R v Featherstone, Featherstone & Burch
[2024] QDC 1
•15 January 2024
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Featherstone, Featherstone & Burch [2024] QDC 1
PARTIES:
THE KING
(respondent)
v
MICHAEL JOHN FEATHERSTONE, ZACH MICHAEL FEATHERSTONE and TRAVIS CHARLES BURCH
(applicants)
FILE NO/S:
1561 of 23
DIVISION:
Criminal
PROCEEDING:
Application under s 590AA of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court of Queensland at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
15 January 2024
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
18 December 2023
JUDGE:
Loury KC DCJ
ORDER:
1. The application for a permanent stay is refused;
2. The particulars are struck out;
3. I will hear the parties as to any consequent applications and orders.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – application for permanent stay of the indictment – where the applicants are charged with fraud and related charges – where there are many complainants - where the prosecution has provided multiple iterations of its particulars – whether the current particulars remain deficient –whether the balance falls in favour of granting the stay application
LEGISLATION:
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 7(1)(b)-(c), 8, 541
CASES:
Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Attorney-General v Wands [2019] 1 QR 365
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 5 – Indictment) (2021) 394 ALR 403Dupas v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 237
Handlen v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 282
Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23
O’Dea v State of Western Australia (2022) 273 CLR 315
Patel v The Queen (2012) 247 CLR 531
Pickett v Western Australia (2020) 270 CLR 323
R v Barlow (1997) 188 CLR 1
R v Handlen and Paddison [2010] QCA 371
R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450
R v Melling [2010] QCA 307
R v Mosely (1992) 28 NSWLR 735
R v White [2023] QCA 66
Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1COUNSEL:
T Game SC, C Wilson and T Bicanic for Michael Featherstone
D Jones KC and A Cappellano for Zach Featherstone
A Hoare KC for Travis Burch
C Marco and S Muir for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Hannay Lawyers for Michael Featherstone
Guest Lawyers for Zach Featherstone
Legal Aid Queensland for Travis Burch
Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent
Introduction
The defendants, Mr Michael Featherstone; Mr Zach Featherstone and Mr Travis Burch were charged by police on 24 February 2016 with fraud and related charges. They each apply for a permanent stay of the indictment on the grounds that the delay in the prosecution combined with the changing Crown case and the continued material deficiencies in the particulars provided, amounts to an affront to the administration of justice.
On 5 December 2018, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) provided the first version of a draft statement of facts and particulars. On 21 December 2018, the ODPP provided the second version of a draft statement of facts and particulars. On 12 June 2019, the ODPP provided further amended draft particulars. All of the draft particulars were provided prior to the committal hearing. It is correct to acknowledge that they did not bind the Crown.
A committal hearing with cross-examination of witnesses took place over a number of days in 2021. Each of the defendants were committed for trial on 19 October 2021.
On 14 April 2022 an indictment was presented to the District Court.
On 16 August 2022 the ODPP provided further particulars following presentation of the indictment.
On 8 December 2022 the ODPP provided further amended particulars said to be necessary as a result of the decision of O’Dea v State of Western Australia[1].
[1] (2022) 273 CLR 315
On 19 September 2023, following the filing of submissions in relation to the particulars, a further set of particulars were provided.
On 9 October 2023, after hearing submissions in relation to the particulars I ordered that the prosecution provide further and better particulars. The particulars provided in September 2023, I found, did not disclose a principal offence.
On 9 November 2023 the prosecution provided a final set of updated particulars.
The material before me reveals that there are in excess of 100,000 exhibits. The prosecution’s case involves 1,300 complainants. Disclosure has been ongoing and occurred as recently as 4 December 2023, despite clear indications that the material then disclosed had been in the possession of the Queensland Police Service for as long as nine years. The applicants, and indeed the prosecution, are unaware of what, if anything, is outstanding.
The trial (with an estimated length of three months) is listed to commence on 5 February 2024.
The application
The applicants argue that the seventh set of particulars provided on 9 November 2023 do not alleviate the concerns and issues raised at the hearing on 9 October 2023, but rather intensify those concerns and issues.
On 9 October 2023 I ruled as follows:
“The particulars provided are deficient. What must be proven by the Crown to prove accessorial liability is that the defendant knew the essential matters which constitute the offence. They must prove [Michael Featherstone; Zack Featherstone and Travis Burch] knew that others were committing an offence. It is necessary for the Crown to particularise the act or acts, that is, the conduct, or the omission, which gives rise to the offence of fraud.
The particulars [fail] to identify who did the act or acts or [caused the] omissions, and [they] fail to identify the person, persons or entity who did the act or acts which constitute the offence, and if those persons cannot be identified [they] fail to identify that a particular person or persons cannot be identified as engaging in or undertaking an act or acts.”
In Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 5 – Indictment)[2] after referring to the observations of the plurality in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University[3] that “[p]arties, have choices as to what claims are to be made and how they are to be framed” but that “limits will be placed upon their ability to effect changes to their pleadings, particularly if litigation is well advanced”; Wigney J said of criminal proceedings:
“While some of the principles and considerations that apply in the civil context may not be readily transferable to the criminal context, it may certainly be accepted that limits are and must be placed upon the ability of a prosecutor to change the pleading or particularisation of an indictment, particularly if the proceedings are well advanced.”
[2] (2021) 394 ALR 403 at [246]
[3] (2009) 239 CLR 175 at [112]
It is argued that the prosecution has attempted numerous iterations of its case against the applicants over a period of more than five years, and that the limit has now been reached where it ought not be given any further opportunity to re-plead its case.
The factors said to justify the taking of the acknowledged, extraordinary step in ordering a permanent stay of the indictment are that firstly, the delay in the prosecution combined with the changing Crown case and the continued material deficiencies in the particulars is said to amount to an affront to the administration of justice; secondly, the Crown’s case now includes reliance upon a common purpose or conspiracy the particulars of which are materially deficient; thirdly, it remains unclear despite the many references to various corporate entities in the particulars, as to whether any of those entities bear criminal responsibility; fourthly, the prosecution has not made any attempt to particularise the “combination”, “common purpose” or agreement which it is alleged ties the co-offenders together in the fraud; fifthly, the particulars create innumerable paths to conviction and make it impossible for the applicants to prepare for trial, construct a defence case, determine what evidence is relevant and to what evidence objection should be taken and prepare for cross-examination; and sixthly, it will be impossible to instruct a jury in a way consistent with a fair trial.
The particulars
It is common ground among all parties that it is necessary to consider only the particulars with respect to Count 1 on the indictment as the particulars in respect of each count of fraud are largely in the same terms. If the applicants are successful in their application with respect to Count 1, they will be successful with respect to all offences on the indictment. The particulars with respect to Count 1 are annexed to this judgement.
Whilst the earlier particulars provided prior to the committal hearing were said to be drafts, it is useful to consider the basis of criminal liability set forth in those particulars to understand the way in which the prosecution’s case has changed over time. M Featherstone, Z Featherstone and T Burch, along with others, were said to be engaged in a joint criminal enterprise which had as its object the defrauding of investors by dishonestly inducing investors to give money to a number of businesses.
The second set of particulars again alleged a joint criminal enterprise.
The third set of particulars also provided prior to the committal hearing alleged that the defendants participated in a scheme rather than a joint criminal enterprise which had as its object the defrauding of investors by dishonestly inducing them to give money to a series of businesses. Each of the defendants, including M Featherstone, Z Featherstone and T Burch, were said to be criminally liable as principals under s7(1)(a) and/or as a party under s7(1)(c).
The fourth set of particulars provided after the indictment was presented set out the basis of liability for each individual defendant. M Featherstone, Z Featherstone and T Burch were said to have “acted in concert to operate an investment scheme with the intention of defrauding investors”. Each defendant was said to be liable as a principal offender. M Featherstone was said to have engaged in five acts with knowledge that the investment scheme promoted to investors was fraudulent. Alternatively, M Featherstone was said to be liable pursuant to section 7(1)(b) and (c) because he did one or more of those five acts with the knowledge that the investment scheme promoted to investors was fraudulent for the purpose of aiding, assisting or enabling the principal offender.
Z Featherstone and T Burch were similarly said to have done various acts which made each of them liable as a principal offender. They were alternatively said to be liable as a party pursuant to section 7(1)(b) or 7(1)(c).
The fifth set of particulars alleged that the scheme utilised a corporate entity/entities. Members of the public were approached to invest moneys into bank accounts accessed by the companies. M Featherstone; Z Featherstone and T Burch operated an investment scheme with the intention of defrauding investors. Each of the defendants were said to be liable as a principal offender because the acts of each of the defendants was sufficient to have caused the pecuniary detriment to each of the complainants. This fifth set of particulars were provided in order, it is said, to comply with the decision in O’Dea v The State of Western Australia[4](“O’Dea”). Alternatively, it was alleged that M Featherstone, Z Featherstone and T Burch were each a party pursuant to section 7(1)(b) and/or (c) because they each did one or more acts with the knowledge that the investment scheme was fraudulent.
[4] (2022) 273 CLR 315 per Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ
On 19 September 2023, the prosecution delivered a sixth set of particulars which were the subject of the legal argument heard on 9 October 2023. As indicated, I found that those particulars were deficient and ordered the provision of further and better particulars. Those particulars stated that a fraudulent scheme that utilised corporate entities was operated to dishonestly cause a detriment to the complainants. The principal offender could not be identified or there was no principal offender because no person did every act that constituted the offence. M Featherstone; Z Featherstone and T Burch were said to be liable as parties to the offence pursuant to section 7(1)(b) or (c). As earlier indicated, those particulars did not disclose the act/s which gave rise to the offence of fraud.
On 9 November 2023, the seventh set of particulars was delivered. Those particulars reveal that the act relied upon that gives rise to the offence of fraud is the procuring of salespeople. The particulars fail to make clear whose act of procuring salespeople gives rise to the offence of fraud.
M Featherstone; Z Featherstone and T Burch are said to be liable by virtue of section 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.
It is further stated at paragraph [13] of the particulars:
“There are reasonable grounds based on paragraphs 1-12 to infer that Michael Featherstone committed the offence in combination with Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Charlie Goransson, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald. The acts and declarations of Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Charlie Goransson, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald in furtherance of the common purpose may be used to prove the offence charged.”
There is footnoted, references to Ahern v The Queen[5] (“Ahern”) and Tripodi v The Queen[6] (“Tripodi”).
[5] (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 99
[6] (1961) 104 CLR 1
The particulars read similarly for Z Featherstone and T Burch including reference to the common purpose.
Whilst paragraph [13] appears under a heading “Liability of Michael Featherstone” the prosecution in its outline of submissions and in argument on 9 November 2023 made clear that this paragraph was not relied upon to allege a conspiracy to commit an offence in accordance with s541 of the Criminal Code but rather “to permit the admission of evidence to establish the substantive offence of fraud that may otherwise be inadmissible on account of the hearsay rule”.
Consideration
In Patel v The Queen[7] Heydon J said of particulars:
[168] “In Johnson v Miller Evatt J said:
‘It is an essential part of the concept of justice in criminal cases that not a single piece of evidence should be admitted against a defendant unless he has a right to resist its reception upon the ground of irrelevance, whereupon the court has both the right and the duty to rule upon such an objection. These fundamental rights cannot be exercised if, through a failure or refusal to specify or particularise the offence charged, neither the court nor the defendant (nor perhaps the prosecutor) is as yet aware of the offence intended to be charged.’
But the importance of particulars does not lie only in relation to questions of inadmissibility for irrelevance. Particulars can also be necessary to enable the defence to make particular forensic judgements. Some concern the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. Others concern the marshalling and deployment of its own evidence. Parts of the trial record, incidentally, suggest that the present may, with respect, illustrate Evatt J’s point that without particulars the prosecution can be as unsure of the case being run as is the court and the defendant.
[169]In pleading civil cases there is a distinction between the ‘necessary’ particulars of allegations like fraud, which ought to appear in the pleadings themselves, and other particulars, which need not appear in the pleadings but must be supplied if requested.
“[It is] anomalous and wrong that a case against a defendant should be spelled out with less particularity when he stands in the dock accused of [homicide] than when he resists a claim for compensation.”
The nature and seriousness of the charges levelled at the appellant obligated the prosecution to provide some particulars either in the indictment itself or at least well before the trial.”
(Citations and footnotes omitted)
[7] (2012) 247 CLR 531 at [168]-[169]
The prosecution in its outline of submissions and in argument state that the particulars do not assert that the applicants are criminally responsible pursuant to a common purpose or conspiracy. The prosecution has eschewed reliance upon a common purpose or conspiracy in the conduct of its case. Indeed, it is submitted by the prosecution that the particulars have been misinterpreted and that paragraph [13] could simply be struck-out. Despite that concession, the prosecution still rely, it says, on the principles which arise pursuant to Tripodi and Ahern, to make the acts or declarations of one person admissible against another.
Despite that indication, the prosecution have not particularised the nature of the combination or the common purpose. They have not particularised what the terms of the agreement were; nor what acts/declarations of which people they are seeking to attribute to M Featherstone; Z Featherstone or T Burch.
There are, as indicated, a very large number of complainants and other complexities to the case, including the use of corporate entities to perpetrate the fraud.
Initially, the Crown case was one of joint criminal enterprise, a concept foreign to the Criminal Code.[8] Until 12 June 2019, the “draft particulars” did not attribute criminal liability to any defendant pursuant to any provision of the Criminal Code.
[8] See R v White [2023] QCA 66 at [6] per Mullins P
On 12 June 2019, when the third set of “draft particulars” were delivered prior to the committal hearing, the prosecution’s case against both M Featherstone and Z Featherstone was that they were each principal offenders or they assisted others to commit the offence.
The particulars delivered on 19 September 2023 narrowed the prosecution’s case by relying solely on accessorial criminal liability. The particulars delivered in response to my orders of 9 October 2023 rely solely on accessorial criminal liability. The prosecution continues to eschew reliance upon section 7(1)(a) as a basis of criminal liability for M Featherstone, Z Featherstone or T Burch.
However, the prosecution in their outline of submissions and particulars, continue to assert that M Featherstone, Z Featherstone and T Burch together with others, were participants in a common purpose. Despite that, they have not pleaded a case based upon section 8 of the Criminal Code which attributes criminal liability in circumstances where there is a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose.
It remains unclear whether the prosecution is relying upon a common purpose in order to attribute criminal liability to any person.
The three persons referred to in the first line of the particulars are Phil Cropper; Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson. They are said to be principal offenders. O’Dea makes clear that s7(1)(a) cannot be used to attribute the acts of one person to another. The proper approach to the operation of s7(1)(a) is, as was reasoned by Holmes JA (as she then was) in R v Melling[9] that “for the Crown to succeed in establishing criminal responsibility on the part of both appellants under s7(1)(a), it was necessary that against each there be proved an act causing injuries amounting to grievous bodily harm, as well as the necessary intent”. Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ said in O’Dea that in other words “the act ‘causing’ the [offence] must be the ‘actual’ and not the attributed act of the accused person….The act that constitutes the offence… must be one the person ‘actually does’”.
[9] [2010] QCA 307 at [25]
In O’Dea, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ said of the textual requirement for the commission of an offence under s 7 of the Western Australian Criminal Code (which is in the same terms as the Queensland Criminal Code):[10]
“The opening words of s7 are: ‘When an offence is committed’. Section 2 defines an ‘offence’ as ‘[a]n act or omission which renders the person doing the act or making the omission liable to punishment”. By their terms, ss7(b); 7(c) and s7(d) therefore all require that another person has done an act that renders that person liable to punishment, subject to excuses. Section 7(a) requires that the accused person ‘actually does the act’ which constitutes the offence.”
[10] (2022) 273 CLR 315 at 338 [62]
In O’Dea, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ considered the decision of Pickett v Western Australia[11] and the several important steps to the reasoning of Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ in respect to s7 including that sections 7(b) and (c) and (d) and s8 all required that the act or omission of another constitute the conduct element of an offence that is committed. Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ said:[12]
“This summary demonstrates the centrality to the reasons of Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ of the requirement for liability of a participant under s7(b), s7(c) or s7(d) that there be an offence committed by the other person.”
[11] (2020) 270 CLR 323
[12] Ibid at 339 [65]
Reference was also made to the reasoning of the plurality of Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ in R v Barlow.[13] The reference in ss7 and 8 to an offence “denotes the element of conduct….which, if accompanied by prescribed circumstances, or if causing a prescribed result or if engaged in with a prescribed state of mind, renders a person engaging in that conduct liable to imprisonment.”
[13] (1997) 188 CLR 1
The particulars in respect of the principal offence of fraud assert either, that the three persons, Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson are each principal offenders or inferentially were acting together in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose. It is impossible to know what case the prosecution is alleging by that first paragraph of the particulars.
The prosecution’s outline of submissions states “The prosecution case is patently clear that Michael Featherstone acted with Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Charlie Goransson, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald to commit the offence.”[14] (emphasis added)
[14] Paragraph 31 outline of submissions
According to this paragraph, M Featherstone, Z Featherstone and T Burch were acting jointly with others, that is, in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose. Yet, section 8 is not relied upon to attribute criminal responsibility. Despite the prosecution asserting that it is not relying upon a common purpose, paragraph [13] of the particulars and paragraph [31] of the outline of submissions indicates precisely that. Paragraph [13] of the particulars includes a footnote indicating reliance upon the principles found in Tripodi and Ahern. Those principles apply in the prosecution of substantive offences in which it is alleged that two or more persons acted in preconcert to commit an offence.[15]
[15]Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 at 6-7
The prosecution relies upon R v Handlen and Paddison[16] (“Handlen”) to make good their argument that despite not relying upon a case of common purpose, they are entitled to rely upon the principles found in Tripodi. In Handlen, the Court of Appeal said of a case which involved aiding and abetting in the importation of drugs “The evidentiary content of the Crown case is unaffected: the prosecutor was entitled to lead evidence of the acts and statements of all accused in furtherance of the common purpose of importation on the Tripodi principal, whatever basis of criminal liability was advanced.” (Footnotes omitted).
[16] [2010] QCA 371 at [72]
The trial in Handlen was conducted on the mistaken assumption, shared by the parties and the trial judge, that guilt of the importation offences could be established by proof that the appellants were parties to a joint criminal enterprise to import the drugs into Australia. The Court of Appeal found that the jury had been directed in “terms alien to the forms of criminal responsibility then recognised by the [Commonwealth] Criminal Code”. The Court of Appeal made the statement referred to in the previous paragraph in determining what followed from the finding that the trial proceeded upon a basis unknown to the law. The Court of Appeal applied the proviso and dismissed the appeal. Each of Handlen and Paddison appealed to the High Court challenging the application of the proviso. They were successful in doing so.
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said of the assumption by the Court of Appeal that the evidentiary content of the Crown case was unaffected by the incorrect directions, that the evidence the Crown was entitled to lead to establish accessorial liability was evidence that tended to establish (i) the commission of the offence by the principal offender; (ii) the conduct of the appellant that aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of the principal offence; and (iii) any fact or circumstance from which it was open to infer that the appellant had the intention, in engaging in the conduct to assist the principal offender in the commission of the offence.[17]
[17]Handlen v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 282 at [44]
The High Court said that it was not correct that the Crown was entitled to lead evidence to prove the existence of a group exercise when pursuing convictions by virtue of accessorial liability. At trial, no objection had been taken to the evidence proving the existence of a group exercise and the complaint to the High Court was not as to the admission of that evidence but rather the directions that were given to the jury as to the use to be made of it. Whilst the High Court did not have to determine the question as to whether the prosecution could rely upon the acts/declarations of others who acted in preconcert, ultimately the appeal was successful as it was said that the conduct of the trial conferred an evidentiary advantage on the prosecution, leading to the admission of evidence to prove the existence and scope of the group exercise. The issue posed for the jury was whether the appellants were parties to the group exercise when this was irrelevant to proof of their complicity in the principal offender’s offences.
In Tripodi, Dixon CJ, Fullagar and Windeyer JJ, whilst stating that the co-conspirators rule was not limited to charges of conspiracy but also applied to substantive offences cautioned “But at the same time it may well lead to error if the question of the admissibility of such evidence in any given case is treated exactly in the same manner as it might be on a charge of conspiracy”. Later in the reasoning they wrote of the foundation for the co-conspirators’ rule and said, “It must be remembered that the basal reason for admitting the evidence of the acts or words of one against the other is that the combination or preconcert to commit the crime is considered as implying an authority to each to act or speak in furtherance of the common purpose on behalf of the others.”[18]
[18]Tripodi at page 7
The Court went on to comment that it is easy to understand that preconcert confederacy or combination may make directions, instructions or arrangements made in the absence of a defendant admissible when they are given by one of several “acting in preconcert with the prisoner and are given in furtherance of the common design.”[19]
[19] At 7-8
Consistent with the reasoning which unpins the extension of the conspirators’ rule to substantive offences, is the reasoning of the High Court in Handlen. The only basis of criminal liability pursued in Handlen was accessorial. Proof of the appellant’s involvement in a group exercise to import drugs was irrelevant to guilt on that basis. The prosecution was not entitled to lead evidence to prove the existence of the group exercise.
In the circumstances of the case before me, the prosecution has eschewed reliance upon a common purpose. The reasoning in Handlen suggests that evidence which goes to proving the existence of preconcert is not admissible where the prosecution is relying only upon accessorial liability. Evidence which proves the existence of preconcert between offenders who are not said to be acting in combination is irrelevant to establishing guilt upon an accessorial basis.
If the prosecution is not relying upon section 8 to establish criminal liability for M Featherstone, Z Featherstone or T Burch, proof of a common purpose between them and others is irrelevant. If proof of a common purpose is irrelevant, proof of the acts or declarations of other persons in furtherance of that common purpose is irrelevant.
Whilst the prosecution concedes that paragraph [13] could be struck out from the particulars, it still insists that it can rely upon evidence of the acts or declarations of others in furtherance of a common purpose to assist in proof of the substantive offences. As reasoned above, I consider that approach to be fundamentally wrong. Even if I were wrong in that regard, the prosecution, despite wanting to rely upon the principles in Tripodi and Ahern, have not particularised the precise nature of the combination; the common purpose or what act/s of each other person they are seeking to attribute to M Featherstone, Z Featherstone or T Burch.
In a prosecution which involves an unwieldy number of complainants and complexities involving multiple levels of corporate entities and multiple co-offenders, it is necessary for the prosecution to properly particularise these features in order that the defendants can make determinations as to what evidence they should object to and how to conduct their respective cases.
The decision of R v Masters[20] (“Masters”) is instructive in terms of the need to properly particularise what acts or declarations are relied upon as establishing the common purpose and what acts or declarations are relied upon in furtherance of the common purpose. Whilst Masters involved a charge of conspiracy, the statements made by the Court demonstrate the need to differentiate between acts which give rise to the agreement and the acts done in furtherance of it. The Court said:[21]
“In order to establish the existence of the conspiracy, evidence is admissible of acts done or statements made by persons other than the particular accused even if he were not present – not (so far as the statements are concerned) to prove the truth of what was said but in order to establish, from the fact that the acts were done or the statements were made, the inference that the agreement which constituted the conspiracy charged had been entered into: Ahern v The Queen. That evidence is direct evidence, not hearsay; and it is admissible for that purpose even if the acts were done or the statements were made before the particular accused joined or became a participant in that conspiracy, for it does not depend in any way upon any acknowledgement or acceptance of the truth by that accused of the statements so made.
In order to establish that the particular accused participated in that conspiracy, there must first be reasonable evidence of that participating – that is, evidence independent of those acts and statements by other persons – which is admissible in the ordinary way against that accused: Ahern v The Queen. Once the judge has decided that there is a such reasonable evidence in the case against that accused (a concept to which we will return later), the acts and statements by other persons to the conspiracy will become admissible against that accused not only as establishing the existence of the conspiracy but also, if they were done or made in furtherance of the conspiracy, as establishing his participation in it: Tripodi v The Queen; Ahern v The Queen; R v Davidovic”. (Citations omitted)
[20] (1992) 26 NSWLR 450
[21] At 461
Each of the applicants is entitled to particulars setting out what the agreement is that gives rise to the common purpose; the date that agreement was entered into; the date on which other parties entered into the agreement and the acts the prosecution rely upon in proof of that agreement. They are each further entitled to know what acts are relied upon or statements made which are said to be in furtherance of that common purpose. No attempt to particularise this has been undertaken.
As indicated, the particulars are either attributing the conduct of one principal offender to another or they are asserting a common purpose. The latter appears to be the very approach that the prosecution is asserting at paragraph [31] of their outline.
The particulars refer to the act which gives rise to the principal offence as being the “procuring of salespeople to sell managed packages, licences and memberships that purported to apply software” without identifying the act/s of each of the principal offenders that gives to the offence as required.[22] There are 620 complainants who are said to have purchased the managed packages, licences and memberships. The possible acts involved in this statement are oppressive. The absence of particulars that properly identify the case that the defendants have to meet in this regard tends to reinforce that what the prosecution is in fact asserting is a case based upon a common purpose. If each of Phil Cropper; Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson are principal offenders pursuant to s7(1)(a), the particulars fall foul of the decision of the High Court in O’Dea. If the prosecution’s case relies upon a common purpose, they have not attempted to particularise it at all.
[22]R v Melling[2010] QCA 307
As indicated in these reasons, I previously ruled that the particulars were deficient because they importantly, failed to identify the act/s which give rise to the offences. The particulars now provided are confusing and fail to properly identify the basis of criminal liability of any principal offender or any party. It is unclear whether Phil Cropper, Patrik Gorranson and Charlie Goransson are each principal offenders pursuant to s7(1)(a), or are involved in a common purpose or conspiracy.
It also remains unclear whether criminal liability is attributed to any corporate entity. For example, M Featherstone is said to aid or enable the commission of the principal offence by arranging for UKHBB Pty Ltd to be registered as a company. Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson are said to employ people on behalf of UKHBB Pty Ltd. Is UKHBB Pty Ltd in fact a principal offender? Is it UKHBB Pty Ltd who sold the product that did not exist or did not work? M Featherstone is said to have aided or enabled the principal offender by directing another to recruit a “puppet director” for UKHBB Pty Ltd. Numerous acts attributed to M Featherstone surround his conduct in respect to UKHBB Pty Ltd including instigating and managing the shutdown of UKHBB Pty Ltd. The statement of facts which runs to 127 pages, alleges an agreement between M Featherstone and UKHBB Pty Ltd along with other corporate entities suggestive of a commercial relationship with a criminal purpose.
The prosecution has already been given one opportunity by the court to correct the deficiencies in the particulars. The prosecution were placed on notice by M Featherstone at the last hearing that any further application in relation to the inadequacy of the particulars would be for a permanent stay. The prosecution were also placed on notice that any reliance on a common purpose needed to be properly particularised.
The question then becomes what is the remedy given my determination that the particulars remain deficient?
The applicants argue that the prosecution has conceded that the particulars provided after presentation of the indictment were amended upon their becoming aware of the decision of O’Dea. Since that time, there have been a further two attempts to properly particularise its case. The particulars now provided are confusing, inadequate and do not make clear what case M Featherstone, Z Featherstone or T Burch must meet. The particulars continue to fail to meet the requirements of O’Dea and they are contrary to the position taken by the High Court in Handlen.
The determination of the appropriate relief involves a balancing exercise to ascertain where the interests of justice lie. On the one hand is the prejudice the applicants will experience in the event that the prosecution is given yet another opportunity to formulate their particulars. On the other is the interest of the community in having those charged with criminal offences brought to trial.[23]
[23]Dupas v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 237 at [37]
The applicants were charged in 2016. The prosecution has been attempting to particularise its case since 2018. They have still failed to do so. The trial is listed to commence on 5 February 2024. Preparation for the trial has been stymied by the failure of the prosecution to understand and particularise its case.
A permanent stay is only granted in rare and exceptional circumstances. The granting of a permanent stay is “tantamount to a continuing immunity from prosecution”.[24] The touchstone is always one of fairness. The prejudice to the defendants has been identified as inconvenience, costs and delay. Those issues arise if it is necessary for the trial to be adjourned. One remedy which might overcome that prejudice is a temporary stay until such time as they have been compensated for the costs thrown away by any adjournment of the trial.[25]
[24]Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23
[25]R v Mosely (1992) 28 NSWLR 735; Attorney-General v Wands [2019] 1 QR 365
There are a total of 1,300 complainants involved in all counts on the indictment. The money said to have been defrauded exceeds $9 million. Given the large number of complainants and the large amount of money involved the balance, in my view, falls in favour of allowing the prosecution one final opportunity to particularise its case.
The application for a permanent stay of the indictment is refused. The particulars in their present form are deficient and embarrassing. The particulars fail to inform the applicants and the trial judge of the case upon which the prosecution relies.
My orders are:
1. The application for a permanent stay is refused;
2. The particulars are struck out;
3. I will hear the parties as to any consequent applications and orders.
Annexure 1
Count1 – Michael Featherstone, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson
The Offence:
Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, and Charlie Goransson employed salespeople to sell managed packages, licences, and memberships to complainants1 on behalf of UK Home Based Business Pty Ltd (“UKHBB”) that purported to apply software to make selections on horses. The complainants invested money into trading accounts operated by Vince McDonald on behalf of Pacific International Gaming Ltd (“PIGL”) to place bets and yield profits.
The salespeople2 (with the exception of Charlie Goransson and Patrik Goransson who also performed sales) did not know that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
The money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships, and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to them and Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson knew that.
The act of procuring salespeople to sell managed packages, licences, and memberships that purported to apply software with the knowledge that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits, and that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships and to trade into the trading account was not returned to them, is dishonest by the standards of ordinary honest people.4
The combined loss to the complainants was to the value of more than $30,000 and up to
$9,314,289.05.
Liability of Michael Featherstone:
Michael Featherstone knew that Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, and Charlie Goransson employed salespeople to sell managed packages, licences, and memberships to complainants that purported to apply software to make selections on horses, to yield profits on money invested by complainants into trading accounts to place bets.
Michael Featherstone knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
1 The list of complainants is annexed in table A.
2 The list of identifiable salespeople who were used as innocent agents is annexed in table B.
4 s.7(4) Criminal Code
Michael Featherstone knew that Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
Michael Featherstone knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
Michael Featherstone knew that Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
Michael Featherstone with the knowledge set out at paragraphs 7-11, did any one or more of the following acts for the purpose of enabling or aiding the commission of the offence5, or which aided the commission of the offence with that intention6:
(a)arranging for UKHBB to be registered as a company with ASIC and the first director appointed to be an employee of Phoenix Global Pty Ltd (“Phoenix Global”) a company that he was the sole and managing director of.
(b)directing Travis Burch who was employed at Phoenix Global to recruit a ‘puppet’ director for UKHBB before it commenced trading.
(c)negotiating the commercial relationship between Phil Cropper and Vince McDonald as to the services that each would provide and the disbursement of the complainants’ money.
(d)arranging or directing an employee of Phoenix Global to register the domain for the layexchange.com.
(e)directing Zoei Keong who was employed at Phoenix Global to provide bookkeeping services to UKHBB and Vince McDonald that consisted of paying the wages of employees of UKHBB from UKHBB bank accounts, paying invoices for UKHBB from UKHBB bank accounts, producing weekly spreadsheets showing the products sold and the amount of money deposited by complainants to trade, determining the share of those deposits that were owed to Vince McDonald and Michael Featherstone as per their agreement, and making sure that Michael Featherstone received the payments he was owed pursuant to that agreement.
(f)directing Zach Featherstone and Travis Burch who were employed by Phoenix Global to draft documents required for UKHBB to operate, for example: to draft contracts of employment for staff, update purchase agreements, draft contracts of sale.
5 s.7(1)(b) Criminal Code.
6 s.7(1)(c) Criminal Code.
(g)giving advice to salespeople about what to say to complainants to sell the products.
(h)negotiating the settlement of complaints made by complainants.
(i)addressing issues or complaints raised by ASIC against UKHBB.
(j)being the director of Code S Pty Ltd that provided with his knowledge mobile telephones and cars to UKHBB and that received payments for trials of the software engaged in by complainants for UKHBB at times.
(k)instigating, planning, managing, and completing the tasks that needed to be completed for the shutdown of UKHBB and PIGL, for example: by setting the start date for the new entity, drafting the message that complainants were to receive about the shutdown of PIGL, directing Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch and Zoei Keong, to devise shutdown procedures for data and files and communicating shutdown procedures with staff of UKHBB, to draft a sale of business contract, to provide risk consultancy to PIGL.
(l)overseeing the application for a bookmaking licence in Costa Rica.
There are reasonable grounds based on paragraphs 1-12 to infer that Michael Featherstone committed the offence in combination with Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Charlie Goransson, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald. The acts and declarations of Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Charlie Goransson, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald in furtherance of the common purpose may be used to prove the offence charged.7
Liability of Zach Featherstone:
Zach Featherstone knew that Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, and Charlie Goransson employed salespeople to sell managed packages, licences, and memberships to complainants that purported to apply software to make selections on horses, to yield profits on money invested by complainants into trading accounts to place bets.
Zach Featherstone knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
Zach Featherstone knew that Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
Zach Featherstone knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
7 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 99, Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 at 6-7.
Zach Featherstone knew that Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, and Charlie Goransson knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
Zach Featherstone with the knowledge set out at paragraphs 14-18, did any one or more of the following acts for the purpose of enabling or aiding the commission of the offence8, or which aided the commission of the offence with that intention9:
(a)drafting the ‘puppet’ directors job description for ‘puppet’ director John Kane.
(b)directing John Kane as ‘puppet’ director for UKHBB to complete tasks for the operation of UKHBB, for example: opening bank accounts for UKHBB, opening a mobile telephone account for the supply of mobile telephones to UKHBB, signing documents for UKHBB, emailing the correspondence he drafted on behalf of UKHBB to ASIC officers as though John Kane wrote it, closing the UKHBB accounts, signing blank cheques to disburse the complainants’ money.
(c)chasing up payments for John Kane for his services.
(d)drafting “deeds of settlement” to settle complaints made by complainants.
(e)updating Vince McDonald on the payments received from complainants into the bank accounts held by Code S Pty Ltd.
(f)arranging the drop box account for UKHBB and keeping the login details.
(g)completing tasks for the shutdown of UKHBB and PIGL, for example: checking the cloud worked and showing staff how to load files onto the cloud, organising all hard files to be packed up and secured off site, supplying them with the numbers they need for an immediate shutdown, securing the drop box account, drafting the sale of business contracts, producing the handover run down sheet for PIGL.
(h)writing reports to have removed negative comments about UKHBB from websites and the internet.
(i)providing invoices to UKHBB for payment of businesses that purportedly provided services to the business.
(j)devising ‘puppet’ director pay rates and schedules of payments for services.
(k)producing a draft sale of business contract to sell UKHBB to the new entity, E- Wealth.
(l)addressing issues or complaints raised by ASIC against UKHBB.
8 s.7(1)(b) Criminal Code.
9 s.7(1)(c) Criminal Code.
There are reasonable grounds based on paragraphs 1-6 and 14-19 to infer that Zach Featherstone committed the offence in combination with Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Charlie Goransson, Michael Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald. The acts and declarations of Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Charlie Goransson, Michael Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald in furtherance of the common purpose may be used to prove the offence charged.10
Liability of Travis Burch:
Travis Burch knew that Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, and Charlie Goransson employed salespeople to sell managed packages, licences, and memberships to complainants that purported to apply software to make selections on horses, to yield profits on money invested by complainants into trading accounts to place bets.
Travis Burch knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
Travis Burch knew that Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
Travis Burch knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
Travis Burch knew that Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, and Charlie Goransson knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
Travis Burch with the knowledge set out at paragraphs 21-25, did any one or more of the following acts for the purpose of enabling or aiding the commission of the offence11, or which aided the commission of the offence with that intention12:
(a)arranging and contributing to the design of the website for UKHBB.
(b)recruiting John Kane to be a ‘puppet’ director of UKHBB.
(c)providing advice to employees of UKHBB in respect of complaints made by complainants.
(d)drafting documents for the operation of UKHBB, for example, employment contracts for staff of UKHBB.
10 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 99, Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 at 6-7.
11 s.7(1)(b) Criminal Code.
12 s.7(1)(c) Criminal Code.
(e)updating the offer to purchase agreements used by UKHBB.
(f)overseeing the setup of the merchant facilities for Code S Pty Ltd to receive complainants’ payments.
(g)finding an alternative to PIGL as the ‘bookmaker’.
(h)procuring Christopher Edwards to obtain a bookmaking licence from Costa Rica.
(i)completing tasks that needed to be completed for the shutdown of UKHBB and PIGL, for example: educating UKHBB staff about the procedure to shut down the clouds, strategizing the closure of UKHBB, liaising with Vince McDonald about the changeover of ‘bookmaking licences’, passing on Michael Featherstone’s dictated message about what the complainants should be told about the shutdown of PIGL, drafting the sales agreement of PIGL to Sentry, following up Vince McDonald on changes to be made to “bet resulting”, correcting problems with phone diversions.
There are reasonable grounds based on paragraphs 1-6 and 21-26 to infer that Travis Burch committed the offence in combination with Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Charlie Goransson, Michael Featherstone, Zach Featherstone, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald. The acts and declarations of Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Charlie Goransson, Michael Featherstone, Zach Featherstone, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald in furtherance of the common purpose may be used to prove the offence charged.13
Liability of Patrik Goransson:
Patrik Goransson is liable for his conduct as a principal offender as per paragraphs 1-6 for procuring salespeople to sell the products14 and for selling the products himself15.
Patrik Goransson knew that Phil Cropper and Charlie Goransson employed salespeople to sell managed packages, licenses, and memberships to complainants that purported to apply software to make selections on horses, to yield profits on money invested by complainants into trading accounts to place bets.
Patrik Goransson knew that Charlie Goransson performed sales.
Patrik Goransson knew that Phil Cropper and Charlie Goransson knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
13 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 99, Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 at 6-7.
14 s.7(4) Criminal Code
15 s.7(1)(a) Criminal Code
Patrik Goransson knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
Patrik Goransson knew that Phil Cropper and Charlie Goransson knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
Patrik Goransson with the knowledge set out at 29-33, did any one or more of the following acts for the purpose of enabling or aiding the commission of the offence17, or which aided the commission of the offence by Phil Cropper and Charlie Goransson with that intention18:
(a)providing input into the design of the website for UKHBB.
(b)selling managed packages, licences, or memberships.
(c)managing the salespeople of UKHBB, by supervising them, providing advice on how to sell the products, authorising variations of the price and conditions of purchase agreements, storing and charging the mobile telephones used, informing them of the release of new licences and memberships, providing them with lead sheets.
(d)managing the business operations of UKHBB, by opening the business; recruiting, inducting, and training new staff; managing staff; managing the sale of the business service; collecting receipts from customers; providing customer support; authorising and accounting for expenditure and making payments; reporting on the business daily and weekly.
(e)working with Zoei Keong who was doing the bookkeeping for UKHBB by providing to her invoices paid and for payment, information pertaining to the sales completed and auditing the accounts.
(f)making payments for UKHBB from UKHBB bank accounts.
(g)directing John Kane as ‘puppet’ director for UKHBB to complete tasks for the operation of UKHBB, for example: delivering the mail he received to UKHBB, adding or removing access to people from the UKHBB bank accounts, cashing cheques made out to cash drawn on the UKHBB bank accounts to disburse the complainants’ money, closing the UKHBB bank accounts.
(h)directing administrative officers to cash cheques made out to cash drawn on the UKHBB bank accounts to disburse the complainants’ money.
(i)reporting adverse posts on the internet and websites about UKHBB to employees of Phoenix Global.
17 s.7(1)(b) Criminal Code
18 s.7(1)(c) Criminal Code
(j)reporting issues raised by ASIC officers about UKHBB to employees of Phoenix Global and addressing as advised.
(k)commissioning and approving changes to the UKHBB website and launching advertising campaigns.
(l)completing tasks for the shutdown of UKHBB and PIGL, by directing that he be removed from the UKHBB bank accounts, ascertaining the active mobile telephones associated with UKHBB, changing the serviced office.
(m)completing tasks that needed to be completed before the new entity to replace UKHBB, namely E-Wealth, could start operating, by organising the design of the new website, assigning the lease at 4/16 Queensland Avenue, Broadbeach to a different entity, providing evidence to ensure that E-Wealth remained registered for GST, setting up the domain names for the new entities.
There are reasonable grounds based on paragraphs 1-6 and 29-34 to infer that Patrik Goransson committed the offence in combination with Phil Cropper, Charlie Goransson, Michael Featherstone, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald. The acts and declarations of Phil Cropper, Charlie Goransson, Michael Featherstone, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald in furtherance of the common purpose may be used to prove the offence charged.19
Liability of Charlie Goransson:
Charlie Goransson is liable for his conduct as a principal offender as per paragraphs 1-6 for procuring salespeople to sell the products20 and for selling the products himself.21
Charlie Goransson knew that Phil Cropper and Patrik Goransson employed salespeople to sell managed packages, licenses, and memberships to complainants that purported to apply software to make selections on horses, to yield profits on money invested by complainants into trading accounts to place bets.
Charlie Goransson knew that Patrik Goransson performed sales.
Charlie Goransson knew that Phil Cropper and Patrik Goransson knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.
Charlie Goransson knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
19 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 99, Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 at 6-7.
20 s.7(4) Criminal Code
21 s.7(1)(a) Criminal Code
Charlie Goransson knew that Phil Cropper and Patrik Goransson knew that the money deposited by the complainants to purchase the managed packages, licences, and memberships and to trade into trading accounts was not returned to the complainants.
Charlie Goransson with the knowledge set out at 37-41, did any one or more of the following acts for the purpose of enabling or aiding the commission of the offence22, or which aided the commission of the offence by Phil Cropper and Patrik Goransson with that intention23:
(a)selling managed packages, licences, and memberships.
(b)managing the salespeople of UKHBB, by supervising them, providing advice on how to sell the products, authorising variations of the price and conditions of purchase agreements, storing and charging the mobile telephones used, informing them of the release of new licences and memberships, providing them with lead sheets.
(c)managing the business operations of UKHBB by, opening the business; recruiting, inducting, and training new staff; managing staff; managing the sale of the business service; collecting receipts from customers; providing customer support; authorising and accounting for expenditure and making payments; reporting on the business daily and weekly.
(d)directing John Kane as ‘puppet’ director for UKHBB to complete tasks for the operation of UKHBB, for example: delivering the mail he received to UKHBB, adding or removing access to people from the UKHBB bank accounts, cashing cheques made out to cash drawn on the UKHBB bank accounts to disburse the complainants’ money, to closing the UKHBB bank accounts.
(e)directing administrative officers to cash cheques made out to cash drawn on the UKHBB bank accounts to disburse the complainants’ money.
(f)working with Zoei Keong who was doing the bookkeeping for UKHBB to ensure invoices were paid.
(g)reporting issues raised by ASIC officers about UKHBB to employees of Phoenix Global and addressing as advised.
(h)commissioning and approving changes to the UKHBB website and launching advertising campaigns.
(i)completing tasks for the shutdown of UKHBB and PIGL, by changing the serviced office, meeting with Zoei Keong and John Kane, seeking the redirection of 1300 telephone numbers.
22 s.7(1)(b) Criminal Code
23 s.7(1)(c) Criminal Code
(j)completing tasks that needed to be completed before the new entity to replace UKHBB, namely E-Wealth, could start operating, by organising the design of the new website, assigning the lease at 4/16 Queensland Avenue, Broadbeach to a different entity, providing evidence to ensure that E-Wealth remained registered for GST, setting up the domain names for the new entities.
There are reasonable grounds based on paragraphs 1-6 and 36-42 to infer that Charlie Goransson committed the offence in combination with Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Michael Featherstone, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald. The acts and declarations of Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, Michael Featherstone, Zach Featherstone, Travis Burch, Zoei Keong, and Vince McDonald in furtherance of the common purpose may be used to prove the offence charged.24
24 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 99, Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 at 6-7.
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