Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

TREVOR KINGSLEY FERDINANDS  APPELLANT

AND

COMMISSIONER FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT  RESPONDENT

Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment [2006] HCA 5

2 March 2006
A15/2005

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia

Representation:

S C Churches with S D Ower for the appellant (instructed by Iles Selley Lawyers)

C J Kourakis QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia with C A Stevens for the respondent (instructed by Crown Solicitor's Office South Australia)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ.   The Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA)[1] ("the IER Act") provided a procedure whereby certain employees, including public employees, who were dismissed could seek, from the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia, a determination that the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, and an order for re-employment.

    [1]This Act is now known as the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA), see Industrial Law Reform (Fair Work) Act 2005 (SA), s 4.

  2. The Police Act 1998 (SA) ("the Police Act") established a scheme for the control and management of South Australia Police which included provision for termination of the appointment of police officers by the Police Commissioner in certain circumstances. The appellant was convicted of an offence of assault. His appointment was terminated by the Police Commissioner. He applied to the Industrial Relations Commission complaining of harsh, unjust or unreasonable dismissal.

  3. The Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court held that the Industrial Relations Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain the application.  The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, by majority, agreed[2]. Stated in broad terms, it was held that the legislative scheme relating to appointment, and termination of appointment, of police officers under the Police Act was not subject to review under the IER Act. Stated more precisely, it was held that the Police Act, in its application to persons in the position of the appellant, by necessary implication repealed the IER Act[3].

    [2]Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2004) 233 LSJS 110.

    [3]Goodwin v Phillips (1908) 7 CLR 1; Butler v Attorney-General(Vict) (1961) 106 CLR 268.

  4. It was not suggested that there is repugnancy between the two State statutes, in the sense that they create conflicting commands, which cannot both be obeyed, or produce legal rights or obligations which cannot be reconciled; although the implications of a potential order under the IER Act for re-employment of a police officer were not fully explored. Rather, the contention, which was upheld in the South Australian courts, was that there is such contrariety in the two legislative schemes that, by necessary implication, the Police Act excluded the operation of the IER Act in its application to termination of the appointment of a person in the position of the appellant. The problem is one of statutory…

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Details
Case
[2006] HCA 5
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Trevor Ferdinands against the Commissioner for Public Employment concerning the termination of his appointment as a member of the South Australia Police. Mr Ferdinands had been convicted of assault, leading to the termination of his employment. He sought relief from the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia on the grounds that his dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable, as provided for under the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA). The central dispute revolved around whether the Police Act 1998 (SA), which empowered the Police Commissioner to terminate appointments, implicitly repealed or excluded the operation of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA) in relation to police officers.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Police Act 1998 (SA) impliedly repealed the provisions of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA) that allowed for relief against harsh, unjust, or unreasonable dismissal, thereby depriving the Industrial Relations Commission of jurisdiction. The Court also considered whether the interpretation of the statutes should be guided by the beneficial character of the provisions for unfair dismissal and the potential relevance of an incorporated international convention.

The High Court reasoned that the two Acts could operate concurrently and that there was no implied repeal. The Court emphasised that in the absence of express legislative intent to exclude police officers from the protections of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA), and given the beneficial nature of such provisions, the more appropriate interpretation was that they could coexist. The Court noted that the South Australian Parliament had not expressly exempted police members from the operation of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA), and that such an exemption would have been readily available if intended. The Court also considered that an interpretation favouring the availability of remedies under the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA) would give effect to the purpose of the South Australian Parliament in ensuring a substantial review of dismissals.

The appeal was allowed with costs. The orders of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia to be determined according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the Full Court in the present case, the judges in the majority concluded that the Police Act 1998 (SA) ("the Police Act"), empowering the Commissioner of South Australia Police to terminate the appointment of a member of the Force, excluded the operation of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA) ("the Industrial Act"), which affords relief to employees against "harsh, unjust or unreasonable"[90] dismissal. The dissenting judge concluded that the two enactments could operate together. Now, by special leave, the question comes before this Court. [90]Industrial Act, s 108(1). The Industrial Act was renamed the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) by the Industrial Law Reform (Fair Work) Act 2005 (SA), the relevant provisions of which commenced on 16 May 2005. The amending Act preserved the appellant's rights in relation to the Act as it stood at the relevant times. The facts and issues The facts:Before 22 November 2001, Mr Trevor Ferdinands ("the appellant") was a police officer serving with the South Australia Police. In December 1999, at the Adelaide City Watch House, he was involved in an incident that led to his being charged with an offence of assault contrary to s 39 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)[91]. The appellant was found guilty of the offence and convicted. The Police Commissioner terminated the appellant's appointment as a member of the South Australia Police[92]. [91](2004) 233 LSJS 110 at 120 [54].[92]Pursuant to s 40 of the Police Act. The appellant initiated an appeal against his conviction to the Supreme Court of South Australia[93]. This was not pursued. He also initiated proceedings in the District Court of South Australia to seek judicial review of his termination[94]. However, these proceedings were rejected for want of jurisdiction, a decision that the appellant does not now contest. [93]See reasons of South Australian Industrial Relations Court: Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment [2003] SAIRC 19 at [4].[94]Pursuant to the Police (Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings) Act 1985 (SA), s 46(2). The appellant then commenced proceedings in the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia ("the Commission") claiming relief pursuant to s 106 of the Industrial Act. The relief was sought on the basis that his dismissal from the Police was "harsh, unjust and unreasonable". Pursuant to s 214(1) of the Industrial Act, the Commission, at the request of both parties, referred two questions to the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia ("the Industrial Relations Court")[95]. The first was whether the Commission could extend the time within which the appellant could apply for the relief that he had sought under the Industrial Act. The second question, assuming the answer to the first to be in the affirmative, was whether the Commission was deprived of jurisdiction to determine the appellant's application because the Police Act, and associated police legislation, operated to the exclusion of s 106 of the Industrial Act, or because the appellant's failed application to the District Court had estopped him from claiming the remedy that he later sought under the Industrial Act[96].[95][2003] SAIRC 19 at [1].[96]Pursuant to s 106(2) of the Industrial Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ (dissent) KIRBY J (dissent) CALLINAN J (dissent)
It follows that the normal rule for the construction of legislation upholding the implementation of an international treaty favours the interpretation advanced by the appellant[153]. This Court should uphold that interpretation. It should do so because it is the only way to give effect to the Convention in this case as the Parliament indicated was its purpose and objective.[153]Cf Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 492 [29]. Conclusion and orders The result is that, whilst, as in virtually every case, in default of express provision clarifying the intersection, there are arguments both ways, the preferable interpretation of the interaction of the Police Act and the Industrial Act is that submitted for the appellant. Each Act is important. The two Acts can, as a matter of practicality, operate together. Adopting this course conforms to the regular and recent practice of this Court in similar cases. It gives effect to the language of both Acts, according to their terms and operating in their respective spheres. It upholds an important and beneficial provision enacted by the South Australian Parliament to repair instances of unfair dismissal and to remedy shortcomings of common law remedies. Instances of unfair dismissal are inherent, as possibilities, in an uncontrolled interpretation of the Police Act. The appellant's interpretation also fulfils the objective of the South Australian Parliament to ensure the availability of a substantial review of the justification of a termination of employment in the case of police members that would not otherwise be achieved on the respondent's argument. Express exemptions of such police members would have been readily available but were not taken. This Court should not imply an exemption from the operation of the Industrial Act in this case where the State Parliament has refrained from expressly so providing. The appeal should be allowed with costs. Orders 2 and 3 of the orders of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia should be set aside. In place of those orders, the appellant's application for leave to appeal to the Full Court should be granted and the appeal to that Court should be allowed with costs. The matter should be remitted to the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia to be determined according to law. Issue This appeal raises a question whether legislation enacted with respect to the establishment and administration of the Police Force of South Australia should be read as subject, so far as the termination of members of the Police Force is concerned, to industrial legislation of general application throughout the State. Facts and earlier proceedings The appellant was a police constable in the South Australian Police Force. On 27 March 2001 he was convicted of assault in the Adelaide Magistrates Court. He filed, but did not pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia against his conviction. The Commissioner of Police terminated his service in the Police Force on 22 November 2001 as a result of it. He unsuccessfully sought to have the District Court of South Australia review the termination.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ,

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