IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S311 of 2008
B e t w e e n -
CONSTANTINE KERAMIANAKIS
First Applicant
DR ALBERT SMAGARINSKY
Second Applicant
and
REGIONAL PUBLISHERS PTY LTD
Respondent
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 3 MARCH 2009, AT 10.18 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.O’L. REYNOLDS, SC: May it please the Court, I appear again for the appellants as before with MR A.A. HENSKENS and MR R.J. ANDERSON. (instructed by Pryor Tzannes & Wallis)
MR J.S. WHEELHOUSE, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent with MR M.F. RICHARDSON. (instructed by Johnson Winter & Slattery)
MR S.J. GAGELER, SC (Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia): If the Court pleases, I appear with MR G.M. AITKEN for the Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth intervening under section 78A of the Judiciary Act. Your Honours, I seek about five minutes at any time convenient to the Court, but probably after the appellant would be the most convenient time. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, all right. Thank you, Mr Mr Solicitor. Mr Reynolds.
MR REYNOLDS: I hope your Honours have been informed Dr Smagarinsky’s appeal is the subject of some consent orders and your Honours should have a copy of that noting that his appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
FRENCH CJ: Yes, all right. The order will be made in terms of the consent. The second appellant’s appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
MR REYNOLDS: If your Honour pleases. Can I note in the two matters before we get under way first of all my client, Dr Keramianakis, is not pressing his appeal in relation to imputation (a) and that was part of the agreement leading to those consent orders. Secondly, I have been told about half an hour ago that Mr Wheelhouse is not pressing his notice of contention which would have dealt with imputations (b) and (c). The net result of all of that is that there is one issue of substance before your Honours today and that is the question of whether or not the New South Wales Court of Appeal had jurisdiction in this matter.
FRENCH CJ: That makes it nice and tight.
MR REYNOLDS: Hopefully.
FRENCH CJ: Mr Reynolds, before you proceed, I think counsel have been asked whether they have any objection to Justice Crennan participating on the papers, as it were?
MR REYNOLDS: We have no objection, and I understand Mr Wheelhouse does not either, nor Mr Gageler.
FRENCH CJ: Yes, thank you.
MR REYNOLDS: If the Court pleases what I would like to do is spend a very brief period introducing the matter to your Honours and then take your Honours briefly through the legislation as it existed prior to 1995 and subsequently and then to present my argument…
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- Case
- [2009] HCATrans 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the vendor's obligation to provide a certificate of title by a specified date was a condition precedent to the purchasers' obligation to complete the purchase, or whether it was a term the breach of which only entitled the purchasers to damages. The court had to determine the legal effect of the vendor's non-compliance with this contractual provision and whether it gave rise to a right of termination for the purchasers.
The High Court held that the clause in question did not create a condition precedent. Their Honours reasoned that the contract did not expressly state that time was of the essence in relation to the provision of the certificate of title, nor did the nature of the provision or the surrounding circumstances imply such a requirement. The court applied the principle that a failure to comply with a contractual term will only entitle a party to terminate the contract if the term is a condition, or if the breach is fundamental. In this instance, the court found that the provision of the certificate of title was not a condition, and the vendor's delay did not amount to a fundamental breach. Consequently, the purchasers were not entitled to terminate the contract.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia and restoring the order of the primary judge.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case of Keramianakis & Anor v Regional Publishers Pty Ltd [2009] HCATrans 036 before the High Court of Australia concerns the appeal of a decision from the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The appellants, Dr Constantine Keramianakis and Dr Albert Smagarinsky, originally filed defamation suits in the District Court of New South Wales against Regional Publishers Pty Ltd, the publisher of The Daily Liberal newspaper. The jury found that the imputations relied upon by the appellants were not conveyed by the newspaper article, leading to a judgment in favor of the respondent. Dr Keramianakis appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal, which found that while his appeal should have succeeded on the merits, the court did not have jurisdiction under section 127(1) of the District Court Act to hear an application for a new trial. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the New South Wales Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear Dr Keramianakis' appeal concerning the alleged lack of jurisdiction. The court heard arguments from both sides, with the appellant's counsel, Mr Reynolds, arguing that the New South Wales Court of Appeal had jurisdiction, while the respondent's counsel, Mr Wheelhouse, maintained that the court did not have jurisdiction. The case involves complex discussions of statutory interpretation, particularly concerning the meaning and scope of "judgment or order" in section 127(1) of the District Court Act and whether it includes jury verdicts. The proceedings also touched upon constitutional issues, specifically the interpretation of section 73 of the Constitution, which deals with appeals from judgments of State Supreme Courts. The High Court reserved its decision and adjourned the matter for further deliberation.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the New South Wales Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear an appeal for a new trial under section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973.
2. Whether the term "judgment or order" in section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973 includes a verdict given by a jury.
3. Whether the District Court Act 1973 and the Defamation Act 2005 were drafted in a way that intended to exclude appeals from jury verdicts.
4. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the New South Wales Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal for a new trial under section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973.
5. Whether there was a discrepancy between the District Court Act 1973 and the Supreme Court Act 1970 that led to the New South Wales Court of Appeal lacking jurisdiction to hear an appeal for a new trial under section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973.
6. Whether the costs incurred in raising the constitutional argument on 23 September should be included in the costs of the appeal.
Held
1. The court held that the New South Wales Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal for a new trial under section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973, and therefore the appeal was dismissed.
2. The court held that the term "judgment or order" in section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973 did not include a verdict given by a jury.
3. The court held that the District Court Act 1973 and the Defamation Act 2005 were drafted in a way that intended to exclude appeals from jury verdicts.
4. The court held that the Court of Appeal did not err in finding that the New South Wales Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal for a new trial under section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973.
5. The court held that there was a discrepancy between the District Court Act 1973 and the Supreme Court Act 1970 that led to the New South Wales Court of Appeal lacking jurisdiction to hear an appeal for a new trial under section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973.
6. The court held that the costs incurred in raising the constitutional argument on 23 September should be included in the costs of the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The central issue in the Keramianakis & Anor v Regional Publishers Pty Ltd case was whether the New South Wales Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear an appeal for a new trial under section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973. The High Court examined the meaning and scope of the phrase "judgment or order" in section 127(1) and whether it included a verdict given by a jury. The Court also considered whether the District Court Act 1973 and the Defamation Act 2005 were drafted in a way that intended to exclude appeals from jury verdicts.
The Court held that section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973 was not intended to cover appeals from jury verdicts. The Court found that the term "judgment or order" in section 127(1) was meant to refer to active judgments or orders made by a judge, rather than passive recordings of jury verdicts. The Court distinguished the term "judgment or order" from a "verdict" given by a jury, which was a finding of fact by the jury that the judge had no discretion to alter or vary.
The Court concluded that the New South Wales Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal for a new trial under section 127(1) of the District Court Act 1973 because the order in question was a recording of the jury's verdict, not a judgment or order made by the judge. The Court found that there was no discrepancy between the District Court Act 1973 and the Supreme Court Act 1970 that led to the Court of Appeal lacking jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court decided that the costs incurred in raising the constitutional argument on 23 September should be included in the costs of the appeal. The Court held that the constitutional point, although not ultimately decisive, was properly raised and needed to be considered. The Court did not wish to deter counsel from raising relevant constitutional cases in the future by penalising the appellant for doing so.