Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

Link copied
Case Copied 50 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

WILLIAM ARTHUR FORGE & ORS  PLAINTIFFS

AND

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION & ORS  DEFENDANTS

Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44
5 September 2006
C7/2005

ORDER

1.The First and Second Defendants' Demurrers to the Statement of Claim dated 12 April 2005 are allowed.

2.Judgment for the Defendants with costs.

Representation

R J Ellicott QC with J L Glissan QC, S M Whybrow and W J Wilcher for the plaintiffs (instructed by Ken Cush & Associates)

S J Gageler SC with M R Pearce SC for the first defendant (instructed by Australian Securities and Investments Commission)

M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales with J G Renwick for the second defendant (instructed by Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)

D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with N L Sharp for the third defendant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Interveners

W C R Bale QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Tasmania with S K Kay intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Tasmania (instructed by Solicitor-General of Tasmania)

W C R Bale QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Tasmania with S L Brownhill intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the Northern Territory (instructed by Solicitor for the Northern Territory)

R J Meadows QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia and R M Mitchell intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by State Solicitor's Office (Western Australia))

C J Kourakis QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia with M J Wait and S A McDonald intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia (instructed by Crown Solicitor's Office South Australia)

P M Tate SC, Solicitor-General for the State of Victoria with S G E McLeish, K L Walker and R J Orr intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)

W Sofronoff QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland with R W Campbell intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of Queensland)

Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  PLAINTIFF

AND

WILLIAM ARTHUR FORGE & ORS  DEFENDANTS

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge
5 September 2006
C12/2005

ORDER

1.        The questions reserved are answered as follows:

1.As to the validity of the appointments under the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) of the Honourable Michael Leader Foster to act as a Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and the capacity of his Honour to act in the cause:

None of the successive appointments of the Honourable Michael Leader Foster to act as a judge of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] HCA 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission* concerned a challenge to the validity of appointments made under section 37 of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW), which permitted individuals to act as judges of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for periods not exceeding 12 months. The specific dispute involved the Honourable Michael Leader Foster, a former Federal Court judge, who had been appointed as an Acting Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales through a series of commissions. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) had brought proceedings against Mr Forge and others, alleging contraventions of civil penalty provisions of corporations legislation, which were heard and determined by Mr Foster during his appointments.

The central legal issues before the High Court of Australia were whether the appointments of Mr Foster as an Acting Judge were validly made, and consequently, whether section 37 of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW) was constitutionally valid. This involved considering whether the appointment of Acting Judges, particularly in significant numbers and through successive commissions, substantially impaired public confidence in the institutional integrity and impartiality of the Supreme Court, thereby preventing it from answering the constitutional description of a "Supreme Court of any State." The Court also considered whether the fact that Acting Judges were typically retired judges was relevant, and whether the parties were precluded from raising the validity of the appointments due to acquiescence or waiver, although this latter point was not pursued by the opposing parties.

The High Court determined that the historical context of acting judges in the Australian colonies prior to federation indicated that Chapter III of the Constitution contemplated the validity of state legislation permitting such appointments. The Court rejected arguments that the sheer number of acting judges appointed could be decisive, finding that it was necessary to consider the reasons for their appointment and the safeguards in place to protect judicial independence and impartiality. The Court found that there were ample safeguards and no evidence to suggest that the appointments of acting judges were inconsistent with the constitutional requirements for the exercise of judicial power. Accordingly, section 37 of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW) was held to be valid, and the appointments made under it were also valid.

The High Court allowed the demurrers filed by the First and Second Defendants to the Statement of Claim and entered judgment for the Defendants with costs. This outcome meant that the challenge to the validity of section 37 of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW) and, by extension, the appointments of Mr Foster as an Acting Judge, failed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The First and Second Defendants' Demurrers to the Statement of Claim dated 12 April 2005 are allowed. 2. Judgment for the Defendants with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ
The challenge to the validity of s 37, and thus to the appointments of Foster AJ, fails.Conclusion I agree with the answers to questions, and orders, proposed by Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. There are two issues that arise in the two matters in this Court[30], and also in an application for special leave to appeal to this Court that was heard at the same time[31]. The first issue raises fundamental questions about the operation of Ch III of the Constitution. It concerns the validity of the legislation permitting appointment of acting judges of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. It is with this issue that these reasons deal first.[30]Matter No C7 of 2005 is a proceeding instituted in the original jurisdiction of this Court against Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the State of New South Wales and the Commonwealth and in which the first and second defendants demurred to the whole of the plaintiffs' statement of claim. In Matter No C12 of 2005, part of a matter pending in the Supreme Court of New South Wales was removed into this Court pursuant to s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and questions were reserved for the opinion of the Full Court.[31]Against the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 7 December 2004 in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 213 ALR 574.Acting judges The Honourable Michael Leader Foster was, from 1987 until his retirement on 26 November 1998, a judge of the Federal Court of Australia. By successive appointments, each made by commission under the public seal of the State, Mr Foster was appointed to act as a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for terms of 12 months commencing on 31 May 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. Between March and May 2002, during the third of these periods of appointment, he tried proceedings brought in the Supreme Court of New South Wales by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC") against Mr Forge and others in which ASIC alleged the commission of contraventions of certain civil penalty provisions of corporations legislation. On 28 August 2002, during the fourth period of appointment, Foster AJ delivered judgment in those proceedings. Were the appointments of Foster AJ that were in force when these proceedings were heard and determined validly made? It will be necessary, later, to identify the relevant civil penalty provisions more precisely when considering the second of the issues that arise in this Court but that is a task that need not be undertaken in considering the validity of the appointments of Foster AJ. For the moment, it suffices to recognise that the trial was an exercise of federal jurisdiction, the proceedings instituted by ASIC being proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commonwealth[32].[32]Constitution, s 75(iii); Judiciary Act, s 39(2); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559. Each appointment of Foster AJ was made in reliance upon the provisions of s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) which, in its terms, permits the appointment of a qualified person to act as a judge for a time not exceeding 12 months specified in the commission. Mr Foster was a "qualified person" because he had been a judge of the Federal Court of Australia[33]. Section 37 provides:[33]Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 37(2)(b)."(1)The Governor may, by commission under the public seal of the State, appoint any qualified person to act as a Judge, or as a Judge and a Judge of Appeal, for a time not exceeding 12 months to be specified in such commission.(2)In subsection (1) qualified person means any of the following persons:(a)a person qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales,(b)a person who is or has been a judge of the Federal Court of Australia,(c)a person who is or has been a judge of the Supreme Court of another State or Territory.(3)A person appointed under this section shall, for the time and subject to the conditions or limitations specified in the person's commission, have all the powers, authorities, privileges and immunities and fulfil all the duties of a Judge and (if appointed to act as such) a Judge of Appeal.(3A)The person so appointed may, despite the expiration of the period of the person's appointment, complete or otherwise continue to deal with any matters relating to proceedings that have been heard, or partly heard, by the person before the expiration of that period.(3B)The person so appointed is entitled to be paid remuneration in accordance with the Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act 1975. The remuneration payable to an acting Judge is to be paid to the acting Judge so long as his or her commission continues in force.(4)A retired Judge of the Court or of another court in New South Wales (including a retired judicial member of the Industrial Commission or of the Industrial Relations Commission) may be so appointed even though the retired Judge has reached the age of 72 years (or will have reached that age before the appointment expires), but may not be so appointed for any period that extends beyond the day on which he or she reaches the age of 75 years.(4A)A person who is or has been a judge of the Federal Court of Australia or of the Supreme Court of another State or Territory may be so appointed even though that person has reached the age of 72 years (or will have reached that age before the appointment expires) but may not be so appointed for any period that extends beyond the day on which he or she reaches the age of 75 years.(5)The conditions or limitations specified in a commission under this section may exclude the whole or any part of the period of appointment from being regarded as prior judicial service (within the meaning of section 8 of the Judges' Pensions Act 1953) by the person.(6)The provisions of section 36(4) and (5) apply to an acting Judge who acts as a Judge of Appeal in the same way as they apply to a Judge who acts as an additional Judge of Appeal."[34][34]Some questions about the construction and operation of sub‑s (3A) were touched on in oral argument. Those questions need not be and are not addressed in these reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ

In short, the history of acting judges in the Colonies before federation points to the conclusion that Ch III contemplates the validity of State legislation permitting the appointment of acting judges. The arguments of the applicants concentrated on the numbers of acting judges as a proportion of the whole. Those are misleading figures, for not all acting judges work full-time during the period in which they are acting. To compare them with appointments of a single acting judge to a Colonial Supreme Court ignores the possible impact of even a single appointment of that kind on courts with the very low memberships of those days. But even apart from those qualifications, if the relevant criterion is the protection of judicial independence and impartiality, the conclusion of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ[303] that the numbers of judges appointed alone cannot be decisive and that it is necessary to consider why they have been appointed and what safeguards are in place to protect judicial independence and impartiality must, with respect, be correct. There is no evidence as to why the acting judges were appointed. There are ample safeguards to protect judicial independence and impartiality. Section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) is not invalid. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – Ch 10[303]At [90]. I agree with the reasoning of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ.Orders I agree with the orders proposed in relation to each of the proceedings by Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ.