Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 987

File number: QUD 1139 of 2015
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 19 August 2016
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21(1)(c), 16.21(1)(d), 16.21(1)(e) and 16.21(1)(f) – application to strike out parts of amended statement of claim – whether parts of the amended statement of claim defective – whether claims disclose no reasonable cause of action – whether material facts pleaded – whether claims conclusory – whether claims ambiguous, evasive and likely to cause prejudice – leave given to replead further amended statement of claim

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A – Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01– application for summary judgment – whether reasonable prospect of success – successful applications to strike out paragraphs of statement of claim not equivalent to unreasonable prospect of success – application for summary judgment refused

COSTS – Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) s 570 – whether Court satisfied criteria in s 570(2) FW Act are met – principal proceedings commenced pursuant to FW Act – criteria in s 570 FW Act not satisfied – no costs order

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 3, 340(1)(a)(i), 342, 342(1), 360, 361, 362, 550, 570, 570(2)

Federal Court Act of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 7.23, 16.02, 16.21, 16.21(1), 16.21(1)(a)-(f), 16.43, 26.01(a)

Cases cited:

Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] NSWCA 131

Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 469

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717

Australian Wool Innovation Ltd v Newkirk [2005] FCA 290

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Visy Packaging Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 525

Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279

Brambles Holdings v Carey (1976) 15 SASR 270

BWK Elders Australia Pty Ltd v Westgate Wool Company Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] FCA 87

Byrne v Australian Ophthalmic Supplies (2008) 169 IR 236

Coffey v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1998] FCA 1202

Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46

Community & Public Sector Union v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2001) 107 FCR 93

Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658

Dunstan v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [1999] FCA 1608

Fair Work Ombudsman v Al Hilfi [2015] FCA 313

Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1135

Fair Work Ombudsman v Offshore Marine Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 943

Forty Two International Pty Limited v Barnes [2010] FCA 397

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Granitigard Pty Ltd v Termicide Pest Control Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 81

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 987
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd, the applicants, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) and Building Materials Australia (BMA), sought leave to file a further amended statement of claim against BHP Coal. The respondents opposed the application, arguing that the claims in the amended statement of claim were defective and should be struck out. The CFMEU's claims were based on the respondents' alleged adverse actions against the applicants, in violation of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The respondents argued that the amended statement of claim was conclusory, ambiguous, evasive, and likely to cause prejudice, and that the applicants had no reasonable prospect of success. The applicants sought leave to replead their claims, and the court had to decide whether the amended statement of claim was defective and whether the applicants should be granted leave to replead.

The court held that the amended statement of claim was defective in several respects. The court found that the claims in paragraphs 28B, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 33A, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 40A, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 were either conclusory or did not disclose any reasonable cause of action. The court found that the applicants had not pleaded any material facts to support their claims, and that the claims were ambiguous, evasive, and likely to cause prejudice to the respondents. The court held that the successful application to strike out paragraphs of the statement of claim did not necessarily mean that the applicants had no reasonable prospect of success. The court found that the applicants had a reasonable prospect of success on some of their claims, and that the application for summary judgment was therefore refused. The court also found that the criteria for ordering costs under section 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) were not satisfied, and that no costs order should be made.

The court granted leave to the applicants to file a further amended statement of claim by a specified date and set a further directions hearing. The court ordered that paragraphs 28B, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 33A, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 40A, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of the amended statement of claim be struck out. The court noted that the applicants had leave to apply for an extension of time to file a further amended statement of claim if necessary. The court also noted that there would be liberty to apply on three days' written notice. The court's orders were made under rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Paragraphs 28B, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 33A, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 40A, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 of the amended statement of claim filed by the applicant on 28 January 2016 be struck out.

2. The applicant has leave to file a further amended statement of claim by 4 pm on 30 September 2016.

3. The matter return for further directions at 9.30 am on 10 October 2016.

4. There be liberty to apply on three (3) days’ written notice.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Second, I am unable to identify material facts pleaded to support the conclusion pleaded in paragraph 30 that “by making” the BMA-Downer Agreement, BMA has or threatened to do the acts pleaded in paragraph 30(a), (b) and (c). Mr Neil SC for the first and second respondents submitted that, in fact, paragraph 30 refers to a bilateral act and not a unilateral act, namely the entry into the BMA-Downer Agreement by BMA and Downer. Paragraph 29 pleads that the BMA-Downer Agreement came into being by the agreement between BMA and Downer (a bilateral act) whereas paragraph 30 then purports to plead that it was “made” by BMA (a unilateral act) which clearly cannot be the case. It may well be that what the applicant actually claims is that by agreeing in (unidentified) terms to an agreement with Downer, BMA was threatening to do, or actually doing, harm to BHP, including terminating the labour supply agreement with BHP. The jump from the facts pleaded in the particulars to paragraph 30(c), to the claims in paragraph 30(a), (b) and (c) is, however, not clear. The CFMEU does not point to any aspect of either the formal service contracts or the three documents whereby BMA either threatened to, or did, terminate labour supply agreements with BHP. It is also unclear how BHP has or would suffer prejudice, even if the entry of BMA and Downer into the BMA-Downer Agreement of itself effected a termination or reduction in services to be provided by BHP to BMA. Third, it is unclear to me how the particularised allegation of the CFMEU in paragraph 30(c)F that BHP would “dismiss” 43 employees by way of “voluntary redundancy” constitutes a refusal by BMA to, or a threat to refuse to, make use of the services of BHP. This is particularly confusing in light of the following comments of RD Nicholson J in Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34 at [244]:(1)An offer of voluntary redundancy is not a threat to injure an employee in his or her employment. It is an offer the employee may accept or reject.(2)Acceptance by an employee of payment of redundancy, a fortiori payment at an enhanced rate, is evidence of absence of injury in the employment to which the redundancy relates.(3)Once accepted by the employee, the redundancy takes effect and the employment ceases. There is therefore no relevant employment against which to measure any alleged injury arising from the redundancy.(4)Consequently, allegations of worse terms and conditions being inevitable on engagement in new employment are not relevant to alleged injury in the former employment … I respectfully adopt these comments as statements of general principle referable to the concept of adverse action in s 342 of the FW Act, and voluntary redundancy. In this case, the CFMEU does not plead any facts supporting the proposition that voluntary redundancies offered by BHP (and apparently accepted by workers) were, in fact, not voluntary, and/or that workers (or BHP) were in this respect the subject of adverse action. In this respect the proceedings before the Court can be contrasted with those before the Full Court in Community & Public Sector Union v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2001) 107 FCR 93 where the Full Court observed that implementation of “downsizing” by the employer exposed its employees to a prospect of redundancy that was not truly voluntary.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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