FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 50
Appeal from: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 987 File number: QUD 683 of 2016 Judges: GREENWOOD, FLICK AND RANGIAH JJ Date of judgment: 23 March 2017 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – paragraphs of amended statement of claim struck out – paragraphs ambiguous or likely to cause prejudice or embarrassment – decision not attended by sufficient doubt – no substantial injustice – application for leave to appeal dismissed Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 342, 361, 362, 550, 793
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 7.23, 16.02, 16.03, 16.21, 16.41, 16.43, 16.45, 20.13
Cases cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Visy Packaging Pty Ltd(No 3) (2013) 216 FCR 70
Banque Commerciale SA v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279
Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697
Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Fair Work Ombudsman v Al Hilfi [2012] FCA 1166
Gould, Birbeck and Bacon v Mount Oxide Mines Ltd (in liq) (1916) 22 CLR 490
Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563
Lee v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] FCA 467
Lion-Dairy & Drinks Pty Ltd v Sinclair Knight Merz Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 869
Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34
Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125
Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 99
Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238
Thorpe v Commonwealth (No 3) (1997) 71 ALJR 767
Date of hearing: 21 November 2016 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 73 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H Borenstein QC with Mr J Fetter Solicitor for the Applicant: Hall Payne Lawyers Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mr A Duffy QC with Mr I Neil SC Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Ashurst Australia Counsel for the Third and Fourth Respondents: Mr C Murdoch Solicitor for the Third and Fourth Respondents: Corrs Chambers Westgarth ORDERS
QUD 683 of 2016 BETWEEN: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Applicant
AND: BHP COAL PTY LTD (ACN 010 595 721)
First Respondent
BM ALLIANCE COAL OPERATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 096 412 752)
Second Respondent
DOWNER EDI MINING PTY LTD (ACN 004 142 223) (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
JUDGES:
GREENWOOD, FLICK AND RANGIAH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
23 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal…
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 50
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the primary judge's decision to strike out the specified paragraphs of the ASOC was justified. The key legal issue was whether the primary judge's findings regarding the confusion in the pleaded agreement and the sufficiency of the detail provided in paragraph 29 were correct. Additionally, the court needed to assess if the interlocutory judgment had any impact on the CFMEU's substantive rights, considering the primary judge had granted leave to replead. The court's reasoning involved examining the applicant's arguments and submissions concerning the merits of the proposed appeal, focusing on the clarity and intelligibility of paragraph 29 and the relationship between this paragraph and the other paragraphs that were struck out.
The court found that the primary judge's decision to strike out the paragraphs of the ASOC was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal. The court reasoned that the primary judge's findings regarding the confusion and insufficient detail were not erroneous. Furthermore, the court held that the interlocutory judgment did not affect the CFMEU's substantive rights since the primary judge had already granted leave to replead. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and made no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. There will be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Leave to appeal is more readily given where the interlocutory judgment affects a party’s substantive rights: Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125 at [19]. In this case, the judgment does not affect the applicant’s substantive rights since the primary judge gave the applicant leave to replead. Consideration The applicant’s oral submissions as to the merits of the proposed appeal focused principally on paragraph 29 of the ASOC. The applicant accepted that each of the succeeding paragraphs struck out was related to paragraph 29. The applicant conceded that in the proposed appeal the fate of each of the paragraphs struck out, other than s 28B, will depend upon the fate of paragraph 29. The applicant’s draft notice of appeal contains the following ground in respect of paragraph 29 of the ASOC:31.Her Honour erred in striking out paragraph 29 for the reason that it contained insufficient detail to enable Downer to answer it, and for the reason that there was confusion in the agreement pleaded, in relation to which the Applicant relies on grounds 1 to 6 above. Grounds 1 to 6 of the draft notice of appeal deal with paragraph 30 of the ASOC. Of those grounds, only ground 2 has any relevance to the striking out of paragraph 29. That ground states:2.Her Honour erred in finding that there was confusion in the Applicant’s case as to the precise nature of the BMA-Downer Agreement as defined in paragraph 29 of the ASOC, by herself confusing the defined agreement with the two formal contracts between BMA and Downer which were produced on affidavit by BMA. In its written submissions, the applicant argues that:30.Her Honour found that the “BMA-Downer Agreement” pleaded at ASOC [29] was to be understood as a reference to three contracts placed into evidence by the Respondent. That finding affected her Honour’s decision to strike out not only ASOC [29], but every other paragraph challenged, save for ASOC [28B]…31.Her Honour failed to consider and deal with ASOC [29] in its own terms. Her Honour was distracted by the contracts produced by the Respondents which led her into error. Her Honour wrongly assumed that ASOC [29] seeks to plead those formal contracts. It does not. It simply pleads an agreement – in the ordinary sense of a mutual arrangement or understanding – the effect of which is stated, namely, that Downer would “replace” BHP Coal. Further details of the agreement, and its implementation, are given in the particulars to ASOC [30].32.The question for her Honour was whether ASOC [29] raised an intelligible factual allegation. It clearly did and her Honour erred in striking it out.(Citation omitted.) In their oral submissions, counsel for the applicant said:And we made the point before her Honour that we were not suggesting or referring to any particular contract in a formal sense. We were referring to an agreement or arrangement, in the commonly understood sense, which called for certain things to happen, and then we plead that they happened.…The documents that we rely on are not contractual documents. We never said they were. But they are documents which contain, effectively, admissions from the parties of the arrangement. And the particulars which were given are also consistent with those admissions.