James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Seltsam Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND CALLINAN JJ

JAMES HARDIE & COY PTY LIMITED  APPELLANT

AND

SELTSAM PTY LIMITED  RESPONDENT

James Hardie & Coy Pty Limited v Seltsam Pty Limited (S64/1998)
[1998] HCA 78
21 December 1998

ORDER

  1. Appeal dismissed.

  1. The respondent has liberty to file, within 7 days of the date of this Order, written submissions on the making of orders for costs of the appeal to this Court.

  1. The appellant has liberty to file, within 7 days of the date of the filing of the submissions referred to in par 2 of this Order, written submissions in reply on the making of orders for costs of the appeal to this Court.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation:

C G Gee QC with J A McIntyre and R A Pepper for the appellant (instructed by Diamond Peisah & Co)

D F Jackson QC with J J E Fernon for the respondent (instructed by Toomey Pegg & Drevikovsky)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

James Hardie & Coy Pty Limited v Seltsam Pty Limited

Tort – Contribution – Parties entitled to claim contribution – Parties against whom contribution can be claimed – Relevance of final judgment obtained by consent in favour of party against whom contribution claimed.

Tort – Contribution – Assessment – Relevance of liability of claimant tortfeasor to tort victim when determining liability between claimant tortfeasor and other tortfeasors.

Statutes – Construction – Purposive construction – History of legislation – Previous decisions on the statutory provision.

Words and phrases – "tort-feasor liable in respect of that damage" – "who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage".

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5.

  1. GAUDRON AND GUMMOW JJ. This appeal raises an issue of construction of s 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)Act 1946 (NSW) ("the Law Reform Act"). This provision, as the Court observed in its joint judgment in Bitumen and Oil Refineries (Australia) Ltd v Commissioner for Government Transport[1], was transcribed from the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 (UK) ("the UK Act"), the foundation of which had been in the recommendations of the Third Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee, presented in July 1934 ("the Report")[2].

    [1](1955) 92 CLR 200 at 205, 211‑212.

    [2]Cmd 4637.

    The statute

  2. Section 5(1) of the Law Reform Act applies "[w]here damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort" and in those circumstances has two distinct operations. First, in par (a), it abolishes what had been a particular plea in bar. Secondly, in par (c), supplemented by s 5(2), a right and remedy of contribution is created where they did not exist at common law.

  3. In the Report, par (I) of the Summary of Suggested Recommendations had recommended alteration of the rule in Brinsmead v Harrison

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Details
Case
[1998] HCA 78
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal by James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (the appellant) against Seltsam Pty Ltd (the respondent) concerning a claim for contribution under legislation. The dispute arose from a situation where the appellant sought to recover contribution from the respondent in relation to damages awarded to a plaintiff, despite a prior judgment in favour of the respondent in the plaintiff's action against it. The High Court of Australia was required to determine the appellant's entitlement to claim contribution.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the respondent could be considered a party "who would if sued have been liable in respect of the same damage" or a party "against whom contribution may be claimed" within the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions, given that the plaintiff's action against the respondent had concluded with a final consent judgment in the respondent's favour. The court also considered the relevance of the finality of this judgment to the appellant's ability to pursue a contribution claim.

The High Court reasoned that the statutory provisions for contribution require the party from whom contribution is sought to either have been adjudged liable or to be a party against whom a claim for contribution can still be made. In this instance, the consent judgment in favour of the respondent was a final order that brought the plaintiff's action against the respondent to an end, thereby absolving the respondent of liability to the plaintiff. The court held that this final judgment meant the respondent did not fit either of the statutory descriptions necessary for the appellant to claim contribution. The appellant's argument that the consent judgment was not a judgment "to judgment" in the required sense was rejected, as the judgment was final and effective in absolving the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed. The court granted liberty to the parties to file written submissions regarding the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Appeal dismissed.

2.

The respondent has liberty to file, within 7 days of the date of this Order, written submissions on the making of orders for costs of the appeal to this Court.

3.

The appellant has liberty to file, within 7 days of the date of the filing of the submissions referred to in par 2 of this Order, written submissions in reply on the making of orders for costs of the appeal to this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GAUDRON AND GUMMOW JJ HUGH J KIRBY J (dissent)
In Hart v Hall & Pickles Ltd[45], the English Court of Appeal held that, where the action by the victim of the tort against the defendant in the contribution proceeding has been dismissed for want of prosecution, that person answers the description of one who "would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage". This was because the phrase "if sued" was rendered inapplicable only if the tortfeasor in question had been sued to judgment and the dismissal for want of prosecution was but an interlocutory order.[45][1969] 1 QB 405. See also Canberra Formwork Pty Ltd v Civil & Civic Ltd (1982) 41 ACTR 1 at 17 (non‑prosecution); Re Securitibank Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 280 at 283 (leave to discontinue).Conclusions The appellant sought to bring the respondent within the second limb by submitting that the respondent had not been sued to judgment in the sense required to deny the respondent the character of a person not yet sued. Thereby the appellant would open the way to demonstrate in the contribution proceeding that, as between it and the respondent, the respondent was liable in respect of the same damage and that it should have the remedy specified in s 5(2). However, in the present litigation, the order dismissing the plaintiff's action against the respondent was a final order which brought that action to an end. It would be a distortion of the text and structure of par (c) of s 5(1) to hold in those circumstances that the respondent thereafter answered the description of one yet to be sued. The plaintiff's cause of action against the respondent merged in the judgment, thereby destroying its independent existence. The status of the Tribunal as a court of record was such that the circumstance that the judgment in favour of the respondent was entered by consent renders it no less effective to absolve the respondent from liability to the plaintiff[46]. It was for the appellant to have taken the necessary steps to oppose that entry of judgment and to have put itself in the procedural position whereby it was competent to appeal against that entry. In the meantime, whilst that judgment remained on the record of the Tribunal, the respondent did not answer either of the statutory descriptions necessary to confer entitlement upon the appellant to proceed against it for contribution.[46]Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 at 508. With respect to the first limb, the respondent had not been adjudged liable to the plaintiff. Rather, it had succeeded in establishing the opposite. With respect to the second limb, the presence of the judgment in the respondent's favour denied it the character of a party still awaiting a final determination of a suit in respect of the damage sustained by the plaintiff. The appellant sought to weaken the determinative character of the consent judgment by reference to the decision of the House of Lords in Munster v Cox[47]. The House of Lords dismissed an appeal against an order of the Court of Appeal setting aside an order of the Divisional Court for the trial of an issue whether one Cox was liable to have execution against him upon a judgment in an action against a partnership. Cox asserted he had dissolved the partnership before the issue of the writ. There was an issue as to the authority of one partner to bind an absent partner by consenting to judgment in an action against the partnership for damages for libel. The judgment itself was not impugned. The question was whether Cox was liable to have execution issued against him upon the judgment. The decision provides no support for the appellant.[47](1885) 10 App Cas 680.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GAUDRON AND GUMMOW JJ, HUGH J,

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