HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Fullagar, Taylor and Menzies JJ.
PIONEER EXPRESS PTY. LTD. v. HOTCHKISS
20 October 1958
Constitutional Law (Cth)
Constitutional Law (Cth)—State statute—"Public motor vehicle"—Drive or operate—Cause or permit to be driven or operated—"Operate"—Permission or exemption under State statute—Licence—Necessity—Conformity therewith—Motor vehicle owned by company driven by employee from Sydney (N.S.W.) to Melbourne (Vict.) via Canberra (A.C.T.)—Passengers conveyed thereto for reward—Some terminating journey at Canberra—Motor vehicle neither licensed nor exempted—Freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse—Owner and employee—Guilt—Whether journey to Canberra incidental to inter-State journey—State Transport (Co-ordination) Act 1931-1956 (N.S.W.), ss. 3, 12, 13 (1), 28—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict.c.12), ss. 52, 92, 109, 125—Motor Traffic Ordinance 1936-1950 (A.C.T.), s. 12.
Decisions
October 20.
THE following written judgments were delivered:-
DIXON C.J. These are two appeals, heard together, from two respective convictions by a court of petty sessions exercising federal jurisdictions. The convictions were obtained upon informations under State law but the jurisdiction became federal because some of the defences that failed were founded upon immunities which, according to the defendant's claim, arose under the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The informations were laid under s. 28 of the State Transport (Co-ordination) Act 1931-1956 (N.S.W.). The material part of the section provides that no person shall, except in pursuance of a permit under that Act or under an exemption granted or declared under the Act, drive or operate or cause or permit to be driven or operated as a public motor vehicle any motor vehicle, unless the motor vehicle is licensed as a public motor vehicle and is used in conformity with the licence. (at p544)
2. On 17th January 1957 a motor coach belonging to the appellant Pioneer Express Pty. Ltd. was driven upon a journey from Sydney to Melbourne by way of Canberra. The appellant Wade drove it. The motor coach carried passengers in the ordinary way. Most of the passengers were carried to Melbourne or at all events into Victoria. Some however were set down in Canberra. Wade was charged under s. 28 with driving the vehicle, the company with operating it. It was a public motor vehicle and it was not licensed in that character nor was there any exemption. Both Wade and the company set up s. 92 of the Constitution as an answer to the respective charges against them. The journey was an inter-State one, and what matter, so they said, if a passenger or two were set down in the Australian Capital Territory before the Victorian State border was crossed. To set down such passengers was an indispensable or at all events a natural incident of an inter-State coach service and when s. 92 protects an inter-State commercial transaction it protects everything properly incidental to the transaction. Moreover the natural meaning of the bare words of s. 28 is restricted by sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act which requires all the provisions to be read subject to the Constitution, to say nothing…
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- Case
- [1958] HCA 45
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the appellant had discharged its onus of proving that the damage to the respondent's vehicle occurred without its negligence or default. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the appellant had taken all reasonable precautions to prevent the damage, and whether the damage was caused by an event for which the appellant was not responsible.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, found that the appellant had failed to discharge its onus. The court reasoned that the appellant had not established that the damage was not due to its negligence or default. The evidence did not demonstrate that all reasonable precautions had been taken to prevent the damage, nor did it establish that the damage was caused by an event for which the appellant was not responsible. The court applied the principles of bailment, noting that a bailee is liable for loss or damage to goods unless they can prove that the loss or damage occurred without their negligence or default. The appellant's failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for the damage meant it could not escape liability.
The appeal was dismissed.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Legal Principle Established
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