Voxson Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Limited (No 7)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Voxson Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Limited (No 7) [2017] FCA 267

File number: NSD 2436 of 2013
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 20 March 2017
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether pleading can be amended under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to add a statute barred cause of action – whether new claim for relief arose out of the same facts or substantially the same facts – whether amendment operates from date of commencement of proceeding or date of order allowing amendment
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AC

Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) (repealed) Order 13 Rule 2, Order 13 Rule 2(1), Order 13 Rule 3A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 1.33, 8.21, 8.21(1), 8.21(1)(g)(i), 8.21(2), 16.53

Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (No2) [2013] FCA 409; (2013) 213 FCR 289

Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44

Clasul Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2014] FCA 1133

Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34; (2004) 220 CLR 363

McGrath v HNSW [2014] FCA 165; (2014) 219 FCR 489

Re Sterling; Ex parte Esanda Ltd [1980] FCA 61; (1980) 44 FLR 125

Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd [1963] HCA 50; (1963) 109 CLR 285

Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm), in the matter of Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) [2015] FCA 1098

Voxson v Telstra [2015] FCA 1490

Voxson v Telstra (No.3) [2015] FCA 1492

Voxson v Telstra(No.6) [2017] FCA 13

Pearce D and Geddes R, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (8th ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2014)

Date of hearing: 2 February 2017
Date of last submissions: 3 February 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Patents and Associated Statutes
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Shavin QC  
Solicitor for the Applicant: DibbsBarker
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Bembrick and Ms F St John
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Spruson & Ferguson Lawyers
Counsel for the Third and Sixth Respondents: Mr A Lang
Solicitor for the Third and Sixth Respondents: Baker & McKenzie
Counsel for the Fifth Respondent: Ms C Cochrane
Solicitor for the Fifth Respondent: Allens

ORDERS

NSD 2436 of 2013

BETWEEN:

VOXSON PTY LTD (ACN 005 291 458)

Applicant

AND:

TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED (ACN 051 775 556)

First Respondent

OPTUS MOBILE PTY LIMITED (ACN 054 365 696)

Third Respondent

VODAFONE HUTCHISON AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 096 304 620)

Fifth Respondent

OPTUS NETWORKS PTY LIMITED (ACN 008 570 330)
Sixth Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The parties are to bring in short minutes of order giving effect to these reasons within 14 days.

2.The matter be stood over for a further case management hearing on Friday, 7 April 2017 at 9:30am.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 267
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Voxson Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Limited (No 7) involved a dispute between the parties regarding whether a pleading could be amended to add a statute-barred cause of action under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The case centered on whether the new claims arose out of the same or substantially the same facts as the original claim and the date from which the amendment would take effect. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining these issues.

The primary legal issues were whether the Court had the power to amend a pleading to include a statute-barred cause of action and, if so, under what circumstances. Additionally, the Court needed to decide whether the new claims arose from substantially the same facts as the original claim and determine the effective date of the amendment. The Court found that it had the power to grant leave to amend both an originating process and a pleading to add a statute-barred cause of action, but only if the amendment arose out of substantially the same facts. Furthermore, the Court had the power to specify a date other than the date of commencement of the proceeding for the amendment to take effect.

The Court reasoned that while the grant of leave by Bennett J did not create any issue estoppels or res judicata, the question of whether the claims arose out of substantially the same facts had not been argued or resolved. Consequently, the Court did not regard the interlocutory judgment as resolving the issue. The Court also noted that the initial claims included a factually incorrect proposition, which was later accepted by Voxson, leading to the second amended statement of claim. The Court concluded that the amendment did arise out of substantially the same facts.

The final orders required the parties to bring in short minutes of order within 14 days and set a further case management hearing for 7 April 2017. The Court emphasised that the entry of orders was to be dealt with under Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties are to bring in short minutes of order giving effect to these reasons within 14 days.

2. The matter be stood over for a further case management hearing on Friday, 7 April 2017 at 9:30am.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Accordingly, I conclude that the Court has the power to grant leave to amend both an originating process and a pleading to add a statute barred cause of action but only in the circumstances referred to in FCR 8.21(2). It would be helpful if FCR 16.53 were explicitly brought into line with FCR 8.21 but in fact, as a matter of implication, it already operates that way. The Court also has the power in both cases to make the date upon which such an amendment is to take effect, a date other than the date on which the proceedings were initiated for analogous reasons.4. ‘Substantially the same facts’ There is no dispute that the amendments which were manifest in the 2FASOC raised claims which were statute barred. For the reasons I have already given, the Court only had power to grant leave to amend to Voxson to pursue these statute barred claims if the amendments, relevantly, arose out of substantially the same facts. Bennett J granted leave to amend. As a matter of logic, this might imply that the Court must have concluded that the claims did arise out of substantially the same facts as the earlier claim, otherwise the power to amend could not have arisen. I do not think this would be a productive way to reason. The parties agreed that the limitation issues could be argued at a later time. The fact is that the question of whether the claims arise out of substantially the same facts has not been argued or been the subject of reasoned resolution (although her Honour did consider the related, but different, question of whether the nature of the case had changed: see Voxson v Telstra [2015] FCA 1490 at [49]-[50]). As an interlocutory judgment which did not finally determine any substantive issues between the parties, the grant of leave by Bennett J would not ordinarily create any issue estoppels or res judicata: cf. Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd [1963] HCA 50; (1963) 109 CLR 285 at 297-298 per Kitto, Taylor and Menzies JJ; Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34; (2004) 220 CLR 363 at 374-375. It is true that matters which have been determined at an interlocutory hearing may not endlessly be revisited: Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46-47 per McLelland CJ in Eq. But in this case, the point has never been argued. I do not therefore regard Bennett J’s orders as resolving the issue before me. As I have already indicated above at [5], Voxson’s initial claims included the proposition that the Respondents used their own A-GPS servers to communicate local positioning services to customers’ devices on their networks. This contention proved to be factually incorrect. The Respondents, apart from Telstra in respect of its 2G and 3G networks, did not operate their own A-GPS servers. The local positioning information was communicated by third parties and was transmitted across the Respondents’ mobile networks as ordinary data traffic. It was Voxson’s acceptance of this state of affairs which eventually led to the 2FASOC.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Court have the power to grant leave to amend an originating process and a pleading to add a statute-barred cause of action?
2. If so, under what circumstances can this power be exercised?
3. Does the amendment operate from the date of commencement of the proceeding or from the date of the order allowing the amendment?
4. Do the amendments in the 2FASOC arise out of substantially the same facts as the earlier claims?

Held
1. The Court has the power to grant leave to amend both an originating process and a pleading to add a statute-barred cause of action. This power can be exercised under the circumstances referred to in Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR) 8.21(2).
2. The Court can exercise this power if the amendment arises out of substantially the same facts as the earlier claims.
3. The amendment operates from the date of the order allowing the amendment, not from the date of commencement of the proceeding.
4. The amendments in the 2FASOC do not arise out of substantially the same facts as the earlier claims.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court concluded that it has the authority to allow amendments to an originating process and a pleading to include a statute-barred cause of action. This authority is restricted to the circumstances outlined in FCR 8.21(2). Although FCR 16.53 could be more explicit, it is already consistent with FCR 8.21 by implication. The court also retains the discretion to determine the effective date of such amendments, which can be set at a date other than when the proceedings began. The court determined that the claims in the second further amended statement of claim (2FASOC) were statute-barred, but the court had the authority to allow the amendments if they arose from substantially the same facts as the earlier claims. The judge, Bennett J, granted leave to amend, suggesting that the claims might arise from substantially the same facts. However, this was not conclusively argued or resolved. The parties agreed to address limitation issues at a later stage, and the question of whether the claims arose from substantially the same facts was never argued or decided. Therefore, the court’s previous orders do not create issue estoppels or res judicata. The initial claims included a contention that the respondents used their own A-GPS servers to communicate local positioning services, which was later found to be incorrect. The local positioning information was communicated by third parties and transmitted across the respondents’ mobile networks as ordinary data traffic. This realization led to the 2FASOC. The binding legal principle established in this decision is that the court can amend pleadings to include statute-barred claims if the amendments arise from substantially the same facts as the earlier claims, and it can set the effective date of such amendments.