Jenkins v Director of Public Prosecutions

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Jenkins v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] NSWCA 406
Hearing dates:11 November 2013
Decision date: 03 December 2013
Before: Hoeben JA at [1];
Gleeson JA at [4];
Simpson J at [88]
Decision:

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents' costs.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - prerogative writs and orders - where jury separated without an order under s 54(1)(b) of the Jury Act 1977 - consequences of procedural irregularity - where trial judge refused an application to discharge the jury - where jury subsequently entered a guilty verdict - whether the direction of the trial judge that the jury continue their deliberations was affected by jurisdictional error - whether the jury verdict was affected by jurisdictional error - whether there is basis for an order in the nature of certiorari to be made

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - prerogative writs and orders - merger principle - where no challenge to conviction - where the appropriate procedure to set aside the conviction arises under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912
Legislation Cited: Bail Act 1978, s 30AA
Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2003, Schedule 5(1)
Constitution, s 73
Crimes Act 1900, ss 93C(1), 95(1)
Criminal Appeal Act 1912, ss 5, 5F, 6
Criminal Appeal (Amendment) Act 1987
Criminal Procedure Act 1986, s 46, 131, 132, 133
District Court Act 1973, ss 8, 9, 11,166, 169, 173
Judiciary Act 1903, s 39
Juries Act 1968 (Vic)
Jury Act 1977, s 54(1)(b), 73
Jury Amendment Act 1987, Schedule 1(1)
Matrimonial Causes Act
Supreme Court Act 1970, s 17, 69, Schedule Three
Cases Cited: Adler v District Court of New South Wales (1990) 19 NSWLR 317
Area Concrete Pumping Pty Ltd v Inspector Barry Childs (WorkCover) [2012] NSWCA 208
Boral Gas (NSW) Pty Ltd v Magill (1993) 32 NSWLR 501
Brown v The Queen [1986] HCA 11; 160 CLR 171
Brownlee v The Queen [2001] HCA 36; 207 CLR 278
Capital Traction Company v Hof [1899] USSC 85; 174 US 1
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters Subscribing to
Cesan and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) [2007] NSWCCA 273; 230 FLR 185
Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund [1982] HCA 13; 150 CLR 49
Commissioner of Taxation v Unit Trend Services Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 16; 297 ALR 190
Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 293 ALR 412
Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163
Elias v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2012] NSWCA 302; 222 A Crim R 286
Ex parte Waldron
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Details
Case
[2013] NSWCA 406
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Jenkins, sought prerogative relief from the Supreme Court of New South Wales against the Director of Public Prosecutions and the District Court of New South Wales. The dispute arose from a criminal trial where the jury, after separating without an order under section 54(1)(b) of the Jury Act 1977, was directed by the trial judge to continue deliberations, ultimately returning a guilty verdict. The applicant contended that this direction and the subsequent convictions were affected by jurisdictional error.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the trial judge's direction to the jury to continue deliberations, following their separation without a formal order, constituted jurisdictional error, and consequently, whether the jury's guilty verdicts and the resulting convictions were also affected by such error. The applicant argued that the Supreme Court retained supervisory jurisdiction to address these issues, notwithstanding potential avenues for appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. The respondents contended that the applicant had a right of appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal and that prerogative relief was not available, particularly as the jury verdict was not considered an act of the District Court against which certiorari could issue.

The Court, in its reasoning, accepted that a jury verdict constitutes an act of the District Court, making relief in the nature of certiorari potentially available to quash a conviction in appropriate circumstances. However, the Court found that the applicant's claims were not properly brought before it. The Court noted that the applicant did not challenge the trial judge's refusal to discharge the jury as an interlocutory order, but rather focused on the consequences of that refusal. Crucially, the Court determined that the appropriate procedure for setting aside a conviction, where no challenge to the conviction itself was made, lay under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912, invoking the "merger principle".

Consequently, the Court dismissed the application. The applicant was also ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents' costs.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Counsel for the applicant did not contend that the decision of the trial judge refusing the discharge application (the "refusal decision") was not an "interlocutory judgment or order" given or made in proceedings on indictment in the District Court. Rather, counsel for the applicant submitted that the claim for relief in this Court is not excluded by s 17 of the Supreme Court Act because the claim is directed to what the applicant's counsel described as being the "consequences" of the refusal decision, not the refusal decision itself. In this regard, it is to be observed that the terms of declaration [1] sought in the further amended summons are framed with respect to the asserted invalidity of the trial judge's "direction" to the jury to continue their deliberations on 26 September 2013, rather than any error or invalidity in the trial judge's refusal decision. Similarly, the terms of the declarations sought in [4A] and [4B] of the further amended summons are directed to the asserted invalidity of the convictions against the applicant in consequence of the jury's guilty verdicts. Thus it was argued by the applicant that s 17 of the Supreme Court Act does not prevent a claim being made in this Court to quash or prohibit, not an interlocutory judgment or order, but the proceeding itself: Adler v District Court of New South Wales (1990) 19 NSWLR 317 at 341F per Mahoney JA, 335E-336A per Kirby A-CJ (Priestley JA agreeing generally with the reasons of Kirby A-CJ and Mahoney JA). The respondents contended that the applicant has a right of appeal against conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal under s 5 of the Criminal Appeal Act. However, they did not contend that the impugned "direction" of the trial judge, the subject of declaration [1] sought in the further amended summons, was an "interlocutory judgment or order" in respect of which the applicant had a right of appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal under s 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the applicant's submission that there is supervisory jurisdiction and power in this Court, which is engaged by the "direction" given by the trial judge on 26 September 2013 to the jury to continue its deliberations. There are two further preliminary matters to note in relation to the claims for relief in this Court. First, the respondents contended that the jury verdict is not the act of the first respondent, the District Court and that certiorari cannot issue against the jury. Accordingly, it was contended that there is no basis for the claims for relief in the nature of certiorari as sought in the further amended summons in [3], [4A] and [4B]. Likewise it was contended that there is no basis for the claim for the declaration in [4A] in respect of the first respondent. No authority was cited by the respondents in support of the contention that the jury verdict is not the act of the District Court. As noted at [11] above, it is not in dispute that the delivery of a verdict of guilty by a jury constitutes a conviction. For the reasons given by Simpson J, which I have had the benefit of reading in draft, it should be accepted that the verdict of a jury is an act of the District Court, and that relief in the nature of certiorari may be available to quash a conviction in an appropriate case. It is not necessary for the grant of such relief that the "record" of the inferior court or tribunal whose decision is the subject of the application be removed into this court: Hoffenberg v The District Court of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 142 at [4].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established