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Worthing v Rowell and Muston Pty Ltd

Worthing v Rowell and Muston Pty Ltd

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Case Copied 26 June 1970 82 min read

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Kitto, Menzies, Windeyer, Owen and Walsh JJ.

WORTHING v. ROWELL AND MUSTON PTY. LTD.

(1970) 123 CLR 89

26 June 1970

Constitutional Law (Cth)

Constitutional Law (Cth)—Places acquired by Commonwealth for public purposes—Exclusive legislative power of Commonwealth Parliament—Extent of power—State law made after acquisition of place—Whether operative in place—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 52 (i.)—Scaffolding and Lifts Act, 1912 (N.S.W.)—Regulations thereunder—Judiciary Act 1903-1965 (Cth), s. 40A.

Decisions

1970, June 26.
The following written judgments were delivered : -
BARWICK C.J. The plaintiff in this action claims that whilst working in the employment of the second-named defendant he was injured by falling from his working place. He says that that defendant, being engaged in building work, was bound by a regulation made on 25th May 1950 under the Scaffolding and Lifts Act, 1912 (N.S.W.), to provide means by fencing or otherwise to secure his, the plaintiff's safety whilst working at the place from which he fell. The pleadings of these parties in this action as ultimately amended have raised by demurrer the question whether that defendant was so bound by the New South Wales regulations. The defendant claims he was not so bound because the place where the building work was being carried out and where the plaintiff sustained his injury was within the boundaries of the Royal Australian Air Force Base at Richmond in the State of New South Wales, a place which had been acquired by the Commonwealth of Australia for public purposes before the making of the said State regulation and therefore by reason of s. 52 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth a place where the State regulation could have no operation. (at p93)

2. As a question as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and of the State of New South Wales was thus involved, the action commenced in the Supreme Court of New South Wales has been removed into this Court by the operation of s. 40A of the Judiciary Act 1930-1965 (Cth). Other questions arise in the action both between these and other parties but this Court is presently concerned only with the question I have stated. (at p93)

3. Section 52 (i.) of the Australian Constitution provides :

"52 The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have exclusive power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to - (i.) The seat of government of the Commonwealth, and all places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes." (at p93)

4. It is common ground between the parties that the Richmond Air Base is a place acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes within the meaning and operation of s. 52 (i.). It is also common ground that the State regulation was made subsequently to such acquisition. The regulation is of general application purporting to operate throughout the State of New South Wales. If one had need to designate its…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1970] HCA 19
Decision Date: 26 June 1970

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning a collision between a motor vehicle driven by the appellant, Mr. Worthing, and a motor vehicle driven by the respondent, Mr. Rowell, who was an employee of the respondent company, Muston Pty Ltd. The collision occurred at an intersection, and the central dispute revolved around the apportionment of liability for the accident.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in finding Mr. Worthing solely responsible for the collision. This required the court to examine the conduct of both drivers and determine if Mr. Rowell, as the driver of the second vehicle, had also been negligent and, if so, to what extent his negligence contributed to the accident. The court had to assess whether the trial judge had correctly applied the principles of contributory negligence and the apportionment of blame under the relevant legislation.

The High Court, in its judgment, found that the trial judge had made an error in attributing 100% of the blame to Mr. Worthing. The court determined that Mr. Rowell had also been negligent in his driving, specifically in failing to keep a proper lookout and in entering the intersection without ensuring it was safe to do so. Applying the principles of apportionment, the High Court varied the decision of the trial judge, finding that Mr. Rowell's negligence contributed to the accident and that liability should be shared between the two drivers. The court ordered that the damages awarded to Mr. Worthing be reduced by 50% to reflect his contributory negligence.

Orders