Davies v Ryan

Case [1933] HCA 64


50 CLR 379

RESPONDENT. DEFENDANT,

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS OF

THE TERRITORY FOR THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. High Court-Jurisdiction-Appeal-Competency-Court of Petty Sessions-Dis- H. C. OF

missal of information-" Order Ruling "-"Determination"-Judiciary Act 1903-1927 (No. 6 of 1903-No. 9 of 1927), sec. 34A-Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance (No. 2) 1930 (F.C.T.) (No. 21 of 1930), secs. 143 (1)*, 207*, 208*. Court of Petty Sessions-Information-Disclosure of offence-Sufficiency of par-

ticulars-Words of ordinance followed Sufficient in law '-Liquor Ordinance 1929-1932 (F.C.T.) (No. 15 of 1929-No. 15 of 1932), S8. 19 (2)* 43 (1) (d)*- Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance (No. 2) 1930 (F.C.T.) (No. 21 of 1930), secs. 27,* 28*.

An order of dismissal made under sec. 143 (1) of the Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance (No. 2) 1930 (F.C.T.), is either an "order" of the Court of Petty Sessions within the meaning of sec. 208 of the ordinance, or a "ruling" or a

determination, of such Court within the meaning of sec. 207 therefore the High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal therefrom. The Liquor Ordinance 1929-1932

any time to bona fide lodgers or travel- (F.C.T.) provides:--By sec. 19 (2) "Sub-

lers for consumption on the premises ject to the provisions of this ordinance a

by those lodgers or travellers and their residential hotel licence shall authorize

guests and (d) to boarders, within the the licensee to sell, supply and dispose of

hours prescribed for boarders, as part liquor on the licensed premises-(a)

of meals supplied to those boarders and during trading hours; (b) between the

their guests for consumption on the hours of six and eight o'clock in the

premises." By sec. 43 (1): " Every evening of any day, as part of a meal,

holder of a licence shall be guilty of an to persons having on the premises a meal for which a price (excluding the

hibited hours, keeps his licensed prem- price of any liquor) of not less than two

ises open for the sale of liquor, or sells shillings and sixpence is paid (c) at

or supplies any liquor, or permits any

50 CLR 380

The respondent was charged by information that, being the holder of a residential hotel licence under the Liquor Ordinance 1929-1932 (F.C.T.), she, upon a day named, supplied liquor during prohibited hours on her licensed premises except as provided in the ordinance, in that she supplied liquor at such licensed premises during hours other than trading hours contrary to the ordinance in such case made and provided. The information was dismissed on the ground that it did not disclose an offence.

Held, that, as the information disclosed one offence only and followed the exact words of the ordinance creating the offence, it was "sufficient in law within the meaning of sec. 27 of the Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance (No. 2) 1930 (F.C.T.).

APPEAL from the Court of Petty Sessions of the Territory for the Seat of Government.

On an information laid by Alfred David Davies,…

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AGLC
Davies v Ryan [1933] HCA 64
Case
[1933] HCA 64
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from an order of dismissal made by the Court of Petty Sessions of the Territory for the Seat of Government. The appellant, a police officer, had laid an information against the respondent, a hotel licensee, alleging she supplied liquor during prohibited hours on her licensed premises contrary to the Liquor Ordinance 1929-1932 (F.C.T.). The magistrate dismissed the information on the ground that it did not disclose an offence.

The High Court was required to determine two principal legal issues. Firstly, whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order of dismissal made by the Court of Petty Sessions under section 143(1) of the Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance (No. 2) 1930 (F.C.T.). Secondly, whether the information laid against the respondent was "sufficient in law" to disclose an offence under the relevant ordinances.

The Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, finding that an order of dismissal under section 143(1) constituted an "order," "ruling," or "determination" within the meaning of sections 207 and 208 of the Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance, which conferred appellate jurisdiction on the High Court. Regarding the sufficiency of the information, the Court reasoned that section 27(2) of the Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance provided that an information following the exact words of the ordinance creating the offence would be sufficient in law. The information in this case alleged a single offence and used the language of the Liquor Ordinance, thus satisfying this requirement.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of dismissal, and remitted the matter to the Court of Petty Sessions to hear and determine the information. The Court noted that while the information was legally sufficient, it would be desirable for informants to provide further particulars, such as the identity of the person to whom liquor was supplied and the approximate time of supply, to assist the defendant in preparing their defence.

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