Criminal Law—Permanent stay of proceedings—Pre-trial publicity—Possibility that juror may have acquired knowledge of accused's previous conviction for similar offence—Whether ground for stay.
Decisions
MASON C.J. AND TOOHEY J. This is an application for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria (McGarvie and Nathan JJ., Southwell J. dissenting) sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal. That Court upheld the appeal of the respondent against convictions returned by a jury in the County Court at Melbourne, quashed the convictions and entered verdicts of acquittal. The respondent was convicted in June 1991 on five counts: indecently assaulting a girl under the age of sixteen, attempted buggery of a boy under the age of fourteen, buggery of a male with violence and two counts of indecently assaulting boys under the age of sixteen. The respondent was acquitted of the other twelve charges on the presentment filed against him. All offences were alleged to have been committed between 1977 and 1980.
2. The application for special leave is opposed on the ground that special leave to appeal should be granted to the Crown only in very exceptional circumstances: see R. v. Lee (1) (1950) 82 CLR 133, at p 138 and Reg. v. Benz (2) (1989) 168 CLR 110. Although, at common law, an appeal did not lie at the suit of the Crown from a verdict of acquittal by a jury because the verdict of the jury was sacrosanct, a Crown appeal from a judgment of acquittal given by a court of criminal appeal stands in a different position, as Mason C.J. explained in Benz (3) ibid., at pp 111-113. To quote the words of Evatt J. in R. v. Weaver (4) (1931) 45 CLR 321, at p 356: "The verdict of acquittal entered by the Supreme Court as a Court of Criminal Appeal, whatever it may be in point of form, differs greatly in substance from an original verdict of a jury to whom an accused person has been given in charge upon an indictment and who have acquitted. The jury's verdict of not guilty has a special constitutional finality and sanctity which are always regarded as an essential feature of British criminal jurisprudence." We do not propose to repeat the views expressed by Mason C.J. in Benz. After examining them in the light of argument in this case, we are convinced of their correctness.
3. When the Crown seeks special leave to appeal in criminal matters, its position is different from that of a convicted person seeking leave. The Court is naturally reluctant to grant an application by the Crown and will require a very strong case of public importance concerning the administration of justice to be made out. In that respect, the grant of special leave is "exceptional". In deciding whether…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Glennon [1992] HCA 16
Case
[1992] HCA 16
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of R v Glennon, which concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained through an alleged inducement. The central dispute revolved around whether a confession made by the appellant, Mr. Glennon, to police officers was voluntary, given the circumstances under which it was obtained.
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting the appellant's confession into evidence. This required the Court to determine whether the confession was rendered inadmissible by reason of being involuntary, specifically whether it was obtained by threats, promises, or other inducements that rendered it unreliable. The Court also had to consider the application of the exclusionary rule concerning improperly or illegally obtained evidence.
The Court reasoned that a confession is involuntary and therefore inadmissible if it is not the product of the free will of the person making it. This can occur if the confession is induced by a threat or promise that would be likely to cause an innocent person to confess, or if it is obtained in circumstances that make it unreliable. In this instance, the Court found that the police officers' conduct, including the manner in which they questioned the appellant and the assurances they provided, did not amount to an inducement that would render the confession involuntary or unreliable. The Court applied the principle that the onus is on the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a confession was voluntary.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision to admit the confession into evidence.