R v Tang, Wei
[2006] VCC 637
•9 June 2006
IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Case No. CR-04-01316
THE QUEEN V
WEI TANG
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| JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE McINERNEY |
| WHEREHELD: | Melbourne |
| DATEOFHEARING: | 19, 20, 24, 26, 27 & 28 April, 1 to 31 May, 1, 2, 3 & 5 June 2006. |
| DATEOFSENTENCE: | 9 June 2006 |
| CASEMAYBECITEDAS: | R v Tang, Wei |
| MEDIUMNEUTRALCITATION: | [2006] VCC 637 |
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REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Catchwords: Slavery – Possess a slave – Use a slave – Definition of slavery – S.270.1, 270.3 Criminal Code (Commonwealth).
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
For the Crown | Ms R Carlin and Ms L West | The Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) |
For the Accused | Mr John Dickinson | Slades & Parsons |
COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA
250 William Street, Melbourne
HIS HONOUR:
1On the 3rd June 2006, Wei Tang was found guilty by a jury, of ten counts of the breach of s.270.3(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (Commonwealth) 1995, being five counts of possess a slave and five counts of exercise a power of ownership over a slave, being the power to use. Such charges related to five complainants.
2This provision of the Criminal Code was introduced into law by Parliament in 1999. Last year, Wei Tang was tried for these offences. That jury was discharged without verdict. Prior to that trial, and in pre-trial argument to this trial, the meaning of the definition of slavery in the Criminal Code at s.270.1 was extensively canvassed. I am advised that this is the first jury conviction under the Act, albeit that Wei Tang’s original co-accused, “F”, pleaded guilty to three counts of slavery and two counts of slave trading and was sentenced by this Court on 24th January 2005. Such sentence was appealed to the Court of Appeal which re-sentenced the co-accused on the 12th day of April 2005.
3Without rehearsing the full legislative history of these provisions, I quote the Minister, Ian MacDonald’s statement in the second reading speech of the 24th March 1999, that:
“The importance of this bill is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that its provisions will be inserted in Chapter 8 of the Code, which is the chapter which deals with crimes against humanity.”
4The circumstances of criminality in short compass are:
(1)The five complainants were recruited in Thailand.
(2)All complainants had previously worked in the sex industry.
(3)All complainants consented to come to Australia to work in the sex industry.
(4)“F” and others were involved in recruiting and transporting the complainants to Australia, obtaining entry visas and placing them with “owners” and in brothels to work off their contracts.
(5)The Thai connections in four instances were paid, by the accused and others, sums in the order of $20,000, and on the fifth instance concerning “A”, Wei Tang paid a co-owner in Sydney the portion which he had paid to Thailand.
(6)“F” gave evidence that such transactions “were the money for purchasing women from Thailand to come here.”
(7)Thereafter, the terms of the contract were confirmed in each instance between the woman, “F” and Wei Tang.
(8)In the main, the contract debt was the sum of $45,000.
(9)In return, the individual woman would work in Wei Tang’s brothel, known as Club 417 in Brunswick Street, Fitzroy.
(10)While under contract, each woman would serve up to nine-hundred customers over a period of four to six months.
$110.00 would be charged for a sexual service (intercourse).
$67.00 went to the owners and $43.00 to the brothel.
With each service, $50.00 was deducted from the contract debt.
The hours of work were on average from 6:00 pm to 2:00 am or later.
(11)The women earned nothing in cash during the period of the contract, but for what could be earned on what was euphemistically called “a free day”. Such did not mean no work for the women, for by working on the seventh day of the week she was able to keep the $50.00 which would otherwise go to offset her contract debt.
(12)Each of the women lived at found premises where they were lodged, fed and their medical requirements attended to.
(13)While on contract their passports and airfares were retained by Wei Tang.
(14)It was intended that “F” would obtain further visas for the women when in Australia.
5In fact only two of the five woman paid off their contracts:
• “A”, in the sum of $35,000 over a period of eight months from September 2002 to May of 2003. (She had been in Melbourne working for another brothel owner for a month prior to coming to work with Wei Tang).
• “B”, whose contract was the sum of $45,000, which she paid off over a period of seven months from the 10th October 2002 to the 24th May 2003.
6As to the other three women, they were arrested mid-contract:
• “C” – gave evidence that her contract involved eight-hundred clients.
In cross-examination, she said such involved $40,000. She worked from the 8th day of April 2003 to the 31st day of May 2003 (being the day of the raid by Immigration authorities), a period of seven weeks.
• “D” – worked from the 3rd day of May 2003 to the 31st day of May 2003 (raid), being twenty-eight days, during which time she gave evidence that of her debt of $45,000, $4,110 was paid off it.
• “E” – worked for six days from the 26th day of May 2003 to the 31st day of May 2003 (raid), and her contract involved nine-hundred customers and/or $45,000.
7In carrying out the task involved in classifying these crimes, I take into account what the High Court said in R v Ibbs [1987] 163 CLR 441, 452:
“When an offence is defined to include any of several categories of conduct, the heinousness of the conduct in a particular case depends not on the statute defining the offence but on the facts of the case. In a case of sexual assault, a sentencing judge has to consider where the facts of the particular case lie in a spectrum at one end of which lies the worst type of sexual assault perpetrated by any act which constitutes sexual penetration as defined. As Dwyer CJ said in Reynolds v Wilkinson (1948) 51 WALR 17 at 18: ‘Crimes bearing the same general description have not equally evil content or characteristics, and offenders also differ in themselves.’”
8In counsels’ submissions on the aspect of classifying the crimes, there emerged a number of factual issues and also a submission as to certain differences in facts from these upon which the Court of Appeal had sentenced “F”:
(1)Firstly, Mr Dickinson submitted that unlike “F”, Wei Tang was not responsible for bringing the girls from Thailand, that is, she had not been a conduit for such purpose. This is true, for insofar as the conduct relied upon by the DPP as to “F” pursuant to Ahern principles, [1988] 165 CLR 87, such conduct was specifically not included. (See my Ruling of the 26th May 2006).
As Chernov J.A., described “F”, she was party to an international scheme whereby women were conveyed to Australia, smuggled through customs and then kept in Sydney until “placed” in “ownership” and brothels.
The behaviour of “F” attributable to Wei Tang pursuant to such principle as put to the jury was the payment of money to the Thai agents in four instances, and the Sydney owner as to “A” in one instance, by Wei Tang in order to purchase the women.
(2)The second issue was whether the five women were “effectively kept under lock and key” as referred to by Chernov J.A., at paragraph 5 of the sentence in R v DS [2005] VSCA 99. There is no evidence that the
women were kept under lock and key. Such is accepted by the Director of Public Prosecutions.
The agreed facts upon which “F” was sentenced were that she believed the women were restrained by means of being locked up as they had no key, and pursuant to the restrictions of the contract as explained to the women.
Also in paragraph 6 of R v DS, as to “F”, Chernov J.A., said that the women did not have keys and were effectively under guard in their lodgings, which was not the evidence received at this trial.
However, the effect of the restrictions imposed upon the women amounted to what the learned prosecutor submitted to the jury was an insidious use of control by way of fear of detection from Immigration authorities or visa offences/advice to be aware of Immigration authorities, advice to tell false stories to Immigration authorities if apprehended/the hours of work involved/instructions that they were not to go out from their accommodation from either “F”, Wei or Paul, the manager of Club 417.
In fact, as to the apartment at 14 Rae Street, Fitzroy, there was no capacity to lock the apartment in the manner attested to by “E” and “D”. These two women had no key, and keys to the door were held by at least Wei Tang, Paul Pick and “F”.
Hence, while I find that “E” and “D” may not ever have been locked in the apartment, despite their evidence, the totality of circumstances was that they were effectively restricted to the apartment, albeit that on rare occasions they would have ventured out with consent or under supervision.
As to “A”, “C” and “B”, they were not subject to any locked situation at “Mummies”. However, again the totality of the control was such as to
effectively restrict them to “Mummies” to circumstances where they were only allowed, at the beginning of their contract, supervised outings with trusted non-contract girls.
The regime at “Mummies” became more relaxed as the contract progressed and a girl proved she could be trusted. “C” lived out in a converted garage and she had a key at all times. “B” and “A” shared a key owned by another girl and gradually benefited from a more relaxed policy at “Mummies”. Close to the end of their contracts they were at liberty to go out as they wished, albeit that each gave evidence that even if they were staying out overnight they obtained permission from “Mummy” to do so.
(3)As to the work premises at Club 417, while the women were permitted to go out for the occasional bit of personal shopping, effectively, owing to a combination of the type of work and the hours at which they worked, they were restricted to the premises. Indeed, in this regard two of the women, “C” and “B”, were not allowed to attend the brothel on Thursday and Friday nights before 12:00 am and had to go to 45 Alexander Parade for fear of Immigration raids. Each of the women were advised by “F” and Wei Tang of false stories, to convey to Immigration if questioned, whereby they would deny their background and the existence of a contract with Club 417 and the accused.
(4)To comprehend the impact of such a regime of restriction, one has to marry such a regime to the circumstances. One asks the rhetorical question: How could they run away when they had no money, they had no passport or ticket, they entered on an illegally obtained visa, albeit legal on its face, they had limited English language, they had no friends, they were told to avoid Immigration, they had come to Australia consensually to earn income and were aware of the need to work particularly hard in order to pay off a debt of approximately $45,000
before they were able to earn income for themselves?
(5)“C” gave evidence that “F” told her if she was picked up by Immigration during the period of the contract debt and deported, such debt would be cancelled. Such detection would defeat the purpose for the women coming to Australia, hence, I find that these women, in order to achieve what they set out to do, would adhere to the restrictions imposed. “F” gave evidence that such restrictions of movement were imposed by Wei Tang in order to ensure the women were available to work at the Club.
(6)Hence, I find as a sentencing fact, that owing to the combination of the circumstances rehearsed, while not locked in premises, all of the women were effectively restrained by the insidious nature of their contract.
Economic Status
(7)Mr Dickinson submitted the Court should recognise that the women were here willingly, that they had come to make money in the sex industry, in which they were experienced. Despite the fact that the jury had impliedly found the terms of the contracts oppressive, Mr Dickinson submitted that the contracts themselves were not coercive, in the sense that there was no violence or fraud involved.
(8)Mr Dickinson submitted there was no evidence to suggest that any of these women were financially deprived and/or being preyed upon in an economic sense. They were here for the purpose of making money.
(9)Consent was of course a factor for the jury when considering the status of slavery, however, such is not a defence to slavery.
(10)As to the economic condition of these women, I find that there is evidence, of which I can be satisfied to the required standard, that these women were financially deprived and vulnerable upon arriving in Australia:
(a) (1) “E”
“E” said that she came from a poor family and was entering
into the contract in order to get money for her family. She never paid anything for the air tickets or the visa and had no money on arrival but for $60.
(2)
“A”
She was given $500 for the trip by her escort, however, that was taken back upon arrival in Australia. She paid no money for the expenses of the trip. (3)
“D”
She gave evidence that all the documents were arranged in Thailand and that when she arrived in Australia she had only
$50.
(4)
“C”
She gave evidence that she wanted to get money in Australia for a better life than that of a sex worker which she had been carrying out in Thailand. She said she paid for nothing and arrived in Australia with less than $100. (5)
“B”
She said that the parties in Thailand arranged all aspects, she paid no money but for her agreement to pay the costs agreed in the contract.
(b)All of these women had limited education.
(c)All, upon coming to Australia, gave up possession of their passports.
(d)All of these women entered into contracts to work for no actual cash return over the period of a contract of some three to six months, servicing large numbers of men.
(e)All of the above factors were such that the women would only have put themselves into such condition by way of being impelled to do so because of economic vulnerability.
Contract
(11)The next question raised upon the plea was: What did these women consent to? The learned prosecutor described the contract in regard to each of the women as a fallacy. No doubt each of these women saw the income to be derived by them after the contract terms had concluded as a financial opportunity. That is, their motive was financial.
(12)However, the facts of the contracts were these:
(1)At all times the women had entered Australia on an illegally obtained visa, although legal on its face.
(2)At all times they were dependent for the continuation of the receipt of the so-called benefit under the contract upon not being apprehended by Immigration authorities, as in fact happened to three of the five women within, respectively, ten days, two weeks and seven weeks of arriving in Australia.
(3)If the women obtained a bridging visa, which on its face was legal, albeit obtained illegally, at all times there was a risk of further apprehension by Immigration authorities. In order to obtain such a visa, both women who had done so, being “A” and “B”, said that they paid an additional $2000 after the end of their contracts to “F” for such.
(4)When “B” and “A” were indeed interviewed by Immigration authorities in February 2004, they were detained when it became apparent that each of them had no idea that they had in fact applied for refugee status in Australia.
(5)It is true that by dint of good luck, each of “A” and “B” had lasted in Australia free of the contract for eleven months subsequent to the raid upon Club 417.
(6)The benefits from the contract which were the more certain to be obtained were those received when the women were hidden and kept away from Immigration, whereby their contracts were paid and profits made by their owners. I find that the contracts rendered the women at grave risk of being apprehended and deported.
(7)Mr Dickinson submitted to the jury, each woman got a commercially arrived at good deal with a raft of services. Considering the reality of the contract with these women, I would reject that submission, as I presume the jury did also.
(8)For sentencing purposes, I therefore conclude that the contract was designed to earn large profits from each girl for their owners, Wei Tang (who owned, but for “A”, fifty percent of each girl. For “A”, she obtained $49 per service only, being the payments made to the brothel).
(9)For the four girls, but for “A”, the owners stood to earn $69,000 per girl over the term of the contract, subject to the expenses to be borne by the owners, being the accounting for the approximate
$20,000 paid to Thailand, the costs of internal travel in Melbourne and living expenses during the period of the contract. In addition, in regard to each girl, the sum of $43,000 was paid to the brothel owner, being Wei Tang. (As I said, in regard to “A” only, this
payment was received by Wei Tang).
9Mr Dickinson, in the plea, maintained his submission made at the start of this trial that what the facts really showed in regard to these five complainants was a circumstance of debt bondage. That may be so, however, the jury have, in each count found that slavery resulted from such contract. Such a circumstance was envisaged by the Act, as I found in my Ruling of the 20th April 2006, in the trial. (See in particular page 115 of the transcript). Further, in the second reading speech which related to the state of the code before the addition of s.270.8, that is, the introduction of debt bondage which took place after the first trial of Wei Tang, the Minister said:
“It is important to make the point that, although this bill contains separate offences to address the conduct I will refer to shortly as sexual servitude, the slavery offences may also apply if the control over the sex worker is so far reaching that it effectively amounts to a right of ownership over her or him.”
10I do not accept the submission of Mr Dickinson, that each finding by the jury was no more than a finding of debt bondage and hence should be classified at the lower end of the spectrum of heinousness.
11On this point, the learned prosecutor in reply submitted I should find heinousness of Wei Tang a the mid-range level, and after considering all of the factors that I have just referred to, I accept that submission in regard to Counts 1 to 4, the seriousness being less for Counts 5 to 10.
12The learned prosecutor referred me to paragraph 19 of R v DS as synthesising the relevant sentencing principles where Chernov J.A. said:
“It is plain that, for the reasons given by the learned sentencing judge, the appellant's offending conduct here was serious. It is also plain that the offences are very serious given the maximum custodial sentences prescribed by the Commonwealth Parliament. Moreover, I think that the sentencing principles of general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment assumed considerable importance in this case.”
13These are serious crimes and I have referred earlier to the fact that slavery was specifically enacted into the Commonwealth legislation in 1999 to honour
international Treaties and enhance the cause of humanity. (See Exhibit A to the Ruling on slavery of the 20th April 2006, at page 113).
14Chernov J.A., went on to look at a number of mitigating factors in the “F” case.
It is appropriate, as to general sentencing factors, to bear in mind that in the second reading speech, the Minister expressed, in talking of the purposes of the bill, the importance of such as being perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that this provision was inserted in the chapter of the code that deals with crimes against humanity. Further, in such speech, the Minister remarked that the maximum penalty of imprisonment for the slavery offences is twenty-five years and that insofar as such penalty was concerned, in view of the heinousness of the crime involved, that such penalty was more than justified.
15There is no remorse demonstrated here, but this is not a negative as far as Wei Tang is concerned. The prisoner comes before the Court with no prior offences whatsoever at the age of forty-four and is entitled to have that taken into account and be granted all leniency possible in regard to such.
Motive
16Coming then to motive. I find that the motive of Wei Tang was the chance to make substantial profits from the possession and use of these five slaves. By way of analogy, when people indulge in drug trafficking for such motive, the law has been expressed that such people should expect condign punishment. For example, in R v Berisha & Ors. [1999] VSCA 112, at paragraph 32, Charles J.A., said:
“. . . trafficking in heroin is a very serious crime. The courts have repeatedly stigmatised the offence in the strongest terms. Offenders play for high stakes and persons detected in the business of trafficking in heroin can expect condign punishment and little mercy from the courts.”
17In the plea, Mr Dickinson said the business at Club 417 was suffering and that in order to meet competition for good workers, Wei Tang looked overseas. While such may explain her motive, it in no way excuses it. A further analogy
to drug sentences is that the true gauging of the criminality is not obtained by seeing what was actually gained by way of income, but it is necessary for a court to also consider the potential profits of what was planned, and what was likely to be achieved, in the context of the totality of the denial of rights detailed in regard to the three women whose contracts were frustrated by the raid of the Immigration authorities. Hence, by understanding the potential financial returns of those frustrated contracts, the full scope of each crime is appreciated, insofar as it relates to those three complainants. (See R v Peter John Spall & Rush [1999] VSCA 18).
18Mr Dickinson submitted that, given the difference to the “F” case and the different counts being faced, insofar as “F” and Wei Tang was concerned, I should totally disregard the sentence in R v DS. I find that such is not possible, as one must accept that both parties were accomplices in regard to the same criminal enterprise. Indeed, insofar as “A”, “C” and “E”, “F” was charged with the same offence. The difference being that Wei Tang faced slavery counts in regard to “B” and “E”, whereby “F” faced counts of slave trading, albeit for both offences the maximum penalty was twenty-five years. I find it is not possible to disregard the Court of Appeal decision in “F”. The prosecution submitted to the jury that both were parties to the same criminal enterprise. Of course, the cases were substantially different, insofar as mitigating factors available to “F” are not available here, being the plea of guilty, remorse and co-operation.
19The learned prosecutor submitted that the sentence should utilise the sentencing principles highlighted by Chernov J.A., in R v DS to which I have referred.
20The learned prosecutor also submitted that the starting point as to penalty is the twelve years with a minimum of five suggested by Chernov J.A., as would have been appropriate to “F” had there been no co-operation (paragraph 22).
21There is a large disparity in such sentence between the aggregate sentence and the parole period. It may be that this Court is the cause of such given the disparity in the sentence imposed by me upon “F” upon which the Court of Appeal adjudicated. Given such, it is not possible to disregard such disparity in any sentence I impose on Wei Tang.
22As I have said, the criminality in Counts 5 to 10 is less serious as those Counts involved a lesser period of activity, the production of much less actual profit and in fact individual contracts which to a substantial degree were not completed insofar as Wei Tang’s interests were concerned.
23As to parity, the learned prosecutor says the Court of Appeal determination must be considered. It must be accepted that “F” herself got less financial return from the enterprise. By way of ownership of fifty percent of four of the women and of the brothel itself, Wei Tang stood to earn far more from such enterprise. In this trial, “F” said that Wei Tang was not aware that anyone else but “F” had an interest in the balance of the fifty percent ownership.
24Chernov J.A., held that “F” was an important player in the scheme and I find no basis to particularly discriminate their roles in the performance of the contracts in Australia which concerned Wei Tang. “F”’s offending was classified as serious on the first count of slavery as to “A”, and less serious as to the others. As to Wei Tang, the offending conduct as to Counts 1 to 4 is serious, and I find less serious insofar as Counts 5 to 10 are concerned, due to their less protracted nature. As submitted by Mr Dickinson, I do take account of the factual differences that I have referred to. However, I do not agree that “F”’s sentence can be disregarded. I see no basis to discriminate their roles but for the fact of comprehending that “F” was involved on her own, insofar as the transport of the women and arrangements therefore from Thailand. I also accept, as was put by Mr Dickinson, that of course, given the consent of the women, there was not present the element of force, entrapment, fraud or sexual or physical abuse or coercion frequently found in
slavery situations.
25The aggregate sentence I will pass upon Wei Tang is less than that postulated by Chernov J.A., in R v DS, which the learned prosector submitted should be the starting point. This is so because:
(1)“F”’s plea was considered on the basis of agreed facts, and was not subject to the investigation of two trials, as has taken place with Wei Tang.
(2)While I have not been able to discriminate as between “F” and Wei Tang’s role in these offences concerning the contracts performed at Club 417, Wei Tang was not responsible, as was “F”, for being party to the international scheme which brought these women to Australia, deposited them in Sydney and placed them in contracts and brothels.
(3)I have found that these women were not locked up or watched over by “guards” and in fact in three instances had keys or access to keys to their premises, albeit that I have found they were restricted by contractual arrangements.
(4)The general treatment of the women, albeit restricted, was not to the degree or as demeaning as what was understood in the “F” agreed facts scenario. The evidence in this trial showed that the women were in fact well provisioned, fed and provided for in order to play this part in the business of Wei Tang. Indeed, on occasions they were taken out to social functions by Wei Tang or others.
(5)As to my classification as to the heinousness of criminality, in my sentence of “F”, I had classified such as being from mid-range to serious. In R v DS, Chernov J.A, accepted in general terms as to two counts of slavery, the heinousness was at the mid-range but less serious in regard to Counts 3 to 5 in regard to “F”. It has been
necessary to reflect that assessment in my sentencing considerations.
26As to personal factors, I accept the harsh background, both socially, politically and economically that Wei Tang endured in China as the daughter of a banker from 1968 through to 1998, being the date she came to Australia. I also accept that she had financial problems in her business. However, as the learned prosecutor submitted, given her background and experience of repression, it is surprising that she chose to commit such serious crimes against humanity.
27Both counsel submitted such crimes warranted imprisonment. Mr Dickinson submitted that a suspended sentence was within range. I would reject that. Firstly, because I could not determine an aggregate sentence in all the circumstances for all counts at three years or less and, secondly, because the objective seriousness of the crimes take the same outside the range for a suspended sentence.
28I accept that as a result of the raid by Immigration, Wei Tang’s business was closed. No doubt the Taxation Officers had something to do with that. She has lost the goodwill associated with that business and her assets are subject to the Proceeds of Crime legislation.
29I also take into account that Wei Tang has stood her trial twice, once in 2005 for eight weeks when the jury was discharged without verdict, and this trial, now in its eighth week. Throughout both trials, Wei Tang conducted herself in an exemplary manner. I stress that the accused is entitled to test the case against her and put the prosecution to its proof without suffering any negative consequences as to sentence. I also acknowledge that at the time of the commission of these offences, the crime of slavery had been only recently enacted as law.
30Hence, after taking account of all of the above factors, I sentence you, Wei Tang, as follows:
Count Sentence
1 Seven (7) years’ imprisonment 2 Seven (7) years’ imprisonment 3 Seven (7) years’ imprisonment 4 Seven (7) years’ imprisonment 5 Five (5) years’ imprisonment 6 Five (5) years’ imprisonment 7 Four (4) years’ imprisonment 8 Four (4) years’ imprisonment 9 Three-and-a-half (3½) years’ imprisonment 10 Three-and-a-half (3½) years’ imprisonment
31I accept the learned prosecutor’s submission that as to the second count in relation to each complainant there should be concurrency, and that there should be cumulation of sentence as to each complainant to recognise individual criminality. (See DPP v Grabovac [1997] 92 A Crim R 258).
32Hence, in terms of Victorian sentencing practice, I would order that eighteen months of the sentence on Count 3, twelve months of the sentence on Count 5, three months of the sentence on Count 7 and three months of the sentence on Count 9 be served cumulatively upon each other and upon the seven years imposed in Count 1, making a total aggregate sentence of ten years.
33In the circumstances of this case, s.19(2) of the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1907 requires the Court to direct the date upon which each sentence is to “commence so that no sentence commences later than the end of the sentence the commencement of which has already been fixed or of the last to end of those sentences.”
Count Commencement
1 9th June 2006 2 9th June 2006 3 9th December 2007 4 9th December 2007 5 9th December 2010 6 9th December 2010 7 9th March 2012 8 9th March 2012 9 9th January 2013 10 9th January 2013
34That means that the aggregate period of imprisonment the appellant will have to serve will be between the 9th January 2006 and the 8th July 2016, namely ten years.
35In accordance with s.19AB(1) of the Commonwealth Crimes Act, I fix a single non-parole period of six years.
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