Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717

Citation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717
Parties: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION v BRIAN HEALEY, ANDREW THOMAS SCOTT, SAMUEL KAVOURAKIS, JAMES WILLIAM HALL, PAUL ASHLEY COOPER, PETER GRAHAM GOLDIE, LOUIS PETER WILKINSON and ROMANO GEORGE NENNA
File number: VID 750 of 2009
Judge: MIDDLETON J
Date of judgment: 27 June 2011
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – Directors and officers – Duties – Functions – Division of functions between Board and management – Non-executive directors – Duties of non-executive directors – Degree of skill required of non-executive directors – Extent to which directors entitled to rely on judgment and advice of management and experts – Duties of chief executive officer – Statutory duty of care and diligence – Standard of care – Duty to read and understand financial statements – Duty to apply background knowledge to review of financial statements

NEGLIGENCE – Directors – Failing to take reasonable steps to secure compliance by a company of its obligations in relation to accounting records – Nature of what is required – Relevance of belief that others discharging the obligation – Reliance on others – Whether reliance on internal and external processes discharges duties of directors – Negligence not mistake

STATUTES - Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – ss 180, 344, 601FD, 294, 295A, 296, 297, 298, 299, 200A – Interplay between s 180 and s 344 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Pleadings – Principles regarding unpleaded case – Whether parties can depart from pleaded case – No case to answer submission – Election – Procedure in Federal Court of Australia – Federal Court Rules – Order 35 Rule 1 – s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

EVIDENCE – Onus and standard of proof in civil penalty proceedings

Legislation:

Companies Act 1896 (Vic)
Companies Act 1929 (UK)
Companies Act 1938 (Vic)
Companies Act 1948 (UK)
Companies Act 1958 (Vic)
Companies Act 1961 (Vic)
Companies Act 1981 (Cth)

Companies Act 2006 (UK)  

Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth)
Corporations Act 1989 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Financial Reporting Act 1993 (NZ)

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty [2009] FCA 1678
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67
Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australasia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 (CA)
Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1

Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285

Freeman v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 78 FCR 91
Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville (1988) 164 CLR 234
Jones v Peters [1948] VLR 331
Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; (2004) FCAFC 337
Prentice v Cummins (No 6) (2003) 203 ALR 449; [2003] FCA 1002
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 717
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) brought proceedings against Healey in the Federal Court of Australia, asserting that he failed to fulfil his obligations as a non-executive director of a company, resulting in financial losses for the company and its shareholders. The dispute primarily revolved around the duties and responsibilities of a non-executive director, specifically the extent to which he could rely on the expertise of management and the necessity for him to maintain a general understanding of the company's business and its financial status.

The central legal issues in the case were the scope and standard of the duty of care and diligence that a non-executive director must exercise, and whether such a director could validly rely on the company's management and external experts without personally reviewing the company's financial statements. The court was also tasked with determining whether Healey's reliance on internal and external processes absolved him from his directorial duties, and if his actions constituted negligence rather than a mere mistake.

The Federal Court examined the statutory duties under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), particularly sections 180 and 344, which mandate that directors and officers act with the care and diligence of a reasonable person and avoid reckless trading, respectively. The court referenced previous cases such as AWA Ltd v Daniels and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Clark to clarify the nature of the duty of care, emphasising the necessity for directors to possess at least a general understanding of the company's business and its financial health. The court held that while directors need not audit corporate books, they must maintain familiarity with the financial status through regular review of financial statements and be prepared to inquire further when anomalies are detected. The court further determined that the duty of care was not merely subjective but included an objective test of competence and diligence, particularly in cases where the directorial role involved special skills.

Based on the evidence presented, the court found that Healey did not meet the required standard of care and diligence as a non-executive director. His failure to review the company's financial statements and his over-reliance on management and external experts constituted a breach of his directorial duties. Consequently, the court ruled in favour of ASIC, holding Healey liable for his negligence in failing to ensure the company's compliance with its financial obligations.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns the duties and obligations of directors of a company, specifically focusing on the extent to which they can rely on the judgment and advice of management and experts. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) brought proceedings against Mr Healey, a director and CEO of AWA Ltd, alleging breaches of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in relation to the company's financial records and statements. The case examines the nature and extent of the duties of directors, including non-executive directors, in ensuring compliance with statutory obligations and exercising due care and diligence. It also considers the interplay between different sections of the Corporations Act, particularly sections 180 and 344, and the standard of care and diligence required of directors.

The matter came before the Federal Court of Australia as an appeal from the Federal Court's original decision. The original proceedings were initiated by ASIC, which sought civil penalties against Mr Healey for alleged breaches of the Corporations Act. The primary judge made findings on several issues, including the duties of directors, the standard of care and diligence, and the relevance of reliance on others in discharging directorial duties. Mr Healey appealed certain findings and orders made by the primary judge, and ASIC cross-appealed on other issues. The appeal process involved consideration of the pleadings, evidence, and arguments presented by both parties. The court also had to address procedural matters, including whether the parties could depart from the pleaded case and the application of Order 35 Rule 1 of the Federal Court Rules.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR 759, at 864, Rogers CJ Comm Div said:A director is obliged to obtain at least a general understanding of the business of the company and the effect that a changing economy may have on that business. Directors should bring an informed and independent judgment to bear on the various matters that come to the Board for decision. (own emphasis) The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Daniels v Anderson considered the matter further. In the course of the relevant part of the judgment of Clarke and Sheller JJA, their Honours said that “the modern cases to which we have referred, set in the context of a legislative pattern of imposing greater responsibility upon directors, demonstrate that the director’s duty of care is not merely subjective, limited by the director’s knowledge and experience or ignorance and inaction.” They went on to endorse observations made in the New Jersey decision of Francis v United Jersey Bank (1981) 432 A 2d 814 which included the following:Because directors are bound to exercise ordinary care, they cannot set up as a defence lack of the knowledge needed to exercise the requisite degree of care. …While directors are not required to audit corporate books, they should maintain familiarity with the financial status of the corporation by a regular review of the financial statements. … The review of financial statements, however, may give rise to a duty to inquire further into matters revealed by those statements. (own emphasis) In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Clark [2003] NSWCA 91 Spigelman CJ (with whom the other members of the New South Wales Court of Appeal agreed) reviewed the authorities, including those mentioned above, and said (at [108]–[109]) that: What constitutes breach of the standards of care and of diligence, in a particular case, will depend on a wide variety of circumstances including the precise nature of the business conducted by the company and the composition of its board. However, the case law indicates that there is a core, irreducible requirement of involvement in the management of the company.Although the standard of skill may vary in accordance with the particular skills of the director, the core, irreducible requirement of skill involves an objective test, such as “ordinary competence” (3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (at 373) per Foster J) or “reasonable ability” (Rema Industries & Services Pty Ltd v Coad (1992) 7 ACSR 251 at 259, per Lockhart J). An equivalent objective test applies to the core, irreducible requirement of diligence, such as “reasonable steps to place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the management of the company”, per Rogers J in AWA Ltd v Daniels (at 864), adopted by Clarke JA and Sheller JA on appeal in Daniels v Anderson (at 501). (own emphasis) Justice Austin later stated in ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291 at [30] that Daniels v Anderson “established an objective duty, broadly in the region of competence, arising out of the director’s duty of diligence. It is therefore a duty capable of being encompassed by the statutory standard of care and diligence.” His Honour later went on to note that the authorities established that the statutory duty was enhanced where the directorial appointment is based on a special skill, and that there was a standard of skill for executive officers who were appointed to positions requiring skill, and that standard was encompassed in the statutory formulation of care and diligence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Daniels v Anderson considered the matter further. In the course of the relevant part of the judgment of Clarke and Sheller JJA, their Honours said that “the modern cases to which we have referred, set in the context of a legislative pattern of imposing greater responsibility upon directors, demonstrate that the director’s duty of care is not merely subjective, limited by the director’s knowledge and experience or ignorance and inaction.” They went on to endorse observations made in the New Jersey decision of Francis v United Jersey Bank (1981) 432 A 2d 814 which included the following:Because directors are bound to exercise ordinary care, they cannot set up as a defence lack of the knowledge needed to exercise the requisite degree of care. …While directors are not required to audit corporate books, they should maintain familiarity with the financial status of the corporation by a regular review of the financial statements. … The review of financial statements, however, may give rise to a duty to inquire further into matters revealed by those statements. (own emphasis) In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Clark [2003] NSWCA 91 Spigelman CJ (with whom the other members of the New South Wales Court of Appeal agreed) reviewed the authorities, including those mentioned above, and said (at [108]–[109]) that: What constitutes breach of the standards of care and of diligence, in a particular case, will depend on a wide variety of circumstances including the precise nature of the business conducted by the company and the composition of its board. However, the case law indicates that there is a core, irreducible requirement of involvement in the management of the company.Although the standard of skill may vary in accordance with the particular skills of the director, the core, irreducible requirement of skill involves an objective test, such as “ordinary competence” (3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (at 373) per Foster J) or “reasonable ability” (Rema Industries & Services Pty Ltd v Coad (1992) 7 ACSR 251 at 259, per Lockhart J). An equivalent objective test applies to the core, irreducible requirement of diligence, such as “reasonable steps to place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the management of the company”, per Rogers J in AWA Ltd v Daniels (at 864), adopted by Clarke JA and Sheller JA on appeal in Daniels v Anderson (at 501). (own emphasis) Justice Austin later stated in ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291 at [30] that Daniels v Anderson “established an objective duty, broadly in the region of competence, arising out of the director’s duty of diligence. It is therefore a duty capable of being encompassed by the statutory standard of care and diligence.” His Honour later went on to note that the authorities established that the statutory duty was enhanced where the directorial appointment is based on a special skill, and that there was a standard of skill for executive officers who were appointed to positions requiring skill, and that standard was encompassed in the statutory formulation of care and diligence.