for false imprisonment, to the extent it sought damages for deprivation of liberty, was not a “claim for personal injury damages” (at [34]). Their Honours said:

“[35] The judgment entered in this matter in the District Court did not identify how the damages were computed or on what account they were allowed. On its face, the judgment was consistent with the allowance of damages only for the deprivation of liberty with no allowance for any impairment of the respondent's physical or mental condition. It is not possible to show that the sum which the respondent recovered was ‘recovered on a claim for personal injury damages’. The costs limiting provisions of Div 9 of Pt 3.2 of the Legal Profession Act2004 were thus not engaged.”

73. The majority of the High Court must be taken to have rejected the appellant’s submission that to satisfy the requirement that the claim for damages for loss of dignity as a result of false imprisonment “related to” the plaintiff’s injury, it was enough that the same false imprisonment had caused him psychological injury, so that each head of damage claimed “related to” injury to the plaintiff.

74. Rather, it was held both in the Court of Appeal and in the High Court that because some part of the damages claimed for false imprisonment was not damages “for” personal injury and because the settlement was for an indivisible sum, it was not possible to say that the amount received was an amount recovered “on a claim for personal injury damages”.

75. It follows that the majority of the High Court in New South Wales v Williamson did not read the words in s 11 of the Civil Liability Act “damages that relate to the death of or injury to a person” as having a wider sense than as meaning damages for personal injury or death to a person.

76. In this appeal the respondent submitted that:

“the Williamson decision doesn’t take it any further than the Cross decision. If the Cross decision, where the majority look at this provision and say, unless it’s obviously absurd, then it’s appropriate to take a literal approach to the interpretation of this provision”.

77. I do not agree.

78. In Certain Lloyd Underwriters v Cross the majority of the High Court adopted a literal interpretation of the legislation in rejecting the purposive construction adopted by this Court that the expression “personal injury damages” in s 198C(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1987 applied only to such damages (as defined) to which Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act applied. The Court did not otherwise address the scope of the expression “relate to” in the definition of “personal injury damages” in s 11 of the Civil Liability Act.

79. That issue was addressed by the High Court in New South Wales v Williamson. There, the ambiguous but potentially wide expression “relate to” was construed in the narrow sense of meaning “for”.

80. In Hammond v Stern [2013] NSWSC 70 (Harrison AsJ) and Hammond v Stern (2014) 86 NSWLR 612; [2014] NSWSC 864 (Button J) the plaintiff sued his former lawyers for professional negligence for loss of lump sum workers’ compensation and for common law damages for personal injury as a result of his lawyers not having brought such claims in earlier litigation. The claim against his former lawyers was settled for $60,000. The issue was whether his costs were capped pursuant to s 338(1)(a) at 20% of the amount recovered. At first instance, Harrison AsJ, and on appeal Button J, held that the costs were so capped.

81. Harrison AsJ held that the claims “related to” the personal injury suffered by the plaintiff. Her Honour quoted that part of para 41 of the reasons of French CJ and Hayne J in Cross where their Honours said:

“A claim for personal injury damages includes any and every form of claim for damages that relate to the death of or personal or bodily injury to a person…”.

82. Her Honour rejected the plaintiff’s submission that the claim that a possible claim for personal injury damages was squandered or allowed to cease to exist was not itself a claim for personal injury damages (at [37] and [45]).

83. On appeal (Hammond v Stern (2014) 86 NSWLR 612; [2014] NSWSC 864), Button J focused on the width of the expression “relate to” in the definition of personal injury damages in s 11 of the Civil Liability Act. Button J correctly observed that the expression is potentially one of broad import and can denote a connection or relationship, direct or indirect, between one subject matter and another, but that its meaning must depend upon context (at [45]-[47] quoted above).

84. Button J said:

“[52] Both parties observed that neither decision (viz Cross or Williamson) is directly on point with regard to the question of the construction of the phrase ’that relate to’."

85. Evidently Button J was not assisted with submissions directed to the necessary point upon which Williamson was decided as to the scope of the phrase “relate to”.

86. In the absence of appropriate submissions as to the reasoning of the majority of the High Court in New South Wales v Williamson, Button J concluded as follows:

“[59] I turn now to the construction of the phrase under consideration. I consider that a claim for professional negligence that arises from a failure properly to prosecute a claim for personal injury is a claim for damages that "relate to the death of or injury to a person". That is so for seven reasons.

[60] First, Parliament has used a phrase that inherently connotes indirect connection.

[61] Secondly, the fact that Parliament has used the preposition "for" in other parts of the Civil Liability Act strongly suggests that Parliament intended that a distinction be drawn in this context.

[62] Thirdly, as a matter of plain language, I consider that one can say that the damages received by the appellant as a result of the settlement of his professional negligence claim "relate to" the personal injury with regard to which his lawyers were negligent.

[63] Fourthly, in a different but related context within the same statute, the New South Wales Court of Appeal has approached damages in a professional negligence claim founded upon personal injury as being "personal injury damages". Even accepting that that approach is obiter, it remains powerfully persuasive.

[64] Fifthly, in s 337(1) of the Legal Profession Act, Parliament has expressly and exhaustively excluded various forms of action from the costs limitation provision. If Parliament had intended to exclude claims for professional negligence founded on personal injury (and other derivative claims) from the cost limitation provision, it could easily have done so.

[65] Sixthly, to the extent that I should consider matters of policy (at least to the extent of avoiding absurd results in statutory interpretation) I do not consider it anomalous for Parliament, having created a costs limitation provision with regard to personal injury claims, to extend that costs limitation provision to professional negligence claims founded on such claims.

[66] Seventhly, to my mind the underlying personal injury was not merely a matter of background or context. It was the failure competently to enforce the rights of the appellant with regard to his personal injury that led directly to his claim for professional negligence. It is true that the defendants in the professional negligence claim were not the person who injured the appellant. But the fact is that, looking at the matter holistically, the damages obtained in the professional negligence claim were the recompense (to use that word in a non-technical sense) that the appellant ultimately received as a result of the original personal injury.

87. If the matter were free from authority and the question were only one of literal construction, there would be much to be said for this construction. But the matter is not free from authority. The decision of this Court in State of New South Wales v Williamson and of the High Court in New South Wales v Williamson does not permit a construction of the phrase “that relates to” as connoting a merely indirect connection between the claim for damages and the personal injury to which the claim for damages relates. New South Wales v Williamson requires that the claim for damages be a claim for the personal injury suffered.

88. That construction is consistent with the purpose of the original amendments to the Legal Profession Act that was the progenitor of the current legislation, that had the purpose of reducing the cost of public liability insurance and was concerned with legal costs associated with claims for personal injury damages where the sum recovered was no more than $100,000 (Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross per Kiefel J at [99] and [103]).

89. The fourth of Button J’s reasons (Hammond v Stern at [63]) referred to the decision of Allsop P, with whom Macfarlan and Young JJA agreed in Firth v Sutton [2010] NSWCA 90. There a solicitor was found liable in negligence for failing properly to pursue his client’s claim for personal injuries. No complaint was made in relation to the prosecution of the client’s workers’ compensation claim (at [17]). Button J said that in Firth v Sutton Allsop P “…affirmed the application of s 18 of the Civil Liability Act to the determination of interest on damages in a professional negligence suit founded on personal injury” (at [34]).

90. I do not read Allsop P’s reasons in Firth v Sutton as having expressed any view upon the application of s 18 to the awarding of interest on the action for the lost opportunity to pursue a personal injury damages claim. As I read his Honour’s reasons, Allsop P considered that the primary judge was correct in characterising the claim as a loss of opportunity action but expressed no view on the primary judge’s determination that interest was controlled by s 18 of the Civil Liability Act. Rather, his Honour invited submissions from the parties on the question of interest, expressing no view as to whether the primary judge’s approach was correct (at [189]-[192]).

91. When the matter returned for the entry of final orders the parties provided calculations of interest. Both parties’ calculations used the long term bond rate provided for by s 18 (Firth v Sutton (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 109 at [4]). The Court was not called on to decide the issue.

92. I respectfully disagree with the observations of Hoeben J (as his Honour then was) in Pritchard v Trius Constructions Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1114, where his Honour considered that Allsop P had expressed a view in favour of the approach adopted by the primary judge in Firth v Sutton in regard to the interest payable, such that his Honour was bound by the authority of Firth v Sutton to find that interest on a claim for professional negligence in the conduct of a claim for personal injury damages was governed by s 18 ([22]).

93. In any event, the question is to be determined not in the light of Firth v Sutton, but having regard to the High Court’s reasoning in New South Wales v Williamson. For the reasons above, New South Wales v Williamson requires a narrower construction of the words “relate to” than their connoting an indirect connection but requires them to be read in the narrower sense of “for”.

94. For these reasons I would uphold ground 4 of the notice of appeal. Order 1 made by the primary judge on 17 June 2021 should be varied by deleting the cap of $10,000. The respondents did not dispute that it was appropriate that they pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings in the District Court in the proportions 70% to the first respondent and 30% to the second respondent.

95. Although the applicant is entitled to succeed on one of the grounds on which he sought leave to appeal, he has either abandoned or failed on the other grounds on which he sought leave to appeal. The ground on which he has succeeded raised a separable issue. The parties have had mixed success on the application.

96. Prima facie costs will follow the event. But the applicant advanced two claims: one concerning the quantum of damages, the other costs. He failed on the first and succeeded on the second. The issues are separable. Where parties have had mixed success on separable issues such that it is not appropriate that a successful plaintiff or appellant (or defendant or respondent) receive the whole of his or her costs, the perspective of both parties is to be considered (Oikos Constructions Pty Ltd t/as Lars Fischer Constructions v Ostin & Anor (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 98 at [28]). The respondent succeeded on the applicant’s claim for leave to appeal on the quantum of damages claim and would be entitled to its costs of that claim and the grounds the applicant abandoned.

97. Having regard not only to the two grounds that were the subject of the oral submissions, but the other grounds that were the subject of extensive written submissions but were abandoned, I cannot say that more costs would have been spent in this court on the ground that succeeded than on the grounds which were abandoned or failed.

98. I would make no order as to the costs of the summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

99. I therefore propose the following orders:

1. Grant the applicant leave to appeal on ground 4 of the proposed “revised draft notice of appeal” dated 18 October 2021.

2. Otherwise dismiss the applicant’s summons for leave to appeal.

3. Order that within seven days the applicant file a notice of appeal in accordance with the leave granted.

4. Allow the appeal against order 1 made in the District Court on 17 June 2021.

5. Vary the order made by the District Court on 17 June 2021 by deleting the words “in the sum of $10,000”.

6. No order as to costs of the summons for leave to appeal or the appeal, with the intent that the parties bear their own costs of the proceedings in this Court.

100. McCALLUM JA: Save as to the issue of the costs of the summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal, I agree with White JA, for the reasons his Honour has stated. I also agree with Garling J’s additional reasons. As to the issue of the costs of the summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal, I agree with Garling J. Accordingly, I agree with orders 1 to 5 proposed by White JA and order 6 proposed by Garling J.

101. GARLING J: I agree with White JA that leave ought to be granted to the applicant on Ground 4 of the proposed Notice of Appeal, and that his appeal ought to be allowed. I would not grant leave to appeal on the other proposed ground of appeal.

Cap on Costs Issue

102. I wish to add these reasons to the judgment of White JA. I will refer to the applicant as the appellant.

103. Ground 4 raises a matter of the proper interpretation of Cll 1 and 2 of Sch 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (“the LP Act”). The relevant provisions are set out at [22]-[25] above.

104. Until the appellant’s lawyers acted negligently, he made no claim for damages of any kind against anyone. Whilst he claimed to have been physically injured at work as a taxi driver, the appellant’s claim was that he had a statutory entitlement from his deemed employer for weekly payments pursuant to the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW).

105. The factual circumstances in which the appellant’s injuries occurred did not give rise to, nor did the appellant ever claim to be entitled to, an award of damages for his injuries against anyone, much less his lawyers whom he retained only after his injuries had occurred.

106. Clause 2 of Sch 1 of the LP Act limits the maximum costs for legal services provided to a “party”. The party to whom the legal services were provided here, and to whom the Court below applied Cl 2, was the appellant. Clause 2 operates only on a claim “for personal injury damages” (emphasis added). That is to say a claim for damages that, relevantly, relates to injury to a person.

107. Even according to the much used phrase “relate to” an expansive definition, which for the reasons given persuasively by White JA would not be the correct approach, there is no part of the appellant’s claim for damages for breach of the retainer of the respondents which relates to personal injury.

108. The retainer with the solicitors was described somewhat succinctly in these terms:

“I, Kofe Osei, hereby instruct P K Simpson & Co to act in respect of my Workers Compensation Proceeding.”

109. Any written retainer with the barrister was not tendered in evidence, but in his Defence the barrister admits he was retained by the solicitors to appear for the appellant at a conciliation and/or arbitration hearing before the Workers Compensation Commission on 29 January 2013.

110. Neither of the retainers agreed to provide any legal services which referred to or included the bringing of any claim for damages against the person at fault for the appellant’s injuries. No such proceedings were ever brought. The proceedings in the Workers Compensation Commission were not a claim for damages.

111. The following propositions clearly emerge:

1. the circumstances in which the appellant was injured (i.e. assault by an unknown person) did not give rise to any claim for personal injury damages;

2. his deemed employer, Sunrise Cabs, was not said to be tortiously liable for the appellant’s injuries – hence, the appellant brought no claim for “work injury damages” under the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW);

3. the appellant’s proceedings in the Workers Compensation Commission were not for damages but were for a statutory entitlement to a weekly benefit;

4. the retainers between the appellant and each of his solicitors and barrister did not seek the provision of legal services to make a claim for personal injury damages;

5. the legal services provided to the appellant which were the subject of the cap under Cl 2 of Sch 1 of the LP Act were all of the services appropriate to enable him to claim he had suffered pure economic loss, calculated by reference to the principle of a loss of chance of a more favourable outcome in his claim for weekly benefits, because of the negligence and breach of contract of this solicitors and barrister.

112. As I see the matter, the Court below erred in concluding, by following the decision of Harrison AsJ in Hammond v Stern [2013] NSWSC 70, that the costs of the appellant at trial fell within the cap provided in Sch 1 of the LP Act because they related to personal injury. As the propositions above show, not even in the broadest interpretation of the phrase “relate to”, could it be said that here the appellant’s costs related to damages for personal injury.

Costs of the Appeal

113. White JA would order that each party pay their own costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

114. I have the misfortune to disagree. I would order that the respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself.

115. The respondents opposed the grant of leave to appeal with respect to all issues raised including the issue relating to the cap on the legal costs of the proceedings below. As the judgment of White JA shows, Ground 4 raises an important issue which has not previously been decided by this Court.

116. The argument about the cap on costs issue occupied the substantial part of the oral and written argument in this Court. Given that the proceedings in the District Court were heard over eight days with written submissions on the questions of costs, the ground upon which the appellant is in my view entitled to succeed is the most substantial in monetary terms.

117. Neither of the respondents made any submissions, nor provided any evidence to support a submission, that costs ought not “follow the event”, that is, costs ought not follow the result of the application for leave, or the appeal if leave is granted.

118. In those circumstances when the appellant has succeeded on the most substantive issue, I see no reasons why his costs should not be ordered to be paid by the respondents.

Orders

119. In addition to Orders 1 to 5 proposed by White JA, I propose, in lieu of Order 6, the following Order:

1. Order the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

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