Farrell; Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Freedom of information)
[2017] AATA 409
•31 March 2017
Farrell; Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Freedom of information) [2017] AATA 409 (31 March 2017)
Division
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DIVISION
File Number(s)
2015/4174
Re
Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection
APPLICANT
And
Paul Farrell
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:The Hon. Dennis Cowdroy OAM QC, Deputy President
Date:31 March 2017
Place:Sydney
(a)In relation to Documents 1-14, the decision of the Australian Information Commissioner dated 7 July 2015, as amended by Order of the Tribunal made under s 26 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 on 14 April 2016, is affirmed.
(b)In relation to Document 15, the decision of the Australian Information Commissioner dated 7 July 2015, as amended by Order of the Tribunal made under s 26 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 on 14 April 2016, is varied. The Tribunal finds that the whole of the document is exempt under ss 33 and 47E of the Freedom of Information Act 1982, subject to the abovementioned Order dated 14 April 2016.
...............................[sgd]............................................
The Hon. Dennis Cowdroy OAM QC, Deputy President
Catchwords
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – access to documents – whether exempt – ‘public interest’ – ‘security of the Commonwealth’ – power of the Commonwealth – watch officer logs from vessels involved in turnback activities – decision affirmed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, ss 35(2)
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, ss 4(a), (aa)
Commonwealth Constitution, ss 51(vi), (xxix)
Criminal CodeAct 1995 (Cth), Division 73
Customs Act1901, ss 185(3AB) - check
Freedom of Information Act 1982, ss 3(2)-(4), 4(5), 11, 11A(5), 11B, 31B, 33(a)(i), (iii), 34, 37(2)(b), 43(1)(c), 45A, 47B(a), 47E(d), 58E, 60A, 93A
Judiciary Act 1903, s 78B
Maritime Powers Act 2013, ss 7, 4(2), 16(1), 17(1), 52(1), 54(1), 72(4), 75, 107, 229, 233AMigration Act 1958, ss 42, 229, 233A 245B(9A)-(9B), 245F
Cases
Adams and Tax Agents Board (1976) 1 ALD 251
AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton (2002) 58 NSWLR 464
Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255
Attorney-General (Canada) v Cain [1906] AC 542
Attorney-General's Department and Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltdv Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180
Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25
Collector of Customs (NSW)v Brian Lawlor Automotives Pty Ltd [1979] FCA 37; (1979) 41 FLR 338
CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 255 CLR 514
David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holden's Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294
Diamond and Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority [2014] AATA 707
Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] Vic Rep 6; (1991) 1 VR 63
Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2006) 225 CLR 130
Jaffarie v Director- General of Security (2014) 226 FCR 505
McKie and Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 8 AAR 90
Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal and Ors [2012] HCA 36; (2012) 246 CLR 379
Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director General of Security (2012) 251 CLR 1
Purvis and Dairy Adjustment Authority [2005] AATA 233; (2005) 86 ALD 713
Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491
Sarina and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 14 ALD 437
Sawmillers Exports Pty Ltd and Minister for Education and Training, AAT No 9359 9 March 1994, unreported
Staats and National Archives of Australia [2010] AATA 531
Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307
Tillman’s Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry’s Employees Union (1979) 42 FLR 331
Wake v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 43White v Director of Military Prosecutions (2007) 231 CLR 570
Secondary Materials
Concise Oxford Dictionary
Guidelines issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982
Macquarie DictionaryOxford Online Dictionary
REASONS FOR DECISION
The Hon. Dennis Cowdroy OAM QC, Deputy President
31 March 2017
On 14 August 2015, the Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection (“the Secretary”) applied to this Tribunal for review of a decision of the Australian Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”), claiming that the Commissioner had erred in his assessment of an application made under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (“the FOI Act”) on 17 January 2014 by Paul Farrell (“Farrell”).
Farrell had applied under the FOI Act to the Department of Defence for certain documents concerning “turnback” operations conducted as part of Operation Sovereign Borders (“OSB”). Such request was referred to the then Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (“ACBPS”). On 7 February 2014 Farrell expanded his request to include copies of watch officer logs from any vessels involved in turnback operations; and requests for final confirmation, approval or orders to conduct turnback operations since November 2013.
By decision dated 14 March 2014 ACBPS refused access to each of the 15 documents identified as relevant to the request, on the basis of s 47E(d) of the FOI Act. Accordingly Farrell applied to the Commissioner for review of such decision. On 17 July 2015 the Commissioner varied the ACBPS decision by granting access to part of document 15, but otherwise upholding the decision with respect to documents number 1 to 14 inclusive and part of document 15 pursuant to ss 47E(d) and s 11A(5) of the FOI Act.
The reasons for the Secretary’s application to the Tribunal are stated as follows:
The Information Commissioner mistook the submissions of the [Secretary] with respect to document 15. The [Secretary] claimed the whole of document 15 was exempt under ss 33 and 47E of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). Having claimed s 33 over the whole of document 15 it was not open to the information Commissioner to determine any part of it should be released without first consulting the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security – Part VII Div 9 FOI Act refers.
When the application came on for hearing on 8 August 2016, the parties agreed that the Tribunal was requested to consider not only the application of the Secretary in respect of the one document, namely document 15, but, in addition and at the request of Farrell, the decision with respect to the remaining documents. It follows that the decision of the Commissioner is to be reviewed in its entirety in respect of the 15 documents in issue (“the documents”).
The issues arising in this application are several. They are:
(a)in respect of documents 1 to 15 for which exemption has been claimed by the Secretary, are they exempt from release pursuant to s 33(a)(i) of the FOI Act on the ground that disclosure would reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security the Commonwealth?
(b)Alternatively are parts of documents 1 to 15:
(i)conditionally exempt from release pursuant to s 47E(d) of the FOI Act on the basis that their disclosure could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect upon the operations of the ACBPS; and
(ii)contrary to the public interest to disclose, as provided by s 11A(5)?
(c)Alternatively;
(i)could the release of parts of documents 7 and 15 reasonably be expected to cause damage to the international relations of the Commonwealth: see s 33(a)(iii)?
(ii)Could release of parts of documents 3, 6, 7, and 15, reasonably be expected to reveal procedures for dealing with evasions of the law in a manner which is reasonably likely to prejudice their effectiveness: see s 37(2)(b)?
Statutory Provisions
The objects of the FOI Act, as stated in s 3(1), are to give the Australian community access to information held by the Government of the Commonwealth by requiring agencies to publish the information and to provide for a right of access to documents (see (a) and (b) thereof). The intention of Parliament in the furtherance of such objects are contained in sub-s 3(2), (3) and (4).
The furtherance of the right of access is provided by s 11, which relevantly provides that:
…every person has a legally enforceable right to obtain access in accordance with this Act to:
(a)a document of an agency, other than an exempt document; or
(b)an official document of a Minister, other than an exempt document.
Section 31B relevantly provides:
A document is exempt for the purposes of this Part if:
(a) it is an exempt document under Division 2; or
(b) it is conditionally exempt under Division 3, and access to the document would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest for the purposes of subsection 11A(5).
Note 1: a document is an exempt document for the purposes of this Act (see subsection 4(1)) if:
(a) it is exempt under this section; or
(b)it is exempt because of section 7 (exemption of certain persons and bodies); or
(c)it is an official document of a Minister that contains matters not relating to the affairs of an agency or a Department of State.
Note 2: Access must generally be given to a conditionally exempt document unless it would be contrary to the public interest (see section 11A)
"Exempt document" is defined in s 4 as follows:
(a) a document that is exempt for the purposes of Part IV (exempt documents) (see section 31B); or
(b)a document in respect of which, by virtue of section 7, an agency, person or body is exempt from the operation of this Act; or
(c)an official document of a Minister that contains some matter that does not relate to the affairs of an agency or of a Department of State.
Section 33 provides:
A document is an exempt document if disclosure of the document under this Act:
(a) would, or could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to:
(i) the security of the Commonwealth;
(ii) the defence of the Commonwealth; or
(iii) the international relations of the Commonwealth; or
(b) would divulge any information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of a foreign government, an authority of a foreign government or an international organization to the Government of the Commonwealth, to an authority of the Commonwealth or to a person receiving the communication on behalf of the Commonwealth or of an authority of the Commonwealth.
Documents affecting enforcement of law and protection of public safety are referred to in s 37(2) and include exemption if the document would or could reasonably be expected to:
(b) disclose lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law the disclosure of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures.
Legal professional privilege is provided for in s 42 of the FOI Act.
The Evidence
The Secretary relies upon an affidavit of Major General Andrew William Bottrell sworn on 26 May 2016. Major General Bottrell is the Commander of OSB, and provided the affidavit on behalf of the Joint Agency Task Force (“JATF”) for OSB. His affidavit referred to a statement of Ms Bradshaw dated 20 February 2015 relating to the establishment and nature of Border Protection Command, now known as Maritime Border Command (“MBC”), and the role of that organisation in border protection. The affidavit refers to the operations of JATF in respect to combatting people smuggling, and particularly the procedures undertaken to deter such activity, including the withholding relevant operational material which could otherwise be exploited to render the tactics, techniques and procedures less effective or ineffective. The evidence also refers to threats to Australia's border security, and confirms that such threats have not disappeared or diminished and remain an ongoing concern for Australia's security.
Major General Bottrell’s affidavit states that the release of the documents would pose a serious risk to the ongoing effectiveness of border control operations, since the methods by which MBC undertakes its functions in national security operations in deterring people smuggling ventures would be exposed. His affidavit states that the release of details describing turnback operations would allow persons who participate in people smuggling to predict, and render less effective, turnback operations because of the knowledge gained from the documents. Release of the documents would show how such operations are planned and executed, including tactics involved, techniques and procedures. Further, the affidavit states that such knowledge could be used to encourage passengers or crew to participate in such ventures, on the basis that they would obtain the confidence that such activities could be carried out successfully.
The affidavit states that if the information were released, it could be used in such a way that, having obtained knowledge of the operations of the vessels involved on behalf of the Commonwealth, and the capabilities of such vessels, a risk to personnel on such vessels could be created.
The affidavit further states that MBC would be required to revise its current operation methodology to reduce the risk of harm; that such procedures would take a considerable time to develop. During the interim, the opportunity would be created for the people smuggling trade to increase. Further, release of the documents would reduce the effectiveness of the vessels and infrastructure used in a wide range of other activities including illegal fishing, narcotic importation, biosecurity threats, including maritime piracy and security for oil and gas platforms.
Major General Bottrell states that should OSB be compromised, a real threat to Australia's national security would result. The tactics, techniques and procedures comprised in the current operations and referred to in the documents have been developed over a decade and the release of the level of detail referred to in the documents would put lives at risk. Such procedures have been developed only in consequence of improvement and refinement, and to release the documentation would result in the undermining of such processes.
Major General Bottrell also states that he has considered whether any further information could be released from the documents which are sought on this application. He concluded that no portion of the documents could be released which would in any way be intelligible without running the risk of the harm he has referred to.
Major General Bottrell was extensively cross-examined on the content of his affidavit by Counsel for Mr Farrell. Due to national security issues, as referred to hereunder, he declined to answer during the public portion of the hearing, some of the questions asked of him concerning the content of the documents.
Observations
The Tribunal now refers to the specific matters relied upon by Farrell.
Farrell makes no admissions concerning the claims of the Secretary, and relies upon the fact that the onus of establishing that the documents qualify for exemption from access lies on the party claiming that exemption.
Issues
Power of the Commonwealth
Farrell has made two submissions that the power of the Commonwealth does not extend to legislating with regard to “turnback activities”. Such submission raises the issue whether the current legislation relied upon to support turnback operations is constitutional.
The Tribunal observes that such issues should be brought before a court, rather than in proceedings brought under the FOI Act. This Tribunal is not the appropriate forum for the determination of constitutional issues. Questions of this nature are usually determined only after extensive submissions have been provided by the Attorneys-General of all States and Territories, following the issue of notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), let alone being assisted by detailed submissions of the parties. In the absence of any finding by a competent Federal Court which resolves such issue, the Tribunal must proceed on the basis that the various legislation used to support the turnback operations are valid; see Adams and Tax Agents Board (1976) 1 ALD 251; Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automative Pty Ltd [1979] FCA 37; (1979) 41 FLR 338; McKie and Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 8 AAR 90 at 96; Sarina and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 14 ALD 437; Sawmillers Exports Pty Ltd and Minister for Education and Training, AAT No 9359, 9 March 1994, unreported; Purvis and Dairy Adjustment Authority [2005] AATA 233; (2005) 86 ALD 713.
Farrell relies upon an extract from the dissenting decision of the joint judgement by Hayne and Bell JJ in CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 255 CLR 514 at [143] in support of the proposition that the Commonwealth must be able to demonstrate a power to carry out its turnback activities; that the mere assertions of power are insufficient; that there was no power to conduct any operations in Indonesian territorial waters and that operations against people smugglers are illegal, with the consequence that the documents do not qualify for exemption since exemption is only applicable to documents relating to lawful activities.
The High Court in CPCF determined whether s 72(4) of the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) authorised detention of persons who enter the migration zone or a place outside such a zone where that person did not hold a current visa. The High Court held that s 72(4) was a valid exercise of power.
It is necessary to consider authorities. In Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, French J (as his Honour then was) said with reference to provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) which restricted entry into Australia of non-citizen, at [192]:
Australia's status as a sovereign nation is reflected in its power to determine who may come into its territory and who may not and who shall be admitted into the Australian community and who shall not. That power may also be linked to the foundation of the Constitution in popular sovereignty implied in the agreement of the "people" of the pre-Federation colonies "to unite in one indissoluble federal Commonwealth". It may be said that the people, through the structures of representative democracy for which the Constitution provides, including an Executive responsible to the Parliament, may determine who will or will not enter Australia. These powers may be exercised for good reasons or bad. That debate, however, is not one for this Court to enter.
At [193] his Honour said:
In my opinion, the Executive power of the Commonwealth, absent statutory extinguishment or abridgement, would extend to a power to prevent the entry of non-citizens and to do such things as are necessary to effect such exclusion...
French J referred at [114] of his decision to the observations of Lord Atkinson writing for the Privy Council in Attorney-General (Canada) v Cain [1906] AC 542 at 546 as follows:
One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is a right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State...[1]
[1] Vattel, Law of Nations, book 1, s 231; book 2, s 125.
The Commonwealth is entitled to rely upon several powers in support of its activities in turnback operations, as were discussed in CPCF. The Maritime Powers Act authorises enforcement powers to be undertaken in maritime areas: see s 7. Further, operations to prevent persons entering Australia without a visa has been found to be consistent with the permitted purpose of ensuring compliance with s 42(1) of the Migration Act. Such power can be exercised to prevent an intended contravention of such act, the contravention being that "a noncitizen must not travel to Australia without a visa that is in effect". Such act was enacted “to provide a single comprehensive framework for enforcing Australian law at sea", see Gageler J in CPCF at [338].
In addition to the statutory powers of the Commonwealth, the decision of the High Court in CPCF refers at [20] to the operation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). French CJ referred to the fact that UNCLOS provided that, subject to the Convention:
…ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of a coastal State. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State, but shall be considered to be prejudicial if, in the territorial sea, the foreign ship engages in the loading or unloading of any person contrary to the immigration laws and regulations of the coastal State. (Footnotes omitted).
The above authorities are useful in that they provide the basis for the exercise by the Commonwealth of its legislative powers. The Tribunal concludes that there is ample legislative power arising from the operation of the Maritime Powers Act and the Migration Act to conduct the activities of turnback operations. Further, the powers extend geographically to the contiguous zone of Australia (see [29] of CPCF) and to places outside Australia (see s 4(2) of the Maritime Powers Act). In so far as any incursions may have taken place in the waters of a foreign country, then such an incursion, in the absence of any activities of loading or unloading refugees, would not constitute a breach of the UNCLOS. Even if further reserve powers were required, it is arguable that the sovereign powers of Australia, which are unspecified but are described in CPCF as "the common law in Australia as modified by the Constitution" (see [145], [270] of CPCF) would provide the necessary powers to defend the integrity of Australia's borders. The High Court in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 has also confirmed that the external affairs power contained in s 51(xxix) of the Commonwealth Constitution may be relied upon to counter threats to Australia’s borders, in addition to the defence power contained in s 51(vi) of the Constitution.
In so far as Farrell relies upon the dissenting decision of Hayne and Bell JJ as providing some basis for supporting its proposition that the Commonwealth lacks the necessary power to undertake the turnback operations, it should be noted that the decision of the High Court did not concern the question of power, but rather the scope of that power. That is not in question in the present circumstances.
Consideration of submissions relevant to section 33 of the FOI Act
Where a document is claimed to be exempt by virtue of s 33 of the FOI Act, the Tribunal before determining that the document is not an exempt document under s 33, must, inter alia, request the Inspector-General to appear personally and provide evidence concerning the damage that could be caused to the security of the Commonwealth, its defence and its international relations if access to the document were provided in accordance with the request.
Farrell submits that ss 58E (production of documents to the Tribunal) and 60A (which makes provision for the Inspector-General to give evidence in certain proceedings) only operate when the documents in issue are exempt documents, and that the 15 documents do not qualify for exemption, for the reasons hereunder.
Farrell submits that:
(a)the phrase "security of the Commonwealth" in s 33(a)(i) has a meaning to be determined by the ordinary meaning of the words extended by the inclusive definition in s 4(5) of the FOI Act: that "security" means protection from all measures taken against espionage theft, infiltration, sabotage or the like (see the definition contained in the Macquarie Dictionary) or the safeguarding or safety of a state against some internal or external threat, for example terrorism, espionage and the like: that it is impermissible, in determining the meaning of the phrase "security of the Commonwealth" in the FOI Act to rely upon the definition of "security" in the ASIO Act (see s 4(aa)) where s 4(aa) was inserted by the Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010 (Cth) and there was nothing to indicate that the amendment was to impact upon the definition of "security of the Commonwealth" in the FOI Act;
(b)that the term "the Commonwealth" means the polity, or body politic of the Commonwealth constituted by the Constitution and is not synonymous with the territory of Australia; that no support can be found in the term "security" contained in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (“ASIO Act”), as referred to in the submissions of the Secretary, in aid of the definition of "security of the Commonwealth" contained in the FOI Act; that it is impermissible, in determining the meaning of the phrase "security of the Commonwealth" in the FOI Act to rely upon the definition of "security" in the ASIO Act (see s 4(aa)) where s 4(aa) was inserted by the Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010 (Cth) and there was nothing to indicate that the amendment was to impact upon the definition of "security of the Commonwealth" in the FOI Act; and
(c)that the concept of security, whilst it can vary over time, and includes protection from war, sabotage and violent interference, it does not extend to people smuggling. It must be so, it was submitted because persons who have engaged in people smuggling are all detained and assessed before their release and accordingly, the security of the Commonwealth cannot become an issue.
Consideration: “Security of the Commonwealth”
The definition of "security of the Commonwealth" contained in s 4(5) of the FOI Act is broad. It relevantly provides: -
Without limiting the generality of the expression security of the Commonwealth, that expression should be taken to extend to:
(a) matters relating to the detection, prevention or suppression of activities, whether within Australia or outside Australia, subversive of, or hostile to, the interests of the Commonwealth or of any country allied or associated with the Commonwealth,..
The word "security" is defined in the Oxford Online Dictionary to include: "freedom: from danger or threat". The High Court of Australia in Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25 considered the meaning of such word. At 60 Mason J said, when interpreting provisions of the ASIO Act:
…Security is a concept with a fluctuating content, depending very much on circumstances as they exist from time to time; it is similar to the constitutional concept of defence.
As to the definition of "security of the Commonwealth", the definition in s 4(5) is expansive when it refers, in its opening words "without limiting the generality of the expression security of the Commonwealth". The words make it plain in s 4(5)(a) that it extends to prevention or suppression of activities inside or outside Australia subversive to the interests of the Commonwealth or any associated or allied country. The Concise Oxford Dictionary includes in the definition of "subvert" the words “overturn", "upset", "effect destruction or overthrow of”. The same dictionary defines "hostile" as having the following meanings: "of an enemy; unfriendly; opposed".
Applying such terms, the definition contained in s 4(5) extend to the detection, prevention or suppression of activities which could be regarded as having the effect of overturning or upsetting the integrity of Australia's borders or actions opposed to such operations. Accordingly the definition contained in s 4(5) includes these concepts in defining “security of the Commonwealth". Added to this is the definition referred to previously by Farrell contained in the Oxford Online Dictionary that security includes “freedom from danger or threat, safety and safeguarding”.
Farrell refers to the observation of French CJ in Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director General of Security (2012) 251 CLR 1 at [60], in which his Honour referred to the broadening of the definition of security in the regulations to the Migration Act so that the concept of security contained in s 4 of the ASIO Act became the criteria for consideration instead of the concept of “Australian national security”. Reference is also made to Bell J at [459] where her Honour referred to the “wider notions of security” arising from the definition of “security” contained in the ASIO Act. As was observed in Church of Scientology, security is a concept “with a fluctuating content”.
This illustration however does not detract from the Tribunal’s finding that the FOI Act is sufficiently comprehensive to include border patrol operations where those operations are designed to protect the integrity of Australia’s borders, which necessarily includes the activities of people smugglers. So considered, the submissions concerning provisions in the Migration Regulations 1994 are remote from the issue now before the Tribunal. Farrell’s submissions suggest that security should be confined only to activities of a warlike nature. However, such a narrow interpretation is unwarranted and has no application.
In Jaffarie v Director-General of Security (2014) 226 FCR 505 the full Federal Court considered whether the definition of "security" contained in the ASIO Act extended to the protection of Australia's territorial and border integrity from serious threats. The Full Court concluded that the definition included such operations.
At [59] in Jaffarie the Full Court, having referred to the wide ambit of the defence power conferred by s 51(vi) of the Constitution, referred to the fact that such power was not to be narrowly construed and that there was no basis for constraining the Commonwealth's power with respect to the word “‘security’ … in a manner consistent with a confined interpretation sought to be distilled from international law". The Full Court referred to the discussion of the broad power invested in the Commonwealth in White v Director of Military Prosecutions (2007) 231 CLR 570 at [106] per Kirby J, and to the decision in Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255 at 278 per Dixon J. Significantly, their Honours referred to the following extract from Thomas v Mowbray at [7] where Gleeson CJ said in respect of the defence power:
…is not limited to defence against aggression from a foreign nation; it is not limited to external threats; it is not confined to waging war in a conventional sense of combat between forces of nations; and it is not limited to protection of bodies politic as distinct from the public, or sections of the public.
In addition to the observations of Gleeson CJ referred to above, which, by analogy, can be used in support of the border surveillance power as an aspect of security of the Commonwealth, there is always the "supreme power" in every State to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State, as discussed in Attorney-General (Canada) v Cain.
Contrary to Farrell’s submissions, there is no basis for the submission that “the Commonwealth” when used in the definition is to be confined to the body politic, since the definition refers to “within Australia or outside Australia”. The inference can readily be drawn that these words must be construed as the geographic borders of Australia, rather than as a reference to the body politic.
Whilst the Secretary, in its submissions, has called in aid of the interpretation of ‘security’ as contained in s 4 of the ASIO Act, which defines ‘security’ as the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several States and Territories from, inter alia various enumerated threats (see (a)), and includes the protection of Australia's territorial and border integrity from serious threats; (see (aa)), the Tribunal concludes that the definition of “security of the Commonwealth” contained in the FOI Act is adequate to include the operations of the border force in protecting Australia's borders from unauthorised persons entering Australia, without having to rely upon or refer to the definition contained in the ASIO Act. The definition contained in the ASIO Act has not been incorporated into the FOI Act. The fact that the definition of ‘security’ contained in the ASIO Act specifically encompasses the protection of Australia's territorial and border integrity from serious threats does not result in the conclusion that such activities do not readily fall within the definition of "security of the Commonwealth" contained in the FOI Act. Each act is directed to a different subject matter.
The security of the Commonwealth is not confined to external threats: such security also arises from internal threats and for many measures taken to subvert Australia’s national interest. The fact the definition contained in the ASIO Act of ‘security’ specifically refers to the protection of Australia's territorial and border integrity from serious threats does not result in the conclusion that such activities do not readily fall within the definition of "security of the Commonwealth" contained in the FOI Act. Having reached such conclusion, submissions by Farrell concerning the applicability of the definition in the ASIO Act as discussed in Staats and National Archives of Australia [2010] AATA 531, do not arise for consideration.
In summary, the Tribunal finds that the definition of “security of the Commonwealth” contained in the FOI Act is sufficiently comprehensive to include border patrol operations where those operations are designed to protect the integrity of Australia's borders. As has been referred to in Church of Scientology, “security” is a concept "with fluctuating content". The submissions of Farrell suggest that security should be confined only to activities of a warlike nature: such a limited interpretation cannot be sustained.
Would disclosure reasonably be expected to cause damage to the Commonwealth?
Operation of section 47E of the FOI Act
Section 47E of the FOI Act provides that a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under the FOI Act would, or could reasonably be expected to, have certain consequences as listed therein.
Farrell submits that disclosure of any document to which access is sought could not reasonably be expected to damage any of the matters mentioned in s 4(5)(a) of the FOI Act. In support of that submission Farrell refers to the fact that the watch officer logs relate to vessels of Australian Customs and not Defence vessels. Further, the vessels to which the logs relate to are no longer in service with Australian Customs. The disclosure would not compromise any function shown to be performed by Customs vessels which are relevant to the "security of the Commonwealth".
The test whether such requirement is satisfied has been established In the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Attorney-General's Department and Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltdv Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180 at 190, a matter involving the interpretation of s 43(1)(c)(ii), where their Honours said: -
In our opinion, in the present context, the words "could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information" were intended to receive their ordinary meaning. That is to say, they require a judgement to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous, to expect that those who would otherwise supply information of the prescribed kind to the Commonwealth or any agency would decline to do so if the document in question were disclosed under the Act. It is undesirable to attempt any paraphrase of these words. In particular, it is undesirable to consider the operation of the provision in terms of probabilities or possibilities or the like.... It is preferable to confine oneself to the language of the provision itself and to attempt to form an opinion, on the evidence, as to what can reasonably be expected to happen if disclosure occurs.
There is no reason not to apply such definition in the present circumstances. It requires the Tribunal to form an opinion whether disclosure would, in the present circumstances, undermine the security of the Commonwealth. This is the approach which the Tribunal will adopt when it comes to consider the documents for which exemption is sought. To make a finding, as Farrell seeks, without doing so would be contrary to principle.
Operation of section 47E(d)
The FOI Act contains a provision that a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under the FOI Act would, or could reasonably be expected to, have certain consequences one of which is set out in s 47E(d):
have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of an agency.
Farrell submits that disclosure of the documents, particularly of incursions into Indonesian waters during turnback operations, will "significantly enhance the public accountability of Operation Sovereign Borders on a matter of public interest without any prospect of affecting current operations which would not occur in Indonesian waters". Farrell also submits that the Tribunal, in assessing the impact on operations, will consider the legal requirement in respect of the conduct of turnback operations had regard to Division 73 of the Criminal CodeAct 1995 (Cth) and the sovereignty of Indonesia over its territorial waters and the limitations on rights of innocent passage under UNCLOS. Should the documents disclose or tend to disclose breaches of domestic international law, it is submitted that "in the conduct of turnback operations, their disclosure is likely to have a chilling effect on the continuation of unlawful operations", and that such effect would not damage but enhance the proper operations of the agency.
The guiding principle must be that referred to in Australian Iron and Steel. Such principle has been followed in this Tribunal: see Staats at [99]. The question therefore is whether it is satisfied that the disclosure of the records sought by Farrell "could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth" by reason of the fact that it discloses information that could be used by people smugglers in the future. Even though the information may relate to matters that have now passed, the question is whether the detail provided therein could be employed to the detriment of Australia's security.
The evidence of Major General Bottrell states that the information would provide vital information for use by those engaged in people smuggling in their planning of operations, because it would reveal aspects of operations designed to deter or prevent those operations, or otherwise compromise the operations in some way. This would be achieved by describing locations, identifying the vessels engaged in those operations, irrespective of whether they are Defence vessels or vessels of an Australian agency undertaking border patrols. Ultimately it will be necessary for the Tribunal to provide its ruling on those issues.
Public Interest
Farrell submits that the Secretary cannot establish the requisite damage if the documents are disclosed. Section 11B of the FOI act relevantly provides: –
(1)This section applies for the purposes of working out whether access to a conditionally exempt document would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest under subsection 11A(5).
…
(5)In working out whether access to the document would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest, an agency or Minister must have regard to any guidelines issued by the Information Commissioner for the purposes of this subsection 93A.
In Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal and Ors [2012] HCA 36; (2012) 246 CLR 379, the court said at [42]:
It is well-established that, when used in a statute, the expression “public interest” imports a discretionary value judgement to be made by reference to undefined factual matters. As Dixon J pointed out in Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning, when a discretionary power of this kind is given, the power is “neither arbitrary nor completely unlimited” but is “unconfined except in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable the Court to pronounce given reasons to be definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view.
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] Vic Rep 6; (1991) 1 VR 63, the Court held:
The “public interest” is a term embracing matters, among others, of standards of human conduct and of the functioning of government and government instrumentalities tacitly accepted and acknowledged to be for the good order of society and for the well being of its members. The interest is therefore the interest of the public as distinct from the interests of an individual or individuals.
See also AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton (2002) 58 NSWLR 464; David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holden's Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294; Wake v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 43.
In determining whether access to the documents or some of them should be permitted, the Tribunal will determine whether, having considered the above principles, in its discretion it should allow access to Farrell. The Tribunal will also be mindful of the Guidelines issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (“the Guidelines”) as contained in Part 6 – Conditional Exemptions.
Damage to the International Relations of the Commonwealth
Farrell submits there is no evidence to support the Secretary's submissions that disclosure of the documents would, or could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to the international relations of the Commonwealth as referred to in s 47B(a) of the FOI Act.
The Secretary refers to 5.30 of the Guidelines, which provide:
The phrase ‘international relations’ has been interpreted as meaning the ability of the Australian Government to maintain good working relations with other governments and international organisations and to protect the flow of confidential information between them. The exemption is not confined to relations at the formal diplomatic or ministerial level. It also covers relations between governments and agencies. (Footnotes omitted).
Farrell submits that the Indonesian government disapproves of the turnback policy, and relies upon an extract from The Age newspaper dated 27 September 2013 in support of such contention. The Secretary acknowledges that the Tribunal may be informed by such article and that the claim for exemption under s 33 of the FOI Act should be considered accordingly.
The Tribunal will consider the documents mindful of the submissions of the parties. But from Farrell’s own article, the disapproval of Indonesia with respect to turnback operations appears undisputed.
Were the methods involved lawful?
Farrell submits that the Secretary must prove that the methods or procedures involved in the turnbacks disclosed by documents were lawful; and that the turnbacks prevented breaches or evasions of Australian domestic law which would otherwise have occurred. Such submission is predicated upon the text of s 37(2) of the FOI Act, which relevantly provides:
A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or could reasonably be expected to:
…
(b)disclose lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law the disclosures of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures;…
Mr Farrell relies upon an affidavit of his solicitor, Mr Thomas Pilseniks sworn on 8 August 2016. Mr Pilseniks states that he accessed a website with respect to the tracking of vessels known as "FleetMon". He has also annexed photographs of patrol vessels and their accompanying specifications.
Mr Farrell also relies upon extracts from various newspapers, including:
·that of The Guardian, dated 17 April 2014 (written by Mr Farrell) which refers to incursions into Indonesian waters by a vessel known as the Ocean Protector in December 2013 and January 2014;
·an article of the Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, ‘Fact Sheet – Turning Back Boats’, published by the University of New South Wales, which refers to the purchase of lifeboats used for the purpose of transporting asylum seekers to a tow back place located just outside Indonesian waters;
·a compilation entitled “Historical Search and Rescue Incidents in Operation Sovereign Borders”, available from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s website;
·a compilation entitled “Illegal Entry Vessel Arrivals – 19 September to 17 October 2014”, available from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s website;
·fact sheets relating to ACB vessels;
·a redacted publication of the Department of Defence entitled “Joint Review of Operation Sovereign Borders Vessel Positioning”; and
·a media release concerning the rescue of six endangered turtles by an ACB vessel and a media release dated 1 March 2016 concerning the placement of the MV Ocean Protector.
Also included in the exhibit tendered by Mr Farrell is an opening statement by Mr Michael Pezzullo, Chief Executive Officer of Australian Customs and Border Protection Service dated 21 March 2014. It appears that such statement was provided to a Senate Standing Committee which was conducting an enquiry into a breach of Indonesian territorial waters. It is not apparent from such document that any admission was made that there was a deliberate incursion into Indonesian waters. In fact, the statement refers to the fact that there were inadvertent incursions resulting from an incorrect calculation of the boundaries of Indonesian waters rather than as a deliberate action or navigational error.
Mr Farrell has provided the Tribunal with various documents to assist in the interpretation of the FOI Act, including a Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on the Freedom of Information Bill 1978, Chapter 27; the Explanatory Memorandum to the Freedom of Information Bill 1981, a decision of the High Court of Australia in Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2006) 225 CLR 130 and a compilation of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).
Upon the basis of the material provided, Mr Farrell seeks a finding that the conduct of ACBPS in its incursions into Indonesian waters was unlawful. Specifically, it is claimed that there has been “an offence of organising entry into the land mass of Indonesia, and that accordingly, the exemption provided under s 37(2) of the FOI Act is not available to the Secretary”. At hearing, this submission was put as follows:
DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Well, let’s just think about it a minute. What you’re asking the tribunal to do is to make a finding of fact that the Commonwealth has engaged in unlawful conduct.
MR BRENNAN: Yes.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Is that so?
MR BRENNAN: Yes.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Right. Now, what makes it unlawful?
MR BRENNAN: That the evidence shows that there is an organised system whereby lifeboats are put on some Australian vessel.
Finding: Allegation of unlawfulness
Section 37(2) of the FOI Act does not refer to unlawful conduct generally: it is confined to the question of whether the document relates to “lawful methods” involved in the prevention, detection, investigation or dealing with matters relating to breaches of the law. The documents sought indirectly relate to the prevention of breaches of the law in that the vessels concerned were involved in attempts to prevent illegal entry into Australia. However they do not directly deal with the subject matter to which s 37(2) is directed, namely the disclosure of lawful methods or procedures for preventing or detecting or investigating the detection, or prevention or investigation of such breaches. Rather, the records relate to ship movements.
But there are further reasons why this Tribunal cannot make a finding of unlawfulness. Firstly, there is no material from which the Tribunal could safely conclude that the operations were unlawful because incursions took place in Indonesian waters. At the highest, the evidence establishes inadvertent incursions due to errors unrelated to the navigation of the vessel or vessels concerned. Such conclusion falls well short of a finding that because of such incursions, the conduct of such vessels was unlawful. Secondly, to make a finding of fact, as sought by Mr Farrell, of unlawfulness would require the Tribunal to embark upon a major enquiry necessitating the testimony of oral witnesses, cross examination of those witnesses and submissions. The extracts from articles from various sources and groups is clearly insufficient to make a finding of the kind sought, which could have far reaching consequences, and could even be used in findings of criminal conduct.
That is not the purpose for which the FOI Act was enacted. The objects of such act are to facilitate access to documentation held by the Commonwealth and its agencies: it is not the intent of the FOI Act that it should operate so as to provide a forum of fact-finding more appropriate to a court of law. If Mr Farrell seeks a declaration of invalidity by the Secretary or of his Department, he is at liberty to seek declaratory relief to that effect in a court; see Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd.
Further, the Maritime Powers Act, s 16(1), authorises operations, including turnback operations. An authorising officer may authorise the use of maritime powers with regard to a vessel (or installation, protected land area or isolated person) if such officer suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the vessel bracket or other facility is involved in a contravention of an Australian law: see s 17(1). Such actions would include a contravention of the Migration Act including a non-citizen who travels to Australia without a current visa (see s 42); and carriage of non-citizens to Australia without documentation (s 229); and of s 233A (offence of people smuggling). The exercise of powers under the Maritime Powers Act includes the boarding of a vessel (s 52(1)); requiring a vessel to stop or manoeuvre or to adopt a specified course or speed or to maintain a specified course or speed (s 54(1)); to detain a vessel (s 69(1)); to detain a person on a detained vessel: see s 72(4), including to a place outside Australia: s 72(4). Further, s 75 excludes any action for civil or criminal liability in respect of the detention or restraint of a person resulting from the operation of Division 8 of the Act.
It should also be observed that s 107 of the Maritime Powers Act absolves any authorising officer, maritime officer, person assisting or other person acting under the direction authority of the maritime officer from liability, whether civil or criminal.
Mr Farrell submits that such powers do not absolve conduct which occurred prior to the introduction of the Maritime Powers Act. This submission overlooks the immunities provided to officers undertaking operations under the Migration Act, as contained in the (then) ss 245B and 245F. Section 245F(9B) provided that no proceedings, whether civil or criminal, could be instituted in respect of the operations conducted under sub-s (9A) against the Commonwealth, or an officer where the operations were conducted in good faith and no greater force was used than was authorised under sub-s (10).
Subsections 245F(9A) and (9B) together with similar amendments to the Customs Act1901 (Cth) (see s 185(3AB)) were introduced by the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001. The Explanatory Memorandum relating to such amendment makes it plain that the provisions were enacted in response to increasing threats to Australian borders by people smugglers.
It can therefore be concluded that immunities existed prior to the Maritime Powers Act which had the effect of absolving any conduct by officials carried out in relation to people smuggling operations. Such immunities applied irrespective of whether such persons were members of the Defence Force, or civilians engaged by a Government agency.
The application before the Tribunal concerns the current impact upon an agency if disclosed. This is clear from the words of s 37(2)(b) which refers to the disclosure which “would, or could reasonably be expected to… disclose lawful methods…” Similar wording is used in s 47E(d). The section addresses the current and future effect, not the past effect, of any access or disclosure. Since there is no question that the Maritime Powers Act authorises such conduct (this issue having been determined by the High Court in CPFC), the operations are, for the purpose of considering the application of the FOI Act, to be treated as lawful, even if, contrary to the Tribunal’s findings, the actions preceding the introduction of the Act, were unlawful. It follows that the submissions of Farrell that the Criminal Code has operation, must be rejected.
Inspection of documents for which exemption is claimed
In view of the claims made by the Secretary relating to the exemptions, an application was made by the Secretary that the Tribunal order, pursuant to s 35(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) that part of the hearing take place in private. Because of the sensitive nature claimed as justifying the exemptions, the Tribunal considered it appropriate to make such order and to direct that the private session occur following the cross examination by Counsel for Mr Farrell of Major General Bottrell.
Following the completion of the public examination of Major General Bottrell, the Tribunal commenced the closed session. During the course of the closed session, Major General Bottrell produced the documents for which exemption is claimed and explained, document by document, the reason for the exemption.
Tribunal's finding
As a result of the Tribunal's inspection and analysis of the 15 documents, and of the reasons provided by the Secretary in support of the claim for exemption, the Tribunal is satisfied of the following:
(i)that the documents, if disclosed, would, or could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth as referred to in s 33(a)(i) of the FOI Act; and further concludes that access to such documents would, or could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the international relations of the Commonwealth as provided by s 33(a)(iii) of the FOI Act. Such conclusion is reached upon the material which could be used by people smugglers to subvert or otherwise render useless the methods adopted by ACBPS to prevent people smuggling operations and thereby render vulnerable the integrity of the Australian Borders against the influx of illegal entrants. Insofar as Australia’s international relations are concerned, there is material which shows that Indonesia does not approve of turnback operations. The disclosure of material could prejudice such relations by revealing the places at which turnback operations occur and the methods used in such operations. Because some facts contained in the documents may have become public knowledge does not justify release of the whole document. Nor is it relevant that the documents relate to the operations of a Commonwealth agency, rather than the Defence Force.
(ii)that certain of those documents, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to disclose lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting breaches or evasions of the law, the disclosure of which would be reasonably likely to prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures, thereby compromising the integrity of Australia’s borders, and are exempt from production pursuant to s 37(2)(b);
(iii)that in addition to the foregoing, all documents are conditionally exempt on the basis that they could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of a Commonwealth agency and that disclosure of the documents would have that effect: see s 47E(d) of the FOI Act. The phrase “substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of an agency” has been the subject of consideration in Diamond and Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority [2014] AATA 707 at [114]–[120]. It is not in the public interest that access be granted to documents 1 to 14, as referred to in s 11A of the FOI Act. The documents comprise sensitive documents relating to maritime operations for the protection of Australia’s national borders, and thereby, the interests of the security of the Commonwealth, which is the public interest. As referred to, Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith, the public interest must be contrasted with the interest of an individual, or individuals, which are separate to the public interest. The public interest in this instance is to be recognised, and the private interest subverted to it. Further, the word “substantial” means more than trivial or minimal: see Tillman’s Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry’s Employees Union (1979) 42 FLR 331. Further, some of the documents, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the international relations between the Commonwealth and another State, namely Indonesia: see s 33(a)(iii) of the FOI Act.
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal finds that:
(a)In relation to Documents 1-14, the decision of the Australian Information Commissioner dated 7 July 2015, as amended by Order of the Tribunal made under s 26 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 on 14 April 2016, is affirmed.
(b)In relation to Document 15, the decision of the Australian Information Commissioner dated 7 July 2015, as amended by Order of the Tribunal made under s 26 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 on 14 April 2016, is varied. The Tribunal finds that the whole of the document is exempt under ss 33 and 47E of the FOI Act, subject to the abovementioned Order dated 14 April 2016.
I certify that the preceding 85 (eighty- five) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of The Hon. Dennis Cowdroy OAM QC, Deputy President ..................................[sgd].........................................
Associate
Dated 31 March 2017
Date(s) of hearing 8 & 9 August, 29 November 2016 Date final submissions received 19 December 2016 Counsel for the Applicant Mr J Davidson Solicitors for the Applicant
Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Respondent Mr T Brennan Solicitors for the Respondent SBA Lawyers
0
18
0