Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP  APPELLANT

AND

SZIZO & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO [2009] HCA 37
23 September 2009
S568/2008

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside orders 1 and 2 of the orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 3 July 2008, and in lieu thereof order that:

(a)order 2 of the orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 5 September 2007 be set aside; and

(b)the appeal be otherwise dismissed.

3.Appellant to pay the first to sixth respondents' costs of the appeal to this Court.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

N J Williams SC with K A Stern for the appellant (instructed by Clayton Utz Lawyers)

B W Walker SC with B K Nolan for the first to sixth respondents (instructed by the first to sixth respondents)

Submitting appearance for the seventh respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ. A decision made by the appellant, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship ("the Minister"), or his delegate, refusing to grant a protection visa to an applicant who is physically present in the migration zone is reviewable by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal")[1]. The conduct of the review is governed by the provisions of Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"). Section 422B(1) provides that the provisions of Div 4 are taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule ("the hearing rule") in relation to the matters that they deal with. The manner of giving and receiving documents in connection with the review is governed by the provisions of Div 7A of Pt 7 of the Act. Section 422B(2) provides that the provisions of Div 7A, in so far as they relate to the conduct of reviews under Div 4, are to be taken to be an exhaustive statement of the hearing rule in relation to the matters that they deal with. An applicant for review may appoint a person, an "authorised recipient", to receive documents in connection with the review on his or her behalf. In the event that an applicant nominates an authorised recipient, the Tribunal is required to give review documents to that person instead of giving the documents to the applicant[2].

    [1]Sections 411, 412 and 414 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The relevant text of the Act is reprint 9.

    [2]Section 441G.

  2. In this case, the Tribunal failed to give a notice inviting the applicants for review to attend a hearing to the authorised recipient in the manner that is prescribed by Div 7A. As will appear, this did not occasion any adverse consequence to any of the applicants for review, who are the first to sixth respondents to…

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Details
Case
[2009] HCA 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute concerned the review of a protection visa application made by a family of Lebanese nationals. The primary issue was whether the Refugee Review Tribunal's (RRT) failure to provide a hearing notice to the nominated "authorised recipient" of the applicant, as required by section 441G(1) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), rendered the subsequent decision invalid.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether non-compliance with the procedural steps outlined in section 441G of the *Migration Act* necessarily compels the conclusion that a decision made by the RRT is invalid, and whether the circumstances of the case amounted to a denial of natural justice. The RRT had sent the notice of hearing directly to the first respondent (the primary applicant) and not to his nominated authorised recipient, despite the applicant having designated an authorised recipient for the purpose of receiving review documents.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Court reasoned that while section 441G(1) mandates that review documents be given to an authorised recipient, a failure to comply with this specific procedural step does not automatically invalidate the RRT's decision. The Court emphasised that the ultimate question is whether the RRT's conduct resulted in a denial of natural justice. In this instance, all respondents attended the hearing, and no unfairness or prejudice arose from the non-compliance with section 441G(1). The Court distinguished the situation from cases where a failure to comply with statutory requirements directly impacts procedural fairness, such as the failure to provide written particulars of adverse information as considered in *SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs*. The Court concluded that the RRT's actions did not amount to a jurisdictional error or a denial of natural justice in these particular circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside orders 1 and 2 of the orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 3 July 2008, and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) order 2 of the orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 5 September 2007 be set aside; and

(b) the appeal be otherwise dismissed.

3. Appellant to pay the first to sixth respondents' costs of the appeal to this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister appeals by special leave to this Court from the decision of the Full Court. For the reasons that follow the appeal should be allowed and the orders made in the Full Court should be set aside. The facts The respondents are a family, who come from Lebanon. The first respondent is the husband, the second respondent is his wife and the third to sixth respondents are their children. The family arrived in Australia on 21 March 2001. On 14 November 2005 they applied for protection visas. The first respondent made substantive claims to being a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention[4] as amended by the Refugees Protocol[5] (together "the Convention")[6]. The remaining respondents applied for protection visas as the first respondent's spouse and dependants respectively[7]. [4]The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951. [5]The Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967. [6]Section 36(2)(a). [7]The second to sixth respondents' application was made pursuant to s 36(2)(b) of the Act. On 13 January 2006 a delegate of the Minister refused the respondents' applications on the ground that none satisfied the criterion for the issue of a protection visa. The respondents filed an application for review of the delegate's decision. Their application was submitted on a pro forma issued by the Tribunal. Multiple applicants for review are permitted to submit applications on the same form. The form which the respondents signed contained the following printed advice:"Each person is an applicant in his or her own right. Unless an included applicant advises the Tribunal otherwise, the Tribunal will communicate with Applicant 1 or his or her authorised recipient. Applicant 1 must inform each applicant of the contents of any communication from the Tribunal and reply to the Tribunal for them." The first respondent was named as Applicant 1 in the application. He nominated his eldest daughter, the third respondent, SZIZQ, as his authorised recipient. SZIZQ's address was given as the address of the premises at which all of the respondents were residing ("the family residence"). Telephone numbers for a landline and a mobile service were supplied as a means of contacting SZIZQ. The first respondent signed a declaration undertaking to inform each of the respondents of the contents of any communication from the Tribunal and to reply to the Tribunal on their behalf. The remaining five respondents, including SZIZQ, signed the application acknowledging that each had read and understood the information supplied in it and authorising the Tribunal to communicate with the first respondent or his authorised recipient about the application. The application was dated 6 February 2006. It was received by the Tribunal on 9 February 2006. The Tribunal sent a notice by prepaid post addressed to the first respondent inviting him and the other respondents to attend a hearing, to be held on 23 March 2006 ("the notice of hearing"). The first respondent was instructed to inform each of the other respondents of its contents, including that any response would be regarded by the Tribunal as a joint response, unless the Tribunal was advised otherwise. A brochure explaining what would happen on the day of the hearing, and a "response to hearing invitation" ("the response form"), were enclosed with the notice.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ

The Minister submits that compliance with each of the identified steps in Divs 4 and 7A will always discharge the Tribunal's obligations under the hearing rule but that it does not follow that departure from any of the steps, including those dealing with the giving and receiving of review documents, is intended to exclude consideration by the court of whether the requirements of natural justice have been satisfied. SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Before turning to the characterisation of the obligations imposed on the Tribunal under ss 441G and 441A, reference should be made to the decision of this Court in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[33]. In that case the Tribunal failed to provide to the applicant for review written particulars of information that it considered would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. This was a breach of the requirements of s 424A, which is in Div 4. Justice McHugh, who was one of the Justices who formed the majority, concluded as follows[34]:"However, because the Act compels the Tribunal in the conduct of the review to take certain steps in order to accord procedural fairness to the applicant for review, before recording a decision, it would be an anomalous result if the Tribunal's decision were found to be valid, notwithstanding that the Tribunal has failed to discharge that obligation. It is not to the point that the Tribunal may have given the applicant particulars of the adverse information orally. It is also not to the point that in some cases it might seem unnecessary to give the applicant written particulars of adverse information … If the requirement to give written particulars is mandatory, then failure to comply means that the Tribunal has not discharged its statutory function. There can be no 'partial compliance' with a statutory obligation to accord procedural fairness. Either there has been compliance or there has not. Given the significance of the obligation in the context of the review process (the obligation is mandated in every case), it is difficult to accept the proposition that a decision made despite the lack of strict compliance is a valid decision under the Act." [33](2005) 228 CLR 294; [2005] HCA 24. [34]SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 321 [77]. Justice Hayne (with whose reasons on this aspect Kirby J agreed) observed that the evident purpose of Pt 7, and Div 4 in particular, is to afford procedural fairness to applicants[35]. His Honour identified the focus of the inquiry as to jurisdictional error as being the validity of the act done in purported performance of the Tribunal's obligation to review and decide the matter[36]. He concluded that[37]:"Where the Act prescribes steps that the Tribunal must take in conducting its review and those steps are directed to informing the applicant for review (among other things) of the relevance to the review of the information that is conveyed, both the language of the Act and its scope and objects point inexorably to the conclusion that want of compliance with s 424A renders the decision invalid."[35]SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 350 [192].[36]SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 353-354 [205].[37]SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355 [208] (emphasis in original).