HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJTREVOR KINGSLEY FERDINANDS APPELLANT
AND
COMMISSIONER FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RESPONDENT
Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment [2006] HCA 5
2 March 2006
A15/2005ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia
Representation:
S C Churches with S D Ower for the appellant (instructed by Iles Selley Lawyers)
C J Kourakis QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia with C A Stevens for the respondent (instructed by Crown Solicitor's Office South Australia)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ. The Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA)[1] ("the IER Act") provided a procedure whereby certain employees, including public employees, who were dismissed could seek, from the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia, a determination that the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, and an order for re-employment.
[1]This Act is now known as the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA), see Industrial Law Reform (Fair Work) Act 2005 (SA), s 4.
The Police Act 1998 (SA) ("the Police Act") established a scheme for the control and management of South Australia Police which included provision for termination of the appointment of police officers by the Police Commissioner in certain circumstances. The appellant was convicted of an offence of assault. His appointment was terminated by the Police Commissioner. He applied to the Industrial Relations Commission complaining of harsh, unjust or unreasonable dismissal.
The Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court held that the Industrial Relations Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, by majority, agreed[2]. Stated in broad terms, it was held that the legislative scheme relating to appointment, and termination of appointment, of police officers under the Police Act was not subject to review under the IER Act. Stated more precisely, it was held that the Police Act, in its application to persons in the position of the appellant, by necessary implication repealed the IER Act[3].
[2]Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2004) 233 LSJS 110.
[3]Goodwin v Phillips (1908) 7 CLR 1; Butler v Attorney-General(Vict) (1961) 106 CLR 268.
It was not suggested that there is repugnancy between the two State statutes, in the sense that they create conflicting commands, which cannot both be obeyed, or produce legal rights or obligations which cannot be reconciled; although the implications of a potential order under the IER Act for re-employment of a police officer were not fully explored. Rather, the contention, which was upheld in the South Australian courts, was that there is such contrariety in the two legislative schemes that, by necessary implication, the Police Act excluded the operation of the IER Act in its application to termination of the appointment of a person in the position of the appellant. The problem is one of statutory…
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- Case
- [2006] HCA 5
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Police Act 1998 (SA) impliedly repealed the provisions of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA) that allowed for relief against harsh, unjust, or unreasonable dismissal, thereby depriving the Industrial Relations Commission of jurisdiction. The Court also considered whether the interpretation of the statutes should be guided by the beneficial character of the provisions for unfair dismissal and the potential relevance of an incorporated international convention.
The High Court reasoned that the two Acts could operate concurrently and that there was no implied repeal. The Court emphasised that in the absence of express legislative intent to exclude police officers from the protections of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA), and given the beneficial nature of such provisions, the more appropriate interpretation was that they could coexist. The Court noted that the South Australian Parliament had not expressly exempted police members from the operation of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA), and that such an exemption would have been readily available if intended. The Court also considered that an interpretation favouring the availability of remedies under the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA) would give effect to the purpose of the South Australian Parliament in ensuring a substantial review of dismissals.
The appeal was allowed with costs. The orders of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia to be determined according to law.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ,
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