Shuren & Fang (No 5)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1)

Shuren & Fang (No 5) [2023] FedCFamC1F 966

File number MLC 3815 of 2023
Judgment of WILSON J
Date of judgment 29 November 2023
Catchwords FAMILY LAW – MAJOR COMPLEX FINANCIAL PROCEEDINGS LIST – recusal application – allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias – aggregation of alleged instances of bias – the double might test – relevant test not made out on application – recusal application dismissed.  
Legislation

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 285, 285, 1306

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79A

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021

Cases cited

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) FCR 291

Amos v Wiltshire [2016] QCA 70

Bainton v Rajski (1992) 29 NSWLR 539

Brayton & Brayton [2021] FedCFamC1F 337

Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 30 Fam LR 488

Brisciani v Piscioneri [No 1] [2016] ACTCA 30

Brisciani v Piscioneri [No 2] [2016] ACTCA 24

Brisciani v Piscioneri [No 3] [2016] ACTCA 31

British American Tobacco v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283

Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577

Duke Group Ltd (In liq) v Pilmer [No 3] [2001] SASC 215

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

Erris Promotions Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2003) 16 PRNZ 1014

Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45

Frugtniet v Secretary, Dept of Social Services (2021) 285 FCR 159

Girlook (Sales) Pty Ltd v Hurrell (1982) 149 CLR 155

Goodheart & Goodheart [2023] FedCFamC1F 715

Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470

In The Marriage of Ruby (1991) 15 Fam LR 47

Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135

Islam v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2009) 51 AAR 147

Jackson v R [2019] VSCA 65

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488

Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 294

Mann v Northern Territory News (1988) 88 FLR 194

Masi-Haini v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCA 430

Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427

Morley v Statewide Tobacco Services [1993] 1 VR 423

North Australia Aboriginal Legal Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146

QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affair [2023] HCA 15

Rayney v Western Australia [2020] WASCA 206

Rayney v Western Australia [No 2] [2020] WASCA 207

Rayney v Western Australia [No 3] [2020] WASCA 209

Re JRL; ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342

Re Lusink; ex parte Shaw (1980) 55 ALJR 12

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H (2001) 75 AJLR 982

R v Watson; ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248

Setka v Gregor [2011] FCAFC 64

Shuren & Fang [2023] FedCFamC1F…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC1F 966
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Shuren & Fang (No 5) involves a recusal application brought by the husband, Mr Fang, against the judge in a family law matter. The wife, Ms Shuren, had initiated proceedings under section 79A of the Family Law Act seeking to set aside consent orders made by a registrar on 1 October 2020. One of the orders restricted Mr Fang from taking any steps to remove Ms Shuren as a director and secretary of B Pty Ltd. The husband appealed this order and, in the meantime, made a recusal application against the judge, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court was tasked with determining whether the judge should be recused from the case based on the husband's allegations.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the judge's decisions on various interlocutory applications and orders demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias against the husband. The husband argued that the cumulative effect of these decisions created such an apprehension. The court examined the husband's submissions and the relevant legal principles, including the double might test for bias. The judge considered whether the husband's concerns were justified and whether any reasonable observer would perceive a lack of impartiality. The judge also noted the procedural context, including the expedited nature of proceedings in the Major Complex Financial Proceedings List and the judge's active engagement in the case.

The court found that the husband's application for recusal failed. The judge concluded that the issues raised by the husband related to matters outside the scope of the s 79A application, such as the composition of the board of B Pty Ltd and the recovery of its property and records. The judge emphasized that the husband's legal representatives had taken isolated statements out of context to suggest bias. The court also highlighted that the judge had followed proper procedural practices and engaged in a fair and interactive process with the parties. The judge rejected the husband's argument that the aggregation of issues created a reasonable apprehension of bias and dismissed the recusal application.

The court further dismissed the husband's application to vacate the trial date and ordered a directions hearing to ensure that the February 2024 trial would proceed as scheduled. The judge maintained the trial date and refused to vacate it, emphasising the importance of maintaining procedural fairness and expeditious case management in complex financial proceedings. The judge concluded by dismissing the recusal application and denying the husband's request to vacate the trial date, ensuring that the case would continue on track for the scheduled trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

MLC 3815 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN

MR FANG

Applicant

AND

MS SHUREN

First Respondent

C PTY LTD

Second Respondent

B PTY LTD

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY

WILSON J

DATE OF ORDER

29 NOVEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT

1. The applicant husband’s recusal application is hereby dismissed.

2. The applicant husband’s application to vacate the trial date is hereby dismissed.

3. A directions hearing shall be fixed on a date to be determined to ensure the February 2024 trial date is maintained.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

To better understand what follows, it is necessary for me to delve into the several applications that were brought before me subsequent to the decision handed down on 24 August 2023.FIRST INTEGER ALLEGED – JUDGMENT DELIVERED 24 AUGUST 2023 At the outset it is necessary to repeat that the initiating application in this proceeding is for relief under s 79A of the Family Law Act. The wife seeks orders setting aside consent orders made by a registrar on 1 October 2020. Among the issues to be determined at the trial of the s 79A application will be the sufficiency of the parties’ disclosure of assets leading to the consent orders being made. Issues about the present composition of the board of B Pty Ltd is not among the matters that fall for determination on the hearing of the s 79A application. On 3 November 2023 counsel for the husband informed me that my decision made 24 August 2023 is the subject of appeal, to be heard on 6 December 2023 and that the husband appeals against the order restricting him from taking any step to remove the wife as a director and secretary of B Pty Ltd. Counsel for the husband submitted on 3 November 2023 that every shareholder in B Pty Ltdpossesses a right to call a shareholders’ meeting yet the effect of paragraph 5(a) of the orders made on 24 August 2023 is that any such right does not extend to the husband. Counsel for the husband submitted that a fair-minded lay observer might take the view, based on the terms of paragraph 5(a) of the orders made 24 August 2023, that I might not bring an impartial mind to bear on the hearing and determination of the trial of this s 79A proceeding. Before examining that contention in detail, it is important to point out that counsel for the husband omitted several issues when advancing his propositions about the 24 August 2023 orders. First, paragraph 5(a) of the orders made that day is expressed to be “pending further order of this court”, wording commonly employed by judges sitting in courts across the Commonwealth of Australia to put a temporal limitation on the duration in the operation of the order. For example, interim injunctions are routinely expressed to operate until the hearing and determination of the trial of the proceeding “or further order”, indicating that the orders are not permanent and that they can be reviewed if a party wishes to apply for such a review at any time up until the hearing and determination of the proceeding at trial. Paragraph 5(a) of the orders was expressed to be subject to such a temporal limitation, namely, “pending further order of this court”. The husband has not sought to avail himself of the opportunity to apply to the court in respect of paragraph 5(a). The background facts leading to the orders made on 24 August 2023 related to the husband’s application of the provision of the Corporations Act for the removal of a director of B Pty Ltd. He did not apply the relevant stipulations of the Corporations Act. In my reasons[46] I examined the manner in which the husband purported to remove the wife as a director and the manner in which his purported removal contravened various provisions of the Corporations Act. The wife applied for orders preventing the husband from engaging in a repeat of the steps leading to her application declaring as invalid her purported removal as a director and secretary of B Pty Ltd. An order in the form of paragraph 5(a) was made but it was not of indefinite duration. Naturally, as a shareholder in B Pty Ltd the husband’s company enjoys what has been described academically as a shareholder’s “precious right” to call for the holding of an extraordinary general meeting. In this instance, the exercise of that precious right is subject to court order. Contrary to the submissions of counsel for the husband, there was no unqualified or absolute prohibition on the husband from taking further steps to remove the wife as a director and secretary of B Pty Ltd embedded in paragraph 5(a) of my 24 August 2023 orders. [46] Shuren & Fang [2023] FedCFamC1F 712.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the risk of repetition, the husband relied on the accumulation of the issues he raised as amounting, in aggregate, to the existence of a reasonable apprehension of bias, because if taken individually none would be dispositive. CONSIDERATION In my view, the husband’s application for me to recuse myself failed. I say that mainly for the reason that all issues agitated on 11 October 2023, on 17 October 2023, on 20 October 2023 and on 27 October 2023 concerned the board of B Pty Ltd or the recovery of B Pty Ltd property and records, those issues having no bearing whatsoever on the issue pertinent to the trial of this proceeding, namely, a s 79A application. No findings have been made by me on any of the applications heard on 11 October, 17 October, 20 October and 27 October 2023. On each application, I engaged in an interactive exchange between Bench and Bar, asking questions with a view to ascertaining the real issues for determination. It is wholly abstract for the husband’s legal representatives – solicitors and barristers – to pluck a question, a word or a line in an exchange – as being indicative that my mind has been made up against the interests of the husband or that such a result inures according to the double might test. Judges are encouraged nowadays to actively engage in the debate in the cases before them. The days of sitting Sphynx-like are long gone. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules permit applications to be made verbally. It must not be overlooked that circumstances vastly more disadvantageous to the applicant seeking recusal presented themselves in Michael Wilson and the High Court rejected the suggestion that a reasonable apprehension of bias had been demonstrated. No criticism can be legitimately levelled against me for entertaining applications said by the wife to be urgent. It would be wrong for me to refuse to entertain an application said to be urgent without first knowing what the so-called urgency was in fact. The Major Complex Financial Proceedings List embeds practices and procedures that reflect modern case management practices. The interlocutory phases of litigation in that list proceed with expedition. Most practitioners who operate in that list are not only aware of that but they encourage and support such an approach for the obvious benefit to their clients in having major complex financial cases heard and determined expeditiously but without compromise of parties’ right to procedural fairness. DISPOSITION The husband has failed in his recusal application. This case remains in my docket. A directions hearing shall be convened on a date to be determined to ensure that the February 2024 trial is on track. Otherwise, I dismiss the husband’s recusal application and refuse his application to vacate the trial date.