FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dunstan v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [1999] FCA 1608
COLIN GEORGE DUNSTAN v HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, SUSAN LESLEY LANGFORD and LINDA JANE HIGGINSON
A 77 OF 1999
MANSFIELD J
19 NOVEMBER 1999
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
DISTRICT REGISTRY
A 77 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
COLIN GEORGE DUNSTAN
ApplicantAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First RespondentCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second RespondentSUSAN LESLEY LANGFORD
Third RespondentLINDA JANE HIGGINSON
Fourth RespondentJUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 NOVEMBER 1999
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The time from which any application for leave to appeal from the order in par 1 hereof, or from which any appeal from the order in par 1 hereof, commence to run from 22 November 1999.
3.The applicant pay to the first respondent and to the second respondent their costs of the application, including their costs of their notices of motion of 9 and 8 November 1999 respectively, to be taxed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
A 77 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
COLIN GEORGE DUNSTAN
ApplicantAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First RespondentCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second RespondentSUSAN LESLEY LANGFORD
Third RespondentLINDA JANE HIGGINSON
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
19 NOVEMBER 1999
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR DECISION
There is before the Court two notices of motion of the first respondent (“HREOC”) and of the second respondent (“the Commonwealth”) under O 20 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules (“the Rules”) to dismiss this application on the grounds that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious, or that the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court.
Neither motion was supported by affidavit (see O 19 r 1(2) of the Rules). Each of those respondents made submissions based upon the terms of the application itself and upon the affidavit of the applicant (“Mr Dunstan”) filed in support of the application (see O 4 r 6). They did not seek to rely upon any extraneous material. In those circumstances, in my view, it is appropriate to dispense with compliance with O 19 r 1(2) of the Rules in respect of each motion. I do so, pursuant to the power in O 1 r 8 of the Rules.
As the parties did in the course of submissions, I have however also had regard to the nature of the allegations in matters AG 30 of 1997 and AG 77 of 1997. In each of those proceedings Mr Dunstan is the applicant. In matter AG 30 of 1997, HREOC and the Commonwealth are also respondents, and in matter AG 77 of 1997, the respondents are named officers of the Commonwealth. Upon the same basis, I have also had regard to the…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1608
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear the application and whether the application constituted an abuse of process. HREOC and the Commonwealth argued that the court lacked jurisdiction and that the application was an improper attempt to influence the criminal proceedings. The court had to determine if the application was solely aimed at the conduct of the criminal proceedings, which would fall outside the court's jurisdiction, or if it also included claims that could be addressed by the court.
The court found that the application was largely focused on the conduct of the criminal proceedings, which the court did not have jurisdiction to review. The claims regarding the handling of Mr. Dunstan's complaints and the decisions made by his superiors were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Furthermore, the application was deemed to be an abuse of process as it was primarily directed at influencing the ongoing criminal proceedings. The court concluded that Mr. Dunstan's proper recourse was to appeal the decisions of the trial judge regarding the conduct of the criminal trial. Therefore, the application was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The time from which any application for leave to appeal from the order in par 1 hereof, or from which any appeal from the order in par 1 hereof, commence to run from 22 November 1999.
3. The applicant pay to the first respondent and to the second respondent their costs of the application, including their costs of their notices of motion of 9 and 8 November 1999 respectively, to be taxed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The submissions put on behalf of HREOC and the Commonwealth were:(1)The Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the application(2)The application was “foredoomed to fail” so that it constituted an abuse of the process of the Court; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ(3)The application was brought for an improper purpose, namely either an attempt to intimidate or discourage witnesses from giving evidence in the criminal proceedings or to obtain information relevant to the prosecution of the criminal proceedings which is not otherwise available to Mr Dunstan, or to delay the criminal proceedings. If those purposes were made out, clearly they would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court: Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509.Consideration of contentions In my judgment I can resolve the motions by ruling on submission (2) above. I have referred to the detailed claims in the application. In large measure they are directed at the conduct of the criminal proceedings. To the extent that they do so, Mr Dunstan now accepts that he cannot maintain the proceedings. Higgins J has addressed the issues which Mr Dunstan sought to raise in these proceedings regarding access to material, the withholding of relevant material, and the significance and consequences of the change in the nature of the charges after the committal hearing. Mr Dunstan acknowledges that the proper avenue, if he is dissatisfied with that ruling, is to appeal from that decision. He also acknowledges that matters such as access to material going to the conduct of a fair trial is a matter for the trial judge. Mr Dunstan nevertheless submits that the application is not directed exclusively to the course of the criminal proceedings. I accept that pars 1, 6 and 7 of the application are not expressly so confined. I have referred above to pars 2 and 3 of the application. They expressly relate to the criminal proceedings. Paragraphs 4 and 5 do not identify possible claims, but recite historical or factual matters, and pars 8 and 9 deal with jurisdiction only. Paragraph 1 of the application refers to judicial proceedings instituted against Mr Dunstan, or to the tribunals in which proceedings have been instituted against him. Those proceedings are nowhere identified. The affidavit in support of the application does not refer to any such proceedings, other than the criminal proceedings. Paragraph 1 of the affidavit is introductory. Paragraph 2 recites a series of general “grounds” for the application. To the extent to which there is any specific focus on those allegations, it is directed to the criminal proceedings (pars 2.4-2.7). Paragraph 3 does not refer to any such proceedings. The affidavit then deals with the “evolution” of charges and the alleged fabrication of evidence in relation to the criminal proceedings (par 4), with the significance of the change in the proposed charges after the committal hearing (pars 5-10 and 35), and with the quality of the proposed evidence concerning intent and other matters in relation to the criminal charges (pars 11-34).