Frigger v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   FRIGGER -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2024] WASCA 159

CORAM:   MAZZA JA

MITCHELL JA

HALL JA

HEARD:   12 DECEMBER 2024

DELIVERED          :   12 DECEMBER 2024

PUBLISHED           :   16 DECEMBER 2024

FILE NO/S:   CACR 128 of 2024

BETWEEN:   ANGELA CECILIA THERESA FRIGGER

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   GETHING DCJ

File Number            :   IND 1112 of 2019


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Bail - Bail after conviction pending sentence - Where trial judge refused to grant bail to the appellant pending sentence in circumstances where the appellant had previously absconded after being given bail following conviction - Whether manner in which the trial judge dealt with the matter gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias - Whether trial judge erred in not permitting the appellant to make submissions in support of the grant of bail - Whether bail should be granted by the appellate court in any re-exercise of the discretion to grant bail

Legislation:

Bail Act 1982 (WA), s 13, s 14, s 15A, s 15B, sch 1 pt A cl 2, sch 1 pt B cl 2, sch 1 pt B cl 4, sch 1 pt C cl 1, sch 1 pt C cl 4

Result:

Leave to appeal refused on ground 1
Leave to appeal granted on ground 2
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : In person
Respondent : L M Fox SC

Solicitors:

Appellant : In person
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 273 CLR 289

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577

Davis v Minister for Immigration [2023] HCA 10; (2023) 97 ALJR 214

Debono v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 208

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Frigger v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 100

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Jia v Minister for Immigration (1998) 84 FCR 87

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

KWLD v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 94

Mercanti v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 254

Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427

Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507

Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1

Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd [2019] QCA 184; [2019] 2 QR 271

Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd [2021] HCA 2

Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd [2021] WASCA 25

QYFM v Minister for Immigration [2023] HCA…

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Details
Case
[2024] WASCA 159
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant in Frigger v The State of Western Australia sought to challenge the refusal of the trial judge to grant bail pending sentence. The appellant had previously absconded after being granted bail following conviction. The dispute centered on whether the manner in which the trial judge dealt with the matter gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and whether the trial judge erred in not permitting the appellant to make submissions in support of the grant of bail. Additionally, the court had to consider whether bail should be granted by the appellate court in any re-exercise of the discretion to grant bail.

The legal issues before the court included the assessment of whether the trial judge's handling of the bail application indicated a reasonable apprehension of bias and whether the trial judge's refusal to hear submissions from the appellant constituted a failure to comply with the rules of natural justice. The court also had to determine if the appellant's previous absconding should influence the current bail decision.

The court found that the inquiry into actual bias required a stringent standard of proof, focusing on the state of mind of the judge. It held that the onus of demonstrating actual bias lay heavily on the applicant and required clear and distinct proof. The court emphasized that the principles of natural justice were concerned with the procedure rather than the merits of the decision. The court further noted that the reasons ultimately given for the impugned decision were irrelevant to the objective assessment of whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend bias. The court concluded that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's conduct and decisions.

The court ultimately declined to grant bail but noted that the appellant's previous absconding was a significant factor in the decision. The court did not find that the trial judge had erred in refusing to hear submissions from the appellant or that the trial judge's reasons indicated any bias. The appellate court's role in re-exercising the discretion to grant bail was limited, and it found no grounds to overturn the trial judge's decision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

An inquiry about actual bias in the form of prejudgment requires assessment of the state of mind of the judge in question, ordinarily on the basis of what the judge had said and done.[35] As French J noted in Jia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs:[36] The onus of demonstrating actual bias lies upon an applicant for judicial review and it is a heavy onus. The fact that an applicant may have demonstrated that on the decision-maker's provisional views he has an uphill job to persuade him away from those views is not enough to demonstrate actual bias.[35] Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427[33].[36] Jia v Minister for Immigration (1998) 84 FCR 87, 106, a judgment approved by members of the High Court in Jia HC [72], [82]. That is, as Kirby J noted in Jia HC,[37] an allegation of actual bias is subject to a 'stringent standard of proof' and will only be upheld 'where the accusations are distinctly made and clearly proved' and, as in the case of allegations of reasonable apprehension of bias,[38] where it is 'firmly established'. [37] Jia HC [127].[38] See R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546, 553 - 554. As this court noted in KWLD v The State of Western Australia,[39] and in Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd,[40] the question of whether there has been a failure to comply with the rules of natural justice is not answered by reference to the outcome of the exercise of the relevant power. The principles of natural justice are not concerned with the merits of a particular exercise of power, but with the procedure that must be observed in its exercise. The focus of attention must therefore be on the position as it stood before the impugned decision was made. Where apprehended bias is alleged, the reasons ultimately given for the impugned decision are not relevant to the objective assessment of whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the issues.[41] [39] KWLD v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 94 [104].[40] Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd [2021] WASCA 25 [26] - [27].[41] Nicholls [33], [67] - [68]. There will be cases where comments made by a judge in the course of his or her reasons for decision give rise to a reasonable apprehension of partiality in the process which led to the decision. The decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd provides an example of such a case.[42] However, there is a difference between apprehending bias in the decision-making process from statements in a court's reasons which might suggest partiality, on the one hand, and apprehending bias merely from the outcome of the decision-making process. The mere fact that a reviewing court does not agree with the reasoning of the decision‑maker, or regards such reasoning as illogical, irrational or even perverse, is not, in itself, sufficient to establish actual or apprehended bias.[43]