District Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Stines v The GEO Group Australia Pty Limited [2021] NSWDC 550 Hearing dates: 16 September 2021 Date of orders: 15 October 2021 Decision date: 15 October 2021 Jurisdiction: Civil Before: Coleman SC DCJ Decision: In relation to the Motion filed by the first defendant on 2 July 2021 (2016/365887‑003), I make orders as follows:
1. The proceedings are dismissed as against the first defendant.
2. I order that the plaintiff pay the first defendant's costs of the proceedings.
In relation to the Motion filed by the plaintiff on 15 September 2021 (2016/365887‑004), I make an order as follows:
1. I direct that the balance of the proceedings, as against the second defendant, be transferred to the inactive list.
Catchwords: TORTS – Intentional Torts – Injury to Offender in Custody – Recovery of Personal Injury Damages – No Award of Damages where Permanent Impairment is Less than 15%
CIVIL PROCEDURE – Summary Dismissal – Defence Application for Dismissal – Whether the Claim has any Reasonable Prospects of Success – Whether Exemplary Damages Constitute Personal Injury Damages – Whether the Plaintiff can Seek a Further Assessment of his Impairment – Whether the Proceedings Should be Dismissed for Want of Due Despatch
Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 3, 21, 26A, 26B, 26C, 26D, 26D(4), 26X
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ss 56, 57, 58, 59, 60
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 18A
Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) ss 314, 322, 322A, 322A(1), 322A(3), 322A(4), 325, 326, 327, 327(1), 327(3), 327(3)(b), 327(4), 329, 329(1), 329(1A), 329(1)(b)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 12.7, 12.7(1), 13.4
Cases Cited: Adriaansen v Dungog & District Retirement Living Ltd [2016] NSW WCCPD 36
Borgese v Carter & Blumer Pty Ltd t/as Carter & Blumer [2016] NSWSC 1252
Collier v State of New South Wales(No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1359
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Simmons v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2014] NSWCA 405
State of New South Wales v Corby [2010] NSWCA 27; (2010) 76 NSWLR 439
State of NSW v Radford [2010] NSWCA 276; (2010) 79 NSWLR 327
State of New South Wales v Williams [2014] 242 A Crim R 22; [2014] NSWCA 177
Texts Cited: Courts Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (NSW)
Courts Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (NSW), Second Reading Speech, New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 10 June 2010
Category: Procedural rulings Parties: Robert Stines (Plaintiff)
The GEO Group Pty Limited (First Defendant)
Simon Waterfall (Second Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
Mr G Schipp (Plaintiff)
Mr J Entwisle (First Defendant)
Prominent Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Sparke Helmore Lawyers (First Defendant)
File Number(s): 2016/00365887‑003; 004 Publication restriction: N/A
Judgment
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Before the Court are two motions, one moved on by each of the first defendant and the plaintiff.
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By Notice of Motion filed 2 July 2021, the first defendant seeks orders summarily dismissing the…
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- Case
- [2021] NSWDC 550
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues revolved around the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning personal injury damages, specifically whether the plaintiff could seek a further assessment of his impairment and if exemplary damages constituted personal injury damages. The court had to consider the provisions of sections 322, 322A, and 329 of the relevant Act, which govern the assessment of permanent impairment and the potential for reassessment. The court also had to decide if the plaintiff's claim had any reasonable prospects of success and whether the proceedings should be dismissed for want of due despatch.
The court held that the plaintiff's claim for damages did not have any reasonable prospects of success because his degree of permanent impairment was less than 15%, which precluded an award of damages under the Act. The court further held that the plaintiff could not seek a further assessment of his impairment as the statutory provisions limited the number of assessments to one. The court concluded that the plaintiff's claim for exemplary damages did not constitute personal injury damages and therefore could not be considered in the assessment of his impairment. Given the lack of reasonable prospects of success and the delay in the proceedings, the court dismissed the claim for want of due despatch.
The court made an order dismissing the proceedings against the first defendant and directing the plaintiff to pay the first defendant's costs. Additionally, the court ordered that the balance of the proceedings against the second defendant be transferred to the inactive list.
Orders
Orders of the court
In relation to the Motion filed by the first defendant on 2 July 2021 (2016/365887‑003), I make orders as follows:
1. The proceedings are dismissed as against the first defendant.
2. I order that the plaintiff pay the first defendant's costs of the proceedings.
In relation to the Motion filed by the plaintiff on 15 September 2021 (2016/365887‑004), I make an order as follows:
1. I direct that the balance of the proceedings, as against the second defendant, be transferred to the inactive list.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Referral of matter for further medical assessment or reconsideration(1) A matter referred for assessment under this Part may be referred again on one or more further occasions for assessment in accordance with this Part, but only by--(a) the President as an alternative to an appeal against the assessment as provided by section 327, or(b) court or the Commission.(1A) A matter referred for assessment under this Part may be referred again on one or more further occasions by the President to the medical assessor for reconsideration.(2) A certificate as to a matter referred again for further assessment or reconsideration prevails over any previous certificate as to the matter to the extent of any inconsistency.(emphasis added) In this case, on the application of the plaintiff, the Commission referred the plaintiff out for assessment in 2019. It will be recalled, as set out above, that the assessment led to a MAC which assessed the plaintiff’s degree of permanent impairment at 4%. The Appeal Panel confirmed that assessment. The plaintiff submits that s 329 provides a pathway for him to have the assessment of his degree of permanent impairment made under s 322 referred again on one or more further occasions for assessment by this Court (relying on s 329(1)(b)). Additionally, the plaintiff submits that s 329(1A) allows the President to refer his assessment again on one or more further occasions to the medical assessor for reconsideration. In answer to this submission, the first defendant refers to s 322A(1). It says that plainly only one assessment may be made of the degree of permanent impairment of the plaintiff by reason of this section. It notes that s 322A(3) prevents a medical dispute about the degree of permanent impairment of the plaintiff from being referred for an assessment if the matter has already been the subject of an assessment and a medical assessment certificate (MAC) under Pt 7. It points out that s 322A(4) prescribes that the section does not affect the operation of the appeal under s 327. In response, the plaintiff submits that s 322A has no application to the plaintiff’s claim in these proceedings. He says that s 322A is limited to a claim for “permanent impairment compensation”. However, as the first defendant submits, the Court should not read that section in a way that so limits its operation. The first defendant submitted in its supplementary submissions: Roche DP in Milosavljevic at [58] observed that s 329 “provides no guidance as to how or when it is to be used”. Malpass AsJ in v Liverpool City Council & Anor [2007] NSWSC 320 at [26]–[27] observed:[26] The intended function of s 329 is far from clear. It is a question that was not the subject of full argument. It may be that it affords a remedy which should have been pursued with the Commission by the plaintiff in lieu of the application for leave to appeal.[27] Also, it may be that s 329 was intended to provide a remedy in cases where no grounds of appeal can be made out but the dictates of justice require a further referral for assessment.” The plaintiff submits (at [16]‑[18] of his supplementary submissions) as follows: [16] Despite the existence of s322A, the Acting President said (at [81]):I accept, consistent with Mansour, that an order can be made pursuant to s 329(1)(b) of the 1998 Act, notwithstanding that there has been a MAP decision.[17] At [91], the Acting President said:Section 329(1)(b) provides a remedy in circumstances where a Medical Appeal, for whatever reason, is not sufficient to satisfy the dictates of justice.[18] The principles that emerge from the cases is that the Certificate is not binding and may be the subject of reconsideration under s329 if the interests of justice dictate, to be assessed on a case-by-case basis ([105]), notwithstanding s322A. The first defendant, in response to this submission (which is one of the new matters raised by the plaintiff), submitted as follows: