JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: AUSTIN -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2023] WASCA 191
CORAM: BUSS P
MAZZA JA
VANDONGEN JA
HEARD: 23 OCTOBER & 7 NOVEMBER 2023
DELIVERED : 13 NOVEMBER 2023
PUBLISHED : 12 APRIL 2024
FILE NO/S: CACR 78 of 2023
BETWEEN: PIETER THEUNIS AUSTIN
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: FORRESTER J
File Number : INS 47 of 2022
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Appellant convicted on his plea of guilty of one count of attempted murder - Sentence of 5 years 6 months' imprisonment - Whether the sentencing judge denied the appellant procedural fairness in rejecting the opinion of a psychiatrist that the appellant's offending was causally related to his depression - Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive - Whether a different sentence should have been imposed
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 31
Criminal Code (WA), s 283(1)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 6, s 8, s 9AA, s 15
Result:
Application for an extension of time to appeal granted
Leave to appeal on ground 1 granted
Leave to appeal on ground 2 refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: D
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | F P Merenda & S R Pack |
| Respondent | : | R F Owen SC |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Cooper Webb Lawyers |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; (2005) 225 CLR 88
Baroudi v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 48
Button v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 264
Chow v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 593
DS v The Queen; DM v The Queen [2022] NSWCCA 156; (2022) 109 NSWLR 82
IEB v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 207
Krijestorac v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 35
Lauritsen v The Queen [2000] WASCA 203; (2000) 22 WAR 442
Leach v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 73; (2008) 183 A Crim R 1
LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12
Minehan v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 140; (2010) 201 A Crim R 243
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80
Pantorno v The Queen [1989] HCA 18; (1989) 166 CLR 466
Parker v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 282
Phillips v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 69
R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67
R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; (1999) 46 NSWLR 346
R v Letteri (Unreported, NSWCCA, 18 March 1993)
R v Uzabeaga [2000] NSWCCA 318; (2000) 119 A Crim R 452
R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269
R v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs;…
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- Case
- [2023] WASCA 191
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's analysis began with the principles of procedural fairness, emphasising that fairness is inherently practical and not abstract. The court referred to the High Court decision in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam, where it was established that procedural fairness aims to avoid practical injustice. The court found that the sentencing judge did not afford procedural fairness by rejecting the psychiatrist's opinion without providing Austin or his counsel the opportunity to address the issue. This was comparable to the situation in Pantorno, where the High Court held that the sentencing judge erred by not allowing the parties an opportunity to address a new issue arising from the judge's departure from the proposition of law on which the case was conducted.
The court concluded that the sentencing judge's failure to provide procedural fairness constituted a significant error, potentially impacting the fairness of the sentence. Although the court recognised that the seriousness of the crime warranted a substantial sentence, it determined that a different sentence should have been considered, given the procedural error. The court ordered a re-sentencing hearing to ensure that Austin had a fair opportunity to address all relevant factors, including the psychiatric evaluation, before a new sentence was determined.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Fairness is essentially a practical concept. It is not abstract in nature. The rules of procedural fairness are concerned to avoid practical injustice. See Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam.[8][8] Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1 [37] (Gleeson CJ). In Pantorno, the appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of a drug of dependence. Defence counsel told the sentencing judge that the quantity of the drug was very small and was for the appellant's own use. He referred to s 73(1)(b) of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic) as prescribing the relevant penalty 'where it is not a trafficable amount, and the Crown doesn't suggest for one moment that this is a trafficable amount'. The prosecutor did not challenge that assertion and made no submissions about sentence. The sentencing judge sentenced the appellant under s 73(1)(c) of the Act, which prescribed a higher penalty than s 73(1)(b), on the basis that there was no evidence before him that the appellant's possession of the drug was not for a purpose relating to trafficking. The High Court held that, since the proceedings before the sentencing judge had been conducted by the prosecutor and defence counsel on the footing that s 73(1)(b) applied, it had not been open to the judge to sentence under s 73(1)(c) without giving defence counsel an opportunity to show why the appellant was not liable to the higher penalty prescribed by s 73(1)(c). Mason CJ and Brennan J said:When the parties to an adversarial proceeding agree on a proposition of law and conduct their cases on that basis, their agreement does not bind the trial judge. If the judge determines the law to be different, he may apply the law as he determines it to be, but he must inform the parties of the view he has formed when that is necessary to give them an opportunity to address new issues arising from the judge's departure from the proposition of law on which the case was conducted. Otherwise both parties are taken by surprise: see Fairmount Ltd v Environment Secretary [[1976] 1 WLR 1255, at pp 1265 ‑ 1266; [1976] 2 All ER 865, at p 874]. Especially in the criminal court, there is a need to ensure that the accused or convicted person is not taken by surprise: he must be given a fair opportunity of meeting the case against him so far as that case has not already been put to him for answer (473). Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ observed:In all the circumstances, it was incumbent upon the sentencing judge to indicate to counsel his lack of acceptance of the underlying assumption upon which the submissions upon sentence had been made. This was particularly the case when counsel had asserted, without dissent from the Crown or comment by the sentencing judge, that the small quantity of heroin found in his client's possession had, in any event, been for the applicant's personal use. In the result, the conclusion is unavoidable that the applicant was effectively denied any adequate opportunity at first instance to call the evidence which it was necessary to call … The denial of that opportunity to call evidence constituted a denial of procedural fairness which vitiated the sentencing judge's finding that, by reason of absence of evidence, he was not satisfied of the absence of any purpose relating to trafficking (482 ‑ 483).