JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: WILLIAMS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2021] WASCA 33
CORAM: BUSS P
BEECH JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 1 FEBRUARY 2021
DELIVERED : 25 FEBRUARY 2021
FILE NO/S: CACR 58 of 2020
BETWEEN: TROY ANDREW WILLIAMS
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: STEVENSON DCJ
File Number : IND 2216 of 2018
Catchwords:
Courts and judges - Procedural fairness - Apprehended bias - Whether the rule against prejudgment was infringed - Whether the judge's response to the statement of facts agreed between the prosecution and the appellant's solicitor gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the factual issues at an ensuing trial of issues
Criminal law and sentencing - Where the statement of facts agreed between prosecution and the appellant's solicitor - Where the judge expressed concern that the agreed facts required the court to sentence on a basis that was false or misleading - Where the judge subsequently determined factual issues adversely to the appellant at a trial of issues - Whether the judge's refusal to recuse himself on grounds of apprehended bias meant that the requirements of procedural fairness had been breached - Whether the sentencing process miscarried
Evidence - Hearsay - Co-conspirator's rule - Whether, in order for evidence to be admitted under the co-conspirator's rule as an exception to the rule against hearsay, there must be reasonable evidence of the participation of the accused in the conspiracy at or before the time the words were said by the alleged co‑conspirator
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Leave to appeal on grounds 1 and 2 granted
Leave to appeal on ground 1A refused
Appeal upheld
Sentence set aside
Matter remitted to the District Court for resentencing before a different judge
Category: D
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | J Condon QC & S E Pratt |
| Respondent | : | R G Wilson |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Sarah Pratt & Associates |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Ahern v The Queen [1988] HCA 39; (1988) 165 CLR 87
Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 253 CLR 58
British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283
Caratti v The Queen [2000] WASCA 279; (2000) 22 WAR 527
Chow v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1992) 28 NSWLR 593
Clarke v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 14
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577
DPP v Perry [2016] VSCA 152; (2016) 50 VR 686
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
GAS v The Queen [2004] HCA 22; (2004) 217 CLR 198
Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135
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- Case
- [2021] WASCA 33
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge's interventions during the sentencing proceedings created a reasonable apprehension of bias, thereby invalidating the sentence. The court had to consider whether the judge's comments, made during the sentencing hearing, indicated a clear and firm view on matters that would be live and significant issues in the sentencing proceedings. Additionally, the court had to determine if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an open mind to the determination of these issues.
The High Court of Australia held that the trial judge had indeed expressed a clear and firm view on questions of fact that were to constitute a live and significant issue in the sentencing proceedings. The court observed that the judge's interventions, particularly on 29 August 2019 and 5 September 2019, manifested a firm view about the factual basis for the appellant's sentencing. The court further found that, given these interventions, a fair-minded and informed lay observer might reasonably have apprehended that the judge might not bring an open mind to the determination of the issues relating to the factual basis for the appellant's sentencing. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal and ordered a new sentencing hearing.
In light of the above findings, the High Court of Australia set aside the decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia and ordered a new sentencing hearing for the appellant. This decision underscores the importance of judicial impartiality and the necessity for judges to avoid prejudging issues that may be significant in subsequent proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng,[119] Hayne J observed that an assertion that a decision-maker has prejudged or will prejudge an issue, and an assertion that there is a real likelihood that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not act impartially and without prejudice, in effect makes a statement which has several distinct elements at its foundation. His Honour elaborated:First, there is the contention that the decision-maker has an opinion on a relevant aspect of the matter in issue in the particular case. Secondly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will apply that opinion to that matter in issue. Thirdly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will do so without giving the matter fresh consideration in the light of whatever may be the facts and arguments relevant to the particular case. Most importantly, there is the assumption that the question which is said to have been prejudged is one which should be considered afresh in relation to the particular case.[119] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 [185]. In the present case, the first three of these elements must be found in order to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. The final element is clearly satisfied in this case and is not open to question. In Livesey, the High Court allowed an appeal on the ground of apprehended bias by a barrister against a decision of the Court of Appeal that he be struck off the roll. Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ held:[120]It is … apparent that, in a case such as the present … a fair-minded observer might entertain a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of prejudgment if a judge sits to hear a case at first instance after he has, in a previous case, expressed clear views either about a question of fact which constitutes a live and significant issue in the subsequent case or about the credit of a witness whose evidence is of significance on such a question of fact. The consideration that the relevant question of fact may be conceded or that the relevant person may not be called as a witness if the particular judge sits would not, of course, avoid the appearance of bias. To the contrary, it would underline the need for the judge to refrain from sitting. (emphasis added)[120] Livesey (300). In British American Tobacco, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ observed that it was recognised in Livesey that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that 'a judge who has found a state of affairs to exist, or who has come to a clear view about the credit of a witness, may not be inclined to depart from that view in a subsequent case'.[121] Their Honours added that the recognition in Livesey was 'a recognition of human nature'.[122][121] British American Tobacco [139].[122] British American Tobacco [139]. In our respectful view, for the reasons and in the manner outlined below:(1)on 29 August 2019 and 5 September 2019, the judge expressed a clear and firm view about questions of fact which, given his Honour's intervention, were to constitute a live and significant issue in the sentencing proceedings, namely, the factual basis for the sentencing of the appellant; and(2)in all the circumstances, a fair‑minded and informed lay observer might reasonably have apprehended that his Honour might not bring an open mind to the determination of the issues, emerging from his Honour's intervention, relating to the factual basis for the appellant's sentencing.