Criminal Law—Trial—Direction to jury violating accused's right to silence—Whether substantial miscarriage of justice—Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.), s. 568(1).
Orders
Application for special leave to appeal against conviction on count 14 granted.
Appeal allowed.
Set aside the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria dismissing the applicant's appeal against conviction in so far as it relates to count 14. In lieu thereof, order that the appeal to that Court be allowed in relation to count 14, the applicant's conviction on count 14 be quashed, and a new trial on that count be held.
Decisions
MASON CJ, BRENNAN AND TOOHEY JJ This is an application for special leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Victoria (Phillips CJ, Brooking and Marks JJ) whereby that Court refused to quash certain convictions. The applicant had been charged with a number of sexual offences involving young people. In relation to three of the counts, which alleged indecent assaults on Jennifer Behnk, Franco Palmieri and Rocco Valotta, the applicant, in his interviews with police, exercised his right to silence and declined to answer questions relating to the alleged offences. In the trial judge's charge to the jury, the trial judge made reference to the applicant's exercise of his right to silence in a way conceded by the Crown to violate the principles laid down by this Court in Petty v. The Queen ((1) (1991) 173 CLR 95.). On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the trial judge's direction was erroneous. However, the Court exercised its discretion under s.568(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.) and held that, as there had been no miscarriage of justice, the applicant's convictions should not be quashed.
2. During the hearing of the application in this Court, the Court refused special leave to appeal against the conviction relating to the offences against Behnk and Valotta. Thus, the only outstanding question concerns the conviction in relation to the offence concerning Palmieri. In so refusing special leave in relation to Behnk and Valotta, the Court disposed of the question whether the trial judge's error in relation to Palmieri infected the other counts on which the applicant was convicted. However, given the view we take of this case in so far as it relates to the conviction for offences involving Palmieri, it is desirable to deal with the issue of infection of other counts in these reasons.
The facts
3. The applicant was a Catholic priest and the founder and director of an organization called the Peaceful Hand Youth Foundation. That Foundation organized various activities for young people in the applicant's parish and at a property at Lancefield known as "Karaglen". One of the principal activities of the Foundation was the Peaceful Hand Karate School, of which the applicant was the sensei or master.…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Glennon v The Queen [1994] HCA 7
Case
[1994] HCA 7
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Glennon, against his conviction for armed robbery. The applicant had been convicted in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and subsequently appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, which dismissed his appeal. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence and the fairness of the trial process.
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of a confession made by the applicant to police. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the confession was voluntary and whether its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Further, the court examined whether the trial judge had adequately directed the jury on the issue of reasonable doubt and the onus of proof.
The majority of the High Court held that the confession was admissible. They applied the principles established in *R v Swaffield* and *The Queen v Pfitzner*, which require a confession to be voluntary and not obtained by unfair means. The court found that the applicant had been properly cautioned and that there was no evidence of coercion or inducement. Regarding the jury directions, the court affirmed the established legal principles concerning the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, finding that the directions given, when read as a whole, were sufficient.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the applicant's conviction.