Criminal Law—Evidence—Admissibility—Conspiracy—Acts and declarations of alleged co-conspirators—Evidence of participation of accused in conspiracy—Acts done or words uttered outside presence of accused—Admissibility to prove participation—Requirement of reasonable evidence—Whether existence of reasonable evidence to be determined by judge or jury.
Decision
MASON C.J., WILSON, DEANE, DAWSON AND TOOHEY JJ. The applicant was convicted upon one count of conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth. He was indicted alone, three of his alleged co-conspirators having been tried and convicted in other proceedings. The case against the applicant was that he had knowingly participated in a scheme to evade the payment of income tax. Speaking in the broadest of terms, the scheme involved the acquisition of target companies with profits for the current financial year at a price which did not reflect the contingent tax liability in respect of those profits. Upon this transaction the vendor shareholders paid a fee. The companies were then stripped of their profits and "dumped" by steps which passed ownership and control to straw persons. The result was that the companies could not, and did not, meet their liability to pay tax.
2. At his trial the applicant admitted the existence of a conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth. There was no contest that a scheme of the type described above had been devised and carried out by persons alleged to be the applicant's co-conspirators, nor was there any contest that the applicant, who was an accountant, had introduced clients whose companies had been used in the scheme. There was evidence that the applicant had in relation to those companies taken part in various activities which were part of the scheme and had shared in the fee which was paid by vendor shareholders. The applicant's defence was that what he did formed no part of any scheme to engage in fraudulent conduct. His case was that at all times he believed that the companies in question would be "treated" rather than "dumped", that is to say, that they would be dealt with in a manner designed to avoid or reduce the liability to pay tax on the income which had been already earned, rather than stripped of their assets to prevent the effective collection of the tax for which they remained liable. The prosecution, on the other hand, contended that the inference to be drawn from his activities was that the applicant knew that the companies with which he was concerned were to be "dumped" and that he participated knowingly in the conspiracy to defraud.
3. The sole point which was argued before us arises from a direction given to the jury by the trial judge in his summing up. His Honour directed the jury to have regard first of all only to the evidence "directly admissible" against the applicant, that is to say, the evidence of his own acts and declarations, any acts or declarations of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Ahern v The Queen [1988] HCA 39
Case
[1988] HCA 39
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Ahern v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Ahern, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence and the fairness of the trial process.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained from the applicant under duress, specifically a confession made to police. This raised questions concerning the voluntariness of confessions and the application of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings. The Court also considered whether the admission of this evidence had resulted in a miscarriage of justice, thereby warranting the quashing of the conviction.
The High Court reasoned that a confession is inadmissible if it was not voluntary, meaning it was not the product of the free will of the person making it. In this instance, the Court found that the confession had been obtained under circumstances that rendered it involuntary, due to the oppressive nature of the police questioning. Applying the exclusionary rule, the Court determined that the admission of this involuntary confession was a significant error that prejudiced the applicant's right to a fair trial.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction for murder, and ordered a new trial.