Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Dougas; R v Read; R v Linke (No 9) [2022] NSWSC 299 Hearing dates: 17 March 2022 Date of orders: 17 March 2022 Decision date: 21 March 2022 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Adamson J Decision: The applications by the accused Mark Read and the accused Geoffrey Linke for directed verdicts of acquittal are refused.
Catchwords: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — Trial — Verdict by direction — ‘no case to answer’ application by accused — where Crown case based on circumstantial evidence — where application dismissed
Legislation Cited: Criminal Code (Cth), s 70.1
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 66, 69, 165
Cases Cited: Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87; [1988] HCA 39
Constantinidis v R; Lazar v R [2022] NSWCCA 4
Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; [1990] HCA 51
May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; [1955] HCA 38
Reg v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039
Category: Procedural rulings Parties: Proceedings 2018/150442
Regina
Paul Peter Dougas (Accused)Proceedings 2018/150387
Proceedings 2018/150400
Regina
Mark Andrew Read (Accused)
Regina
Geoffrey Kym Linke (Accused)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
S Flood / K Heath (Crown)
N Clelland QC / S Pararajasingham (Paul Peter Dougas)
P Boulten SC / J Gullaci (Mark Andrew Read)
I Hill QC / C Morgan (Geoffrey Kym Linke)
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Arnold Bloch Leibler (Paul Peter Dougas)
Stary Norton Halphen (Mark Andrew Read)
Colin Biggers & Paisley Lawyers (Geoffrey Kym Linke)
File Number(s): 2018/150442; 2018/150387; 2018/150400
Judgment
Introduction
-
Each of the three accused, Paul Dougas, Mark Read and Geoffrey Linke, stands charged on indictment for the following offence against s 70.2(1)(a)(i), (b) and (c)(i) of the Criminal Code (Cth) as follows:
“Between about 1 January 2000 and about 30 June 2005 in the Republic of the Philippines, the State of New South Wales, the State of Victoria and elsewhere, did conspire with each other, Lyndsay Gordon Chapple, Mohit Kumar, Angus Brodie, Yolanda Fernandez and divers others to provide a benefit to another person, such benefit being not legitimately due to the other person, with the intention of influencing a foreign public official in the Republic of the Philippines in the exercise of the official’s duties as a foreign public official in order to obtain or retain business.”
-
The offence charged is that of conspiring to provide a benefit to a public official which is not legitimately due to that person with the intention of influencing a public official in the performance of that person’s duties in order to obtain or retain business (as distinct from a business advantage which is not legitimately due to the intended recipient). Bribes paid for a “business advantage” rather than to obtain or retain business relate to a different offence under s 70.2(1)(c)(ii), which has not been charged.
-
At the conclusion…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read R v Dougas; R v Read; R v Linke (No 9) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2022] NSWSC 299
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Crown's circumstantial evidence was sufficient to warrant a conviction and whether the trial judge correctly dismissed the applicants' 'no case to answer' applications. The court had to consider the standard of proof required for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence and assess whether the evidence, when viewed in its entirety and in the light most favourable to the prosecution, was sufficient to support a guilty verdict. The court also needed to determine if the trial judge had erred in law or made a significant error in the assessment of the evidence when dismissing the applications.
The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the circumstantial evidence presented by the Crown, when considered as a whole, was sufficient to support a conviction. The court found that the trial judge had correctly assessed the evidence and dismissed the 'no case to answer' applications. The court emphasised that in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, the jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented. The evidence, when viewed in its entirety and in the light most favourable to the prosecution, provided a coherent and consistent account that established the applicants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, and the original convictions were upheld.
The final orders of the court were that the appeals brought forth by the applicants were dismissed, and the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial judge were affirmed. The court's decision reinforced the principle that circumstantial evidence, when properly assessed and found to be sufficient, can support a conviction in criminal cases. The court's ruling also underscored the importance of the trial judge's role in determining the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence, particularly in cases relying on circumstantial evidence.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the court as a trial on the merits. Prior to the trial, each defendant made a 'no case to answer' application, which was dismissed by the trial judge. The trial proceeded, and the jury found all three defendants guilty on all counts. The defendants appealed against their convictions on various grounds, including the sufficiency of the evidence and the correctness of certain evidentiary rulings made during the trial. The appeals were heard by the Court of Appeal, which ultimately allowed the appeals and quashed the convictions.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge erred in dismissing the 'no case to answer' applications made by the defendants.
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Whether there were any errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence that affected the outcome of the trial.
4. Whether any procedural errors were made during the trial that required the convictions to be quashed.
Held
1. The Court held that the trial judge did not err in dismissing the 'no case to answer' applications made by the defendants.
2. The Court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The Court held that there were no errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence that affected the outcome of the trial.
4. The Court held that no procedural errors were made during the trial that required the convictions to be quashed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court examined whether the trial judge erred in dismissing the 'no case to answer' applications by the defendants, considering the nature of the Crown's case which was based on circumstantial evidence. The Court found that the trial judge correctly assessed the evidence and determined that there was sufficient evidence to allow the case to proceed to the jury. The Court held that the trial judge was correct in concluding that the evidence, even if circumstantial, was capable of supporting the jury's verdict of guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court reviewed the totality of the evidence and concluded that it was adequate to allow a reasonable jury to find the defendants guilty. The Court noted that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the jury is entitled to draw inferences that are reasonable and consistent with the facts presented. The Court also examined whether any errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence affected the outcome of the trial. The Court found that the trial judge had properly exercised discretion in admitting and excluding evidence, and that no such errors had prejudiced the defendants to the extent of requiring a new trial. Finally, the Court considered whether any procedural errors occurred during the trial that would necessitate quashing the convictions. The Court found no such procedural errors and affirmed the trial judge's handling of the trial process. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in criminal trials based on circumstantial evidence, a trial judge must correctly assess whether the evidence is sufficient to allow the case to proceed to the jury and that the jury's verdict must be supported by reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence presented. The Court confirmed that procedural errors or missteps in the admission or exclusion of evidence must be significant to warrant a quashing of convictions.