HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP APPELLANT
AND
SZIZO & ORS RESPONDENTS
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO [2009] HCA 37
23 September 2009
S568/2008ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside orders 1 and 2 of the orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 3 July 2008, and in lieu thereof order that:
(a)order 2 of the orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 5 September 2007 be set aside; and
(b)the appeal be otherwise dismissed.
3.Appellant to pay the first to sixth respondents' costs of the appeal to this Court.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
N J Williams SC with K A Stern for the appellant (instructed by Clayton Utz Lawyers)
B W Walker SC with B K Nolan for the first to sixth respondents (instructed by the first to sixth respondents)
Submitting appearance for the seventh respondent
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ. A decision made by the appellant, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship ("the Minister"), or his delegate, refusing to grant a protection visa to an applicant who is physically present in the migration zone is reviewable by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal")[1]. The conduct of the review is governed by the provisions of Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"). Section 422B(1) provides that the provisions of Div 4 are taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule ("the hearing rule") in relation to the matters that they deal with. The manner of giving and receiving documents in connection with the review is governed by the provisions of Div 7A of Pt 7 of the Act. Section 422B(2) provides that the provisions of Div 7A, in so far as they relate to the conduct of reviews under Div 4, are to be taken to be an exhaustive statement of the hearing rule in relation to the matters that they deal with. An applicant for review may appoint a person, an "authorised recipient", to receive documents in connection with the review on his or her behalf. In the event that an applicant nominates an authorised recipient, the Tribunal is required to give review documents to that person instead of giving the documents to the applicant[2].
[1]Sections 411, 412 and 414 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The relevant text of the Act is reprint 9.
[2]Section 441G.
In this case, the Tribunal failed to give a notice inviting the applicants for review to attend a hearing to the authorised recipient in the manner that is prescribed by Div 7A. As will appear, this did not occasion any adverse consequence to any of the applicants for review, who are the first to sixth respondents to…
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- Case
- [2009] HCA 37
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether non-compliance with the procedural steps outlined in section 441G of the *Migration Act* necessarily compels the conclusion that a decision made by the RRT is invalid, and whether the circumstances of the case amounted to a denial of natural justice. The RRT had sent the notice of hearing directly to the first respondent (the primary applicant) and not to his nominated authorised recipient, despite the applicant having designated an authorised recipient for the purpose of receiving review documents.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Court reasoned that while section 441G(1) mandates that review documents be given to an authorised recipient, a failure to comply with this specific procedural step does not automatically invalidate the RRT's decision. The Court emphasised that the ultimate question is whether the RRT's conduct resulted in a denial of natural justice. In this instance, all respondents attended the hearing, and no unfairness or prejudice arose from the non-compliance with section 441G(1). The Court distinguished the situation from cases where a failure to comply with statutory requirements directly impacts procedural fairness, such as the failure to provide written particulars of adverse information as considered in *SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs*. The Court concluded that the RRT's actions did not amount to a jurisdictional error or a denial of natural justice in these particular circumstances.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside orders 1 and 2 of the orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 3 July 2008, and in lieu thereof order that:
(a) order 2 of the orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 5 September 2007 be set aside; and
(b) the appeal be otherwise dismissed.
3. Appellant to pay the first to sixth respondents' costs of the appeal to this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ
The Minister submits that compliance with each of the identified steps in Divs 4 and 7A will always discharge the Tribunal's obligations under the hearing rule but that it does not follow that departure from any of the steps, including those dealing with the giving and receiving of review documents, is intended to exclude consideration by the court of whether the requirements of natural justice have been satisfied. SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Before turning to the characterisation of the obligations imposed on the Tribunal under ss 441G and 441A, reference should be made to the decision of this Court in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[33]. In that case the Tribunal failed to provide to the applicant for review written particulars of information that it considered would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. This was a breach of the requirements of s 424A, which is in Div 4. Justice McHugh, who was one of the Justices who formed the majority, concluded as follows[34]:"However, because the Act compels the Tribunal in the conduct of the review to take certain steps in order to accord procedural fairness to the applicant for review, before recording a decision, it would be an anomalous result if the Tribunal's decision were found to be valid, notwithstanding that the Tribunal has failed to discharge that obligation. It is not to the point that the Tribunal may have given the applicant particulars of the adverse information orally. It is also not to the point that in some cases it might seem unnecessary to give the applicant written particulars of adverse information … If the requirement to give written particulars is mandatory, then failure to comply means that the Tribunal has not discharged its statutory function. There can be no 'partial compliance' with a statutory obligation to accord procedural fairness. Either there has been compliance or there has not. Given the significance of the obligation in the context of the review process (the obligation is mandated in every case), it is difficult to accept the proposition that a decision made despite the lack of strict compliance is a valid decision under the Act." [33](2005) 228 CLR 294; [2005] HCA 24. [34]SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 321 [77]. Justice Hayne (with whose reasons on this aspect Kirby J agreed) observed that the evident purpose of Pt 7, and Div 4 in particular, is to afford procedural fairness to applicants[35]. His Honour identified the focus of the inquiry as to jurisdictional error as being the validity of the act done in purported performance of the Tribunal's obligation to review and decide the matter[36]. He concluded that[37]:"Where the Act prescribes steps that the Tribunal must take in conducting its review and those steps are directed to informing the applicant for review (among other things) of the relevance to the review of the information that is conveyed, both the language of the Act and its scope and objects point inexorably to the conclusion that want of compliance with s 424A renders the decision invalid."[35]SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 350 [192].[36]SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 353-354 [205].[37]SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355 [208] (emphasis in original).