New South Wales v Radford

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:
State of New South Wales v Steven Charles Radford [2010] NSWCA 276
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

FILE NUMBER(S):
2010/026158

HEARING DATE(S):
16 August 2010

JUDGMENT DATE:
28 October 2010

PARTIES:
State of New South Wales - Applicant
Steven Charles Radford - Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:
Beazley JA Macfarlan JA Sackville AJA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
5411/2005

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Levy DCJ

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
30 October 2009

LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
Radford v State of New South Wales [2009] NSWDC 278

COUNSEL:
Mr M Windsor SC and Mr G Bateman (Applicant)
Dr J Berwick (Respondent)

SOLICITORS:
IV Knight, Crown Solicitor (Applicant)
Eddy Neumann Lawyers (Respondent)

CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – cause of action founded on an alleged assault by police officers – amendment of pleadings outside limitation period to allege cause of action founded on false imprisonment – whether new cause of action arises out of substantially the same facts for the purposes of s 65(2)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) – adequacy of proposed pleading to enable question to be determined
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – limitation period applicable to an action for damages for personal injury founded on false imprisonment
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – claim for aggravated damages founded on alleged assault – whether claim is ‘for damages for personal injury” within s 18A(2) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) – whether limitation period is three years – whether claim for exemplary damages can be pursued independently of pleaded claim for aggravated damages

LEGISLATION CITED:
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
Crown Proceedings Act 1988 (NSW)
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (UK)
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW)
Limitation (Amendment) Act 1990 (NSW)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 (UK)
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)

CATEGORY:
Principal judgment

CASES CITED:
Brickfield Properties Ltd v Newton [1971] 1 WLR 862
Broome v Cassell & Co [1972] 1 AC 1027
Chatsworth Investments Ltd v Cussins (Contractors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1
Darlington Building Society v O’Rourke James Scourfield and McCarthy [1998] EWCA 1664
Greenlands Ltd v Wilmshurst and the London Association for Protection of Trade [1913] 3 KB 507
Kruber v Grzesiak [1963] VR 621
Lamb v Cotogno [1987] HCA 47; 164 CLR 1
Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232
Mason v Mason [1997] 1 VR 325
McGee v Yeomans [1977] 1 NSWLR 273
Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597
New South Wales v Corby [2010] NSWCA 27
New South Wales v Ibbett [2006] HCA 57; 229 CLR 638
New South Wales v Ibbett [2005] NSWCA 445; 65 NSWLR 168
New South Wales v Riley [2003] NSWCA 208; 57 NSWLR 496
O’Neill v Foster [2004] NSWSC 906; 61 NSWLR 499
Sagacious Procurement Ltd v Mayne Group Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1238
State…

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Details
Case
[2010] NSWCA 276
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *New South Wales v Radford* concerned an appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales regarding a plaintiff's claim for damages against the State. The dispute arose from an incident on 15 December 1999, where police officers attended the respondent's home to execute a search warrant and subsequently arrested him after a scuffle. The respondent alleged that excessive force was used during the arrest, resulting in physical injuries. He commenced proceedings on 14 December 2005, initially alleging assault by police officers. The respondent later sought to amend his statement of claim to pursue claims for aggravated and exemplary damages, abandoning his claim for compensatory damages for personal injury.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the respondent's proposed amended claim for aggravated and exemplary damages constituted a cause of action founded on "damages for personal injury" within the meaning of s 18A(2) of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW), and if not, whether the State would suffer prejudice by allowing the amendment outside the limitation period. The court also considered the application of s 65(2)(c) of the *Civil Procedure Act 2005* (NSW) concerning whether a new cause of action arose out of substantially the same facts as the original claim.

The Court of Appeal, comprising Beazley and Macfarlan JJA and Sackville AJA, allowed the appeal. The court reasoned that while the primary judge had considered the original statement of claim likely statute-barred for compensatory damages due to the three-year limitation period under s 18A(2) of the *Limitation Act*, he had granted leave to amend the pleadings. However, the Court of Appeal found that the primary judge erred in granting leave to file the amended statement of claim. The court determined that the respondent's claim for aggravated and exemplary damages, as framed, did not fall within the definition of "damages for personal injury" under s 18A(2) of the *Limitation Act*. Consequently, the court concluded that the respondent's original claim for assault, which sought compensatory damages for personal injury, was indeed statute-barred. The court also found that the proposed amended claim did not arise out of substantially the same facts for the purposes of s 65(2)(c) of the *Civil Procedure Act 2005* (NSW).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the primary judge, and ordered that the respondent's statement of claim be struck out and his amended motion be dismissed. The respondent's application for leave to cross-appeal was also dismissed, and the respondent was ordered to pay the State's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal allowed.

3. Orders 1 and 2 made by Levy DCJ on 30 October 2009 set aside. In lieu of these orders, the following orders should be made:

(1) The respondent's statement of claim filed on 26 April 2007 be struck out.

(2) The respondent's amended motion filed 9 September 2009 be dismissed.

4. The respondent's application for leave to cross appeal be dismissed with costs.

5. The respondent to pay the State's costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

6. The respondent, if otherwise qualified, to have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act 1951 (NSW).

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 64(1)(b) of the CP Act empowers the court at any stage of the proceedings to grant leave to a party to amend any document in the proceedings. Section 64(2) provides that, subject to s 58, all necessary amendments are to be made for the purpose of determining the real questions raised by or otherwise depending on the proceedings. Section 58 requires the court to act in accordance with the “dictates of justice” as that expression is defined in s 58.BACKGROUND At about 7 am on 15 December 1999, a number of police officers attended the respondent’s home in order to execute a lawful search warrant. The warrant had been granted on the basis that the respondent was suspected of supplying heroin. The respondent was arrested after a scuffle. There is a factual dispute concerning the circumstances of the physical confrontation. However, the respondent claims that the arresting police officer used unnecessary and excessive force. There is no dispute that, whatever the circumstances of his arrest, the respondent in consequence of the scuffle suffered physical injuries and required medical treatment. Following his arrest, the respondent remained in custody. He was convicted in October 2000 of drug-related offences and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The respondent was released on parole in August 2004. On 23 July 2000, while in custody, the respondent complained to the Ombudsman that he had been assaulted by the police who had arrested him. An internal police investigation was conducted into the allegations, but in August 2001 the respondent was informed that his allegations were rejected by the Police Service. On 14 December 2005, one day short of six years after his arrest, the respondent commenced the present proceedings by filing a statement of claim. The statement of claim joined as defendants the “NSW Police Service” and three police officers (namely, Mr Deas, Mr Brown and Mr Thomas). The NSW Police Service was said to be sued pursuant to s 5 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1988. The respondent’s statement of claim alleged that in the course of the arrest, the named police officers assaulted the respondent by striking him, throwing him to the floor and against furniture and by manhandling him with excessive force. The respondent further alleged that:“in consequence of the assaults … [he] suffered injuries and continues to suffer disabilities, loss and damage as a consequence of the said injuries.” The particulars of loss and damage identified physical injuries suffered by the respondent. They also identified continuing physical disabilities as well as “psychiatric disabilities including psychosis and schizophrenia”. The respondent claimed $750,000 in damages. No claim was made for aggravated or exemplary damages. The respondent filed an amended statement of claim on 24 March 2006. In this pleading, the respondent named the State as the defendant and deleted the police officers as parties to the proceedings. In its defence, the State admitted that the respondent had suffered personal injury at the time of his arrest. No doubt the State’s admission that the respondent had suffered personal injury at the time of his arrest was motivated, at least in part, by the terms of s 18A(2) of the Limitation Act, which imposes a three year limitation period for causes of action founded on breach of duty for “damages for personal injury”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Counsel for the State, at the hearing on 23 October 2009 opposed a grant of leave to the respondent to file the 5th ASC. Brief argument took place, but the parties did not repeat the submissions previously put to the primary Judge. Again his Honour reserved judgment.THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT On 30 October 2009, the primary Judge delivered a judgment in which he dismissed the State’s motion and granted the respondent leave to file the 5th ASC. His Honour ordered the respondent to pay both the costs of the State’s Motion and the State’s costs of the Respondent’s Motion, including the costs of the motion filed on 26 June 2009. The primary Judge observed (at [23]) that if the State’s Motion was the only application before him, he would have been likely to hold that the original statement of claim, filed on 15 December 2005, was statute barred by reason of the expiration of the three year limitation period imposed by s 18A(2) of the Limitation Act. However, in view of the other motions that had been filed, his Honour considered it unnecessary to decide the point. The primary Judge concluded (at [25]) that, despite the lateness of the Respondent’s Motion, the interests of justice required that the respondent should be able to argue the merits of his application for leave to file the 5th ASC. Moreover, “as a competent adult” the respondent was entitled to abandon his claim for compensatory damages for the alleged assault and to limit his claim to exemplary and aggravated damages. His Honour pointed out that this was the effect of the 5th ASC, which relied on the human emotions of upset, anxiety, distress and humiliation that were said to be the natural consequence of the assault. Nonetheless, given the limitation bar on his claim for compensatory damages, his Honour accepted that the respondent required leave to press his freshly formulated claim for damages of a different character. The primary Judge identified two questions requiring attention. The first was whether a claim for exemplary and aggravated damages, as sought in the 5th ASC, amounted to a cause of action, founded on breach of duty, for “damages for personal injury” within the meaning of s 18A of the Limitation Act. If so, the relief sought in the proposed 5th ASC would have been barred by s 18A(2) at the time these proceedings were commenced and no order could be made under s 65(2)(c) of the CP Act to add the new cause of action to the respondent’s claim. If, however, the respondent’s proposed claim was not a claim for “damages for personal injury”, the second question was whether the State would sustain prejudice such that leave to file the 5th ASC should be refused. The primary Judge considered that aggravated damages are “awardable for injury to feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like”, while exemplary damages are punitive rather than compensatory in character. His Honour accepted the respondent’s contention that damages can be claimed for trespass to the person without seeking damages for personal injury. He said that trespass to the person is actionable per se, that is without proof of damage. In any event, the respondent had a claim for injury to his “dignitary interest”, which was capable of attracting aggravated and exemplary damages if the relevant conduct could be proved.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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