Smart v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   SMART -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2010] WASCA 218

CORAM:   McLURE P

PULLIN JA
MAZZA J

HEARD:   3 NOVEMBER 2010

DELIVERED          :   10 NOVEMBER 2010

FILE NO/S:   CACR 141 of 2010

BETWEEN:   ANDREW JACOB SMART

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :McKECHNIE J

File No  :MCS 18 of 2010

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Bail application - Application for extension of time within which to appeal - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Bail Act 1982 (WA), s 13(1), s 14, s 14(2a), s 15A, s 15B, sch 1

Result:

Application for leave to appeal dismissed
Application for extension of time to appeal dismissed
Application for bail pending appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Re Polites; Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 25; (1991) 173 CLR 78

  1. THE COURT:    On 3 November 2010, this court heard the appellant's application for leave to appeal, application for an extension of time within which to appeal and an application for bail pending appeal.  The background is as follows.

  2. On or about 3 June 2010, the appellant was charged with one count of stalking contrary to s 338E(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (WA) (Code) and one count of making a threat with intent to cause detriment contrary to s 338A(b) of the Code. At the time the appellant was charged with these two offences, he had a large number of other offences pending in Magistrates Courts in various places. He was also subject to a suspended imprisonment order. On 3 June 2010, a magistrate refused bail on the stalking and making a threat charges. Those charges are listed for hearing next month. The appellant then made an application for bail to a judge of this court pursuant to s 14 of the Bail Act 1982 (WA). The application was heard by McKechnie J on 23 June 2010. On 25 June 2010, his Honour dismissed the appellant's application. It is that decision which is the subject of the appeal to this court.

  3. After McKechnie J dismissed the application for bail, the appellant applied to Hall J for bail pursuant to s 14(2a) of the Bail Act alleging that new facts and circumstances had arisen since McKechnie J's refusal of bail and that these facts and circumstances justified the making of a grant of bail.  On 12 August 2010, Hall J decided that none of the alleged changes of fact or circumstance were material.  As a result, his Honour dismissed the application.

  4. On 10 September 2010, the appellant filed the appeal to this court in…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASCA 218
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Smart v The State of Western Australia, the appellant sought leave to appeal against a decision made by McKechnie J regarding bail, an extension of time within which to appeal, and bail pending appeal. The State of Western Australia opposed the applications. The case was heard by the court, which was required to determine whether the appellant had a reasonable prospect of success on appeal, and if so, whether an extension of time should be granted.

The legal issues before the court included whether the appellant had grounds for appeal, specifically whether McKechnie J was impartial, whether the appellant's criminal record and ability to prepare a defence were adequately considered, and if the decision was manifestly unreasonable. The court examined each ground of appeal and found that they did not demonstrate error. The court found that McKechnie J had adequately considered the appellant's criminal history and the impact of custody on his ability to prepare a defence. The court also found that the grounds alleging bias were not substantiated.

The court concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of success on appeal, and therefore, there was no justification for extending the time in which to appeal. As a result, the appeal was dismissed by virtue of s 27(3) of the Criminal Appeals Act. The court also dismissed the appellant's application for bail pending appeal. The formal orders of the court were: (1) application for leave to appeal dismissed; (2) application for extension of time to appeal dismissed; and (3) application for bail pending appeal dismissed. By virtue of s 27(3) of the Criminal Appeals Act, the appeal is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There are then grounds alleging that because McKechnie J had once been the DPP, he was not impartial, unbiased or neutral. The mere fact that McKechnie J was DPP before his appointment to the bench more than a decade ago is not sufficient to support a contention that his Honour was not impartial, unbiased or neutral: Re Polites; Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 25; (1991) 173 CLR 78. Other grounds assert that the appellant had no record of interference with witnesses and that he had no record of injuring anyone but these points do not demonstrate error because his Honour referred to the appellant's long criminal record to satisfy himself that the appellant may commit an offence and endanger the health, safety and welfare of other people. Other grounds contend that McKechnie J erred because the appellant would be kept in custody causing restrictions on his ability to prepare his defence. No error is shown because this factor was taken into account by the judge. Finally, there are grounds contending, in effect, that the decision was manifestly unreasonable. The ground does not rise above the level of assertion. There is nothing to satisfy this court that there was any such error given the factors mentioned by his Honour. There is no reasonable prospect of any of the grounds of appeal succeeding. As a result, there is no justification for extending the time in which to appeal. Because there is no reasonable prospect of any ground succeeding, the appeal is taken to have been dismissed by virtue of s 27(3) of the Criminal Appeals Act. As a result, it is not necessary to deal with the appellant's application for bail pending appeal other than to formally dismiss that application. It is only necessary to say in conclusion that, during oral submissions, the appellant referred to dismissal of certain charges (which are other than the charges listed in December) against him a few days before the hearing in this court. The appellant was informed of the provisions of s 15B(2) of the Bail Act which prevented this court from considering new material and evidence that had arisen after McKechnie J's refusal of bail. The formal orders of the court are:(1)Application for leave to appeal dismissed.(2)Application for extension of time to appeal dismissed.(3)Application for bail pending appeal dismissed. By virtue of s 27(3) of the Criminal Appeals Act, the appeal is dismissed.