JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: KWLD -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2020] WASCA 94
CORAM: BUSS P
MAZZA JA
MITCHELL JA
HEARD: 5, 11 & 21 MAY 2020
3 JUNE 2020
DELIVERED : 16 JUNE 2020
FILE NO/S: CACR 49 of 2020
BETWEEN: KWLD
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: BIRMINGHAM DCJ
File Number : IND 2113 of 2018
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appellate procedure - Appeal from a variation of bail conditions - Whether the Court of Appeal has power to order a report from the primary judge
Courts and judges - Natural justice - Whether a reasonable apprehension of bias arises from the primary judge making private factual inquiries about matters relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion in the absence of the parties and without their knowledge
Criminal law - Bail - Imposition of bail conditions - Relevant principles
Legislation:
Bail Act 1982 (WA), s 15A, s 15B, s 21, s 22, s 24, s 24A, s 17, pt D of sch 1 cl 2, cl 3
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 40(1)(h)
Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), r 30
Result:
Appeal allowed
Bail conditions varied
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | B M Murray |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2005] HCA 72; (2005) 225 CLR 88
Barboutis v The Kart Centre Pty Ltd [2019] WASCA 184
De Alwis v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 146
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
Jebb v Superior Lawns Australia Pty Ltd [2018] WASCA 123
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488
KWLD v The State of Western Australia [No 4] [2013] WASCA 185
Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427
Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99
Morey v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 161
Re JRL; ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342
Smart v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 218
Smits v Roach [2006] HCA 36; (2006) 227 CLR 423
Teakle v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 15; (2007) 33 WAR 188
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:
Summary
The appellant is currently awaiting trial in the District Court of Western Australia on an indictment charging him with:
(1)five counts of sexually penetrating a child (the complainant) under the age of 13 years, committed between 31 December 2014 and 2 February 2015; and
(2)one count of using electronic communication with intent to procure a person he believed to be under the age…
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- Case
- [2020] WASCA 94
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge's private inquiries into the appellant's bail conditions without the knowledge or involvement of the parties breached the rules of natural justice. The court emphasised that the principles of natural justice pertain to the procedure followed in the exercise of power, not the merits of the decision itself. The court held that the failure to inform the parties about the private inquiries was significant, as it allowed the primary judge to consider information to which the parties had no opportunity to respond. Furthermore, the court noted that when assessing apprehended bias, the focus should be on the process followed and not the reasons behind the judge's actions.
The Court of Appeal concluded that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably have apprehended that the primary judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the exercise of his bail discretion. The primary judge's private factual inquiries, one of which was not disclosed to the parties, were a significant factor in this conclusion. The court found that the primary judge's actions were not authorised by the Bail Act, which permits a judge to consider 'such information as he thinks fit' but does not authorise private inquiries not disclosed to the parties. The court held that the private inquiries constituted a breach of natural justice and led to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The Court of Appeal quashed the primary judge's decision and remitted the matter back to the primary judge for reconsideration, ensuring that the principles of natural justice were observed. The court did not determine whether the primary judge was correct in refusing to recuse himself from the pre-trial applications or in recusing himself from the appellant's trial, as it was not necessary for the appeal's outcome. The primary judge's own statement that it would not have been appropriate for him to sit on the appellant's trial was one of the background circumstances in which a reasonable observer would assess the events. The court held that, given the circumstances, a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably have apprehended that the primary judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the exercise of his bail discretion.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However, the question of whether there has been a failure to comply with the rules of natural justice is not answered by reference to the outcome of the exercise of the relevant power. The principles of natural justice are not concerned with the merits of a particular exercise of power, but with the procedure that must be observed in its exercise. The focus of attention must therefore be on the position as it stood before the impugned decision is taken. So, when a breach of the hearing rule is alleged, the question is whether information to which parties have not had an opportunity to respond is credible, relevant and significant to the decision rather than whether the decision-maker gave the information any weight in reaching the decision.[58] Where apprehended bias is alleged, the reasons ultimately given for the impugned decision are not relevant to the objective assessment of whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the issues.[59][58] Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2005] HCA 72; (2005) 225 CLR 88 [16] - [18].[59] Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427 [33], [67] - [68]. Secondly, the primary judge's report indicates that the failure to mention his discussion with Ms Kitney was an inadvertent oversight. We accept that to be the case, but it does not affect the conclusion as to what a reasonable observer might apprehend as a result of the process followed. When considering apprehended bias, the important consideration is the fact that the parties were not informed of the judge's private factual inquiries, rather than the reasons why they were not informed. As noted above, on 16 March 2020, the appellant asked the primary judge to recuse himself from hearing the pre-trial applications. The primary judge refused to do so on the ground that the applications were 'interlocutory'. However, on 25 March 2020, before dealing with the appellant's bail conditions, the primary judge indicated that he would recuse himself from the appellant's trial, having heard the previous matter.[60][60] Trial ts 518. It is unnecessary to determine whether the primary judge was correct in refusing to recuse himself from dealing with the pre-trial applications or correct to recuse himself from sitting on the appellant's trial. Even if the primary judge had recused himself from hearing all matters, it would still have been necessary to deal with the appellant's bail for his next appearance. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the primary judge's own statement that it would not have been appropriate for him to sit on the appellant's trial was one of the background circumstances in which a reasonable observer would assess the above events. In our view, having regard to all of the above matters in combination, a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably have apprehended that the primary judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the exercise of his bail discretion. The most significant feature of those circumstances is the primary judge's private factual inquires conducted out of the hearing room, one of which was not disclosed to the parties. The inquiries of the Clerk of Court and Ms Kitney were not authorised by the Bail Act. Section 22 of the Bail Act, by providing that a judge, in considering any case for bail, may receive 'such information as he thinks fit' excludes the rules of evidence but does not authorise a judge to make private inquiries in the absence of the parties or not to disclose private enquiries. Those inquiries were undertaken in a setting where the primary judge, rather than the prosecutor, had instigated the reconsideration of the appellant's bail conditions.