Rayney v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   RAYNEY -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2020] WASCA 206

CORAM:   BUSS P

HEARD:   7 SEPTEMBER 2020

DELIVERED          :   9 DECEMBER 2020

FILE NO/S:   CACV 15 of 2018

BETWEEN:   LLOYD PATRICK RAYNEY

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   CHANEY J

File Number            :   CIV 2177 of 2008


Catchwords:

Courts and judicial system - Judges - Application for disqualification of judge on ground of apprehended bias - Presumed knowledge or awareness of hypothetical fair-minded lay observer - Whether reasonable apprehension of bias

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Refusal of disqualification

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr M L Bennett
Respondent : Ms R Young

Solicitors:

Appellant : Bennett + Co
Respondent : State Solicitor's Office

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225

British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283

CSR Readymix (Australia) Pty Ltd v Payne [1998] 2 VR 505

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; (1990) 170 CLR 70

Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Rayney [2016] WASAT 142

Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Rayney [No 2] [2018] WASAT 5

Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Rayney [No 2] [2018] WASAT 5 (S)

Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Rayney [2017] WASCA 78

Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Rayney [2020] WASC 131

Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288

Lloyd v Faraone [1989] WAR 154

Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507

Rayney v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2018] WASCA 75

Rayney v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2019] WASCA 104

Rayney v The State of Western Australia [No 9] [2017] WASC 367

Re JRL; ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342

Re Polites; ex parte The Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 31; (1991) 173 CLR 78

The State of Western Australia v Rayney [2013] WASCA 219; (2013) 46 WAR 1

The State of Western Australia v Rayney [No 3] [2012] WASC 404

Webb v The Queen [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41

BUSS P:

  1. The appellant (Mr Rayney) has appealed to this court from a judgment of Chaney J delivered after the trial of an action for damages brought by Mr Rayney against the respondent.

  2. On the night of 7 August 2007 or in the early morning of 8 August 2007, Mr Rayney's wife (Mrs Rayney) was murdered.

  3. When Mrs Rayney…

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Details
Case
[2020] WASCA 206
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rayney v The State of Western Australia, the applicant sought the disqualification of a judge from hearing a case based on the apprehension of bias. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The applicant argued that the judge's previous comments and decisions in a related matter indicated a prejudgment of the issues in the current case, thus raising a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The central legal issue the court had to decide was whether the judge's prior statements and actions created a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a fair-minded lay observer. The court had to consider whether the judge's earlier expressions of opinion or views on matters relevant to the current case were such that they would lead a reasonable observer to doubt the judge's impartiality. The court needed to assess if the judge's previous conduct demonstrated a prejudgment of the issues or if the judge could be expected to approach the current case with an open mind.

The court examined the judge's previous statements and actions to determine if they created a reasonable apprehension of bias. It considered whether the judge's earlier expressions indicated a firm opinion on issues relevant to the current case or if they could be seen as tentative or subject to change with new evidence. The court concluded that the judge's prior comments, while critical, did not amount to a fixed opinion that would lead a reasonable observer to doubt the judge's impartiality. The court found that the judge was willing to consider all evidence and arguments afresh, and thus there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

As a result, the application for the disqualification of the judge was dismissed. The court held that the judge could fairly and impartially hear the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng,[26] Hayne J observed that an assertion that a decision-maker has prejudged or will prejudge an issue, and an assertion that there is a real likelihood that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not act impartially and without prejudice, in effect makes a statement which has several distinct elements at its foundation. His Honour elaborated:First, there is the contention that the decision-maker has an opinion on a relevant aspect of the matter in issue in the particular case. Secondly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will apply that opinion to that matter in issue. Thirdly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will do so without giving the matter fresh consideration in the light of whatever may be the facts and arguments relevant to the particular case. Most importantly, there is the assumption that the question which is said to have been prejudged is one which should be considered afresh in relation to the particular case.[26] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 [185]. In Livesey, proceedings were commenced in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales to strike the name of a barrister from the roll of counsel on the ground of his unprofessional conduct. It was necessary for the Court of Appeal to determine certain matters of fact and to hear evidence from a witness in relation to them. In previous proceedings in which the barrister had not been a party or a witness, two members of the Court had expressed the view that the barrister had actively and knowingly participated in a corrupt agreement or a conspiratorial arrangement to secure the release of his client on bail by the use of the client's own money. It was common ground that such an agreement or arrangement would constitute a criminal conspiracy. In the Court of Appeal, objection was taken on behalf of the barrister to the two members of the Court sitting upon the case. The judges refused to withdraw. The Court of Appeal found that the charges of impropriety were sustained and ordered that the barrister be struck off. The High Court allowed the barrister's appeal. Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ held (300):It is … apparent that, in a case such as the present … a fair-minded observer might entertain a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of prejudgment if a judge sits to hear a case at first instance after he has, in a previous case, expressed clear views either about a question of fact which constitutes a live and significant issue in the subsequent case or about the credit of a witness whose evidence is of significance on such a question of fact. The consideration that the relevant question of fact may be conceded or that the relevant person may not be called as a witness if the particular judge sits would not, of course, avoid the appearance of bias. To the contrary, it would underline the need for the judge to refrain from sitting. (emphasis added)