Tuimaseve v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tuimaseve v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 396

File number: VID 437 of 2017
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 26 March 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the applicant’s visa had been cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where a delegate of the Minister had refused an application to revoke the cancellation – where applicant sought merits review of the latter decision – where, during the course of cross-examination, the Minister sought to rely on a DVD of CCTV footage of an incident involving the applicant – where the Minister had not provided a copy of the DVD to the applicant as required by s 38AA of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – where the Tribunal permitted the Minister to tender the DVD – whether denial of procedural fairness – application allowed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 37, 38AA

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 418, 476A, 499, 501, 501CA

Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

Australian Postal Corporation v Bessey (2001) 32 AAR 508

Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320

BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 159

Boyes v Colins (2000) 23 WAR 123

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389

Kingham v Cole (2002) 118 FCR 289

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Morton v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited [2013] FCA 681

Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

Ramsay v Australian Postal Commission (2005) 147 FCR 39

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1

Re Palmer and Minister for the Capital Territory (1978) 23 ALR 196

SZOIN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 123

WAGP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 151 FCR 413

Date of hearing: 1 November 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 94
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C Horan QC with Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Applicant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PRD Gray QC with Mr CJ Tran
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 437 of 2017
BETWEEN:

DAVID TUIMASEVE

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 396
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Tuimaseve v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) concerning the cancellation of the applicant's visa under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant had previously sought a review of the delegate's decision to refuse to revoke the cancellation. During the review, the Minister sought to rely on a DVD of CCTV footage without having provided a copy to the applicant as required by section 38AA of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Tribunal permitted the Minister to tender the DVD, leading the applicant to argue that this constituted a denial of procedural fairness.

The primary legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error due to the Minister's failure to comply with section 38AA, and whether this failure led to procedural unfairness. The applicant argued that the Minister's non-compliance with section 38AA resulted in procedural unfairness and denied him the opportunity to properly respond to the evidence. The Minister contended that section 38AA was not intended to confer a procedural right on the applicant but rather to assist the Tribunal in reaching a correct decision. The Minister also argued that the lack of compliance with section 38AA did not result in procedural unfairness as there was no practical injustice to the applicant.

The court found that the Minister's failure to comply with section 38AA did not constitute a denial of procedural fairness. The court reasoned that section 38AA was intended to assist the Tribunal rather than confer a procedural right on the applicant. The court noted that the Tribunal's reasons were detailed and objective, and there was no indication that the Tribunal reached any material adverse findings against the applicant due to the entry of the DVD into evidence. The court concluded that the lack of practical injustice to the applicant meant there was no procedural unfairness.

Accordingly, the court allowed the application for judicial review. The court quashed the decision of the Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to determine the application for review according to law. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the applicant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. There be an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 31 March 2017.

2. There be an order in the nature of mandamus directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine the application for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent dated 26 February 2016 according to law.

3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

4. There be liberty to apply in relation to confidentiality.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It follows from the above that there will be: an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the Tribunal’s decision; and an order in the nature of mandamus directed to the Tribunal requiring it to determine the application for review according to law.Procedural background The applicant’s application for review of the delegate’s decision dated 26 February 2016 was initially considered by the Tribunal in May 2016. On 17 May 2016, the Tribunal decided to affirm the decision under review. However, that decision of the Tribunal was set aside by consent by this Court in an earlier proceeding. On 24 August 2016, the Court ordered by consent that: a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Tribunal; a writ of mandamus issue directed to the Tribunal requiring it to determine the application for review according to law; and the Minister pay the applicant’s costs. The orders of the Court dated 24 August 2016 included the following note (by consent): “The [Minister] concedes that the [Tribunal’s] decision is affected by jurisdictional error in that the [Tribunal] failed to consider a mandatory consideration, being the best interests of minor children affected by the decision, being the applicant’s nieces, in compliance with Ministerial Direction No. 65 made under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).” Subsequently, the Tribunal (differently constituted) heard the applicant’s application for review. It is this hearing that is relevant for present purposes. The hearing took place over two days, namely 19 January 2017 and 2 March 2017. The Tribunal provided its decision and reasons on 31 March 2017 (the Reasons). (Although the date on the first page of this document is 31 March 2016, this was corrected to read 31 March 2017 by a corrigendum.) The present proceeding in this Court was commenced on 28 April 2017. On 16 August 2017, an order was made by consent giving the applicant leave to file an amended originating application by 21 August 2017. On that date, the applicant filed an amended originating application for review of a migration decision, setting out four grounds of review. In his outline of submissions filed in advance of the hearing of the proceeding, the applicant indicated that he did not press grounds 2 and 4 in the amended originating application. It is therefore only necessary to consider grounds 1 and 3 in the amended originating application. These are in the following terms:1.The decision of the Administrative [Appeals] Tribunal (the Tribunal) is affected by jurisdictional error, in that the Tribunal allowed the Minister to introduce evidence in the form of CCTV footage, in circumstances which led to the conduct of the review being procedurally unfair to the applicant.…3.The decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error, in that the Tribunal failed to consider clearly articulated arguments.Particularsa)The Tribunal failed to consider a clearly articulated argument relating to the similarity of the applicant’s circumstances as compared with his brother.b)Further particulars may be provided once the applicant has reviewed the transcript.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, this ground of review is not made out. I do not consider the part of the closing submissions relied upon by the applicant in support of this ground (see [56] above), or the evidence upon which it was based, to constitute a distinct argument that needed to be dealt with separately by the Tribunal. The facts and matters relating to the applicant’s relationship with his brother formed part of the general circumstances relevant to the risk that the applicant posed to the Australian community. Although this particular submission and the evidence upon which it was based were not specifically referred to in the Reasons, I would not infer, in the circumstances of this case, and having regard to the Reasons as a whole, that the Tribunal overlooked this submission or the evidence upon which it was based.Conclusion For these reasons, orders should be made as set out in [11] above. In relation to costs, both parties accepted at the hearing that costs should follow the event. Accordingly, I will also order that the Minister pay the applicant’s costs of the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In WZARH, Gageler and Gordon JJ stated, at [55], that the concern of procedural fairness, which operated in that case as a condition of the exercise of statutory power, “is with procedures rather than with outcomes”. Having outlined their approach, their Honours stated (at [57]):That approach to the determination of the existence and consequence of a breach of an implied condition of procedural fairness governing the exercise of a statutory power is wholly consistent with the often-repeated observation of Gleeson CJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam that the concern of procedural fairness is to “avoid practical injustice”, and with his Honour’s conclusion in that case that there was no denial of procedural fairness where “[n]o practical injustice ha[d] been shown”. The absence of practical injustice in Lam lay in the fact that “[t]he applicant lost no opportunity to advance his case”; it was not “shown that he lost an opportunity to put any information or argument to the decision-maker, or otherwise suffered any detriment”.(Footnotes omitted.)Consideration The Minister notes in his written submissions that the Tribunal found that the Minister did not comply with s 38AA of the AAT Act by not providing the DVD to the Tribunal prior to seeking to tender it. The Minister states that that finding is not contested by the Minister, and that the Court should determine this application on the agreed footing that there was non-compliance with s 38AA. The Minister submits that there has been no denial of procedural fairness in what occurred before the Tribunal. His submissions can be summarised as follows:(a)First, the applicant attributes more significance to ss 37 and 38AA than those statutory provisions can properly bear. It goes too far to construe s 38AA as some “procedural right” to receive documents before going into evidence, non-compliance with which requires a new Tribunal to be constituted or else jurisdictional error be committed. Such a procedural right sits uneasily with the very terms of s 38AA, pursuant to which the obligation of disclosure continues until the review is finalised. That is, relevant information may be disclosed, in compliance with s 38AA, even after an applicant has given evidence.(b)While the purpose of s 37(1)(a) and the requirement for reasons is plainly to facilitate the obtaining of a review by the applicant (see Re Palmer and Minister for the Capital Territory (1978) 23 ALR 196), ss 37(1)(b) and 38AA stand in a different category. The requirement to provide the Tribunal with documents is not, strictly, for the benefit of the applicant, but rather for the assistance of the Tribunal. In terms, the obligation is owed to the Tribunal, not the applicant.(c)Section 38AA was inserted into the AAT Act by the Tribunals Amalgamation Act. The explanatory memorandum to the Bill explained that “[t]he proper conduct of reviews is assisted by the Tribunal having all relevant information before it. The President’s ability to make practice directions to define the scope of the continuous disclosure obligation would ensure that it is not unduly burdensome on decision-makers.” This is consistent with the statutory provision existing for the purpose of assisting the Tribunal to reach the correct and preferable decision.(d)Similar provisions in the Migration Act (for example, s 418(3)) have been described as existing for the “evident purpose” of “enabl[ing] the effective and efficient exercise by the tribunal of its review functions” (see Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 at [46]), as opposed to inuring specifically to the benefit of the applicant. It is well established that the Secretary’s failure to transmit documents to the Tribunal in the context of Part 5 and Part 7 reviews is not, without more, a jurisdictional error: see, eg, Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal; BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 159; SZOIN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 123; WAGP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 151 FCR 413. The applicant’s submissions are in tension with this proposition.(e)Second, the logical conclusion of the applicant’s argument is that production of a document at some point after it was reasonably practical to do so, as in this case, will lead inexorably to jurisdictional error or reconstitution of the Tribunal if that material is produced after the applicant has given evidence. It is improbable that the Parliament intended that result. The AAT Act does not say so. The obligation in s 38AA is imposed not on the Tribunal but on the primary decision-maker. The obligation is owed not to the applicant for review but to the Tribunal. Section 38AA does not impose an immediate obligation of disclosure; disclosure need only occur as soon as practicable. A problem with the applicant’s argument is that he treats compliance with s 38AA almost as if it were an end in itself, but it is not: cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627 at [34].(f)Third, the applicant’s position is inconsistent with the case law establishing that material may be put to a witness in cross-examination even if it was not previously disclosed: see Bessey; Morton. Given that a respondent to an application can legitimately withhold material and save it for cross-examination, it is difficult to see how the applicant has been denied procedural fairness in this case, particularly as the Tribunal allowed him an adjournment.(g)Fourth, the position contended for by the applicant leads to odd results in application. It would appear to be the case that an utter failure to comply with s 38AA at all during the course of the Tribunal proceedings may not result in jurisdictional error, applying the case law developed around s 418(3) and analogous provisions, whereas belated production of a document would, according to the applicant, always result in jurisdictional error or reconstitution.(h)The applicant’s argument is also unstable. Does his argument depend upon the supposed importance of presenting evidence in person before the Tribunal? Does that mean there is no necessary jurisdictional error where s 38AA is complied with after written evidence is filed but before oral evidence? If the statutory regime is designed to protect a procedural right to give evidence after considering the universe of relevant evidence, what happens where a decision-maker produces a relevant document which comes into the decision-maker’s possession after the applicant gives written or oral evidence, and thus complies with s 38AA? Surely there is no denial of procedural fairness then. If that is so, the “procedural right” for which the applicant contends appears a fragile and ephemeral one indeed.(i)Fifth, what is ultimately critical in every procedural fairness case is whether or not there is any practical injustice to the applicant: see WZARH. There was none here. The DVD was objective evidence about what occurred on Christmas Island. The Tribunal’s reasons are careful and they are detailed. There is no indication that the Tribunal reached any material adverse findings against the applicant as a result of the course of events concerning the entry of the DVD into evidence.