FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Clurname Pty Limited v McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc [2017] FCA 1319
File number: NSD 957 of 2015 Judge: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 10 November 2017 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to amend originating application and pleading – where representative Applicants allege loss and damage arising from Respondents’ rating of synthetic collateralised debt obligations (SCDOs) – where amendments seek to introduce causes of action in tort of deceit and equitable unconscionability – where amendments brought more than two years after proceedings commenced and seven months before joint trial with related proceedings – where Respondents plead that the Applicants’ causes of action are statute barred – where deceit claim would form basis of concealed fraud claim to defeat limitation defence – whether leave to amend should be allowed – whether deceit claim is reasonably arguable or has reasonable prospects of success – whether deceit claim would be statue barred and is therefore futile – whether pleading is deficient – discretionary considerations – importance of the amendments – whether delay in bringing amendments adequately explained – prejudice to the Respondents – prejudice to third parties in related proceedings
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to amend – whether deceit claim is governed by New York law – whether deceit claim is statute barred – whether Australia is the appropriate forum for the determination of the deceit claim
Held: leave to amend granted.
Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12CB, 12GF(2)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1041I(2), 1317
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 63
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Part IVA, ss 37M, 37M(3), 59(2B)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (repealed)
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), O 13, rr 2, 3A (repealed)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 8.21, 8.21(1)(g)(i), 8.21(2), 16.51, 16.53, 16.54
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 14, 55, 55(1)(a), 55(1)(b)
Cases cited: ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v Morgan Stanley & Co Incorporated 88 FSupp 2D 431 (SDNY 2012)
Althaus v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] 1 Qd R 493
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Baldry v Jackson [1976] 2 NSWLR 415
Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (2010) 189 FCR 356
Brickfield Properties Ltd v Newton [1971] 3 All ER 328; [1971] 1 WLR 862
Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (2015) 236 FCR 322
CE Heath Underwriting & Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd v Daraway Constructions Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Batt J, 3 August 1995)
Clark v Clark (1882) 8 VLR (E) 303
Clasul Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 1133
Clough v Frog (1974) 4 ALR 615; (1974) 48 ALJR 481
Commercial Union Assurance Company of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1319
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the onus was on the party seeking leave to amend to persuade the court that such leave should be given. The court rejected the respondent's argument that the deceit claim was governed by New York law and therefore statute barred. The court held that the essential conduct that was the subject of the deceit case was the conduct of the respondent in knowingly making false representations to Clurname and other investors in Australia. The court also found that the deceit claim was reasonably arguable and had reasonable prospects of success. The court considered the discretionary factors, including the importance of the amendments, the delay in bringing the amendments, and the prejudice to the respondent and third parties in related proceedings. The court concluded that the amendments were important and that the delay in bringing the amendments was adequately explained. The court also found that the prejudice to the respondent and third parties in related proceedings was not sufficient to outweigh the importance of the amendments.
The court granted leave to amend and ordered that the amendments take effect from the date the proceedings were commenced. The court also ordered that the time period for the respondent to seek leave to appeal from these orders not commence to run until the publication of the reasons for making the orders. The court further ordered that the parties were to confer with a view to agreeing on consent orders for the further conduct of the matter, including the variation of existing orders for the filing of evidence. In the event that the parties were unable to agree on orders for the further conduct of the matter, the matter was to be listed for a further case management hearing. The court also restricted third party access to certain exhibits for a period of 14 days to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave be granted to the applicants pursuant to r 8.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to amend the Amended Originating Application by filing and serving the Second Further Amended Originating Application in the form annexed to the interlocutory application dated 15 August 2017 on or before 20 October 2017.
2. Leave be granted to the applicants pursuant to r 16.53 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to amend the Further Amended Statement of Claim by filing and serving the Second Further Amended Statement of Claim in the form annexed to the interlocutory application dated 15 August 2017 on or before 20 October 2017.
3. The amendments contained in the Second Further Amended Originating Application and Second Further Amended Statement of Claim be taken to have effect from the date of the commencement of the proceedings.
4. The time period for the respondent to seek leave to appeal from these orders not commence to run until the publication of the reasons for making the orders.
5. The parties are to confer with a view to agreeing on consent orders for the further conduct of the matter, including the variation of existing orders for the filing of evidence.
6. In the event that the parties are unable to agree on orders for the further conduct of the matter, the matter will be listed for a further case management hearing at 9.30 am on 23 October 2017.
7. Pursuant to s 37AI of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, third party access be restricted for a period of 14 days to Exhibits A16 and A18 tendered at this hearing, being the unredacted deposition transcripts of Richard Gugliada in the United States of America ‘UDBC’ and ‘DOJ’ proceedings.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The onus is on the party seeking leave to amend to persuade the Court that such leave should be given: Dye v Commonwealth Securities Limited (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118 at [17].CONSIDERATION The consideration of whether Clurname should be granted leave to amend can conveniently be addressed by first considering whether, as contended by Standard & Poor’s, the Court does not have power to grant leave to amend, and whether the proposed amendments would be futile because they would be liable to be struck out as defective or as not raising a reasonably arguable cause of action. Attention can then be given to the discretionary considerations.The Court’s power to grant Clurname leave to amend As has already been noted, Standard & Poor’s contended that the Court did not have the power to grant Clurname leave to file the SFASOC because the deceit claim in it was statute barred. That contention in turn hinged on the contention that the proper law for the determination of the claim in deceit was the law of New York. A number of other submissions advanced by Standard & Poor’s for why leave to amend should not be granted also hinged on that proposition. It is accordingly convenient to address the choice of law issue first. The proper law governing the deceit claim Standard & Poor’s submitted that for causes of action in tort, the applicable choice of law rule is that matters of substance are governed by the law of the place of commission of the tort in question. So much so may be accepted: Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 at [9]; Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491. In that context, Standard & Poor’s submitted that the place of the commission of the tort is the place where the relevant tortious conduct occurred. In respect of a cause of action based on fraud or deceit, Standard & Poor’s submitted that the critical element of the cause of action is the state of mind of the wrongdoer. In Standard & Poor’s submission, in this case the relevant conduct therefore occurred in New York because that was where the SCDO ratings methodology, criteria and assumptions, which Clurname alleged were known to be defective or flawed, were formulated by Standard & Poor’s. Standard & Poor’s also appeared to rely on the fact that the officers or employees of Standard & Poor’s who were responsible for the ratings methodology, criteria and assumptions, were stationed in New York. Standard and Poor’s contention that the proper law for the determination of Clurname’s proposed deceit claim is the law of New York is wrong and is rejected. It is based on an erroneous and misleading characterisation of the tortious conduct that provides the foundation for Clurname’s proposed claim in deceit. It is tolerably clear that Clurname’s proposed claim in deceit is that Standard & Poor’s made representations (the S&P Ratings Representations and the S&P Independence Representation) to it and others in Australia which Standard & Poor’s knew to be false, or in respect of which it was recklessly indifferent. Those representations were made when the ratings were issued in circumstances where Standard & Poor’s caused or permitted or authorised the fact of its ratings to be published or disseminated, including in Australia, and was aware that the ratings would be communicated to and relied on by potential investors in Australia (SFASOC [61], [62], [63], [64], [65], [84], [85]). Clurname’s case is that it relied on the ratings and representations when deciding to invest and, most importantly, in proceeding with the acquisition of the SCDOs (SFASOC [91], [91A], [95]). The essential conduct that is the subject of Clurname’s deceit case is the conduct of Standard & Poor’s in knowingly making false representations to it and other investors in Australia. It is not, as Standard & Poor’s contended, the determination of the ratings methodology and criteria for SCDOs.