R v Featherstone

Case •

[2025] QDC 147

•

17 October 2025

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Featherstone & Ors [2025] QDC 147
PARTIES:

THE KING
(Respondent)

v

MICHAEL JOHN FEATHERSTONE
(First Applicant)

ZACH MICHAEL FEATHERSTONE
(Second Applicant)

TRAVIS CHARLES BURCH
(Third Applicant)

ROBERT JOHN DOUEIHI
(Fourth Applicant)

KIRSTY MARIA LESTER
(Fifth Applicant)

NATCHAMON SRISUNANRAT
(Sixth Applicant)

FILE NO:

DC No 1561 of 2023, 2232 of 2022, 2227 of 2022

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

17 October 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

23 September 2025

JUDGE:

Loury KC DCJ
ORDERS:

1.   In respect of Z Featherstone, T Burch, R Doueihi, and K Lester, indictment 1561/23 is permanently stayed.

2.   In respect of M Featherstone, indictments 1561/23, 2232/22 and 2227/22 are permanently stayed.

3.   The applications by T Burch, Z Featherstone and N Srisunanrat for a permanent stay of indictment 2232/22 are refused.

4.   The particulars provided in respect of indictment 2232/22 are struck out.

5.   The applications by R Doueihi and T Burch for a permanent stay of indictment 2227/22 are refused.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW -- ADJOURNMENT, STAY OR PROCEEDINGS -- application for permanent stay where particulars are deficient; where there has been a significant delay; where prosecution has declined to say whether it will satisfy a Mosely order -- where the prosecution is not confident it has reasonable prospects of success -- whether the conduct of the prosecution is unjustifiably oppressive -- whether the conduct of the prosecution amounts to an abuse of process and has the effect of bringing the administration of justice into disrepute

LEGISLATION:

Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 7(1)(a)-(c), 7(4), 567(3), 568(3), 624, 668A

CASES:

Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 5 – Indictment) [2021] FCA 1345
Dupas v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 237; [2010] HCA 20
Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; [1989] HCA 46
KBT v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 417; [1997] HCA 54
KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; [2001] HCA 11
Moti v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50
O’Dea v Western Australia (2022) 273 CLR 315; [2022] HCA 24
PPP v The Queen (2010) 27 VR 68; [2010] VSCA 110
R v Featherstone, Featherstone & Burch [2024] QDC 1
R v Featherstone (No 2) [2025] QDCPR 15
R v Featherstone; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions(Qld) [2024] QCA 197
R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592; [1992] HCA 16
R v Jayaweera [2022] QCA 103
R v Jell, ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 48
R v Quagliata [2019] QCA 45
Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251; [1994] HCA 42
Strickland v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2018) 266 CLR 325; [2018] HCA 53
Walsh v Tattersall (1996) 188 CLR 77; [1996] HCA 26
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; [1993] HCA 77
Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; [1992] HCA 34
COUNSEL:

T Bicanic for the first applicant
D P Jones KC, with A Cappellano, for the second applicant
A M Hoare KC for the third applicant
G M Elmore for the fourth applicant
J Robson for the fifth applicant
K Hillard for the sixth applicant

C N Marco, with S J Muir, for the respondent
SOLICITORS:

Hannay Lawyers for the first applicant
Guest Lawyers for the second applicant
Legal Aid Queensland for the third and fifth applicant
Ashkan Tai Lawyers for the fourth applicant
Beavon Lawyers for the sixth applicant

Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

Background

  1. R Doueihi, T Burch, Z Featherstone and K Lester are each charged with one or more counts of fraud on indictment 1561/23. They each apply for a permanent stay of this indictment on the basis of the extraordinary delay in the matter proceeding and the continuing inability of the prosecution to properly particularise its case.

  2. T Burch, Z Featherstone and N Srisunanrat are charged with fraud on indictment 2232/22. They each make an application for a permanent stay of this indictment on the basis of the extraordinary delay in the matter proceeding and the continuing inability of the prosecution to properly particularise its case.

  3. R Doueihi and T Burch are each charged with fraud on indictment 2227/22. They each apply for a permanent stay of this indictment on the basis of the delay and failure of the prosecution to particularise its case.

  4. M Featherstone is charged on each of indictments 1561/23, 2232/22 and 2227/22 with fraud. Indictment 1561/23 is the subject of a temporary stay pending the payment by the prosecution of costs thrown away[1] (Mosely order). M Featherstone applies for a permanent stay of each of the indictments on the basis of the extraordinary delay in any of the matters proceeding to date; the unknown further delay caused by the decision of the prosecution to not indicate whether it intends to satisfy the Mosely order and to not proceed against M Featherstone on any indictment despite not discontinuing proceedings against him on any indictment.

    [1] R v Featherstone (No 2) [2025] QDCPR 15.

  5. To permanently stay an indictment is an extraordinary step to take. Indictment 1561/23 involves a large number of complainants said to have been defrauded of large sums of money. I have reached the conclusion that the eight iterations of the particulars in respect of indictment 1561/23 remain confusing and are wholly deficient. The prosecution has, after a number of years, now moved to prosecute indictment 2232/22 in order to assess its prospects of success on indictment 1561/23 before determining whether it will satisfy the Mosely order. This suggests the prosecution no longer considers that it has reasonable prospects of success in respect of indictment 1561/23. In my view, the conduct of the prosecution in respect of M Featherstone has reached the point of being unjustifiably oppressive and as having the effect of bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. For those reasons I consider that the prosecution of M Featherstone in respect of each indictment should be permanently stayed. My reasons for reaching that view infect the prosecution of R Doueihi, Z Featherstone and T Burch on indictment 1561/23. I consider the prosecution of each of those persons on indictment 1561/23 ought to be permanently stayed. In respect of indictment 2232/22 and 2227/22 I have reached a different view. I order that the particulars in respect of indictment 2232/22 be struck out. I refuse the application for a permanent stay in respect of each of T Burch, Z Featherstone and N Srisunanrat in respect of indictment 2232/22.

  6. The application for a permanent stay of indictment 2227/22 is also refused in respect of R Doueihi and T Burch.

Particulars

  1. The common law rule against duplicity requires that one count should not charge an accused with having committed two or more offences.[2] Section 567(3) of the Criminal Code 1899 reflects that common law rule. The rule against duplicity and s 567(3) reflect the fundamental principle that a person charged with an offence is entitled to know the precise charge being preferred so that he/she may know what evidence is admissible and what evidence can be properly objected to on the grounds of irrelevance.

    [2] Walsh v Tattersall (1996) 188 CLR 77; [1996] HCA 26 at 104.

  2. Section 568(3) explicitly permits a number of specific frauds to be proceeded against on the one charge even if separate acts of fraud can be identified. Section 568(3) reads:

    (3) In an indictment against a person for fraud the person may be charged and proceeded against on 1 charge even though—

    (a) any number of specific frauds of the same type has been committed, whether or not each specific act of fraud can be identified; or

    (b) the frauds have extended over any space of time; or

    (c) property applied belongs to different persons, and has come into the possession or control of the accused person at different times and subject to different trusts, directions, conditions, or duties to account; or

    (d) the property, benefit, detriment or inducement belongs to or is caused to different persons.

  3. Section 568(3) provides for the charging and proceeding against a person on one charge even if any number of specific frauds of the same type have been committed and whether or not each specific act of fraud can be identified. This provision does not create a continuing offence. The actus reus of the offence is not a course of conduct. The actus reus of the offence is the act of doing a specific fraud, whether one or more of the same type. If that is the actus reus of the offence then a person cannot be convicted unless the jury is agreed as to the commission of each of the specific frauds relied upon to prove the offence. That the provision provides for an offence of fraud to be charged and proceeded against on one charge does not detract from the need to prove the actual commission of the acts which constitute a fraud.[3] That requires those acts to be identified.

    [3] KBT v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 417; [1997] HCA 54.

  4. The existence of s 568(3) does not change the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to know the precise charge being preferred. For an offence charged pursuant to s 568(3) the provision of particulars provides that information. Without identification of each specific fraud relied upon, a person is not able to avail himself/herself of a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict.

  5. In PPP v The Queen[4] Redlich JA described the importance of proper particulars. He said that the provision of particulars:

    1.   Enables the accused to exercise the right to object to evidence on the ground of relevance;

    2.   Permits the accused to know how the charge might be answered;

    3.   Provides the accused with the opportunity to test the credibility of the complainant by reference to the surrounding circumstances disclosed as a result of the particularisation of the count;

    4.   Enables the trial judge to instruct the jury properly as to the law to be applied;

    5.   Ensures that there is a unanimity of view by the jury as to a specific act by the accused;

    6.   In the event of conviction, enables the court to know the offence for which the accused is to be punished;

    7.   Ensures that the record discloses of what offence a person has been acquitted or convicted in order for that person to avail himself or herself, if the need should arise, of a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict.

    [4] (2010) 27 VR 68; [2010] VSCA 110 at 80 - 81.

  6. Each count of fraud on each of the indictments, charged pursuant to s 568(3) involves multiple acts, each of which would independently amount to an offence of fraud. As one of the purposes for the provision of particulars is to apprise the accused of knowledge of the act/s constituting the offence so as to give sufficient indication of the case he/she must meet, there must be clarity as to the acts that amount to the offence. Further, it appears that alternative bases of criminal liability are advanced against the perpetrators of the principal offence of fraud. In R v Quagliata[5] Bond J said of a case in which alternative bases of criminal liability were advanced:

    “If, as is trite, the purpose of particulars is to give an accused sufficient indication of the nature of the case he or she is called to meet, then there must be clarity as to how each of the alternative cases is advanced. An important reason why that is significant is that evidence admissible on one alternative case might not be admissible on another, and the accused is entitled to have the cases sufficiently clarified so that appropriate objection can be taken, appropriate directions given and appropriate forensic decisions made.” (citations omitted)

    [5] [2019] QCA 45 at [15].

  7. If another of the purposes of the provision of particulars is to assist in properly directing the jury as to the law, again there must be clarity as to each of the acts that the prosecution relies upon as constituting the offence. That the legislation allows for multiple of acts of fraud to be charged as one offence, does not mean that there is no requirement on the prosecution to identify each of the acts relied upon to constitute the offence. If a further purpose to the provision of particulars is to ensure unanimity of view by the jury the specific acts relied upon to constitute the fraud must be clearly articulated.

  8. In KRM v The Queen[6] McHugh J remarked of the provision creating the offence with which the appellant had been charged that it

    “… operates in the context of an adversarial system of criminal justice where an accused person is entitled to be given as high a degree of particularity concerning a criminal charge as the subject matter will bear. An accused person ‘is entitled to be apprised not only of the legal nature of the offence with which he is charged but also of the particular act, matter or thing alleged as the foundation of the charge’. These particulars are needed to ensure that the accused person has a fair opportunity to defend the charge.” (citations omitted)

    [6] (2001) 206 CLR 221; [2001] HCA 11 at 226 - 227 [15].

  9. With those observations and requirements in mind, I have considered in detail the particulars as provided in respect of count 1 on indictment 1561/23. The parties agree that a consideration of these particulars will determine the outcome with respect to the sufficiency of the particulars on each count on each indictment.

Indictment 1561/23 - Zach Featherstone and Travis Burch

  1. The prosecution’s case on count 1 is that each of Z Featherstone and T Burch are criminally responsible for an offence of fraud committed on “divers dates between 3 June 2011 and 30 April 2014” as a result of the application of ss 7(1)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code. To prove that a person is liable as a party pursuant to these provisions the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt firstly, an identified or unidentified person (the perpetrator) committed the offence of fraud; secondly that the particular accused assisted the perpetrator to commit the offence of fraud or enabled the commission of the offence by the perpetrator; thirdly, when the accused assisted the perpetrator he did so intending to help the perpetrator to commit the offence of fraud and fourthly that the accused had actual knowledge of the essential facts of the principal offence including the state of mind of the perpetrator.

  2. In the context of the offence of the fraud which is count 1 this means that the prosecution is required to establish:

    1.That the perpetrator dishonestly caused a detriment to the complainant;

    2.Each of Z Featherstone and T Burch assisted the perpetrator to commit the offence of fraud;

    3.When each of Z Featherstone and T Burch assisted the perpetrator he did so intending to help the perpetrator commit the offence of fraud; and

    4.Each of Z Featherstone and T Burch had actual knowledge of the essential facts of the fraud including the dishonest state of mind of the perpetrator.

  3. Sections 7(1)(b) and (c) require that the act or omission of another constitute the conduct element of the offence. In O’Dea v Western Australia[7] the majority held that if a person is not criminally responsible because his/her acts were lawful then a person could not be convicted of aiding in the commission of an offence that had not been committed. To convict either Z Featherstone or T Burch pursuant to ss 7(1)(b) or (c) the conduct of the perpetrator, whether he/she can be identified or not, must be unlawful. This means the perpetrator of the offence of fraud must do the act/s or omit to the act/s which constitutes the conduct element of the offence and must have the dishonest state of mind necessary in order to have committed the offence of fraud.

    [7] (2022) 273 CLR 315; [2022] HCA 24.

  4. For count 1 on indictment 1561/23 under the heading “The offence” the particulars state:

    1.“Salespeople sold managed packages, licences, and memberships under the name of the company UK Home Based Business Pty Ltd ("UKHBB”) to [620 complainants] that purported to apply software to make selections on horses. The [620 complainants] invested money into trading accounts held by Vince McDonald to place bets using the software and to yield profits.

    2.The software did not exist, or if it did exist, was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits.

    3.The money deposited by the [620 complainants] to purchase the managed packages, licenses, and memberships, and to trade, into the trading account, was not returned to the [620 complainants].

    4.The combined loss to the [620 complainants] was to the value of more than $30,000 and up to $9,314,289.05.

    5.The salespeople were employed by Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson, and Charlie Goransson. Not all of the individuals employed in this role were able to be identified, but Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson completed sales to [620 complainants].

    6.Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson knew that the software did not exist, or if it did exist, it was not applied to place bets, or it did not work to yield profits, and that is dishonest by the standards of ordinary honest people.

    7.It is unknown what level of knowledge the remaining salespeople had of the software.

    8.Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson knew that the money deposited by the [620 complainants] to purchase the managed packages, licenses, and memberships, and to trade, into the trading account, was not returned to the [620 complainants], and that is dishonest by the standards of ordinary honest people.

    9.Phil Cropper, Patrik Goransson and Charlie Goransson knew that the company UKHBB was used to enable the dishonest conduct.”

    (footnotes omitted)

  5. Beyond those statements, the particulars provide in a general way for the knowledge that Z Featherstone and T Burch are said to have had, which included knowledge that P Cropper, P Goransson and C Goransson sold the product through salespeople to the 620 complainants; knowledge that the software did not exist or work; knowledge that the money was not returned to the 620 complainants; and, knowledge that UKHBB was used to enable the dishonest conduct.

  6. The particulars then provide in a general way for the conduct engaged in by each of Z Featherstone and T Burch which is said to aid or enable the commission of the offence of fraud by the perpetrator.

  7. The particulars do not properly articulate whose acts are said to give rise to the commission of the principal offence. It is entirely unclear whether it is the acts of the salespeople, the acts of P Cropper, the acts of P Goransson or the acts of C Goransson. It remains unclear whether it is the act of procuring salespeople that is relied upon or whether it is the act of selling the product. The deficiencies in the particulars continue to arise because insufficient attention has been given to the doing of an act which gives rise to the conduct element of the offence of fraud. Indeed, the particulars do not state that any person did any act other than “salespeople” who sold the product. During oral argument the prosecutor confirmed that the act that is said to constitute the offence is the act of a salesperson selling the software to a complainant in circumstances where it, in effect, did not exist. The particulars do not make clear who is the perpetrator of those, what must be, 620 acts.

  8. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the perpetrator of those acts is P Cropper or P Goransson or C Goransson, the particulars do not provide any clarity as to the particular transactions that each of P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson are said to have engaged in whether by reference to a salesperson or a complainant. They do not provide clarity as regards which transactions each of P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson were the actual salesperson as opposed to having employed an innocent agent to sell the product. The particulars do not detail how Z Featherstone and T Burch or any others aided or enabled any specific transaction or even how they are said to have aided each of P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson when making actual sales as opposed to employing others to make the sales.

  1. In paragraphs [1] through [9] the manner in which the particulars are drafted attributes all acts of P Cropper, P Goransson and C Goransson, whether as employers or in their role as salespersons, to each of P Cropper, P Goransson and C Goransson. That is contrary to O’Dea v Western Australia.[8] In argument however, the prosecutor accepted that her case was in fact that it was either P Cropper or P Goransson or C Goransson who employed the salesperson who made the sale.

    [8] (2022) 273 CLR 315; [2022] HCA 24.

  2. In respect of count 1 there are 620 individual transactions which are said to be dishonest and which would amount to the offence of fraud. No attempt beyond naming the complainants has been made to identify the transactions. No attempt has been made to identify which of P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson are said to have employed the salesperson who sold a product to any of the 620 complainants and no attempt has been made to identify with precision the acts of each of Z Featherstone and T Burch which are said to aid one or other of those transactions.

  3. There is no identified basis under the heading “The offence” on which each of P Cropper, P Goransson and C Goransson are said to be criminally liable. There is no description of any one of them having done any act. O’Dea v Western Australia[9] makes clear that s 7(1)(a) cannot be used to attribute the acts of one person to another. The prosecution, to establish criminal responsibility on the part of each of P Cropper, P Goransson and C Goransson under s 7(1)(a) must necessarily prove an act/s causing a detriment coupled with the dishonest knowledge. No attempt to identify the precise acts of any these people even by reference to a complainant has been undertaken.

    [9] (2022) 273 CLR 315; [2022] HCA 24.

  4. In respect of count 1 the prosecution has further attempted to particularise the basis of liability of each of P Goransson and C Goransson. At paragraph [28] it is said that P Goransson is liable under s 7(1)(a) for completing himself sales to the complainants of managed packages, licences and memberships that purported to apply software to make selections on horses with the knowledge that the software either did not exist or did not work to yield profits and that the money deposited by the complainants was not returned to them.

  5. The particulars then state that P Goransson is liable under s 7(4) for “employing salespeople” to sell to the 620 complainants the managed packages, licences and memberships. Section 7(4) relevantly provides that any person who procures another to do or omit to do any act of such a nature that, if the person had done the act or made the omission, the act or omission would have constituted an offence on the person’s part is guilty of doing the act. There is no identification of who he procured and what act he procured that person to do whether by reference to a salesperson or a complainant.

  6. P Goransson is also said to be liable under ss 7(1)(b) or (c) for aiding or enabling P Cropper and C Goransson to employ salespeople to sell managed packages, licenses and memberships to 620 complainants with the knowledge that it did not exist or did not work to yield profits. The particulars then go on to identify the acts that P Goransson engaged in which constitute the aiding or encouraging.

  7. Again there has been no attempt made to identify which of the transactions P Goransson is liable for pursuant to ss 7(1)(a), or 7(1)(b) or (c), or 7(4).

  8. On the basis of these particulars each of Z Featherstone and T Burch aided P Goransson when he sold software to a complainant; when he procured another to sell the software and when P Goransson was himself aiding or enabling P Cropper or C Goransson. There is no such basis of criminal liability that arises under the Criminal Code, aiding an aider or enabler of a criminal offence who is themselves aiding or enabling a principal offence. That the acts of P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson have not been identified in the particulars with precision does not allow Z Featherstone or T Burch to know the case they have to meet.

  9. The prosecutor, in oral argument, submitted that the particulars, as drafted, are not intended to allege for example, Z Featherstone aided or enabled P Goransson when P Goransson’s liability is as an aider or enabler of the perpetrator. The submission made is that the particulars convey that Z Featherstone aided whoever it was that did the act that constitutes the offence whether P Cropper, P Goransson, C Goransson or a salesperson. The difficulty with that submission is that the salesperson is not said to have the dishonest knowledge that must accompany the act of selling the software in order for the prosecution to prove an offence of fraud was committed. The particulars, as drafted are confusing and do not properly allow for Z Featherstone or T Burch to understand the case that they have to meet.

  10. The same difficulty arises with respect to C Goransson. He is also said to be liable pursuant to ss 7(1)(a), (b), (c) and 7(4) with no identification of the transactions relied upon in proof of any of those bases of criminal liability.

  11. It is further instructive to consider how a jury could be directed based upon the particulars provided.

  12. Firstly, it is necessary as indicated above for the prosecution to firstly prove that the offence of fraud has been committed. That requires a jury to be directed that a perpetrator, whether known or unknown, did the act or omission relied on to constitute the offence. No attention has been given to identifying the perpetrator and what his acts are. If it is the act of P Cropper or P Goransson or C Goransson the particulars should properly identify what that act/s is. If it is employing another person to sell a product to a particular complainant the particulars need to identify that. They do not. If the act includes the making of a representation to a complainant himself or through another the particulars should identify that representation.

  13. Secondly, the jury has to be directed that they must be satisfied that it is the act of (assuming for the sake of argument) P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson that causes the pecuniary detriment. That means that it must be the act of P Cropper or P Goransson or C Goransson in himself selling the software to a particular complainant or employing a particular person who sold the software to a particular complainant which was a substantial or significant cause of the pecuniary detriment to that complainant.

  14. Thirdly, the jury would need to be directed that to prove that P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson caused the pecuniary detriment dishonestly, they would need to be satisfied that P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson knew, at the time he sold the product or employed the salesperson to sell the product to a particular complainant, that it did not work or did not exist.

  15. In respect of the matters in which it is said that P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson sold the products directly to particular complainants, in order to prove that the act of P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson caused the pecuniary detriment the prosecution must prove that at the time of selling the products P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson knew that the software did not work or did not exist and acting in that way was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people. The directions that must be given to the jury must identify the knowledge, intention or belief said to be dishonest at the time of each act that is a particular of each count.[10]

    [10] R v Jayaweera [2022] QCA 103 at [112].

  16. In order to direct the jury as to proof of the commission of the offence of fraud by P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson it is critical that the prosecution state clearly what its case is in that respect. As has been said by the Court of Appeal the Crown must articulate clearly the relevant aspect of the perpetrator’s knowledge, belief, or intent which renders the perpetrator’s conduct dishonest.[11]

    [11] R v Jayaweera at [13].

  17. The particulars as drafted refer to P Cropper, P Goransson and C Goransson as if they are a single entity and that the acts or knowledge of any one of them is attributable to the others. The particulars otherwise allege a basis of criminal liability that is unknown to the law, aiding an aider or enabler who is themselves aiding or enabling the perpetrator.

  18. The prosecution’s outline further demonstrates the confusion in the particulars. At paragraph [25] it seems the prosecution’s case is in fact that it is either P Cropper or P Goransson or C Goransson who employed a salesperson to sell the product. So much was admitted during the course of the oral submissions.

  19. The outline further states that in respect of Z Featherstone and T Burch that the prosecution must prove that a salesperson committed the offence. That would then require identification of the knowledge, belief or intent that the salesperson, if they are the perpetrator of the offence, had at the time that he/she sold the product to the particular complainant. However, at paragraph [7] of the particulars it is stated that it is “unknown what level of knowledge the remaining salespeople had of the software”. The reference to the offence in ss 7(1)(b) and (c) is used to denote the element of conduct which if engaged in with a prescribed state of mind, renders a person engaging in the conduct liable to punishment.

  20. To prove the offence of fraud, the conduct of selling the software must be engaged in by a person, whether known or unknown, with a dishonest state of mind. If the state of mind of the salespeople is unknown the prosecution’s case must be that it is P Cropper, P Goransson or C Goransson who has committed the act/s which gives rise to the offence.

  21. It is only once the acts of the perpetrator of the principal offence of fraud are identified, can the jury then be directed in respect of the accessorial liability of Z Featherstone and T Burch. Difficulties arise with respect to the particulars in that regard in terms of directing the jury. For example, in respect of Z Featherstone it is said that he aided or enabled the commission of the offence of fraud by “drafting ‘deeds of settlement’ to settle complaints made by complainants”. There is no identification of what deed of settlement such conduct refers to. It is difficult to understand how drafting a deed of settlement assumedly after the commission of the offence of fraud by the perpetrator in respect of a particular complainant, could amount to aiding or enabling the commission of the offence of fraud in respect of that complainant. The particulars do not identify in any meaningful way what the acts of Z Featherstone are that have aided or enabled the perpetrator to commit the offence of fraud.

  22. The particulars in respect of count 1 are confusing and wholly deficient.

  23. Count 2 is drafted in a similar way to count 1 although with different persons said to employ the salespeople. Those people are “Phil Cropper, Robert Doueihi and Daniel Webb”. The same issues arise. They appear to be treated as a single entity with the act/s of one attributed to another.

  24. Z Featherstone and T Burch are said to be liable pursuant to ss 7(1)(b) and (c). R Doueihi is said to be liable pursuant to ss 7(4) and 7(1)(b) and (c). No identification of the transactions which were said to have been procured by R Doueihi as opposed to those he is said to have aided or enabled has been undertaken. For count 2 there are 558 complainants, inferentially there are at least 558 transactions. There is again no identification of the act/s of R Doueihi or any other person that is said to amount to the conduct element of the offence.

  25. D Webb is said to be liable under ss 7(1)(a),(b) and (c) again with no identification of those transactions in which he is said to have actually done the act which constitutes the offence and those which he is said to be liable because he aided or enabled. Z Featherstone and T Burch cannot be criminally liable for aiding an aider.

  26. Count 5 appears to allege P Cropper as the principal offender who employed salespeople to sell the same product to four complainants. Despite the ease with which the acts of P Cropper could here be identified they have not been. Z Featherstone and T Burch are each said to have aided or enabled those acts. The particulars are deficient.

  27. Count 6 suffers the same problems as counts 1 and 2. Salespeople are said to have sold the product. There are no acts of P Cropper, R Doueihi or D Webb identified. If it is the act of employing a salesperson to sell a product that is the act of one or other of those three men the acts of each of them are attributed to the others. R Doueihi is said to be liable under ss 7(4) and 7(1)(b) and (c) for aiding P Cropper and D Webb. D Webb is said to have done the act and aided or enabled P Cropper and R Doueihi. Z Featherstone and T Burch are said to have aided or enabled the commission of the acts of P Cropper, D Webb and R Doueihi.

  28. The particulars do not identify in a meaningful way how Z Featherstone or T Burch are said to have aided the perpetrator of the offence of fraud. The particulars do not allow Z Featherstone or T Burch to know the case they have to meet.

  29. The particulars provided in respect of Z Featherstone and T Burch are confusing and wholly deficient.

Indictment 1561/23 – Kirsty Lester

  1. In respect of K Lester, she is charged with count 5 which alleges that between 20 October 2012 and 31 July 2014 she dishonestly caused a pecuniary detriment to 17 complainants. She is also charged on count 6 with an offence of fraud committed between 15 January 2013 and 18 December 2014 and on count 7 with an offence of fraud committed between 10 October 2013 and 2 November 2014.

  2. K Lester was employed on a part-time basis for 10 weeks from around 17 January 2014 as an office assistant to M Featherstone. She ceased her employment soon after a search warrant was executed on 28 March 2014. She was charged on 24 February 2016. She continues to await her trial nine years later. The particulars do not identify which of the transactions said to constitute the conduct element of the offences of fraud she is said to have aided or enabled in circumstances where she was only employed for 10 weeks of a more than 2-year period. The brief of evidence is voluminous. She has no ability to identify what evidence is properly admissible against her and what evidence she should take objection to.

  3. The particulars in respect of K Lester are confusing and wholly deficient for the same reasons as with respect to Z Featherstone and T Burch.

Indictment 1561/23 - Robert Doueihi

  1. The same issues arise with respect to R Doueihi in relation to indictment 1561/23. The particulars fail to identify a perpetrator of the offence of fraud or the acts of R Doueihi if he is the perpetrator. He is charged with count 2 on the basis that he procured others to sell the product knowing that it did not exist or work. He is also said to be liable on the basis that he aided or enabled each of P Cropper and D Webb. D Webb’s liability appears to be that either he did the act which is the conduct relied upon or alternatively he aided or enabled P Cropper.

  2. Similar issues arise with respect to count 6. There is no identification of the perpetrator of the offence. There is no identification of the transactions that R Doueihi procured others to engage in, as opposed to having aided or enabled P Cropper or having aided or enabled D Webb. The particulars suggest R Doueihi aided or enabled D Webb who himself is said to have aided or enabled P Cropper, a basis of liability unknown to the law.

  3. R Doueihi further contends that there are enumerable paths to conviction given the way in which the particulars have been drafted. The prosecutor relies upon a statement of facts to assist R Doueihi to understand the acts he is said to have engaged in. The difficulty with that submission is that a jury will not be provided a statement of facts. The prosecutor further submits that a special verdict could be taken in order to determine what acts were found by the jury unanimously. Section 624 of the Criminal Code which provides for the taking of a special verdict states “in any case in which it appears to the court that the question whether an accused person ought or ought not to be convicted of an offence may depend upon some specific fact, or that the proper punishment to be awarded upon conviction may depend upon some specific fact, the court may require the jury to find that fact specially.” Unless the precise acts are properly identified there is no possibility of the taking of a special verdict.

  4. The particulars in respect of R Doueihi are confusing and wholly deficient.

Permanent Stay - Indictment 1561/23

  1. The granting of a permanent stay of an indictment is a rare and exceptional remedy.[12] There are no definitive category of cases in which a permanent stay of proceedings can be ordered. The question to be considered is not so much whether the case can be characterised as extreme but rather whether an apprehended defect in the trial is “of such a nature that nothing that a trial judge can do in the conduct of the trial can relieve against its unfair consequences”.[13]

    [12] Jago v District Court (NSW) at 31, 34, 60, 76; R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592; [1992] HCA 16 at 605; Dupas v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 237; [2010] HCA 20 at 250 [33]-[35].

    [13] R v Glennon at 605.

  2. In Moti v The Queen[14] French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ adopted a statement of McHugh J in Rogers v The Queen[15]:

    “…although the categories of abuse of process are not closed, many such cases can be identified as falling into one of three categories; (1) the court’s procedures are invoked for an illegitimate purpose; (2) the use of the court’s procedures is unjustifiably oppressive to one of the parties; or (3) the use of the court’s procedures would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”

    [14] (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 at 463 - 464.

    [15] (1994) 181 CLR 251; [1994] HCA 42 at 286.

  3. It is the second and third categories which found the applications in this case. One aspect to the contention that the use of the court’s procedures is unjustifiably oppressive is the delay that has been occasioned as a result of the conduct of the prosecution. For indictment 1561/23 this is the eighth iteration of the particulars that the prosecution has provided.

  4. Most relevantly on 9 October 2023 an application was brought by M Featherstone, Z Featherstone and T Burch concerning the adequacy of the particulars. The particulars were struck out with my ruling that they failed to identify the act/s or omission/s which constituted the offences and failed to identify the person, persons or entity who did the act/s or made the omission/s.

  5. On 9 November 2023 the prosecution advised all accused on the three indictments that it would proceed with counts 1-3 and 5-8 on indictment 1561/23 first in time against M Featherstone, Z Featherstone, T Burch and N Forbes only.

  6. On 18 December 2023 M Featherstone, Z Featherstone and T Burch brought an application for a permanent stay of indictment 1561/23 on the basis of the continued deficiencies in the particulars. I refused that application for a permanent stay of the indictment on 15 January 2024 however ordered that the particulars be struck out.[16] The basis of the application was the delay in the prosecution combined with the continued material deficiencies in the particulars which, it was contended, amounted to an affront to the administration of justice.

    [16] R v Featherstone, Featherstone & Burch [2024] QDC 1.

  7. On 25 January 2024 the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) filed a notice referring five questions to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 668A of the Criminal Code. Each question was said to be a question of law arising out of my ruling of 15 January 2024.

  8. The hearing before the Court of Appeal occurred on 31 May 2024 with judgement being delivered on 25 October 2024.[17] The ruling of the Court of Appeal was that it was unnecessary to answer any of the five questions as none of them raised a point of law within the meaning of s 668A. It was made clear as early as 31 May 2024 at the hearing, that the particulars would need to be redrafted as they were indeed deficient. Despite those clear indications at the hearing and in the judgement, the prosecution did not move to provide further particulars until 16 May 2025 (16 months after they were struck out).

    [17] R v Featherstone; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) [2024] QCA 197.

  1. On 14 March 2025 I delivered judgement on an application by M Featherstone in which I temporarily stayed the prosecution of him on indictment 1561/23 until such time as the prosecution had paid the costs thrown away in an amount of $238,489.99.[18]

    [18] R v Featherston (No 2).

  2. On 16 April 2025 the prosecutor informed all accused that she intended to move to prosecute indictment 2232/22 which charges M Featherstone, T Burch, Z Featherstone, D Traynor and N Srisunanrat with one count of fraud. However, the prosecutor advised that she did not intend to prosecute M Featherstone on this indictment. There is no current impediment to the prosecution proceeding against all five accused on indictment 2232/22. The prosecution, however, have determined not to proceed against M Featherstone on that indictment but equally do not intend to discontinue proceedings against him. The prosecutor has confirmed that she intends to prosecute indictment 2232/22 in order to assess her prospects of success on indictment 1561/23 before making a decision as to whether to satisfy the Mosely order in favour of M Featherstone made on 14 March 2025.

  3. It was not until 17 April 2025 when I directed the prosecution to provide particulars in respect of indictment 1561/23 that the prosecution has moved to do so. On 16 May 2025 the particulars referred to in this judgment with respect to indictment 1561/23 and 2232/22 were delivered, absent any reference to M Featherstone, including his liability for the offence contained in indictment 2232/22.

  4. As indicated, the particulars in respect of indictment 1561/23 are deficient.

  5. In respect of the prosecution of indictment 1561/23 there has been an extraordinary delay, some of which has been caused by the conduct of the prosecution. In particular, the filing of an unmeritorious reference to the Court of Appeal and the failure to provide particulars for 16 months after they were struck out. Even now those particulars remain deficient. Given the extensive delay and the multiple attempts the prosecution has had to particularise its case, and despite comments directing the prosecutor to the deficiencies in the particulars by the judges in the Court of Appeal, the prosecution is still unable to properly articulate its case. As Wigney J said in Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 5 – Indictment)[19] “…limits are and must be placed upon the ability of a prosecutor to change the pleading or particularisation of an indictment, particularly if the proceedings are well advanced”. After more than nine years the prosecution remains unable to particularise its case on indictment 1561/23.

    [19] [2021] FCA 1345 at [252].

  6. The decision now taken by the prosecution to move to prosecute indictment 2232/22 first in time means that there will be a further, very significant delay before the prosecution even determines whether it has sufficient prospects of success that it will continue to prosecute any accused on indictment 1561/23.

  7. In respect of Z Featherstone and T Burch this is the third application that has been made with respect to the adequacy of the prosecution’s particulars on indictment 1561/23.

  8. I am not satisfied that there is any other means available to remedy the prosecution’s inability to particularise its case after so many failed attempts. The delay is extraordinary. The continued inability to properly particularise the case and the now moving to prosecute a different indictment in order to assess prospects of success on indictment 1561/23 is unjustifiably oppressive to each of the accused on indictment 1561/23. Further, that the prosecution does not, after nine years, consider that it has reasonable prospects of securing convictions on indictment 1561/23 such that it wishes to delay prosecuting it for an indeterminate period of time has the effect of bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. As said by Kiefel CJ, Bell and Nettle JJ in Strickland v DPP (Cth)[20]:

    “Certainly, as this Court has stated repeatedly, a permanent stay of a criminal prosecution is an extraordinary step which will very rarely be justified. There is a powerful social imperative for those who are charged with criminal offences to be brought to trial and, for that reason, it has been said that a permanent stay of prosecution should only ever be granted where there is such a fundamental defect in the process leading to trial that nothing by way of reconstitution of the prosecutorial team or trial directions or other such arrangements can sufficiently relieve against the consequences of the defence as to afford those charged with a fair trial. But, as this court has also stated there is, too, a fundamental social concern to ensure that the end of a criminal prosecution does not justify the adoption of any and every means for securing as conviction and, therefore, a recognition that in rare and exceptional cases where a defect in process is so profound as to offend the integrity and function off the court as such, it is necessary that proceedings be stayed in order to prevent the administration of justice falling into disrepute.” (citations omitted)

    [20] 266 CLR 325; [2018] HCA 53 at 370 [106].

  9. I am satisfied that there remains no other order that can be made which alleviates the unjustifiable oppression involved to Z Featherstone, T Burch, K Lester or R Doueihi. I am further satisfied that the continued prosecution of indictment 1561/23 against these four accused in circumstances where the eighth iteration of the particulars are confusing and wholly deficient; the prosecution not being satisfied that it has reasonable prospects of success such that it wishes to delay the prosecution on this indictment whilst using another as a “litmus test” to assess its prospects; and the further indeterminate delay that will be occasioned as a consequence of this decision by the prosecution, is a defect in process so profound as to “offend the integrity and function of the court”[21] and brings the administration of justice into disrepute.

    [21] Strickland v DPP (Cth) at 370 [106].

  10. I order that indictment 1561/23 in respect of Z Featherstone, T Burch, K Lester and R Douihi be permanently stayed.

  11. Z Featherstone and T Burch further contend that the absence of any reference to M Featherstone in the particulars delivered in respect of indictment 1561/23 and the conduct of the prosecution in moving to prosecute indictment 2232/22 other than M Featherstone is an attempt to circumvent the Mosely made on 15 March 2025. It is contended that everything that Z Featherstone is alleged to have done in order to aid the commission of the offence of fraud on indictment 1561/23 was done at the direction of M Featherstone. The absence of M Featherstone at a trial on indictment 1561/23 as a result of the prosecution’s decision to not satisfy the Mosely order creates a further level of unfairness and would amount to an abuse of process. It is unnecessary to make any determination as to this aspect of the application for a permanent stay as I am satisfied that indictment 1561/23 in respect of Z Featherstone and T Burch should be permanently stayed on the bases identified in this judgement.

Indictments 1561/23, 2232/22 and 2227/22 - Michael Featherstone

  1. The applicant M Featherstone applies for a permanent stay of all indictments on the basis the prosecution has no intention of meeting the Mosely order made with respect to indictment 1561/23 and that its conduct in now determining to prosecute indictment 2232/22 absent of M Featherstone is an abuse of process.

  2. On 14 March 2025 I ordered the prosecution of M Featherstone be temporarily stayed until such time as the prosecution paid to M Featherstone his costs thrown away in an amount of $238,489.99. No appeal against that ruling has been instituted.

  3. The prosecutor argues that I have no jurisdiction to order a permanent stay of indictment 1561/23 because I have ordered a temporary stay which can only be lifted, in effect, at the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions on payment of the money. No authority has been cited for that proposition.

  4. The District Court possesses all the necessary power to prevent abuse of its own process and to ensure a fair trial. In Jago v The District Court (NSW)[22] Mason CJ adopted the following statement:

    “The justification for staying a prosecution is that the court is obliged to take the extreme step in order to protect its own processes from abuse…it may intervene in this way if it concludes from the conduct of the prosecutor …that the court processes are being employed for ulterior purposes or in such a way…as to cause improper vexation and oppression.”

    [22] (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 30.

  5. Deane J observed[23]:

    “Once a court is seised of criminal proceedings, it has control of them. In the absence of applicable express statutory provision, that control includes the power – either inherent or implied – to ensure that the court’s process is not abused by the proceedings being made an instrument of unfair oppression.

    ..

    The grant of such a stay in those circumstances does not mean that the judge is either stepping into the arena or assuming what is properly to be seen as a function of the executive government. It involves no more than the discharge of the responsibility and duty of the court to see that the process of law is not abused in proceedings before it.” (citations omitted)

    [23] Jago v The District Court (NSW) at 56.

  6. M Featherstone contends that the prosecution’s conduct amounts to an abuse of the court’s processes. The prosecution has now indicated that rather than proceeding with any prosecution on indictment 1561/23 it will move to prosecute indictment 2232/22. The prosecutor has stated that she does not intend to prosecute M Featherstone upon this indictment however does not intend to enter a nolle prosequi. I query how, when M Featherstone has been joined with two others on that indictment, the prosecution could simply say we will not proceed but nor will we discontinue. If the prosecution does not wish to proceed upon this indictment against M Featherstone then it ought properly enter a nolle prosequi. The entering of a nolle prosequi brings proceedings to an end but does not provide any bar against the proceedings being recommenced. It does not dictate that any determination has taken place with respect to the issues. As said by Thomas J in R v Jell, ex parte Attorney-General[24] “in short it is neither a bar to a fresh indictment nor a discharge of the original offence. It is often described as a stay but this does not imply that it is a stay granted by the court; it is a stay effected by executive action.”

    [24] [1991] 1 Qd R 48 at 58.

  7. If the prosecution chooses not to enter a nolle prosequi in respect of indictment 2232/22 the real question is whether a permanent stay of all indictments is the appropriate remedy for M Featherstone. He contends that for two reasons all of the indictments ought to be the subject of a permanent stay, firstly because the continuation of the proceedings would be so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive given the unknown but lengthy delay that will occur as a result of multiple trials having to take place in respect of numerous other individuals as to constitute an abuse of process. Further it is contended that the prosecution’s decision not to prosecute M Featherstone on indictment 2232/22 and not to provide particulars in respect of that indictment for the reasons given by the prosecution brings the administration of criminal justice into disrepute.

  8. On indictment 1561/23 the continuation of proceedings is temporarily stayed. That is the order that I made on 14 March 2025 because I was satisfied that there was fault on the part of the prosecution which had resulted in such unfairness to M Featherstone that a temporary stay until such time as the costs thrown away was paid by the Director of Public Prosecutions was the appropriate order.

  9. M Featherstone’s representatives have over time sought a response to two queries (1) whether the prosecution intends to pay the costs as ordered; and (2) confirmation that should the costs not be paid that the other two indictments charging M Featherstone will be the subject of a nolle prosequi. On 16 April 2025 the prosecutor advised that the intention of the prosecution was to proceed with indictment 2232/22 in respect of all accused other than M Featherstone, after which the prosecution would assess its prospects of prosecuting indictments 1561/23 and 2227/22. The prosecutor confirmed that she did not intend to enter a nolle prosequi in respect of the two indictments charging M Featherstone.

  10. It is contended that such conduct borders on being scandalous.

  11. The prosecutor has not responded to the query as to whether the prosecution intends to satisfy the order for the payment of costs other than saying, after prosecuting other people charged on indictment 2232/22 it will consider its prospects and then make a decision as to whether to pay the costs. The clear inference to be drawn from that statement is that the prosecutor is not now convinced that she has reasonable prospects of conviction against M Featherstone on indictments 1561/23 or 2232/22.

  12. The prosecutor’s submission is that it would be an appropriate exercise of the prosecutorial function to allow the temporary stay to remain in place for an indeterminate period that could extend to 10 years or more without providing any indication as to whether the costs order would be met. In my view, continuing a prosecution in those circumstances in which the Director of Public Prosecutions is not confident has prospects of success is not a proper exercise of the prosecutorial function. It is oppressive for M Featherstone to be left effectively in limbo for an indeterminate number of years awaiting a decision of the prosecution.

  13. There is a substantial public interest in prosecuting those who are reasonably suspected of having committed an offence and against whom there is a prima facie case with reasonable prospects of conviction.[25] I infer by the statements made by the prosecutor before me that she does not have confidence that there are reasonable prospects of success against M Featherstone.

    [25] Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; [1992] HCA 34 at 519; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; [1993] HCA at 396; Strickland v DPP (Cth) at 413.

  14. The conduct of the prosecution in choosing not to prosecute M Featherstone on indictment 2232/22, to not provide particulars of his criminal liability on indictment 2232/22, and to make no decision as to whether it will meet the costs order to allow the temporary stay to be lifted is unjustifiably oppressive.

  15. Accepting that a permanent stay is an extraordinary step that is rarely justified, nonetheless as referred to above the end of a criminal prosecution does not justify the adoption of any and every means for securing a conviction.

  16. In Moti v The Queen[26] the majority said that there were two fundamental policy considerations that are material to a consideration of whether a prosecution of criminal proceedings is an abuse of process:

    “First, ‘the public interest in the administration of justice requires that the court protect its ability to function as a court of law by ensuring that its processes are used fairly by State and citizen alike. Secondly, ‘unless the court protects its ability so to function in that way, its failure will lead to an erosion of public confidence by reason of concern that the court’s process may lend themselves to oppression and injustice.’” (citations omitted)

    [26] (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 at [57].

  17. These policy considerations in my view support a finding that the continuation of criminal proceedings in which the prosecution does not have confidence of its prospects of success in circumstances where it intends to delay those very proceedings for an indeterminate period of time is an abuse of process and lends itself to oppression.

  18. I order that indictments 1561/23; 2232/22 and 2272/22 in respect of M Featherstone be permanently stayed.

Permanent Stay - Indictment 2232/23

  1. T Burch, Z Featherstone and N Srisunanrat all apply for a permanent stay of this indictment on the same basis of the extraordinary delay and the inability of the prosecution to particularise its case. This is the first such application that has been made with respect to indictment 2232/23. The particulars, it seems, suggest that D Traynor is the principal offender who has engaged in the conduct which is causative of the pecuniary detriment. Again there are no properly identified acts of any perpetrator of the offence of fraud set out under the heading “The offence” and the reader is left to assume what those acts are and whose acts they are. D Traynor is said to have employed innocent agents to sell a product he knew did not exist or did not work. There are, again it seems, 61 fraudulent acts. The particulars set out in a general way that for each of those fraudulent transactions D Traynor held the dishonest knowledge.

  2. The particulars for each of T Burch, Z Featherstone and N Srisunanrat state that they are each liable pursuant to ss 7(1)(b) or (c) and set out the acts that each is alleged to have done together with the knowledge of the dishonesty that it is alleged. The real difficulty with the particulars is in respect of the principal offence. The particulars do not attribute any acts to D Traynor. The particulars set out in a very general way that there are 61 acts of fraud. They do not identify in a specific way what the acts of D Traynor are that amount to the conduct element of the offence. The particulars are confusing in that they appear to be saying that salespeople committed the offence when no dishonest knowledge is attributed to any salespeople. In order for each of T Burch, Z Featherstone and N Srisunanrat to understand the case that they have to meet the particulars need to identify for each of the transactions that amount to a fraud what D Traynor is said to have done, what his knowledge was, what representations he made, to whom he made those representations and what each of T Burch, Z Featherstone and N Srisunanrat are said to have done in order to aid or enable him as the perpetrator of the offence, if that is the prosecution’s case.

  3. It is not sufficient for the purposes of the accused knowing the case they have to meet or for the purposes of properly directing the jury for the prosecution to provide general particulars of 61 transactions that might each amount to an offence of fraud, without identifying the perpetrator of each of those acts of fraud, whether known or unknown and the acts or representations of the perpetrator in respect of each of the transactions. The particulars further need to properly identify the basis of accessorial liability in respect of each of those acts/omission that amounts to the conduct element of the offence.

  4. As this is the first application in respect of indictment 2232/22 and given that it appears that there is only one perpetrator, the particulars may not suffer from the difficulties of attributing the conduct of one person to another. It is not appropriate to order a permanent stay of the indictment. I will strike the particulars out and give the prosecution another opportunity to particularise their case with respect to indictment 2232/22.

  5. Particulars are yet to be provided with respect to indictment 2227/22. I refuse the application for a permanent stay of this indictment until such time as particulars have been ordered to be provided.

  6. My orders are:

    1.In respect of Z Featherstone, T Burch, R Doueihi, and K Lester, indictment 1561/23 is permanently stayed.

    2.In respect of M Featherstone, indictments 1561/23, 2232/22 and 2227/22 are permanently stayed.

    3.The applications for a permanent stay of indictment 2232/22 are refused.

    4.The particulars in respect of indictment 2232/22 are struck out.

    5.The applications for a permanent stay of indictment 2227/22 are refused.

Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

21

Statutory Material Cited

0

Walsh v Tattersall [1996] HCA 26
Walsh v Tattersall [1996] HCA 26
Walsh v Tattersall [1996] HCA 26