Long v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Long v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2002] FCA  1422

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – aliens – British subject – arrived in Australia 1975 – resided continuously since 1981 - absorbed into community – no longer immigrant – criminal record – cancellation of visa – detention – whether alien – whether cancellation and detention within constitutional limits upon statutory power

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 189, s 198, s 501

Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In Re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36 cited
NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 cited
Re Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 cited
Robtelmes v Brenan (1906) 4 CLR 395 cited
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 cited
Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v Ah Sheung (1907) 4 CLR 949 cited
China Ocean Shipping Co v South Australia (1979) 145 CLR 172 cited
Pochi v MacPhee (1982) 151 CLR 101 cited
Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178 discussed
Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 182 ALR 657 discussed
Kenny v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 115 ALR 75 cited
Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 cited
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 cited

BRIAN LONG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
NO W61 OF 2002

FRENCH J
19 NOVEMBER 2002
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W61 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

BRIAN LONG
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 NOVEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application is dismissed.

2.        There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W61 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

BRIAN LONG
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH J

DATE:

19 NOVEMBER 2002

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. Brian Long came to Australia from the United Kingdom as a child in 1975.  Although he has returned to England with his family on two occasions since then, he has lived continuously in Australia since 1981.  He has married here and had children.  But he never took out Australian citizenship.  Because of serious criminal offences for which he was convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs has cancelled his visa and he is now being detained as an unlawful non-citizen.  Long challenges the cancellation and his detention on the basis that they are beyond power because he is neither immigrant nor alien but a British subject who is part of the Australian community.  As will be seen, the sole…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1422
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Long v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs was a case before a court in Australia. The parties involved were Long, who was challenging the government's actions, and the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, who was defending the government's decisions. The dispute centred on the interpretation of the term "alien" under the Constitution and its implications for the power to make laws about aliens. Specifically, Long argued that he should not be considered an alien under the law, which would limit the government's power to deport him.

The court was tasked with determining whether Long was an alien under the Constitution and, if not, whether this affected the government's authority to deport him. This involved interpreting the Constitution and relevant statutes, and considering whether the definition of "alien" had changed over time. The court also had to assess whether the previous case law, which had considered Long an alien, should still be followed.

The court concluded that Long was not an alien under the Constitution, effectively overruling previous cases that had considered him as such. This decision was based on a detailed analysis of the Constitution and the historical context in which it was drafted. The court found that Long, having been absorbed into the Australian community and residing there continuously, should not be classified as an alien. This meant that the government's power to deport him was limited by the Constitution. The court's reasoning was grounded in the understanding that Long had become part of the Australian community and could not be treated as an alien for the purposes of immigration law.

The final orders of the court were that the application by Long was dismissed, and there was no order as to costs. This decision highlighted the importance of understanding the constitutional framework in cases involving immigration and the rights of individuals within the Australian community.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH J
Nolan was followed in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (supra). See also Kenny v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 115 ALR 75 (Gummow J). If Nolan’s case were good law, then Long would be regarded as an alien and within the reach of the statutory provisions in issue in this case.The Decision in Re Patterson The recent decision of the High Court in Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 182 ALR 657 was at the centre of the argument in the present case. Mr Taylor was born in the United Kingdom and came to Australia as a child in 1966. He resided continuously in this country thereafter. In 2000 his visa was cancelled pursuant to s 501 of the Migration Act on account of his criminal convictions. On application to the High Court for relief under s 75(v) of the Constitution, one of the points he took, was that he was not an “alien” within the meaning of s 51(xix). It was not in dispute that he, like Long in the present case, had been absorbed into the community and was beyond the reach of the immigration power. The Court upheld his contention that he was not an alien by a majority of four comprising Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ. Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ dissented. The majority overruled Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. The formal outcome of the case was the issue of a writ of certiorari which quashed the Minister’s decision cancelling Mr Taylor’s visa. Prohibition also issued prohibiting the Minister from further proceeding on the cancellation decision. Gaudron J held that, upon his arrival in Australia in 1966, Mr Taylor was a British subject for the purposes of the Naturalisation and Citizenship Act 1948, later known as the Australian Citizenship Act 1948. He was then “a migrant but not an alien as defined in s 5 of the Citizenship Act”. The effect of the deletion of the definition of “alien” which came into effect on 1 May 1987, according to her Honour, was: “… either to confirm Mr Taylor’s membership of the body politic constituting the Australian community by virtue of his status as a British subject or, if the point had then been reached when Australia might treat British subjects as aliens for constitutional purposes, to confer non-alien status upon him – in effect, to naturalise him and all other British citizens in the same position. Either way, Mr Taylor was not, for constitutional purposes, an alien at any time prior to 1987.” [44]In reaching this conclusion her Honour held that Nolan was wrongly decided. McHugh J found for Mr Taylor on administrative law grounds and so did not need to decide the constitutional points raised in the case. He noted nevertheless that other members of the court had expressed their views on those issues and were equally divided on the aliens question [88]. In the circumstances he thought it necessary to express a view on that question. His Honour, like Gaudron J, held that Nolan was wrongly decided. In his Honour’s opinion, the joint judgment had overlooked two significant matters. The first was that, if the emergence of Australia as an independent nation had made Australians, who were subjects of the Queen of the United Kingdom, subjects of the Queen of Australia, there was no constitutional reason for distinguishing their position from that of British-born subjects of the Queen of the United Kingdom living in Australia. Logically, the evolutionary process that converted persons born in Australia into subjects of the Queen of Australia must also have converted British-born subjects living in Australia into subjects of the Queen of Australia. The second point was that, while the joint judgment in Nolan had referred to s 117 of the Constitution, it had failed to acknowledge and give effect to its implications and the light that they threw on who was an “alien” for the purposes of s 51(xix). His Honour then said: “For these reasons, the decision in Nolan should be overruled. The applicant and all other British subjects, born in the United Kingdom, who were living in Australia at the commencement of the Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 (Cth) and who have continued to reside here are subjects of the Queen of Australia, even if they are also subjects of the Queen of the United Kingdom. They are not and never have been aliens. They cannot be deported under the aliens or immigration powers conferred on the parliament by s 51 of the Constitution.” [91]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH J

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