Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 99

Appeal from: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd (No 3) [2015] FCA 1278
File number: NSD 1431 of 2015
Judges: JESSUP, RANGIAH AND WHITE JJ
Date of judgment: 5 August 2016
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Redundancy – Agreement clause requiring recourse to “redeployment and voluntary redundancy” – Whether employer obliged to offer redundancy separation to employees whose positions continued to exist – Agreement clause requiring investigation of “all avenues to avoid forced redundancies, including the reduction of contractors” – Whether confined to contractors engaged on full‑time, permanent, basis – Whether employer had undertaken investigation.

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Obligation to consult where introduction of “change” being considered – Whether change was “major” – Whether introduction of change being “considered” – Potential impact of change on dayworkers – Whether employed on day shift – Whether “a change to the numbers of employees per shift.”

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Adverse action – Dismissed of employee – Whether done because of employee’s position as officer of trade union or his having engaged in industrial activity – Reasons of decision‑maker – Onus of proof – Credibility of witness.

EVIDENCE – Credibility of witnesses – Witnesses’ evidence rejected for reasons which included their failure to refer, in their affidavits, to documents and facts which were unhelpful to their case – Whether they testified that their affidavits were comprehensive – Whether they were given sufficient warning that their omissions might result in the rejection of their evidence.

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Remedies – Reinstatement – Whether available where position previously occupied no longer existed.

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 50, 340, 341, 342, 346, 347, 360, 361, 385, 389, 545, 550

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 28

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27

Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 222 CLR 241

Blackadder v Ramsey Butchering Services Pty Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 395

Blackadder v Ramsey Butchering Services Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 539

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v QR Limited [2010] FCA 591

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466

Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203

Director-General, Department of Health (NSW) v NSW Nurses’ Association (2011) 209 IR 49

Driclad Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 121 CLR 45

Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2001) 111 IR 241

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182

Kuhl v…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 99
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union involves an appeal against an earlier decision by the primary Judge, who upheld significant aspects of the respondents' claims. The primary Judge found that the appellants, Port Kembla Coal Terminal Limited and others, contravened certain clauses of the Port Kembla Coal Terminal Limited Enterprise Agreement 2012-2015 (PKCT Agreement) and sections of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The respondents, Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and others, were employees of the Company who were made redundant. The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the primary Judge's findings were correct, specifically whether the appellants breached the agreement by not properly investigating redeployment and voluntary redundancy options before implementing forced redundancies, and whether the Company had adequately consulted with the Union regarding changes in employment practices.

The Court of Appeal found that the primary Judge erred in his interpretation of the PKCT Agreement. The Court held that the appellants were not obliged to offer redundancy separation to employees whose positions continued to exist, as the agreement only required recourse to redeployment and voluntary redundancy if workforce reductions were necessary. Regarding the consultation clause, the Court held that the changes associated with the redundancies did not necessitate a change in the number per shift in the relevant sense, so the consultation requirement was not triggered. The Court also found that the appellants had undertaken a genuine investigation into reducing contractors, albeit that they limited their consideration to contractors engaged on a full-time, permanent basis. However, the Court concluded that the primary Judge's finding that the appellants contravened the agreement should be set aside. The Court held that the primary Judge erred in his interpretation of the agreement and that the appellants had adequately investigated redeployment and voluntary redundancy options.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal in part. The primary Judge's determination that the appellants contravened s 50 of the Fair Work Act by contravening cl 7 of the PKCT Agreement was set aside, and the respondents' claim was dismissed. The primary Judge's determination of the respondents' claims under ss 340 and 346 of the Fair Work Act was also set aside, and a new trial of those claims was ordered before a differently-constituted court. Otherwise, the appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal's orders included granting leave to appeal, setting aside certain determinations of the primary Judge, dismissing the respondents' claims, and ordering a new trial of other claims before a differently-constituted court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal be granted.

2. The appeal be allowed in part.

3. The primary Judge’s determination that the first appellant contravened s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by contravening cl 7 of the Port Kembla Coal Terminal Limited Enterprise Agreement 2012-2015 be set aside.

4. The respondents’ claim that the first appellant contravened s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by contravening cl 7 of the said agreement be dismissed.

5. The primary Judge’s determination of the respondents’ claims under ss 340 and 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) be set aside.

6. There be a new trial of the said claims under ss 340 and 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) before a differently-constituted court.

7. Otherwise, the appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In his orders of 16 November 2015, the primary Judge gave effect, in part, to an earlier decision, published on 8 October 2015, in which he upheld significant aspects of the now respondents’ claims, but he reserved for further consideration other heads of relief which had been sought. Because his Honour’s orders were, in this respect, interlocutory, leave to appeal is required under s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Federal Court Act”). The decision of 8 October 2015, however, finally determined the rights and wrongs of the case at a high level, and the respondents do not resist the grant of leave to appeal to the extent of grounds of appeal that were developed in the applicants’ written submissions filed before the hearing of the present application. In the circumstances, I consider that leave to appeal should be granted. Henceforth in these reasons, I shall refer to this proceeding as an appeal, and to the applicants as the appellants.THE FACTS IN OUTLINE What follows in this part of my reasons is based substantially on findings made by the primary Judge. The Company, which is owned by a consortium of six coal producers, operates the coal terminal at Port Kembla. As at February 2015, the Company had about 98 full time equivalent employees. Mr Green was the General Manager at the terminal, albeit that he was employed by a company associated with one of the consortium members. Until the termination of their employments in circumstances which led to the proceeding before the primary Judge, Mr Giddings was employed by the Company in the position of Long Term Planner, Mr Rosewarn was so employed in the position of Facilities Maintenance Engineer and Ms Arber was so employed as an Administration Assistant. They were all members of the Union, and Mr Giddings was president of the Port Kembla Coal Terminal Lodge (“the Lodge”). In his reasons of 8 October 2015, the primary Judge explained that deteriorating business conditions in the coal industry in the years leading to 2014 caused the Company to abandon what had, in May 2011, been a project to upgrade the infrastructure and facilities at the terminal. However, earlier reports on the condition of plant and equipment at the terminal had highlighted the extent of the backlog of maintenance and restoration work that was required. The scale and complexity of this work was beyond routine repair and maintenance activities, and it was decided to undertake the necessary work by way of a dedicated project team. At the times which became relevant in the proceeding before his Honour, there were about 50 contractors engaged on this project work, in addition to 5-15 contractors who were performing non-project work at the terminal. In March 2014, Mr Green announced an operational review of the Company’s business. John Gorman, the Operations Manager of the Company (albeit that he too, like Mr Green, was employed by a company associated with one of the consortium members) had been on secondment to another business within the same group. Upon his return to the Company in April 2014, Mr Green asked him to work on that operational review. Mr Gorman did so, and it was not until July 2014 that he returned to his responsibilities as Operations Manager. It was, accordingly, Mr Gorman who carried out much of the early work on the review. Through April, May, June and July 2014, Mr Gorman kept Mr Green informed about how the operational review was progressing, in part through regular fortnightly meetings.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As each of the applicants was a day worker, the changes associated with their redundancies did not necessitate a change in the number per shift in the relevant sense. Accordingly, I consider that cl 9.2 did not, independently of cl 7, require PKCT to consult with the applicants or the CFMEU in accordance with cl 7. Conclusion on breach of cl 7 For these reasons, I consider that the Judge’s finding that PKCT contravened cl 7 of the PKCT Agreement should be set aside.CLAUSE 13.5 Again, for convenience, I will repeat the terms of cl 13.5:13.5 Redundancy13.5.1.The Company undertakes that in managing manning levels to suit the business needs it will make use of redeployment and voluntary redundancy prior to implementing any forced redundancies.13.5.2.If workforce reductions for Employees bound by this Agreement were to become necessary, they will be taken through the consultative process described in this Agreement.13.5.3.The Company shall investigate all avenues to avoid forced redundancies, including the reduction of contractors, where the work performed by contractors can be performed by Employees of the Company, having regard to the skills and competencies of Employees and the nature of the work in question.13.5.4If a redundancy situation still exists after the above steps have been taken, the process for determining required compulsory redundancies within a classification will be through consultation, including taking length of service into account.13.5.5Should the need for redundancy arise, the PKCT standard severance package of four weeks pay in lieu of notice and three weeks pay per each year of service paid at the Special Purpose Rate shall apply, unless otherwise agreed or determined. Looked at generally, cl 13.5 imposes an overarching obligation on PKCT to “investigate all avenues to avoid forced redundancy” (cl 13.5.3) and, in particular, to make use of redeployment, to make use of voluntary redundancy, and to investigate reduction of contractors when employees who have been considered for retrenchment may, having regard to their skills and competencies and the nature of the work in question, perform work which is being carried out by contractors. The primary Judge found that PKCT did not comply with the obligations imposed by cll 13.5.1 and 13.5.2 in relation to the terminations of Mr Giddings and Mr Rosewarn, but that it had done so in relation to the termination of Ms Arber. The Judge summarised his conclusions with respect to the contraventions of cl 13.5 as follows:[9] In my view PKCT breached its obligation under cl. 13.5 of the Agreement to:(a)make use of redeployment and voluntary redundancy prior to implementing “forced redundancies” (which is the term used in the Agreement for compulsory redundancies) as required under cl. 13.5.1; and(b)investigate all avenues to avoid the forced redundancies of the affected employees including by the reduction of contractors, as required under cl 13.5.3.In summary, I say this because PKCT did not give proper consideration to redeploying Mr Giddings and Mr Rosewarn into any suitable vacancy which might have arisen through offers of voluntary redundancy or any suitable role which might have arisen by PKCT reducing its use of contractors.[10]PKCT refused to seek expressions of interest in voluntary redundancy in relation to Mr Giddings’ and Mr Rosewarn’s positions, and as a result they were denied the possibility of redeployment within PKCT. … PKCT refused to consider reducing contractors, unless the contractors were engaged on a full‑time and permanent basis (when none were so engaged). That approach to the construction of the Agreement meant that no contractors fell to be considered by PKCT in its investigation of reducing contractors.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At 5:24 pm on 3 December 2014, Ms Linton emailed a document to Mr Gorman and Mr Stewardson and others, summarising the Union’s concerns and setting out a range of responses to matters anticipated to be raised by the Union. In relation to redeployment into contractors’ work it was stated: a.The Company is obliged to explore a reduction in contractors, where the work performed by a contractors [sic] can be performed by Employees of the Company, having regard to the skills and competencies of Employees and the nature of the work in question[.]b.[The Company] has reviewed the need for contractors to determine whether any contractor’s work can be performed by an affected employee, having regard to the skills and competencies of the employee and the nature and duration of the work.c.We will not redeploy people into contract roles which are for a finite duration where it does not make sense to do so having regard to the status of the contract and the skills required.d.[Insert link to matrix of all contractor positions at [the Company] and analysis of the skills of employees to be made redundant to evidence that the positions are not suitable (including because positions are temporary)]i.initial draft document has been created, to be updated by Roger/John as discussed M:\MANAGERS\Human Resources \ Management Access HR Files\Industrial Relations Material\Project Warranty\Operational Review October 2014\Analysis of contractor positions.xlsx The “matrix” of contractor positions for which a link was required was an assessment of contractor roles that might be performed by affected employees. It had been prepared by Geraldine Uren, a contractor working in an administrative capacity. Although she did not give evidence, the matrix was tendered by the appellants, over the objection of the respondents. It took the form of a very brief spreadsheet, as follows: On 4 December 2014, the Union wrote to the Company requesting it to provide information about the work undertaken by contractors so that it might meaningfully participate in consultation about reducing contractors. It sought the provision of extensive information, the detail of which was set out in the reasons of the primary Judge, but which does not need to be included here. On 5 December 2014, Mr Green met with his senior managers to prepare the Company’s response to that request. In what his Honour described as “extensive email exchanges through that day”, Mr Gorman, Mr Stewardson and Ms Linton discussed the precise wording to be used in the response. His Honour recounted Mr Gorman’s concession in cross-examination that, in formulating this response, he was “simply seeking to justify the company’s position the best way that he could, rather than genuinely considering the Union’s alternative view”. On 8 December 2014, the Company provided its written response to the Union. It was, his Honour found, “little more than a reiteration of [the Company’s] position”. Provision of the information sought by the Union regarding contractors was refused. On 9 December 2014, the Union wrote again to the Company, maintaining that its actions were inconsistent with the Agreement, and complaining that the threatened dismissal of Mr Giddings constituted adverse action under the FW Act.