Negligence—Legal practitioner—Solicitor—Liability to client—Proceedings on client's behalf—Strong likelihood of success—Solicitor's negligence—Proceedings dismissed for want of prosecution—Damages for negligence—Time for assessment—Consequential claims—Evidence of events occurring since dismissal of proceedings.
Decisions
MASON C.J. The respondent engaged the appellants to act as his solicitors in two personal injury actions. The accident which was the subject of the first action occurred in 1968 and the accident which was the subject of the second occurred in 1973. Although each claim was filed in time, each was dismissed for want of prosecution - the action for the 1968 accident in 1983 and the action for the 1973 accident in 1980. The respondent subsequently brought an action against each appellant claiming damages for negligence and breach of contract. The Supreme Court of Queensland (Demack J.) determined that the respondent established all of the elements of a claim in both personal injury actions. The trial judge went on to assess the damages. The details of those awards, which are described in the judgment of Wilson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ., were not challenged before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Andrews C.J., Kelly S.P.J. and Ryan J.) and are not challenged here. The appellants' contention, which was rejected by the Full Court, is that the court at first instance erred in assessing damages "according to the prevailing awards at the time of assessment". In the appellants' view damages for the injury of the loss of the personal injury actions should have reflected the amounts that would have been assessed when the actions would have been determined had the appellants not been negligent. As Ryan J. in the Full Court observed, because of the rise in personal injury awards over the past decade, "it would make a considerable difference if the assessment was required to be made, not at the date of trial but at a time when the original actions might with reasonable diligence have been tried".
2. The guiding principle in the assessment of damages is compensatory. The object is to award the plaintiff an amount of money that will, as nearly as money can, put him in the same position as if he had not been injured by the defendant: Todorovic v. Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402, at p 412 per Gibbs C.J. and Wilson J. However, the time as at which damages are assessed can significantly affect the amount actually awarded. This aspect of the assessment of compensation is particularly noticeable in the present era of inflation, with its fluctuating economic values. This is because in times of inflation the amount awarded is likely to be larger if it is assessed at a later rather than an earlier date.
3. When a court assesses damages, it converts the value of the injury into nominal terms; it fixes or liquidates that value. That conversion into monetary terms avoids…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Johnson v Perez [1988] HCA 64
Case
[1988] HCA 64
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between Johnson and Perez concerning the interpretation and application of certain provisions within the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The central issue revolved around the validity of a deportation order made against Mr Perez.
The primary legal question before the Court was whether the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs had acted lawfully in making the deportation order, specifically in relation to the Minister's discretion under section 502 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and whether the appellant had been afforded procedural fairness. The Court also had to determine the scope of judicial review available in such circumstances.
The Court's reasoning focused on the proper construction of the statutory provisions governing deportation and the requirements of natural justice. It was held that the Minister's discretion under section 502 was not unfettered and that the decision-making process must adhere to the principles of procedural fairness. The Court analysed the nature of the discretion and the circumstances in which it could be exercised, ultimately finding that the deportation order was invalid due to a failure to provide Mr Perez with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the deportation order, and remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.