FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tuimaseve v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 396
File number: VID 437 of 2017 Judge: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 26 March 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the applicant’s visa had been cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where a delegate of the Minister had refused an application to revoke the cancellation – where applicant sought merits review of the latter decision – where, during the course of cross-examination, the Minister sought to rely on a DVD of CCTV footage of an incident involving the applicant – where the Minister had not provided a copy of the DVD to the applicant as required by s 38AA of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – where the Tribunal permitted the Minister to tender the DVD – whether denial of procedural fairness – application allowed Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 37, 38AA
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 418, 476A, 499, 501, 501CA
Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth)
Cases cited: Australian Postal Corporation v Bessey (2001) 32 AAR 508
Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320
BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 159
Boyes v Colins (2000) 23 WAR 123
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389
Kingham v Cole (2002) 118 FCR 289
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Morton v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited [2013] FCA 681
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Ramsay v Australian Postal Commission (2005) 147 FCR 39
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1
Re Palmer and Minister for the Capital Territory (1978) 23 ALR 196
SZOIN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 123
WAGP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 151 FCR 413
Date of hearing: 1 November 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 94 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C Horan QC with Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Applicant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PRD Gray QC with Mr CJ Tran Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 437 of 2017 BETWEEN: DAVID TUIMASEVE
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 396
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error due to the Minister's failure to comply with section 38AA, and whether this failure led to procedural unfairness. The applicant argued that the Minister's non-compliance with section 38AA resulted in procedural unfairness and denied him the opportunity to properly respond to the evidence. The Minister contended that section 38AA was not intended to confer a procedural right on the applicant but rather to assist the Tribunal in reaching a correct decision. The Minister also argued that the lack of compliance with section 38AA did not result in procedural unfairness as there was no practical injustice to the applicant.
The court found that the Minister's failure to comply with section 38AA did not constitute a denial of procedural fairness. The court reasoned that section 38AA was intended to assist the Tribunal rather than confer a procedural right on the applicant. The court noted that the Tribunal's reasons were detailed and objective, and there was no indication that the Tribunal reached any material adverse findings against the applicant due to the entry of the DVD into evidence. The court concluded that the lack of practical injustice to the applicant meant there was no procedural unfairness.
Accordingly, the court allowed the application for judicial review. The court quashed the decision of the Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to determine the application for review according to law. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the applicant's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. There be an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 31 March 2017.
2. There be an order in the nature of mandamus directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine the application for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent dated 26 February 2016 according to law.
3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.
4. There be liberty to apply in relation to confidentiality.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In WZARH, Gageler and Gordon JJ stated, at [55], that the concern of procedural fairness, which operated in that case as a condition of the exercise of statutory power, “is with procedures rather than with outcomes”. Having outlined their approach, their Honours stated (at [57]):That approach to the determination of the existence and consequence of a breach of an implied condition of procedural fairness governing the exercise of a statutory power is wholly consistent with the often-repeated observation of Gleeson CJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam that the concern of procedural fairness is to “avoid practical injustice”, and with his Honour’s conclusion in that case that there was no denial of procedural fairness where “[n]o practical injustice ha[d] been shown”. The absence of practical injustice in Lam lay in the fact that “[t]he applicant lost no opportunity to advance his case”; it was not “shown that he lost an opportunity to put any information or argument to the decision-maker, or otherwise suffered any detriment”.(Footnotes omitted.)Consideration The Minister notes in his written submissions that the Tribunal found that the Minister did not comply with s 38AA of the AAT Act by not providing the DVD to the Tribunal prior to seeking to tender it. The Minister states that that finding is not contested by the Minister, and that the Court should determine this application on the agreed footing that there was non-compliance with s 38AA. The Minister submits that there has been no denial of procedural fairness in what occurred before the Tribunal. His submissions can be summarised as follows:(a)First, the applicant attributes more significance to ss 37 and 38AA than those statutory provisions can properly bear. It goes too far to construe s 38AA as some “procedural right” to receive documents before going into evidence, non-compliance with which requires a new Tribunal to be constituted or else jurisdictional error be committed. Such a procedural right sits uneasily with the very terms of s 38AA, pursuant to which the obligation of disclosure continues until the review is finalised. That is, relevant information may be disclosed, in compliance with s 38AA, even after an applicant has given evidence.(b)While the purpose of s 37(1)(a) and the requirement for reasons is plainly to facilitate the obtaining of a review by the applicant (see Re Palmer and Minister for the Capital Territory (1978) 23 ALR 196), ss 37(1)(b) and 38AA stand in a different category. The requirement to provide the Tribunal with documents is not, strictly, for the benefit of the applicant, but rather for the assistance of the Tribunal. In terms, the obligation is owed to the Tribunal, not the applicant.(c)Section 38AA was inserted into the AAT Act by the Tribunals Amalgamation Act. The explanatory memorandum to the Bill explained that “[t]he proper conduct of reviews is assisted by the Tribunal having all relevant information before it. The President’s ability to make practice directions to define the scope of the continuous disclosure obligation would ensure that it is not unduly burdensome on decision-makers.” This is consistent with the statutory provision existing for the purpose of assisting the Tribunal to reach the correct and preferable decision.(d)Similar provisions in the Migration Act (for example, s 418(3)) have been described as existing for the “evident purpose” of “enabl[ing] the effective and efficient exercise by the tribunal of its review functions” (see Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 at [46]), as opposed to inuring specifically to the benefit of the applicant. It is well established that the Secretary’s failure to transmit documents to the Tribunal in the context of Part 5 and Part 7 reviews is not, without more, a jurisdictional error: see, eg, Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal; BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 159; SZOIN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 123; WAGP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 151 FCR 413. The applicant’s submissions are in tension with this proposition.(e)Second, the logical conclusion of the applicant’s argument is that production of a document at some point after it was reasonably practical to do so, as in this case, will lead inexorably to jurisdictional error or reconstitution of the Tribunal if that material is produced after the applicant has given evidence. It is improbable that the Parliament intended that result. The AAT Act does not say so. The obligation in s 38AA is imposed not on the Tribunal but on the primary decision-maker. The obligation is owed not to the applicant for review but to the Tribunal. Section 38AA does not impose an immediate obligation of disclosure; disclosure need only occur as soon as practicable. A problem with the applicant’s argument is that he treats compliance with s 38AA almost as if it were an end in itself, but it is not: cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627 at [34].(f)Third, the applicant’s position is inconsistent with the case law establishing that material may be put to a witness in cross-examination even if it was not previously disclosed: see Bessey; Morton. Given that a respondent to an application can legitimately withhold material and save it for cross-examination, it is difficult to see how the applicant has been denied procedural fairness in this case, particularly as the Tribunal allowed him an adjournment.(g)Fourth, the position contended for by the applicant leads to odd results in application. It would appear to be the case that an utter failure to comply with s 38AA at all during the course of the Tribunal proceedings may not result in jurisdictional error, applying the case law developed around s 418(3) and analogous provisions, whereas belated production of a document would, according to the applicant, always result in jurisdictional error or reconstitution.(h)The applicant’s argument is also unstable. Does his argument depend upon the supposed importance of presenting evidence in person before the Tribunal? Does that mean there is no necessary jurisdictional error where s 38AA is complied with after written evidence is filed but before oral evidence? If the statutory regime is designed to protect a procedural right to give evidence after considering the universe of relevant evidence, what happens where a decision-maker produces a relevant document which comes into the decision-maker’s possession after the applicant gives written or oral evidence, and thus complies with s 38AA? Surely there is no denial of procedural fairness then. If that is so, the “procedural right” for which the applicant contends appears a fragile and ephemeral one indeed.(i)Fifth, what is ultimately critical in every procedural fairness case is whether or not there is any practical injustice to the applicant: see WZARH. There was none here. The DVD was objective evidence about what occurred on Christmas Island. The Tribunal’s reasons are careful and they are detailed. There is no indication that the Tribunal reached any material adverse findings against the applicant as a result of the course of events concerning the entry of the DVD into evidence.