High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a judgment discharg- ing an accused person, that section does not confer jurisdiction on the High Court to set aside a verdict of "not guilty," SO that, when, as in this case, the judgment properly followed the verdict, the granting of special leave to appeal would be futile; and, as to the direction, on the ground that it was not a "judgment" from which under sec. 73 an appeal lies to the High Court;
By Powers J., on the ground that, although under sec. 73 the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the judgment of acquittal, to set aside the verdict and to grant a new trial, the discretion to grant special leave to appeal should not in the circumstances be exercised.
Musgrove v. McDonald, 3 C.L.R., 132, and Baume v. The Commonwealth, 4 C.L.R., 97. discussed.
Special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia (Gordon J.) refused.
APPLICATION for special leave to appeal.
At the Criminal Sessions of the Supreme Court of South Australia before Gordon J. and a jury, Francis Hugh Snow was presented on information charging him with attempting to trade with the enemy on a number of specified days both before and after 23rd October 1914, on which date the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 was passed. At the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, counsel for the accused contended that the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 was not retrospective as to attempts to trade with the enemy, and that there was no evidence fit to be submitted to the jury of any attempt to trade with the enemy after the passing of the Act. The learned Judge agreed with these contentions and directed the jury to return a verdict of " not guilty," which they did, and the accused was ordered to be discharged from custody.
The Crown moved for special leave to appeal to the High Court. Other material facts are stated in the judgments hereunder. The motion was originally heard on 24th May at Adelaide before Griffith C.J. and Isaacs J., when Cleland K.C. and F. Villeneuve Smith appeared in support of the motion. The Court on 16th June suggested that the motion should be renewed before a Full Bench on notice to Snow. The motion was now renewed accord- ingly.
Blacket K.C. (with him Bavin), for the appellant. The applica- tion is for special leave to appeal both from the judgment of acquittal and from the decision of the learned Judge upon which he based his direction to the jury to find a verdict of " not guilty." This Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from any judgment of the Supreme Court of a State exercising federal jurisdiction and to grant a new trial in any such case Baume v. The Common- wealth (1). That is SO both in civil and criminal matters. Mus- grove v. McDonald…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
R v Snow [1915] HCA 90
Case
[1915] HCA 90
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of R v Snow involved an application to the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The respondent, Francis Hugh Snow, had been charged with attempting to trade with the enemy under the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914. At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the trial judge directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, finding that the Act was not retrospective regarding attempts to trade and that there was insufficient evidence of attempts after the Act's passage. The Crown sought to appeal this direction and the subsequent acquittal.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether it possessed the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a verdict of not guilty in a criminal trial, particularly when that verdict was directed by the judge. This involved determining the scope of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction under section 73 of the Constitution and whether it extended to setting aside an acquittal and ordering a new trial, even if the acquittal was based on an alleged error of law by the trial judge. A related issue was whether the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 had retrospective effect concerning attempts to trade with the enemy.
The Court ultimately refused special leave to appeal. The majority reasoned that while section 73 of the Constitution grants the High Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments of State Supreme Courts, this jurisdiction does not extend to setting aside a verdict of not guilty in a criminal trial. This principle is rooted in the common law, which provides an acquittal with absolute protection, and the Constitution, particularly section 80, which enshrines trial by jury, was not intended to abrogate this fundamental protection. The Court held that a judge's direction to a jury to acquit, even if erroneous, does not constitute an "interlocutory judgment" in the sense that it is appealable as such, and that the High Court cannot create new grounds for appeal or grant a new trial where the law of the relevant State does not permit it.
Consequently, the application for special leave to appeal was dismissed. The Court found that granting leave would be futile as it lacked the power to set aside the acquittal and order a new trial. The Court also noted that even if it had the power, the circumstances would not warrant the exercise of discretion to grant a new trial.