Suleiman v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   SULEIMAN -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2017] WASCA 26

CORAM:   BUSS P

MAZZA JA
MITCHELL JA

HEARD:   20 SEPTEMBER 2016

DELIVERED          :   20 SEPTEMBER 2016

PUBLISHED           :  9 FEBRUARY 2017

FILE NO/S:   CACR 53 of 2016

BETWEEN:   RASHID ALI SULEIMAN

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :FIANNACA J

File No  :INS 216 of 2015

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Appellant convicted on his pleas of guilty of three offences - Unchallenged expert evidence that the appellant was experiencing an acute relapse of a serious psychiatric illness at the time of the offending and that there was a causal connection between the relapse and the commission of the offences - Concession by the prosecutor at the sentencing hearing that the appellant should be sentenced on that basis - Sentencing judge rejected the prosecutor's concession - Sentencing judge not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that at the time of the offending the appellant was suffering from an acute relapse of his serious psychiatric illness - Procedural fairness - Application to admit additional psychiatric evidence in the appeal - Whether a miscarriage of justice occurred when the appellant was sentenced by the sentencing judge

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 40(1)(e)
Criminal Code (WA), s 401(2)(a), s 444(1)(b), s 445A
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 9AA, s 15

Result:

Leave to appeal granted on ground 2
Leave to appeal refused on ground 3
Appellant's application for leave to adduce additional evidence in the appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Sentencing judge's sentencing decision set aside
Appellant resentenced

Category:    D

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr A J Robson

Respondent:     Mr J A Scholz

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Legal Aid (WA)

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

AH v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 228; (2014) 247 A Crim R 34

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; (2005) 225 CLR 88

Baroudi v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 48

Button v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 264

Chow v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 593

IEB v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 207

Krijestorac v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 35

Lauritsen v The Queen [2000] WASCA 203; (2000) 22 WAR 442

Leach v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 73; (2008) 183 A Crim R 1

Minehan v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 140; (2010) 201 A Crim R 243

Mizzi v The Queen [1960] HCA 77; (1960) 105 CLR 659

Pantorno v The Queen [1989] HCA 18; (1989) 166 CLR 466

Parker v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 282

Phillips v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 69

R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67

R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA…

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Details
Case
[2017] WASCA 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Suleiman case involved an appeal by the appellant against his sentence. The appellant had pleaded guilty to three offences. At the time of the offending, he was experiencing an acute relapse of a serious psychiatric illness, which was a causal factor in the commission of the offences. The prosecutor conceded at the sentencing hearing that the appellant should be sentenced on that basis. However, the sentencing judge rejected the prosecutor's concession and was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant was suffering from an acute relapse of his serious psychiatric illness at the time of the offending. The appellant sought to admit additional psychiatric evidence in the appeal and argued that a miscarriage of justice had occurred when the appellant was sentenced by the sentencing judge.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the sentencing judge erred in rejecting the concession by the prosecutor that the appellant should be sentenced on the basis of his psychiatric illness. A secondary issue was whether the appellant's procedural fairness was breached when the sentencing judge rejected the concession and did not allow the appellant to call additional psychiatric evidence.

The court held that the sentencing judge erred in rejecting the concession by the prosecutor that the appellant should be sentenced on the basis of his psychiatric illness. The court held that fairness is a practical concept, and the rules of procedural fairness are concerned to avoid practical injustice. In this case, the concession by the prosecutor that the appellant should be sentenced on the basis of his psychiatric illness was effectively an agreement between the parties on a proposition of law. The sentencing judge was not entitled to reject that concession without giving the appellant an opportunity to show why the concession should not apply. The court held that the appellant's procedural fairness was breached when the sentencing judge rejected the concession and did not allow the appellant to call additional psychiatric evidence.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a re-sentencing hearing before a different judge.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Fairness is essentially a practical concept. It is not abstract in nature. The rules of procedural fairness are concerned to avoid practical injustice. See Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1 [37] (Gleeson CJ). In Pantorno, the appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of a drug of dependence. Defence counsel told the sentencing judge that the quantity of the drug was very small and was for the appellant's own use. He referred to s 73(1)(b) of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic) as prescribing the relevant penalty 'where it is not a trafficable amount, and the Crown doesn't suggest for one moment that this is a trafficable amount'. The prosecutor did not challenge that assertion and made no submissions about sentence. The sentencing judge sentenced the appellant under s 73(1)(c) of the Act, which prescribed a higher penalty than s 73(1)(b), on the basis that there was no evidence before him that the appellant's possession of the drug was not for a purpose relating to trafficking. The High Court held that, since the proceedings before the sentencing judge had been conducted by the prosecutor and defence counsel on the footing that s 73(1)(b) applied, it had not been open to the judge to sentence under s 73(1)(c) without giving defence counsel an opportunity to show why the appellant was not liable to the higher penalty prescribed by s 73(1)(c). Mason CJ and Brennan J said:When the parties to an adversarial proceeding agree on a proposition of law and conduct their cases on that basis, their agreement does not bind the trial judge. If the judge determines the law to be different, he may apply the law as he determines it to be, but he must inform the parties of the view he has formed when that is necessary to give them an opportunity to address new issues arising from the judge's departure from the proposition of law on which the case was conducted. Otherwise both parties are taken by surprise: see Fairmount Ltd v Environment Secretary [[1976] 1 WLR 1255, at pp 1265 ‑ 1266; [1976] 2 All ER 865, at p 874]. Especially in the criminal court, there is a need to ensure that the accused or convicted person is not taken by surprise: he must be given a fair opportunity of meeting the case against him so far as that case has not already been put to him for answer (473). Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ observed:In all the circumstances, it was incumbent upon the sentencing judge to indicate to counsel his lack of acceptance of the underlying assumption upon which the submissions upon sentence had been made. This was particularly the case when counsel had asserted, without dissent from the Crown or comment by the sentencing judge, that the small quantity of heroin found in his client's possession had, in any event, been for the applicant's personal use. In the result, the conclusion is unavoidable that the applicant was effectively denied any adequate opportunity at first instance to call the evidence which it was necessary to call … The denial of that opportunity to call evidence constituted a denial of procedural fairness which vitiated the sentencing judge's finding that, by reason of absence of evidence, he was not satisfied of the absence of any purpose relating to trafficking (482 ‑ 483).