R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja (No 5)

[2022] NSWSC 1657

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja (No 5) [2022] NSWSC 1657

Hearing dates:

08, 09, 18 November, 06 December 2022

Date of orders:

06 December 2022

Decision date:

06 December 2022

Jurisdiction:

Common Law - Criminal

Before:

Hamill J

Decision:

(1) Revoke the interim non-publication orders made on 9 November 2022 and varied on 18 November 2022.

(2) Pursuant to section 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (“the Act”), there will be a non-publication order (as defined in s 3 of the Act) over the names and nick-names of the following persons, but only as it relates to their alleged or admitted involvement in the killing of Nikola Srbin or mention of their names in the evidence at the trial of the accused Sayed Abdaly and Seyed Hosseinishoja:

(a) Abuzar Sultani,

(b) Sayed Abdaly,

(c) Seyed Hosseinishoja,

(d) Mirwais Danishyer,

(e) Siar Munshizada, and

(f) Joshua Baines.

(3) The order does not apply to publication of the Court’s judgments on Caselaw NSW and similar legal websites.

(4) The order is made on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

(5) For the purpose of s 11 of the Act, the non-publication order will apply throughout the Commonwealth of Australia.

(6) For the purpose of s 12 of the Act, the non-publication order will expire:

(a) at the conclusion of the criminal group trial currently listed to commence in the District Court on 17 April 2023, or

(b) upon the making of an order under s 132 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) that the criminal group trial be a trial by judge alone,

whichever event occurs sooner.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – non-publication orders – test of necessity – where accused and others have related trials listed next year – background of sensational media coverage – previous trials – previous non-publication orders – collision between fundamental principles – open justice – right to fair trial – orders made calculated to achieve minimum interference with open justice

Legislation Cited:

Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), ss 7, 8, 10, 11, 12

Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 132

Cases Cited:

Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand v Ibrahim (2012) 263 FCR 211; [2012] NSWCCA 125

Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414; [2000] HCA 15

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales (2004) 61 NSWLR 344; [2004] NSWCA 324

Munshizada v R; Baines v R; Danishyar v R; Hosseinishoja v R; Shekeb v R; Sultani v R; Abdaly v R [2021] NSWCCA 307

Nationwide News Pty Limited v Qaumi (2016) 93 NSWLR 384; [2016] NSWCCA 97

R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja (No 3) [2022] NSWSC 1511

R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592; [1992] HCA 16

R v Horsham Justices, ex parteFarquharson [1982] 1 QB 762

R v Jamal (2008) 72 NSWLR 258; [2008] NSWCCA 177

R v Qaumi & Ors (No 15)(Non-publication order) [2016] NSWSC 318

R v Sultani; R v Munshizada; R v Baines; R v Danishyar [2021] NSWSC 1654

R v Sultani; R v Munshizada; R v Baines; R v Danishyar (Non-publication orders) [2021] NSWSC 1611

Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93 NSWLR 311; [2011] NSWCA 403

Sultani v R; Shekeb v R; Abdaly v R; MD v R; Baines v R; Munshizada v R; Hosseinishoja v R [2021] NSWCCA 301

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Rex (Plaintiff)
Sayed Anush Abdaly (Defendant)
Seyed Amirmohammad Hosseinishoja (Defendant)
Abuzar Sultani (Interested party)
Joshua Baines (Interested party)
Mirwais Danishyar (Interested party)
Commissioner of the NSW Police Force (Interested party)

Representation:

Counsel:
D Patch (Rex)
M Cunneen SC with L Dive (Abdaly)
G Brady SC (Hosseinishoja)
P Lange (Sultani, Baines and Danishyar)
A Hill (Commissioner of the NSW Police Force)

Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Rex)
Tohi Lawyers (Abdaly)
OneGroup Legal (Hosseinishoja)
John B. Hajje & Associates (Sultani)
Kiki Kyriacou Lawyers (Baines)
Fahmy Lawyers (Danishyar)
Crown Solicitor’s Office (NSW) (Commissioner of the NSW Police Force)

File Number(s):

2020/306132; 2020/306616

Judgment

1. This is the final day of the trial of Sayed Anush Abdaly and Seyed Amirmohammad Hosseinishoja each of whom is charged with the murder of Nikola Srbin in 2013. A co-accused, Abuzar Sultani, entered a plea of guilty to the charge in the first week of a pre-trial hearing which took place between 25 October and 8 November 2022. The trial proper commenced on 9 November 2022 and I am about to deliver judgment and return verdicts in relation to each man.

2. This judgment relates to whether the Court should make non-publication orders to protect the integrity of five criminal trials listed throughout 2023 and one trial listed in 2024. There is a strong public interest in the courts being open to the public and in the freedom of the media to report on such trials. Non-publication orders should only be made if they are necessary and, if they are made, their content and duration should go no further than is necessary.

3. At the beginning of the pre-trial hearing, I made orders preventing publication of the evidence adduced and submissions made on the pre-trial hearing. As it turned out, that encompassed Mr Sultani’s plea of guilty two days later. Those orders were calculated to avoid the possible impact on the jury pool and expired when I made an order for a trial by judge alone.

4. At that stage, I heard submissions on what, if any, further orders may be necessary. The Prosecutor opposed final orders while the accused pressed for orders to protect their interests in uncontaminated jury pools for their subsequent trials. There were other interested parties including the media and other men due to face trial and prosecution next year. I concluded that interim orders should be made (without the need to determine the merits)[1] but that the orders should be limited to the identity of the three accused (including Mr Sultani whose status had changed – from “accused” to “offender” following his guilty plea).

   1. Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), s 10.

5. Section 10 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act requires that, when an interim order is made, any application for final orders must be determined as a matter of urgency. Accordingly, I listed the matter for final orders at 2.00pm on Friday, 18 November 2022. Arrangements were made to have other interested parties informed of the date. I welcomed submissions and evidence from any media organisation or individual reporters and from other accused persons who are involved in the trials next year.

6. The invitation to the media was conveyed in court when reporters were known to be listening to the proceedings online, and through the Supreme Court’s media liaison officer. No journalist or lawyer acting on behalf any media organisation appeared at the hearing and no evidence or written submissions were filed.

7. A notice of motion was filed on behalf of Joshua Baines, who is an accused person to be tried next year. A notice of motion was also filed on behalf of Mr Sultani, who also has a number of trials listed next year. Ms Jessica Fahmy, the solicitor for Mirwais Danishyar (another person to be tried next year), wrote to the Court indicating that her client joined in the applications made by Messrs Sultani, Abdaly and Hosseinishoja. Ms Fahmy filed an affidavit in support of the application. The solicitor for Mr Sultani also filed an affidavit.

8. In addition to the affidavits specifically read on the application, I have also read and had regard to the affidavits tendered on the voir dire which included some detail of the media coverage of related cases.

9. I received written submissions on behalf of the present accused and various interested parties (which I take to include, at least, Messrs Sultani, Baines and Danishyar). The Prosecutor also filed written submissions. Oral submissions were made on the afternoon of 18 November 2022.

10. It is to be observed that the submissions on behalf of the various accused (both current and prospective) sought orders of wider import than those that had been in place. This may have resulted on a misapprehension of the breadth of the interim orders that were made on 9 November 2022. Those orders were recorded in the transcript as follows:

“Subject to the revocation of the order, there will be a non-publication order over the names of Sayed Abdaly, Seyed Hosseinishoja and Abuzar Sultani in the context of the subject matter of the present trial and any related sentencing proceedings and pretrial hearing.

The Supreme Court’s media liaison officer is to notify the media interests of those orders.

The application for a final order will be heard on Friday, 18 November 2022, at 2pm.

The DPP is to notify the interested parties in terms of the accused in relevant proceedings to be heard next year. The media liaison officer is to notify media interests from who I also invite submissions.” [2]

2. Tcpt, 9 November 2022, p 2.

11. At the conclusion of the argument on the final order, to preserve the interests reflected in the broader orders sought in the notices of motion filed on behalf of Messrs Sultani and Baines, I varied the interim orders as follows:

“Continue the order made on an interim basis on 9 November, which was order 3, and add to it, a non-publication over evidence and submissions in the trial and pre-trial hearing of Mr Hosseinishoja and Mr Abdaly, as well as submissions and evidence on the present application, and lest it be unclear, I also make a non-publication order over the fact and evidence concerning Mr Sultani’s plea of guilty to the murder of Nikola Srbin.” [3]

3. Tcpt, 18 November, p 470.

12. The prosecution provided a schedule of the trials listed to be heard over the next 12 months or so. The cases are not directly connected with each other, but they are indirectly connected in that they relate to offences allegedly committed by Mr Sultani and a number of his associates and in the context of their involvement in a “criminal group”. Similar trials and sentencing proceedings have occupied courts at various levels for the last few years. Mr Sultani and others had a series of trials and sentencing proceedings before Fagan J in this Court. There were seven trials “utilising about 29 weeks of Court and jury time”. [4] A number of the accused in those trials received long sentences of imprisonment including life sentences.

    4. R v Sultani; R v Munshizada; R v Baines; R v Danishyar [2021] NSWSC 1654 at [22].

13. During the currency of the proceedings before Fagan J there were non-publication orders to ensure that subsequent trials were not compromised by potential jurors becoming aware of the fact that some of the accused were also charged with, or had pleaded guilty to or found guilty of, multiple counts of murder committed in the context of their involvement in Mr Sultani’s criminal activities and groups.

14. After the verdicts, Fagan J lifted the non-publication orders. [5] Meanwhile, an application was made to the District Court seeking orders purporting to restrict publication of the Supreme Court proceedings. The late Judge Zahra SC declined to make those orders.

    5. R v Sultani; R v Munshizada; R v Baines; R v Danishyar (Non-publication orders) [2021] NSWSC 1611.

15. Both the decision of Fagan J (lifting the non-publication orders) and that of Judge Zahra were subject to unsuccessful appeals. [6]

    6. Sultani v R; Shekeb v R; Abdaly v R; MD v R; Baines v R; Munshizada v R; Hosseinishoja v R [2021] NSWCCA 301 (appeal from the decision of Zahra DCJ) and Munshizada v R; Baines v R; Danishyar v R; Hosseinishoja v R; Shekeb v R; Sultani v R; Abdaly v R [2021] NSWCCA 307 (decision of Fagan J).

16. The evidence on the present application establishes that, following those decisions, there was a large amount of media coverage of a sensational kind. The media attention was focussed on Sultani as a “mass murderer” or triple murderer and his “crew” which was described as, amongst other pejorative phrases, “a black ops hit squad”.

17. Ms Fahmy’s affidavit asserts:

“At [50] of the CCA decision (upholding the decision of Fagan J), Basten JA warned that ‘lurid, repetitive or irresponsible journalism’ would run the risk of prosecution for contempt given the knowledge of the forthcoming trial in the District Court. Notwithstanding that warning, the reporting since that time has been lurid, repetitive and irresponsible.”

18. Ms Fahmy was not required for cross-examination and her affidavit was not challenged.

19. The cavalcade of publicity following the lifting of the non-publication orders was the second wave of publicity surrounding these cases and Mr Sultani’s criminal activities. The first wave came much earlier when a large number of gang members were charged with a spate of murders following an investigation which seemed to commence with the execution-style killing of Pasquale Barbaro in 2016.

20. A third wave of publicity arose when Mr Sultani was stabbed in prison by a gangland rival. That led to more sensational reporting with links back to earlier articles.

21. The publicity surrounding these cases was part of the reason that the present accused sought a judge alone trial. It was not the reason I ordered a trial without a jury but it played some part in my decision. The earlier publicity increased the risk of the trial being prejudiced and requiring a discharge of the jury, and that was considered in the light of the fact that Mr Abdaly had been bail refused for around six years. I accepted the submission that the interests of justice required that the trial be completed this year and that the only way that could be ensured was for it to be conducted without a jury.

22. If Mr Sultani’s plea of guilty to a fourth murder is able to be published, along with the identities involved in the present trial, there is likely to be another wave of publicity. It is likely to be, at least in part, sensational and the online versions will enable readers to link back to earlier articles. The articles will inevitably emphasise Mr Sultani’s leadership role in the group, the number of criminal offences proved or alleged which involve members of his criminal group, and the roles of some of the individual participants. The present trial included reference to several of the men to stand trial next year.

23. The trials listed over the next 12 months or so are these:

• Conspiracy to murder Ricky Ciano – Abuzar Sultani, Joshua Baines and Mirwais Danishyar charged.

• There are to be separate (back to back) trials with the commencement dates in the District Court scheduled for 13 February 2023 and 13 March 2023 respectively.

• Participate in a criminal group – Abuzar Sultani, charged with directing the group and 10 men (including Sayed Abdaly, Seyed Hosseinishoja, Siar Munshizada, Joshua Baines and Mirwais Danishyar) are charged with participating in the group.

• Trial listed to commence in the District Court on 17 April 2023 and estimated to conclude in mid-July 2023.

• Murder of Michael Davey – Mirwais Danishyar charged.

• Listed to commence in the Supreme Court on 28 August 2023.

• Concealing the murder of Pasquale Barbaro – Sayed Abdaly and Seyed Hosseinishoja charged.

• Listed to commence in the District Court on 27 November 2023.

• Murder of Mark Easter – Abuzar Sultani charged.

• Listed to commence in the Supreme Court on 5 February 2024.

24. The issue must be determined by reference to the provisions in section 8 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act:

(1) A court may make a suppression order or non-publication order on one or more of the following grounds:

(a) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice,

(b) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the interests of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to national or international security,

(c) the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person,

(d) the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in criminal proceedings involving an offence of a sexual nature (including sexual touching or a sexual act within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900),

(e) it is otherwise necessary in the public interest for the order to be made and that public interest significantly outweighs the public interest in open justice.

25. The relevant paragraphs are (a) and, possibly, (e).

26. The applicants submit that publicity surrounding this trial will compromise the Court’s ability to obtain a jury pool and panel free of prejudice arising from the publicity. It is not uncommon that courts make orders delaying the publicity surrounding criminal proceedings to protect the integrity of forthcoming trials involving the same or similar issues, evidence or identities.

27. The major factors militating against the making of the non-publication orders are the following:

1. The test of “necessity”, which finds voice in s 8 of the Act and in the common law cases on open justice, is a very high one. It is not to be considered by a balancing of interests or by making orders that seem appropriate or expedient in the circumstances. There are many cases which emphasise these points. [7]

2. In addition to the test of necessity in s 8, the Act provides in s 6 that “a court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice”.

3. The criminal justice system proceeds on the basis that juries are robust and can put out of its collective mind adverse publicity, even of a most salacious kind. [8]

4. Similarly, the system proceeds on the understanding that juries obey directions. [9] It assumes the jury will obey firm directions by the trial judge to resist the temptation to undertake its own research including by searching the internet. Experience shows that this understanding is often proven to be a false one, even since the introduction of criminal sanctions for jurors who undertake their own inquiries. [10]

5. The trials are not immediately imminent as would be the case in back-to-back trials where such orders are not uncommon. [11] However, the basis or grounds upon which publication is delayed in such cases is the same as that which underpins the argument in the present case; that is, the orders are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

   7. For example: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales (2004) 61 NSWLR 344; [2004] NSWCA 324, Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651 at 664; [2010] HCA 21 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ), Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93 NSWLR 311 at 320-321; [2011] NSWCA 403 (Bathurst CJ and McColl JA), Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand v Ibrahim (2012) 263 FCR 211; [2012] NSWCCA 125, Nationwide News Pty Limited v Qaumi (2016) 93 NSWLR 384; [2016] NSWCCA 97 and Munshizada v R; Baines v R; Danishyar v R; Hosseinishoja v R; Shekeb v R; Sultani v R; Abdaly v R [2021] NSWCCA 307.

   8. R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592, for example at 603; [1992] HCA 16, and John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales (2004) 61 NSWLR 344 at 103; [2004] NSWCA 324. There are many cases to similar effect.

   9. See, for example, Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414; [2000] HCA 15 and R v Jamal (2008) 72 NSWLR 258; [2008] NSWCCA 177.

   10. See the cases collected in R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja (No 3) [2022] NSWSC 1511 at [21(6)-(7)].

   11. See R v Qaumi & Ors (No 15) (Non-publication order) [2016] NSWSC 318, upheld in Nationwide News v Qaumi (2016) 93 NSWLR 384; [2016] NSWCC 97.

28. These are significant matters and reflect the law’s abhorrence to the closure of the courts and the stifling of public discourse about, and reporting of, court proceedings.

29. However, there are compelling matters in the present case that favour the making of some restriction on the publication of names and identities. These include:

1. There are a number of trials and many accused who may be effected by a further wave of adverse and potentially prejudicial publicity.

2. While I do not accept the submission that the reporting following the lifting of the non-publication orders made by Fagan J was unique or unprecedented in its tendentiousness and salaciousness, I do accept that a lot of the reporting was highly emotive and sensational. A juror familiar with that reporting would have difficulty in bringing an impartial mind to bear on the issues. A further wave of such reporting at this stage may compromise the commencement date of the trials listed early in the new year.

3. As in the case of Mr Abdaly, these prosecutions and the commission of the alleged offences are now very old. There is a strong public interest in the cases being disposed of as soon as possible. The accused have a right to know their fate. The victims and secondary victims are entitled to some closure. Any risk that the trial dates will be jeopardised should be avoided. Further delay is anathema to the proper administration of justice.

4. The interference with open justice sought by those who support the order is far from absolute and the orders can be fashioned so that the interference is relatively confined:

1. Despite various applications and protective orders made by and sought by the Commissioner of the NSW Police Force (“the Commissioner”), the Court has remained open to the public and media throughout the evidence. It was closed to the public and the media during some of the Commissioner’s applications. However, during the evidence and addresses, the Court remained open in some form. There were times where the public gallery was closed and the video link to the public and the media was cut, but the audio link remained open.

2. The media has been free to report on the trial provided:

1. in conformity with the interim orders, it did not identify the accused (including Mr Sultani), and

2. in conformity with various protective orders made at the request of the Commissioner, it did not identify certain witnesses.

3. The length of the prohibition on publication can be reduced to a relatively short time. [12] The application made by Mr Lange of counsel, representing a number of the interested parties including Mr Hosseinishoja, was for the duration of the order to be linked to the conclusion of the “criminal group” charge.

   12. Cf R v Horsham Justices, ex parte Farquharson [1982] 1 QB 762 at 791 (Lord Denning MR).

30. The forgoing paragraphs illustrate the collision of two fundamental principles, which was discussed by Spigelman CJ in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales (2004) 61 NSWLR 344; [2004] NSWCA 324. His Honour said at [17]-[23]:

“As often happens in a context involving fundamental principle, two such principles are in conflict and a judgment must be made as to which principle is to prevail in the circumstances. The principle of open justice and the principle of a fair trial each inform and energise many areas of the law, as I have sought to show in extra-judicial addresses. (See, J J Spigelman, ‘Seen to be done: the principle of open justice’ (2000) 74 Australian Law Journal 290, 378 and J J Spigelman, ‘The truth can cost too much: the principle of a fair trial’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 29.)

…

It is well established that the principle of open justice is one of the most fundamental aspects of the system of justice in Australia. The conduct of proceedings in public including, relevantly, the taking of verdicts after a criminal trial, is an essential quality of an Australian court of justice.”

31. The Chief Justice emphasised that it is well established that “the exceptions to the principle of open justice are few and strictly defined.” His Honour turned to consider the principle of a fair trial and “the most forceful terms” in which the High Court has characterised that principle:

“It has been described as ‘the central thesis of the administration of criminal justice’: McKinney v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468 at 478; as ‘the central prescript of our criminal law’: Jago (at 56); as a ‘fundamental element’ or a ‘fundamental prescript’: Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 299, 326; and as an ‘overriding requirement’: Dietrich (at 330). It is not a new principle. As Isaacs J put it in 1923 with reference to ‘the elementary right of every accused person to a fair and impartial trial’: ‘Every conviction set aside, every new criminal trial ordered, are mere exemplifications of this fundamental principle’: R v MacFarlane; Ex parte O’Flanaghan & O’Kelly (1932) 32 CLR 518 at 541-542.

There is no aspect of preparation for trial or of criminal procedure which is not touched by, or indeed determined by, the principle of a fair trial. As Lord Devlin once put it: ‘… [N]early the whole of the English criminal law of procedure and evidence has been made by the exercise of the judges of their power to see that what was fair and just was done between prosecutors and accuseds’: Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254 at 1347.”

32. I have concluded that some prohibition on publication is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. However, that prejudice can be prevented by simply delaying the publication of the names of the three accused in the present proceedings and those of the three other men who have been mentioned during the proceedings.

33. I accept the analysis of Mr Lange that the most likely prejudice flowing from the unrestricted reporting of the current proceedings is to the criminal group charge. That is because the evidence in the present case included factual details, unlikely to be elicited in the criminal group trial, but potentially prejudicial in the resolution of those issues. For example, the prosecution case included the names and roles of the accused in this and other trials as well as Mr Sultani’s role as the leader of the group.

34. Accordingly, any non-publication orders will expire upon the conclusion of the criminal group trial (or upon an order for the trial to be conducted by judge alone). Limiting the duration of the order reduces the interference with open justice and reporting of the proceedings.

35. I appreciate that the current accused men have a further District Court trial listed in November next year. However, given the outcome of the present trial (which will be known by the time these reasons are published), I am not persuaded that it is necessary to delay publication for a period of around 12 months.

36. The orders will not impact on the ability of the media to report that a plea has been entered and verdicts have been reached in this trial.

37. The orders will not prohibit reporting of the evidence or publication of the circumstances of the killing and the evidence in the case, provided such publication does not result in disclosure of the identity of the men whose names will be nominated in the order. Nor will the order prevent publication of the reasons for judgment in the case.

38. The media should be conscious of suppression orders, and other protective orders, made in relation to some of the witnesses in the case.

39. I make the following orders:

1. Revoke the interim non-publication orders made on 9 November 2022 and varied on 18 November 2022.

2. Pursuant to section 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (“the Act”), there will be a non-publication order (as defined in s 3 of the Act) over the names and nick-names of the following persons, but only as it relates to their alleged or admitted involvement in the killing of Nikola Srbin or mention of their names in the evidence at the trial of the accused Sayed Abdaly and Seyed Hosseinishoja:

1. Abuzar Sultani,

2. Sayed Abdaly,

3. Seyed Hosseinishoja,

4. Mirwais Danishyer,

5. Siar Munshizada, and

6. Joshua Baines.

3. The order does not apply to publication of the Court’s judgment on Caselaw NSW and similar legal websites.

4. The order is made on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

5. For the purpose of s 11 of the Act, the non-publication order will apply throughout the Commonwealth of Australia.

6. For the purpose of s 12 of the Act, the non-publication order will expire:

1. at the conclusion of the criminal group trial currently listed to commence in the District Court on 17 April 2023,

2. or

3. upon the making of an order under s 132 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) that the criminal group trial be a trial by judge alone,

7. whichever event occurs sooner.

**********

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 06 December 2022